




FROM DAR ES SALAAM TO

BONGOLAND

URBAN MUTATIONS IN TANZANIA

COORDINATED BY BERNARD CALAS

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FROM DAR ES SALAAM TO BONGOLAND

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URAFIKI COLLECTION
Coordinated by Bernard Calas

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The French Institute for Research in Africa (Institut français de recherche en Afrique - IFRA), established in 1980 in Nairobi (Kenya), is an organ of research and cooperation in human and social sciences, supported by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its mission is to sustain and promote scientific and academic work on eastern Africa.

Initially going by the name CREDU - centre de recherche, d'échanges et de documentation universitaire (Centre for research, exchange and academic documentation) the institute changed its name in 1992. Originally based in Nairobi (IFRA-Nairobi), it gradually extended its network. The Ibadan office was set up in 1990 and covers western Africa, while Institut français d'Afrique du Sud (IFAS-Research), created in 1995, covers southern Africa.

Ifra takes part in the definition and managing of research programmes in human and social sciences, in partnership with other universities and centres of research in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Within these programmes, the institute offers scholarships and research grants in addition to supporting researchers working in its area of specialization. IFRA houses a specialised library and publishes its research results in the quarterly journal – IFRA, Les Cahiers d'Afrique de l'Est – or in association with French and African publishers.

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Dedicated to the memory of
Jean Hélène, Radio France Internationale journalist
Assassinated on 21 October 2003, at Abidjan,
Passionate observer of the mutations of Black Africa

Form as a pretext for investigating urban changes

Bernard Calas

This collection of research articles results from a conjunction between personal concerns stemming from the conclusions of my thesis (Calas, 1998) and the aspirations of Bernard Charlery de La Masselière, the director of IFRA,¹ for the French Institute for Research in Africa.

The conclusions of my research on Kampala revealed links between Ganda culture and urbanisation processes. The rediscovery of the cultural basis of urbanisation processes on the one hand and the sub-regional visibility of Swahili culture on the other orientated me towards the coast for an in-depth study of these links. Moreover, as I also wanted to observe the dynamics of East Africa's spatial structuring, based on the assertion that these dynamics were partly stimulated by influx polarization of the Indian Ocean's two greatest harbours, I decided to work in Mombasa or in Dar es Salaam. What part does Swahili culture and the role of the harbour play in urbanisation processes?

Having observed that the most recent research on Dar es Salaam dated back to 1970 (Sutton, 1970), Bernard Charlery de La Masselière then called for multidisciplinary research to be done on the subject. What was new in Dar es Salaam since the sixties? What mutations had taken place since then? How was one to evaluate the impact on the city of the opposing policies which Tanzania had followed since Independence: the socialist policies of *Ujamaa* between 1967 and 1985 and the liberal policies of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) from 1986 onwards? Bernard Charlery de La Masselière asked me to coordinate this study along with Ariel Crozon, a political pundit specializing in the Swahili world, one of IFRA's research scholars at the time.

The central aim of this book is thus to evaluate urban mutations in the course of the last thirty years. Its title attempts to account for these mutations by emphasizing the coexistence of two toponyms for a single space: the one official and dating back more than a hundred years, the other recent and chosen by the people; the one imposed by the power of the Sultan, the other disseminated by a multitude of energetic, young neo-urban migrants, post-modern Africans who remind you of Scapino or Rastignac; the one Arabic, the other that is called *Sheng* (slang resulting from the mixture of Swahili and English) in Kenya but not in Tanzania, a sign of the expanding world economy enclosing the city, from the west Indian Ocean to the outside world,

1 Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique

the sign of an emerging 'globality'. The one emphasizes harbour infrastructures and the other, urban expanse. The one sounds like a project, the other like a distressing, disenchanted but paradoxically voluntarist diagnosis. The former entrusts the city to God for protection, expressing the community of *Umma* and its confidence in the future, while the latter maintains that the post-modern individual is alone and has difficulty surviving in a cruel world: from collective faith to individual cunning, from believer to individual, from enduring confidence to future uncertainty, from monarchic subjection to a multi-party system, like a summary of the historical path of this city in Africa on the shores of the Indian Ocean.

The first question we asked ourselves was whether a monograph was justified when Philippe Gervais-Lambony's research (amongst others) clearly highlighted the fertile ground of comparison (1994 and 2003). For a start, the established fertile ground of comparison does not automatically invalidate that of the monograph. Confronting the two approaches is not good epistemological tactics. Indeed, "in the course of geographical research, monographs constitute fundamental moments²" (Brunet, Ferras & Théry, 1992) because comparisons feed on distinctive studies. Moreover, it may be suggested that all descriptions are inevitably comparative seeing as, by means of the concepts, notions, references and instruments mustered, a theoretical yardstick is used, a model from which point of view the observed object is put into perspective and thus compared. No approach is innocent; researchers screen reality according to pre-constructions that put all monographic descriptions into comparative perspective. Lastly, the present research on Dar es Salaam is justified by the perspective of a broader view of urbanistic modes and by the contours of African urbanity. It seemed equally interesting for us to publish the results of this investigation, despite its idiographic nature.

The next question was which main theme to follow in order to answer the two initial questions. We began with a restricted definition of a city, considered firstly as form: a dense concretion of built-up volumes separated by public spaces, housing a dense agglomeration of interacting men and women. We needed to think about the link between this materiality, this form, both constructed décor and urban choreography, Swahili culture and political evolution. It appeared from this question that we had to reflect on the meaning of urban form. Taking our cue from the trend for territory paradigms, we hoped that the territorial approach would constitute an epistemological meeting-point for interdisciplinary interests, and set out with the idea that territories gave meaning to urban materiality (Le Berre, 1995; Roncayolo, 1990; De Méo *et al.*, 1998). We thus decided to investigate territorialisations at work in Dar es Salaam in an attempt to evaluate the respective roles of Swahili culture and socialist and liberal policies on urban mutations. Seeing as all spatial practices involve appropriation, we thought they would of necessity

2 [...] la monographie est un moment nécessaire de la recherche géographique.

sustain territories that would give meaning to urban materiality. By definition, the spaces constructed by urban practices had to be limited, situated in the centre, appropriated and managed by homogeneous, highly integrated communities: territories which would provide us with the key to the meaning of urban forms. We implicitly assumed that behind the façade of a relatively homogeneous city such as Dar es Salaam, according to description (O'Connor 1983; Simon 1992), we would discover a fragmented city.

One of the central ideas of this approach is that territorialisations only come about when people frequent certain places and spaces and invest in them. Therefore, the city had to be observed from the point of view of these concrete places and spaces, selected on the grounds of a time-budget analysis of certain Dar es Salaam households. The analysis indicated the importance of certain activities or preoccupations, using particular places in the life of the city's inhabitants as a starting point. Places of worship, care centres, schools and customer catchment areas, as well as public taps, *daladala* stops and accommodation constituted as many localized observation posts of urban practices and thus of integration or fragmentation processes and of territorialisation. It was thus decided to work around these places and to discern in what way the fact of being frequented was indicative of territorialisation, and this from a double perspective: that of the users and of the amenities. However, taking these places into consideration led us to approach the question of networks and services, their management as well as the geographical meaning of the policies applied to them. This led to a complication of the territorial question, because the proximity of the area and the amenities and establishment systems had to be taken into account, as well as how the networks from which they emerged interlocked. The initial idea was thus to highlight the internal territorialisation processes and emphasize the fragmentation processes.

At the same time, in the tradition of the research done by Stren & White (1989) and by Lebris (1989), we considered Dar es Salaam to be a city in crisis. We thought that the latter was (at least partially) shaping these territorialisation modes and, also, that it would be possible to give an account of those mutations which had occurred between 1970 and 2000. The research thus had to document this urban crisis, notably by means of questions pertaining to access to housing, the supply of water and access to transport. Our theory was that this crisis led to processes verging on urban secession, comparable to those of territorialisation.

Our approach thus had to consider the singularity of the space under observation as well as its historicity, all the more because we were reflecting on the reorientation which Swahili culture and the Tanzanian trajectory had given to so-called general urban dynamics. The importance of history in understanding the present dynamics required that four key features relating to Dar es Salaam's identity be taken into account:

- Its integration into Swahili civilisation, characterised by the development, spanning some ten centuries, of an Arab system of reference; by Islam, urbanity, the significance of maritime trade and by a remarkable ability to incorporate novelties, especially immigrants, without losing its foundations. The resilience of such a matrix and such cultural form lies at the centre of this analysis;
- The importance of the colonial junction, first the Germans and then the English;
- The singularity of the post-colonial trajectory, marked by the alternation of *Ujamaa* and the studious application of the SAP. Certain European intellectuals found the Tanzanian state's singular trajectory so exciting and later so depressing that a return trip to the *Mwalimu's* country became a necessity, all the more so as this trajectory is original as well as exemplary of the course followed by Africa south of the Sahara. During the first period (1964-1985), within a development framework proclaiming itself to emanate from "African Socialism", the political, economic and social primacy of agriculture and of the rural world was declared over the secondary and tertiary sectors and the urban world. In this regard, the 1967 Arusha Declaration – the distinctly anti-urban bias of which is recalled by a number of authors included in this volume – is very clear. During the second period, which began in 1985 with the resignation of *Baba Wa Taifa* Nyerere, a structural adjustment of markedly liberal inspiration was imposed on Tanzania. Were urban dynamics modified by the succession of these two opposing orientations? and
- Its functional status, since Dar es Salaam is Tanzania's economic and cultural capital as well as the harbour of a vast hinterland (fig. 1).


How do these elements inter-react in the construction of the present-day city, and more particularly, how does one compel, influence, modify, localize and harness the fragmentation and territorialisation processes? How do the dialectics of integration and fragmentation operate in Dar es Salaam? How, within these dialectics, are the effects of Swahili civilisation articulated (the urban crisis, especially the networks crisis, as well as the political alternation of Socialism and Liberalism)? All in all, the central question of this project was to discover to what extent territorialisation processes result in urban fragmentation, our hypothesis being that they are correlated to Swahili and Tanzanian political and cultural identities. Having followed the territories' trail without actually delineating the theoretical contours beforehand (but adopting an extensive meaning of the notion), we proceeded to investigate the pursuit of an epistemological illusion, which does not mean that we came back empty-handed. Having wandered through the landscape, the object of which is to familiarize oneself with Dar es Salaam's geography and to define its forms, three directions will be explored, each of which will contribute to giving meaning to an urban materiality revealed by the canons of academic

observation. The meaning of what has been constructed lies in the logic of its elaboration, firstly in its past and present formation, and then in the logic of its use, in the scale of houses and neighbourhoods on the one hand and in the networks innervating this agglomeration on the other. It also lies in the functional and cultural horizons opening up before it and, lastly, in its ability to mesmerize observers.

For Frank Raimbault and Marie-Ange Goux, the emphasis is on morphogenesis: the former dissects events surrounding the German importation and Swahili domestication of European-type land rights; the latter emphasizes the extent to which the century was permanently marked by policies relating to housing. In that sense, forms are more than territories: they become histories of the land and constitute a legacy that is necessarily anachronistic but alive, because it is still occupied and practised.

Adrienne Polomack concerns herself with residence-associated localized practices; her starting point is the premise that access to housing and the practices linked to that particular space constitute the pivots of an appropriation of the land, the walls, the neighbourhood and the city. In this sense, the housing question is central to any observer of potential territories and their meaning.

Figure 1: Dar es Salaam, an East African gateway



Thanks to her mastery of the Swahili language and her involvement with Tanzania which dates back more than ten years, Adrienne Polomack's answer is not only balanced, but also flawlessly firm, with the result that her text goes beyond idiography and touches on the links between urbanity, territoriality and acculturation. She shows how, on the one hand, it is difficult to conclude that territorialisation exists and how, on the other, the culture, which is supposed to give meaning to these forms, is partially informed and deformed by the forms themselves and by the compelling practices which result from them.

The question posed within the city and beyond is how to domesticate distance and the space between places necessary for social reproduction. Amenities, or equipped venues to be precise (cf. the studies of schools and taps undertaken by Cécile Roy and Valérie Messer respectively, and the analysis of public transport stops by Pascal Pochet and Lourdes Diaz Olvera) culminate in the residential expanse being multipolarized on different levels. The patronized venues lead to management and extension actions, notably (although not exclusively) constrained by the conditionality of international sponsors (Lafargue, 2000). These actions are geographical in meaning because they reveal the power relations that exist within the city. However, guided by the existing circumstances, i.e. the form taken by these places and links, the role-players do not invent the city, but innovate and contrive the inclusion of their actions. Thus, a *de facto* dialectical relation is established between form and actions, which is mediated by the balance of power between the role-players. This relation involves geographical constructions – G. di Méo would probably use the term 'socio-spatial formations': community-based organizations, informal transport associations, parent-teacher associations, for example, who take charge of urban management. The question posed by this innovative explosion, is that of the connecting link which creates a city. Is Dar es Salaam a fragmented city or an urban archipelago?

This urban form opens onto horizons that have partially been drawn by common ownership, logistical connections and projections, architectural citations and cultural borrowings whose contours provide information on the value of the site and on the way in which the role-players participate in integrating it into the world. This "integration into the world" gives meaning to the city as a whole. This is why I became interested in the harbour and in the functional horizons of the wharfs on the one hand and in the cultural markers of the public spaces on the other hand.

Lastly, Jérémie Robert and Mohammed Saleh, who both have an intimate knowledge of Zanzibar, expound the extent to which the archipelago's spatial, cultural, social and political proximity is important in understanding Dar es Salaam. Choosing to overlook this common ownership would be risking incomprehension of the city and the islands, which would be a cowardly system. The interplay of glances between the archipelago and the city, interpreted as a space, is one of the keys to understanding its meaning.

With respect to our initial ambitions, we were not able to exceed certain limits.

Initially, the research was orientated towards pluridisciplinarity. However, individual resistance and the initial orientation, which was centred on the processes of territorialisation, resulted in disciplinary collaborations being fewer than expected. One historian, three political pundits and five geographers contributed to this collection. The defection of several political pundits, sociologists and ethnologists resulted in the admission of social and ethnocultural groups not being carried through to a successful conclusion. This may be considered a failure, as it is clear that the territorial contours would have been specified had we been able to present research on the Zaramo, the Chagga and the sailors. A religious and political dimension is also lacking. Observing the polarities induced by attending mosques, Catholic and Protestant churches or political infrastructures during a period of multiparty initiation would have been very fruitful and probably conclusive in terms of territorialisation or geographical innovation.

What is more, only three of the contributors speak a convincing form of Swahili, with the result that they were the only ones who could truly “enter” the mental universe of our interlocutors without mediation. One of the limits of the undertaking is thus that it still depends too much on observation and on the mediation of discourses pronounced in the dominating language. In previous research (Calas, 2002) I emphasized the undeniable contribution as well as the limits of a landscape approach. In my view, and even more so in terms of this research, only linguistic proximity to the role-players can give us some hope of understanding the current meaning of spatial practices. After all is said and done, one of the limits of this research is explained by the difficulties encountered by a researcher in France to find the time to learn a foreign language and to add professional value to this acquired knowledge.

Another failure is the absence of Tanzanian partners. Because of a lack of constant presence on the ground, because we refused to pay for recycling research projects that had already been completed, because we were not able to offer research projects which would have been interesting to Tanzanian academics, no collaboration was secured. Significantly, I invited several Tanzanian academics to work on urban representations and on language. Nothing came of it. The reason is simple: such projects do not interest international sponsors, whose preoccupations over-determine the research orientations of our partners.

However, the conclusion of this undertaking is a source of satisfaction: it served as training for many young researchers in this field: it was the subject-matter of more than ten master’s degrees, three DEAs³ and four doctoral

3 Diplôme d’études approfondies, a preparatory research qualification which precedes the doctorat.

theses. Research in this field was made possible thanks to the financial contribution of four institutions: IFRA in Nairobi, the Geotropical laboratory of Paris X-Nanterre University, the DyMSET team of the UMR,⁴ ADES,⁵ CNRS⁶-University of Bordeaux 3 and the CEAN⁷ of the IHEP⁸ of Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux IV. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the authorities of these institutions, as well as offer my apologies for the delays in publishing this research for which I am solely responsible.

*Tuendeni*⁹

Urban form

Giving meaning to form firstly requires that form be described, even though the job will consist of deconstructing the relevance of this first impression.

A combination of the map, aerial photographs and observations recorded while strolling through the city provides the material for this description of Dar es Salaam's urban forms, a pretext for the subsequent research. When a geographer recites his classics as far as urban agglomerations are concerned, he shows successive interest in the sites (the original sites, as well as later developments), the location, morphology and functions. As for Dar es Salaam, the reasons for its 1867 urban foundation turn this reassuring order upside down. In fact, it was the necessities of east Africa's protocolonial exploitation by the Swahilis of Zanzibar, which, by order of the Sultan, gave birth to the city of Dar es Salaam. In 1867, the Sultan, who was anxious to escape not only the anti-slavery pressures of the European delegations localized in Zanzibar Town, but also the unruly agitation of the urban elite in Bagamoyo, the caravan route terminal situated 40km to the north of Dar es Salaam, decided to create a new caravan terminal which would not be connected to the previous one but would be situated on a level with the Zanzibar strait. The urban choice was thus firstly constrained by the search for a position on the continental coast, close to Zanzibar.

The exact location was a matter of site, which was determined more precisely by the nautical qualities of the Msimbazi ria (fig. 2). This ria, about 10 metres deep and two kilometres wide, stretches into the coastal plateau for more than 10 kilometres, offering a vast sheet of water protected from the northeast and southeast swells by a narrow 200m gully.

4 Mixed Unit for Research.

5 Access to Information on Subterranean Water.

6 National Centre for Scientific Research.

7 CENA, French National Institute of Consumers.

8 Institute for Higher Education Policy.

9 Let's go.

At the end of the 19th century, technical changes pertaining to navigation, i.e. replacing the dhow with the steamer, contributed to German endorsement of the Sultan's choice. In fact, the increase in boat size and weight and the replacement of wooden keels by cast-iron hulls made grounding sites obsolete and contributed to the disqualification of the site and city of Bagamoyo. This explains why the original site is on the banks of this ria, downstream, almost on a level with the gully. But the city's growth point was constituted by the coral plateau (an altitude of 20-80m on average), which is very flat, and incised by a few wide valleys with steep sides and a flat bottom. Today, urbanisation is spreading across the hills (an altitude of 100-200m) dominating this coastal plateau to the west and to the north.


Thus, the harbour and logistical functions constitute the original *raison d'être* of this city, which is first and foremost a harbour. Today, this function remains an important one; the harbour occupies a relatively vast space, generates numerous infrastructures and activities and is, above all, the object of a policy of modernisation that is mobilizing members of the city's dominating elite. Every year, four million tons of merchandise, 140,000 containers and 250,000 passengers pass its wharfs. This trade, which would be ridiculous on a world scale, involves a hinterland that is three times the size of France and populated by 60 million inhabitants.

Train and bus stations have been grafted onto the harbour, next to the airport, like so many urban infrastructures giving structure to urban space and urbanity.

Harbour functions generate logistical functions, the weight of which is expressed in the shape of an urban stain: half a star pressing down on the diverging urban motorways of the original core. Babamoyo road, Morogoro road, Pugu road and Kilwa road, linked by the Nelson Mandela Ring road, constitute the framework of the urban tissue.

At a very early stage, the Germans supplemented the logistical function with that of command post or rather of administrative relay to the Metropole. Today, Dar es Salaam remains the macrocephalic and primatial metropolis, even though it is no longer the official capital of Tanzania. (Fig. 2)

Figure 2: The urban stain



The main ministries, all the diplomatic delegations, including those from the multilateral sponsors, international NGO's, formal companies and the main mafia networks rub shoulders there. The University of Dar es Salaam, the hospitals of Muhimbili and the Aga Khan still have no rivals in Tanzania. The city's four industrial zones are Tanzania's principal industrial zones; nowhere

else is there such a concentration of investments and power. The “gateway” and “seat” effects have been combining for the past century, agglomerating the country’s essential productive activities in Dar es Salaam: 37% of the country’s active industrial establishments, 36% of its workers and 50% of the wage bill. The conventionality of this situation does not exhaust its interest: we know that it reveals a long-term preservation of dependant and dominated extroversion.

Such accumulated activities explain the city’s demographic growth that, in return, provokes an informal profusion. Dar es Salaam experienced one of the most rapid growths in Africa, resulting from the combination of a positive natural balance sheet and wonderful migratory appeal. Within one century, the population multiplied by 600. Although growth was relatively weak until 1945, the annual growth rate from 1945 until 1980 was 8% per annum! The conscription of soldiers during the Second World War was one of the key moments which kick-started urban growth to the extent that a considerable number of men from all over Tanzania and even Zambia found themselves on the Dar es Salaam wharfs.


From the 1950’s onwards, urbanisation gathered pace as a result of the colonial development policy. In the wake of Independence especially, the expansion of the civil service, the policy of industrialisation (setting up breweries, cigarette and clothes factories), the need for the new State to create a social basis by means of a generous urban policy (Kironde, 1994) favoured the accumulation of first men and later women around the seat of power. At first, the urban crisis of the 1970’s did not refute this growth that did, however, mark time during the 1980’s. During the 1990’s, the application of the Structural Adjustment Program, the macroeconomic effects of which were undeniably positive (with more contrasted social effects), the influx of foreign investors, the return of some Indian or even Arab capital and the coffee crisis restarted the migratory engine of urban growth, while the natural balance sheet remains very high.

TABLE 1 – DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH IN DAR ES SALAAM

year	population	annual intercensus growth
1886	5,000	
1914	20,000	
1931	24,000	
1948	690,227	
1958	128,742	
1967	356,286	6.5%
1978	843,090	9 to 12%
1988	1,360,850	8.4%
2002	2,497,940	

Source: Gray, 1959; Sutton, 1970; Coulson, 1982; Tanzania Censa, 1988; Kironde 1994; Tanzania Census 2003.

Figure 3: Urban primacy: the number of non-portable telephone users



Population growth, combined with the near general horizontality of residential urbanization—due to the financial deprivation as well as cultural preference of its promoters, has led to considerable expansion in housing. The continuous urban stretch today covers a 30-kilometre radius, which goes beyond the classic ‘palm-of-the-glove’ type of urbanization. However, the rolling attributes (grading and building outlines) of these radial developments and their differential geo-strategic importance cause an asymmetry between the north and the south of the city. The two wide and smooth northern roads, one of which serves the upmarket suburbs while the other opens up the hinterland—roll out urbanization over a 40 to 50-kilometre area. This contrasts with the south where the poorly-maintained, narrow Pugu and Kilwa Roads lead to virtual dead ends, and have not led to such a long projection of urban housing. The location of Dar es Salaam in an area with a low population density is a factor that explains the slow growth of its peripheral satellites, which is the opposite in other cities located in high population density areas (like Kampala, for example). In Dar es Salaam, this propensity to grow satellite boroughs in under-populated rural areas (which is not as systematic as evidenced by the ongoing developments in the south of Nairobi, Kenya) can also be attributed to the economic crisis in the 1970s and the 1980s as well as socialism—with limited ownership of motor vehicles—was the main reason for the lack of continued urbanization.

The ria in the southeast of the city, which is not easy to reach on a ferry, maintains the asymmetry of the urban expansion (Ruelle, 1997). The lack of a bridge or a tunnel (which had been planned but indefinitely postponed) slows down urbanization of the area between the south coast and the eastern edge of the Msimbazi ria. This is exacerbated by encroachments by the State (military bases, refineries, etc.) and by Catholic and Protestant churches that distend links with the city centre. Nevertheless, a series of hotel investments along the south coast, especially by South Africans, are underway in anticipation of the peri-urban tourism boom and the inevitable urban tide.

The urban expansion is aerated by valleys, vast market gardening and agricultural spaces, as well as State-owned land left fallow or idle. These valleys are theoretically impossible to develop because they are flooded every rainy season (November – December and March – May).¹⁰ However, in the areas closest to the city centre, unscrupulous dealers, who are not in short supply, put up hovels to offer for rent to the ever-rising number of neo-urbanites at the price of gold and thus fill up the interstitial spaces (Laporte, 1997; Drouillard, 1997) (Fig. 4 and Fig. ht colours [Plate 1]).

Despite relative architectural homogeneity, the housing is not homogenous. It is linked to several physical characteristics and, in some cases landscape characteristics. The quality of construction materials (walls and roofs), architectural volume, the alignment of the road network and its nature

10 The amount of rainfall per year in Dar es Salaam is 1,100 mm.

(grading, clearance outline, traffic flow, etc.), the regularity of built-up areas, the readability of public spaces, the density of facilities and connections to various networks are some of the marks of morphological differences. Roughly four rings, which are not lacking in homogeneity, can be identified.

Exposed and unified by the verticality of its modest skyline and the relative massive size of its permanent housing, which is well endowed in facilities and confined in disruptions imposed by colonial urbanisation—golf, tennis, public parks, railway facilities—the city centre displays major nuances (Bart and Calas, 1998; Roy, 1998).

In the Kivukoni front area, a stroller would observe the alternation of tall buildings that are sometimes dilapidated, with low government buildings whose balconies, public hallways, wood and shutters betray their colonial beginnings. The verticality and the antiquity complement each other to provide the decor. The relatively large and rectilinear streets are virtually empty and deserted by night. Near the Askari Monument roundabout and along the Samora Machel Avenue, Indian shops of the 1930s and construction sites after demolitions, alternate with tinted glass-facade high-rise buildings. This is an expression of the vigour of urban renovation.

at Posta contributes to intense activity during rush hour (fig. 7). The Kisutu road area, 200 m to the northwest, is inhabited by Indians who live in massive buildings separated by temples, religious schools and charitable institutions linked to the sub-continent. These buildings overlie the shops, which are often protected by a row of arcades. This area, frequented during the day by the middle class that works in the city centre, becomes a small Indian town at nightfall. Some people refer to it as the Little Bombay. Here, the daylight noisy activity is not suspended at nightfall. Several mosques are a reminder of the complexity of the trademark Swahili architecture surrounding the ties between the Arabian Peninsula, the Persian Gulf and northwestern India.

Further to the south, the centre becomes populous. Housing remains dense and is relatively old (an architect would discern excellent evidence of the diverse currents that characterised architecture from 1900 to 1960). This part of Dar, which is a real architectural conservatoire, is also eaten up by concrete and vertical densification but in a less clear-cut way than in the CBD.

Very active during the day, the ethnic and social identity of this area's residents is much less homogenous than that of Kisutu residents. African civil servants, small-scale Indian, Arab or Swahili traders and African artisans live side by side. There is a high level of dilapidation of housing due to lack of maintenance, fires and general neglect.

- Located in the periphery are two clearly individualised residential areas.

With the Mnazimoja Gardens—the higher grounds for national events—separating it from this part of Dar, which it nevertheless is an extension of, Kariakoo is an area covered by a 2 km² grid of road network and irregular alternation of Swahili houses and narrow, tinted glass-facade buildings, which are rough replicas of the imposing Gulf buildings. In the east and in the north, the proximity to the CBD explains the fact that this triple process of hardening, densification and verticalization, which while respecting the old cadastre, results in spindly buildings and is more advanced than in the west. This is Dar es Salaam's centre of popular history around the Kariakoo main market, which is partly underground. All day long, the daladals block up all the streets by getting stuck in pedestrian traffic, which gets unimaginably dense. At night, the street is left to beggars, vagabond madmen and thieves of all shade and colour. The presence of street children here also bears witness to the area's centrality.

- The second residential crown jewel extends from here up to approximately 15 to 20 kilometres from the centre.

The very upmarket, well-planned suburbs north of the city along the coast (Oyster Bay, Masaki and Msasani) are lined with palatial villas that are often endowed with swimming pools, sheltered with ornamental trees, protected by high perimeter walls and are in some places separated by high-class collective residences. This relatively less densely populated area of choice due to

prohibitive investment by State bourgeoisie and diplomatic missions extends to the north at the expense of the old Msasani peninsula sisal plantation. There is sometimes a lack of connection to networks and it is common to find dusty or muddy roads, depending on the whims of the skies, compensated by an abundance of sleek 4X4 cars, and a lack of tap water resolved by tank water supplies on lorries.

To the south of the city are planned populous areas of Temeke and Changombe, west of Mwananyamala and Magomeni, along a classified road lined by a network of Swahili houses with four corner roofs extended to the rear by utility blocks (kitchens, ablution and toilets), which are sometimes converted to rental houses. The density is higher, the materials are of precarious quality and the villas open straight into the dusty streets. This peri-central jewel grows as peripheral urbanization progresses at the expense of less densely populated rural areas. This growth essentially comes in the form of slums.

However, the best known of these slums—Manzese and Tandika—pale in comparison to the Nairobi slums in terms of population density, insecurity, violence, squalid conditions or vastness. These underprivileged parts of the city have the usual characteristics of insecurity, fragility and density of African shantytowns. Nevertheless, there is no lack of internal difference which contrasts with the old swallowed-up, densely populated and proletarianized Zaramo villages—in the dense, tough bands along the main roads—at the epicentres of activities around markets or public transport stations and the urban sprawl of cubic maisonettes built with sand bricks arranged in a disorganized but not in a chaotic manner.

Extending the posh Msasani suburbs along the coast that have been socially favoured for a long time and served by the Bagamoyo Road, are the paradoxical 'high-class slums' of Mikocheni and Mbezi. The two, which are affluent in terms of quality of housing and residents but are likened to the under-privileged sectors because there is lack of external infrastructure, have taken long to be constructed and the development plans are rarely observed. The development solutions are individual, sometimes collective but on a local scale, most often alongside official urbanisation. Huge several storey commercial centres have been built within the last five years, especially along Old Bagamoyo Road.

Over time, the State has had the time, the will and the support of bilateral or international donors to create vast peri-central spaces. Kironde (1994) tells the story of the successive public initiatives, which gave rise to regular blueprints in Ilala, Temeke, Sinza, Msasani, and Tabata. This explains the mosaic of regular and spontaneous residential areas that make up the large pericentral ring.

- Further along, about 20 kilometres from the centre, the periphery and its boundaries are seeing rapid and classic transformation of agricultural and urban spaces (Kyessi, 2002).

The irregular trails, disorganised allotments, allocations, construction sites are as many as the completed constructions. This landscape of the in situ urban fabric is modelled on population growth, hunger for land and the expansion of market gardening. It is the epitome of urban dwelling. In the continuity of historical grabbing of the coastal land by the elite, the northern peripheries, which are the most affluent due to register allotments as indeed evident in many places but visible enough to warrant generalisation due to a tarmac road running along the coast, is socially comparable to the eastern and southern peripheries, which are more populous and spread in bands over rumps of hills and new construction clusters whose permanent construction material cannot sufficiently conceal the lack of land policy.

However, beyond the diversity and the north-south asymmetry, the Dar es Salaam urban fabric, and especially its spontaneous and irregular sectors (70% of the residents), have relative morphological and social mixture. The geographic profile of most of the sectors is not very far from the centre average. The difference between the irregular and planned sectors appear marginally distinct from that of other centres like Nairobi and Kampala, especially because of the same level of defective facilities and the heritage of relative social homogeneity resulting from the Ujamaa system, the economic crisis and the “invention of a political culture” (Martin, 1988). This does not mean that the distinction and correlation of segregationist processes is missing in Dar es Salaam. At the agglomeration level, it is less intense than in other cities, partly because of the economic crisis and partly because of the political culture characterized by Christian socialism. This has led to very refined, micro-local and even intra-domestic arrangements, which are undoubtedly linked to the Swahili society, long accustomed to manipulating the social distinction on the mode of the nation rather than on spatial practices. This makes it a diversified city, diluting its differences, and not a city of contrasts crystallizing the differences at the level of suburbs separated by rigid boundaries.

The current period nevertheless seems to accentuate the contrasts. Indeed, the current economic growth enormously enriches a small minority (whose success no longer appears immoral), resulting in the slow emergence of a business middle class, the corresponding loss of class by civil servants, an increased stacking-up of migrants and, above all, a un-inhibition of ostentatious riches, on the one hand, and, on the other, the violent pillage. Close observation advances two factors that can explain the high growth of upmarket areas: the circulation of profits from the mining industry, the enormity of South African investments, the success of structural adjustment policies, the circulation of money from corruption as well as arms and drug trafficking.

- Four industrial areas integrated into a distinct urban fabric.

There are other production spaces added to the industrial area that colonial administrators had set up along the Central Railway. This was a result of

socialist industrialization—import substitution policy—and they were established along Bagamoyo Road, in Ubungo, on Morogoro Road and along the Nelson Mandela Ring Road. Centres of quantitative secondary employment, these spaces structure the urban space through the scale of breaks that they introduce in the residential belt through the hopes of national independence that they have carried, the hopes of global integration that they hold and through the more or less transparent manoeuvres whose stakes their companies represent and covered by a media that has a field day over scandals related to privatization of public corporations.

Like in a majority of African cities, the urban structure is highly constrained by its commercial function. The main commercial and formal services are concentrated in the CBD and so are the offices of the main cargo handlers, transporters and ship-owners that sustain not only the port but also the juicy trafficking. This is the Tanzanian leg of the globalized economy. Despite the mushrooming of gigantic peri-central markets that are throbbing with life and trade, an intermediate commercial space around the Kariakoo market, which retains the distinction of the main central market, brings together wholesale and semi-wholesale businesses, small-scale businesses, hawkers and petty traders. This commercial arrangement is common, but it is reducing, around every one of the peri-central markets of Ilala and Manzese. They have poor facilities and are sometimes filthy cesspools during rainy seasons but they play a vital role in urban activities. Finally, occupying interstitial spaces are the little kiosks. These are a multitude of small shops that where hawkers engage in commercial services of the spreading urban areas.

Upon this predominant commercial arrangement in terms of polarised flow, secondary visits and developed socialization superimposes a more discreet and more socially dominant arrangement at shopping malls and a collection of shops, which have higher numbers of customers, in favour of the liberalization of the 1990s. These types of centres are mostly coming up along Bagamoyo Road and even in the northern parts of the city but on a less-developed and more scattered scale.

Aerial View of a section of Dar es Salaam



The Evolution of Dar es Salaam's Peri-Urban Space During the Period of German Colonisation (1890-1914)

Franck Raimbault

In his thesis on Douala¹, Andreas Eckert emphasizes that studies dealing with land issues in new colonial cities are a relatively rare occurrence. However, the evolution of urban real estate constitutes a privileged point of view for the analysis of society as a whole, as this is where numerous issues are dealt with far beyond mere economic dimensions. Colonial society's appropriation of the existing space in its main base of operations, the cities, was as much material as it was symbolic: because of its apparent resemblance to the Saxony massif, the forest 8 km west of Dar es Salaam was baptized *Sachsenwald* by the Germans. At the very heart of the process of integrating peri-urban space into a whole, which is organically linked to the city, what one finds mostly is the development of a property market involving all social groups. Admittedly, the property market developed *a priori* according to legal rules decreed by a colonial State with dreams of omnipresence but which in actual fact rarely had the means of its ambitions. Market reality depended as much on settlers' financial abilities, perceived economic opportunities and the connections between buyer and seller groups. Studying Dar es Salaam's peri-urban space from 1891 to 1914 thus constitutes a means of seeing the various cogs in the machine of colonial society in the making being put in place. This research will not copy K. Vorlauffer's study of the phases of creation of Dar es Salaam's urban space,² but will show the importance of a meticulous study of the property market for a better understanding of the different dimensions of colonial society (the social and economic process; juridical and cultural aspects, etc...) From this perspective, studying the city's real estate market instead of that of the surrounding areas seemed less productive, as the former was too heavily dominated by state apparatus, the weight of which eclipsed the other role players. On the contrary, once the few urbanized hectares disappear into the distance, the State becomes

1 Eckert A., Grundbesitz, Landkonflikte und kolonialer Wandel. Douala 1880 bis 1960. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999, 504p.

2 Karl Vorlauffer was interested in the socio-geographical logic governing the constitution of Dar es Salaam's urban context between 1890 and 1970. Our approaches only tally in the margins, for example when I study those zones outside the city that are destined to become urban in the short term. What is more, by studying the cultural and economic influence of such and such a group on the urban tissue, his approach works from the top down. He does not take into account the reality of the real estate market. Vorlauffer K., Koloniale und Nachkoloniale Stadtplanung in Dar es Salaam, Frankfurt-am-Main, Goethe Universität, 1970, 113p.

one of many players: certainly an important one, but one whose role is often not decisive in determining the future shape of the market.

Using peri-urban space as a stake within colonial society as a starting point, it is possible to study the case of Dar es Salaam's property market, thanks to the practices of the German colonial administration. The Tanzanian National Archives (TNA) conserves files, which are relative to the property market itself,³ containing laws and regulations and especially practice deeds, comprised mainly of sales contracts and local administration reports pertaining to development and status of land having been the object of a sale. Such a corpus is certainly not the perfect means for determining the use of peri-urban real estate and the social realities being played out around it, as many transactions escape the administration's watchful eye. In addition, sales contracts do not always provide precise information about the location of the land that is the object of the transaction and the seller's socio-economic status. Lastly, the development of the purchased land was not an object of continued interest and information is scattered. These gaps can be partially compensated by the various city maps drawn up by the administration.⁴ The archives of the missionary societies (who were amongst the first and most important buyers) provide detail on development difficulties that can be found nowhere else.⁵ Finally, the local press punctually provides information about all the points raised.⁶

Despite the absence of sources that would enable us to give an account of the phenomenon in its entirety, the case of Dar es Salaam is a privileged one amongst African cities.⁷ It does not, however, represent an archetypal case as far as the continent is concerned. In fact, its creation was the result of what may almost be termed a colonial context in existence before the arrival of the Germans. The "harbour of peace"⁸ owed its existence to the initiative of the sultan of Zanzibar, Majid, who decided to found it at the beginning of the 1860's. As yet, there is no definitive conclusion to the debate about the reasons which prompted Majid,⁹ but the qualities of the site, a system of coves forming an excellent natural, deep-water harbour which could accommodate

3 TNA, G7 Series / 198 to 207 and G35 / 1, 3, 10 and 55.

4 Regarding maps conserved in Berlin, see Klaus W., *Pläne und Grundrisse afrikanischer Städte (1550-1945)*, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, Kartographische Bestandsverzeichnis n° 5, Berlin, 1990, 539 p.. The TNA also possess various maps of Dar es Salaam.

5 The archives of the German East African Evangelical Missionary Society, which was present in Dar es Salaam between 1890 and 1903, are housed in Wuppertal. Those of the Berliner Missionsgesellschaft (BMG), which was present from 1903 onwards, can be found in Berlin. Those of the Benedictine mission, which was present during the entire period of study, can be found at the Abbey of Sankt Ottilien (Skt Ot.) near Munich.

6 The *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Zeitung* was published in Dar es Salaam between 1899 and 1916, while the *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Rundschau* was only published between 1908 and 1912. These two newspapers can be consulted in their entirety at Frankfurt-am-Main's Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek.

7 According to Henri Médard, who was kind enough to proofread this text, such a study would be possible in Kampala, where British administration registered real estate with the land registry at an early stage.

8 Regarding the origin and the meaning of the name Dar es Salaam, see Hartnoll M., "A story of the origin of the name BanDar es Salaam, which in the old days was called Mzizima" in T.N.R., 3, 1937, p. 117-119.

9 Sutton J., "Dar es Salaam: a sketch of a hundred years", in Sutton J. (ed.), *Dar es Salaam. City, port and region*, T.N.R., n. 71, 1970, p. 1-19.

modern steam-boats and protect them from the ocean furies, certainly played an important role. The sultanate of Zanzibar's wealth was based on the control and taxation of a regional system of commerce showing strong growth since the beginning of the 19th century. It consisted in the transportation of slaves and ivory by caravan from the high plateaus west of the Great Lakes. During the course of the century, the Swahili and Arab coastal residents themselves started playing an increasingly active part in this traffic. They went as far as to create intermediary cities on the continent, of which Tabora is the best known. The ivory arrived at different points on the coast from where it was transported to the Indian and European clients in Zanzibar. Although slaves partly followed the same route, they were increasingly used to develop and maintain clove or coconut plantations on the coast or on the Zanzibar and Pemba¹⁰ archipelagos. By founding Dar es Salaam, the sultan was looking for a solution to substitute the existing interface: Bagamoyo, the caravans' principal coastal port of arrival, and Zanzibar, an emporium linking the continent and the outside markets. The two functions of caravan *terminus* and of a harbour open to the world economy were thus supposed to have been concentrated in this city. After having been abandoned by Majid's successor in 1870, the project was revived by the 1 July 1870 British-German agreement according to which Zanzibar remained in the United Kingdom's sphere of influence, while Bagamoyo definitively became a part of German-dominated territory. But unlike Dar es Salaam, this port situated on a low-lying, sandy part of the coast could not accommodate steamboats with a strong draught.

In fact, the decision to promote Dar to the detriment of its neighbour was not an immediate one. In fact, from 1887 to 1891, a chartered company (the *Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* or DOAG) and not the metropolis was directly responsible for the colony's administration. Its aim was to deduct its tithe from the commercial flow and to make as few changes as possible to the pre-existing spatial and economic logic, so as to avoid any large-scale investment. The coastal society's 1888 - 1890 revolt called this means of management into question and forced direct intervention from the German Empire, first on a military and then on an administrative level. As Berlin was directly implicated in the new administrative structure put in place during the first months of 1891, it could not limit itself to taking only economic interests into account: national prestige demanded that the colony free itself from Zanzibari influence. From that point onwards, Dar es Salaam established itself as the city to promote: consequently, it became the German East African capital as well as the metropolis' main port of entry.¹¹

Although the ups and downs of international relations (especially those linked to the partition of the African continent) led the Germans to revive the Omani project, there were notable differences in the field.

10 See Sheriff A., *Slaves, spices and ivory in Zanzibar. Integration of East African commercial Empire into the world economy (1770-1873)*, London, James Currey, 1987.

11 It would, however, take more than a decade to destroy Bagamoyo's economic influence.

In 1887, Dar es Salaam and the space surrounding it made up a concentric system of three crowns. The tiny centre was organized around a central street (part of the present *Samora Avenue*) serving as a point of departure for a few badly drawn alleyways.¹² Stone buildings, palaces belonging to Omani dignitaries and the houses of Indian traders and warehouses could be found along the principal highway and close to the harbour. This outline of an urban plan rapidly made way for coconut plantations (*shamba*)¹³ (is this the old spelling or should all instances be changed to “shamba”). These *shamba* differed in size. Those belonging to the sultan could be hundreds of hectares and were farmed by a slavish, 600-700 strong workforce.¹⁴ But many *shamba* were limited to a few hectares. Khalid bin Muso, an Arab from Hadhramaut, described the small *shamba* he had inherited from his father¹⁵ in a 1911-letter to the administration. Khalid’s father, who was originally from Bagamoyo, settled in Dar es Salaam at the request of sultan Majid to practise his liming skills. Amongst other things, the sultan gave him a one-hectare *shamba* on the coast (on the present-day *Kivukoni Front*), where he had some sixty coconut palms planted, built two stone houses and a few huts for his slaves, as well as small mosque where he was buried after his death. The farm was thus an agricultural production space as well as a place of residence and a sacred area recording the group’s religious inclinations. It was a total space, largely centred on itself, a manifestation of the social logic at work: the master’s domination of those who depended on him was also a showcase for his peers. Of Dar es Salaam’s 2000-3000 Zanzibari inhabitants, many lived as dependents within this crown of plantations.¹⁶ The autochthonous and autonomous space of the Zaramo and Chomvi villages lay beyond it.¹⁷

12 See map 1, which is a personal synthesis made up of the following maps: Map of the Imperial Marine, 1888, Berlin municipal library, n° 789, [1: 12500] ; “Situationsplan von Dar es Salaam und Immannuels-Kap” in Nachrichten aus der ostafrikanischen Mission, 1891, p. 12 ; Übersichtskarte von der Stadt Dar es Salaam und deren nächster Umgebung, 1892-1893, Berlin municipal library, n° 794 [1 : 25000]. Situationsplan der Stadt Dar es Salaam, 1902, Berlin municipal library, n° 800 [1 : 5000].

13 This is how the DOAG representative, August Leue, describes Dar es Salaam on his arrival, the 25th mai 1887: As we entered the port of Dar es Salaam on the morning of 25 May 1887, we were astonished by the beauty of the surroundings. Like wings leading down to a stage, wooded hills sloped downwards into the port. The latter, which was so deep that the “Môwe” could get quite close to the bank, was surrounded by gardens and shamba. The town itself presented a refreshing perspective. Buildings emerged from the vegetation and from the green background like intimate hiding-places. Leue, Dar es Salaam, Süsserrot, 1903, p.4.


14 Gray, J., “Dar es Salaam under the sultans of Zanzibar”, in T.N.R., 33, 1952, p. 18.

15 Tanzanian National Archives (TNA), G7 / 208, p. 91 and p. 125.

16 Some of these plantations had no direct contact with the urban centre. These could be found in Msasani, in different parts of Magooni and notably in Mjimwema, where Arab settlers had established themselves in the course of the 19th century. TNA, G7 / 208, p. 189.

17 The Chomvi and Zaramo groups were on good terms, sharing the same culture and activities. To a certain extent, they lived in the same villages; intermarriages were not a rare occurrence. Despite this proximity, each of the groups was able to preserve their identity by being conscious of a different past. The Chomvi claimed to be descendants of migrants of Persian origin; as for the Zaramo, they knew that they had come to the coast at the request of the Chomvi, when the latter were threatened by another hinterland group, the Kamba.

Figure 5 – The expansion of Dar es Salaam between 1887 and 1914



The inhabitants of this third crown lived mainly on fishing, but above all on subsistence agriculture and arboriculture on extensively developed land, where the savannah and its dangers remained an ever-present threat. However, by acquiring an extra work force in the form of slaves, the villages around Dar es Salaam took advantage of economic growth and became one of the main zones exporting rice to Zanzibar.¹⁸ R. Tanner showed that the land did not fall under standardized property rights, linked to a clearly identified person.¹⁹ *Jumbe* or local chiefs controlled the access to those parts of the surrounding savannah that had not yet been cleared and to the abandoned land reclaimed by the natural vegetation. People who had cleared a certain zone as well as their heirs could allocate it to male or female adults, should they so request. The latter thus became clients and owners of the usufruct of the acquired land, which was seldom farmed to its full capacity; depending on the work force at the farmer's disposal, parts of the land were left lying fallow. To understand the complexities of this system, this right of individual use must not be seen in isolation, but within the context of family constraints weighing on the male or female farmer, who did not have all the fruits of the harvest at his or her disposal. Foreigners could be accommodated by the community, notably when the latter's control of the territory was recognized by means of a donation or *ubaani*. Originally, *ubaani* had a deeply religious dimension, which was linked to the cult of the ancestors. It was paid to the *jumbe* or to religious officials, who could also be women. This was how, during the 1860's, the sultan of Zanzibar obtained the land around the city he wanted to build. As far as foreigners were concerned, land use rights were only valid during their time of residence, contrary to that of the village children. This arrangement contradicted the only right of land ownership of a private nature, i.e. the right concerning trees (mango, lemon and especially coconut palms). This is why foreigners were prohibited from planting trees without authorization. During the 1870's, the sultan's disrespect for this rule led to a conflict with the local chiefs.²⁰

In 1914, this ternary model had been replaced by a binary structure. The urban centre had developed considerably by encroaching widely on the plantation crown. The city, a young colonial capital heading the urban network being set up, experienced significant growth: an increase of 3,000 inhabitants in 1887 to more than 20,000. More remarkable than the demographic and spatial extension, is the way in which the very shape of the city evolved. The European colonizers' urban culture differed from the Omani urban

18 Bryceson D., "A century of food supply in Dar es Salaam", dans Guyer J. (éd.), *Feeding African Cities: Studies in Regional Social History*, Manchester, 1987, p. 158.

19 Tanner, R., "Land rights on the Tanganyika Coast" in T.N.R., 1960, p. 14-24; also see J. Glassmann's description of Pangani territory: Glassmann J., *Feasts and Riots ...*, pp. 39 to 42.

20 Despite protestations from the *jumbe*, the sultan rapidly proceeded to create several hundred hectares of plantation. It was not long before the local chiefs had to renounce any claims and accept the Omani possessions' private nature.

culture. Their city experience was marked by the profound European urban tissue mutations of the 19th century, often orchestrated by the authorities. This interventionist tendency, guided by theorized, urbanistic norms, was reinforced by the colonial, tropical context. The State was responsible for protecting Europeans against a difficult environment by developing health and public hygiene policies; at the same time, the settlers had to be kept on top of the social hierarchy by establishing a certain degree of segregation. To an extent, the surrounding areas had escaped autochthonous control and were directly influenced by the city. Although this peri-urban space was in close proximity to the city and also organically linked to it, it did not make it any less complex: the areas closest the city were being transformed into urban tissue, while the areas beyond were devoted to satisfying the city's needs, in ways that varied along with the owners.

I. THE COLONIZERS' FIRST ATTEMPT AT TAKING CHARGE OF THE PERI-URBAN SPACE (1891-1895)

In January 1891, Berlin made Dar es Salaam the capital of German East Africa. The metropolis was of the opinion that the natural, deep-water harbour of this small town with its 3,000 inhabitants, perfectly sheltered from the capricious ocean, was a major asset. The decision was taken contrary to the opinion of *Reichkommissar* Wissmann²¹, who wanted the new administration to respect the spatial logic at work. And yet, the region's main economic centre was not Dar es Salaam, but Bagamoyo, some sixty kilometres to the north. This port, situated across from Zanzibar, was the destination of most of the caravans coming from the continent's interior to sell their treasures (mostly ivory and slaves). But in the eyes of the colonizers, there was a major handicap to this site: the coast was low-lying and sandy, which forced those European steamboats with a strong draught to cast anchor some distance away. Because Berlin refused to invest in large-scale port developments, so as to limit costs pertaining to the colonial empire as much as possible, it was decided to turn Dar es Salaam's harbour site, which was exceptional for the region, into the country's political centre. In April 1891, the colonial administration left Bagamoyo for Dar es Salaam. Although this decision had no immediate repercussions on a regional scale (the caravans continued to converge on Bagamoyo until the beginning of the 20th century), it resulted locally in the redefinition of the city's space according to the administrative apparatus' needs and interests.

21 In 1899, Wissmann had been sent by Berlin to crush a revolt that had erupted along the coast and in the coastal hinterland against the authority of the DOAG, a chartered company to which the colony's administration had been entrusted.

A. The colonial state's formation of a European-style urban fabric

1. *Founding an administrative district*

As soon as he had been nominated to the post of Governor, Von Soden ordered District Chief Leue to start acquiring the necessary land for erecting an administrative as well as a residential quarter in the city's eastern part. It was a choice that represented a break with the past, since the sultan's palace, the former centre of power, was situated west of the agglomeration. The main reason for such a change was hygienic in nature. Governor Von Soden wanted this section to be built in what was considered to be the healthiest part of the city, so that civil servants would be spared the unhealthy coastal conditions. As for the Governor's palace, it was built in an area that was completely exposed to the ocean breeze, the type of *shamba* one finds along the coast. This building, which housed the central administration's offices as well as the accommodation provided along with the job, was completed in February 1892. On the other hand, they had to wait until 1894 for the main buildings of the different administrations to be completed and for the civil servants to be lodged in conditions that would be considered acceptable. These buildings, which served both as offices and as accommodation, are situated on the *Kivukoni Front* (*Wilhelms-Ufer*, at the time) and are still used as administrative buildings. This transfer of political power from west to east also made it possible to establish a zoning process which would facilitate the high administration's isolation from other urban activities. The sultan's palace was very close to the harbour where dockers were carrying cargo, where traders were busy negotiating and where customs officials were busy checking and taxing. The new political power, which was established to the east of the city, at the seaside, could work in peace, far from the hectic economic activities dominated by non-whites. Moreover, the Governor's beautiful residence commanded the channel that gave access to the harbour: the German Empire on African soil was asserting its authority on anyone arriving in the colony by sea. However, travellers disembarking at Dar es Salaam were returning from a visit to Britain's main influence centre in the area, i.e. Zanzibar. The landscape thus constituted quite an architectural and diplomatic programme in itself, a response to the United Kingdom's political weight in the Indian Ocean.

Measures taken in 1891 by the administration for settlement to the east of the agglomeration treated existing property rights with disdain, and the climate of fear and violence in which they were taken reduced their victims to silence for two decades.²² Khalid bin Msuo's petition to the Governor on 24th August 1911 and the way he was subsequently treated by the administration serve to clarify certain practices by the colonial power in 1890 / 1891 when

²² This passage confirms the analysis of J. Kironde, who refers to frequent forced selling in his thesis. Kironde J.M.L., *The evolution of the land use structures of Dar es Salaam, 1890-1990: a study in the effects of land policy*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Nairobi, 1994, 593 p.

taking possession of areas that interested them.²³ In his complaint, Khalid asked the Governor to be financially compensated for the despoliation of a *shamba* on which different administrative buildings had been erected (the *Hauptkasse*, officers' mess and *Schutztruppe* headquarters). When questioned, Leue, the former district chief, who was still (unofficially) present in the colony, declared having offered 1000 rupees to Khalid bin Msuo for his one-hectare *shamba*. As the latter refused to take the money, the administration started building without giving him another thought. People were generally offered compensation of one rupee per coconut palm and some twenty or thirty rupees for their house. The (many) people who had left the city for fear of the Europeans made no demands, however. Although it is impossible to calculate the area of land which was despoiled in this way, testimony emanating from the victims as well as from the colonial regime's former dignitaries leads one to think that it was quite significant. In a letter dated 18 October 1911, Leue himself observed that "*it is true that formerly, shortly after the revolt, one didn't beat about the bush with people. Those who didn't want to sell were expropriated*".²⁴

J. Kironde emphasizes that setting up land ownership was not always branded with an arbitrary stamp: in certain cases, the administration negotiated fairly. However, it is difficult to follow this researcher's reasoning when he claims that Africans were treated more expeditiously by the administration than Arabs or Indians. The fact that Khalid bin Msuo was an Arab did not prevent him from being despoiled. Indeed, the dividing line here is not a racial one, but a political one. People close to the colonial power, like the Omani Soliman bin Nador, Dar es Salaam's *wali* between 1891 and 1903,²⁵ or the rich Indian trader Sewa Haji, who rendered great service to the Germans by setting up caravans and recruiting carriers, were the only people to be spared or treated with consideration. Although these influential people who accepted to collaborate with the new power owned large tracts of land in a zone which was destined to become the administrative quarter, their property rights were not challenged at all. There was no question, however, about allowing the construction of buildings generating non-administrative activities. Sewa Haji and Soliman bin Nador were both enterprising businessmen who would soon find ways of turning their possessions to their advantage.

The 14th May 1891 building regulation (*Bauordnung*) provided the administration with a legal angle to overcome this contradiction. The text divided the city into 46 building plots, split into three zones in turn, for which precise building rules had been defined: in close proximity to the

23 TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 91, p. 92-94, p. 113-115, p. 125-126, p. 189-194 et TNA, G 7 / 209, p. 85-87.

24 Richtig ist auch, dass damals, kurz nach dem Aufstand, mit den Leuten nicht viel Federlesens gemacht wurde. Wer nicht verkauft wollte, wurde enteignet. TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 189.

25 During the Zanzibari period, the wali was the sultan's representative. During the period of German colonization, this title was given to a person who had been invested by the administration and who administered the native town.

harbour and in the eastern part of the city, European building techniques had to be used (§ 4) and all building plans had to be subjected to administrative permission (§ 6); in the quarter behind the harbour, around the *Inderstrasse*, other building types could be constructed, but with solid materials, so as not to fall into “the black hut category” (§ 5); in the third (peripheral) zone, no particular regulation applied, with the result that it devolved *de facto* to African constructions. J. Kironde interprets this text as an immediate implementation of racial segregation, while K. Vorlaufer distinguishes between the textual content which, *de jure*, does not impose racial segregation but rather imposes architectural obligations and concrete application which would eventually bring about segregation. In fact, the colonizers’ 1891 objectives were not to spatially transcribe the racial vision of a colonial society that was still in limbo. Proof of this is that many Africans continued to live in the administrative and residential area.²⁶ Moreover, it is impossible to find traces of any desire on the side of the administration to impose racial segregation before 1906.²⁷ In 1891, the *Bauordnung* was not considered an instrument of racial segregation *stricto sensu*. In fact, at the time, the administration was seeking to protect itself against the possibility of seeing permanent Indian and Arab structures intended for trade and the craft industry (something which would have put the neighbourhood’s future at risk, as it was intended above all to be a haven of peace and work for public servants) at a time when they were not in a position, for political reasons, to take possession of all the property concerned. On the other hand, the administration could endure the presence of African communities who could easily be evicted, if needs be, at the right time and place. Besides, this regulatory measure led Soliman bin Nador and Sewa Haji to come to a compromise with the administration, because they had no intention of embarking on building expensive European buildings. Soliman bin Nador accepted a land exchange in 1895.²⁸ The wealthy Indian trader preferred a solution which was destined to immortalise his name in the colony to an even greater extent: in his will, he made over all his Dar es Salaam property to the government in February 1897 in exchange for the latter’s obligation to found and maintain a technical school open to all Non-Europeans.²⁹

2. Creating the first roads framework

In 1891, rather than to organize strict spatial segregation based on racial criteria, the 1891 *Bauordnung* enabled the colonial administration to

26 It was not until September 1901 that the government decided to buy back an area of 2.3 hectares, a Swahili hamlet called Klein Bagamoyo, situated only a few hundred meters from the Governor’s palace. TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 236-243.

27 On this date, top administration was divided by a debate about whether or not the wealthiest Indians could be allowed to build in the European quarter: it entailed determining the true meaning to be given to the building regulation. The problem became a concrete one as a similar case had been presented in Mombasa, where the rich Indians had built European homes. In the end, the Governor decided in favour of the Indian community. TNA, G 7 / 206, p. 9-40.

28 Exchange contract dated 24 May 1895. TNA, G 7 / 206, p. 62 et G 7 / 207, p. 113.

29 RKA, 998, p. 40 to 43. As regards Sewa Haji’s evergetism, see Raimbault Fr., “Les stratégies de reclassement des élites arabes et indiennes à Dar es Salaam durant la colonisation allemande” (1891-1914) in *Hypothèses*, February 2001, pp 109-118.

integrate a space into the urban fabric, which until then had been intended for agriculture. It was reserved for civil servants, who at that point constituted the main body of the European population. Despite the colonizers' imperfect hold on the land, architectural measures guaranteed the residential character of the future neighbourhood. At the time, the legal definition of Indian and African zones affected the city's structure to a much lesser extent. In the end, legislation did little more than sanction a *de facto* situation as far as the Indian and Arab hold on the existing urban zone behind the harbour was concerned. Africans who, in theory, were pushed back to the periphery, in fact continued to live in direct contact with other communities. On the other hand, the future urban fabric was strongly shaped by a second aspect of the *Bauordnung*: the creation of a roads network that would serve as the backbone of the city's future development.

As defined by the *Bauordnung*, the roads network extended for more than two kilometres in length and 700 m in width, dividing the city into 46 blocks. Its layout integrated the legacies of the previous periods. In 1888, there was no more than an embryonic network structured around part of the present *Samora Avenue*.³⁰ Four badly designed perpendicular roads departed from it to link up with the harbour; they were not, however, lined with buildings. In 1891, a grid plan, delimited by the present *Station Street*, *Zaniki Street*, *Sokoine Drive* and *Samora Avenue*, started to emerge more clearly. These were the first developments undertaken by Leue, the district chief, the DOAG's representative between 1887 and 1890. The plan, which was launched in May 1891, was much more ambitious, as it covered an area to the south of the present *Libya Street*, *Jamhuri Street*, *Jamhun Street* and *Garden Avenue*, up to the present *Pemba Road*.³¹

Besides providing the city with a European character, the network's first objective was to secure the urban area. During the December 1888 to January 1889 battles, Leue (Dar es Salaam's district chief during the revolt) had been struck by the ease with which his enemies had been able to move forward into the city, thanks to the narrow roads network.³² They were able to come within 150 m of the small German fortress (*boma*) without coming under its fire. Creating a roads network that would be wide enough to impose a restrictive framework on urban development was supposed to facilitate police control of the agglomeration in gestation. It also made it possible to establish those choices made as far as the zoning process was concerned. The Europeans' future administrative and residential quarter's spaced out network guaranteed low building density. In the Indian business quarter, the network's development broke with the logic of a grid and adopted a semi-circular form. Two half-

30 The section includes the present-day Mkwepu Street and Mosque Street.

31 See map 1.

32 Leue, Dar es Salaam, p. 27.

rings³³ more or less followed the curved coastline, making it possible to give some depth to this quarter by imposing maximum restrictions on the distance from the harbour. The service functions of this quarter service functions were soon taken into account by a sharp increase in the roads network density.

The network plan could not be carried out in detail in 1891. However, the planned highways materialised rapidly on the ground,³⁴ making it possible to direct the return of those members of the population who had fled the fighting. Various written testimonies bear witness to this fact. As early as November 1891, the district chief observed in a report addressed to government that dwellings had been constructed on either side of the *Ringstrasse* at the point where the latter crossed the *Sultan-schamba*; the sultan had been compensated by those who had settled there.³⁵ In a letter addressed to government on 6 February 1893, the Indian trader Nur Mohamed highlighted the urban development that had taken place since the advent of a power capable of maintaining order. He particularly stressed the fact that urban growth was structured to a large extent by the emergent by-road network that facilitated trade, industry and travelling around.³⁶ Lastly, a map dating from 1893 enables us to go beyond these few qualitative impressions³⁷. Urban growth was especially rapid behind the *Barra Rasta* (*Samora Avenue*), the road along which the caravans arrived from the interior. Palm trees had made way for community installations (mosques, markets) and for numerous Indian, Arabian and African dwellings. Along the 800m of highway formed by the present *Market* and *Makunganya Streets*, there were no less than 110 houses, practically all of them adjoining. In the process, the colonial administration showed itself to be unconcerned by the principle of private ownership. In 1891, the Indian trader Nurbay Mohamedbay, who owned a small 2500 m² *shamba* between the present *Market Street*, *Moschee Street*, *Libya Street* and *Morogoro road*, was informed of the following: ... *I received a letter from Leue, the district chief, that my shamba was necessary for enlarging the city and that I might have to build houses there. Indians, natives ... built there, and thus a neighbourhood appeared.*³⁸

The network was therefore an efficient instrument in the battle against the spatial logic which had existed before the arrival of the colonizers. The plantations, where much of the social life was organized during the

33 These semi-circular highways are constituted by the present Jamhuri and Jamhun street on the one hand and by Market and Makunganya street on the other.

34 Already in May 1891, the district chief contacted the representative of the sultan of Zanzibar to agree to compensation regarding the coconut palms that were cut down during the construction of the Ringstrasse. The two parties agreed on an amount of two rupees per tree. TNA, G 7 / 198, p. 23-25.

35 Towards the present-day Mnazi moja.

36 TNA, G 7 / 199, p. 27.

37 Map 794.

38 G 7 / 202, p. 90, p. 125 to 135 "[...] je reçus de la part du chef de district Leue la communication du fait que ma chamba était nécessaire à l'agrandissement de la ville et que je devais éventuellement y construire des maisons. Des Indiens, des indigènes ... y construisirent des habitations, entraînant ainsi l'apparition d'un quartier."

Zanzibari period, were destroyed for the sake of roads. Social life was forced to conform,³⁹ instead of being concentrated in a multitude of nuclei, the size of which depended on the owner's wealth. Reformulating space by means of a line contributed further to weakening Dar society which existed before the arrival of the Germans. The violence associated with the Buchiri uprising had already caused almost the total population to flee. It is very likely that the Arab community, who only gradually resettled in Dar es Salaam, lost a large part of their dependants on this occasion. Although the colonial administration refused the formal abolition of slavery so as not to damage the socio-economic situation prevailing on the coast, the fact that a spatial alignment scheme was imposed on Dar es Salaam meant that the *shamba* would disappear as places of production and social domination. Not all *shamba* were affected around 1891. At the time, the urban plan extended over some 200 hectares. For a long time, certain zones had remained isolated from the movement, probably depending on the owner's qualities: the sultan's large plantation (the present *Kariakoo*-quarter) first found itself isolated from the process of integration into urban space. The fact remains that the 14 May 1891 *Bauordnung* already made provision for the metamorphosis of those *shamba*, which were in direct contact with the urban nucleus. The urban plan was rapidly extended with the creation of a third semi-circular ring, the present *Libya Street*.

Between 1891 and 1895, the colonial state played a decisive role in integrating space in the immediate vicinity of the Zanzibari part of Dar es Salaam. The aim was to extend the existing urban fabric, transforming it in the process and giving it a European character that was worthy of a capital. The plan and the zoning process were the instruments of this urban policy that established itself from the outset as a priority with the *Bauordnung* of 14 May 1891. Within this framework defined by the colonial administration, the healthiest part of town was reserved for the latter. In order to settle there, it did not hesitate to revert to violence, even if not all residents were evicted.

B. The first property sales

The first half of the 1890's was marked by a somewhat sluggish property market, at least as far as the Europeans were concerned. The small number of transactions for this period found in the archives may certainly be explained by deficiencies in the colonial system, but in any case the settlers were few in number. A few property sales took place on Dar es Salaam's periphery, which began its transformation while anchoring itself in the colonial urban territory.

1. *The missionary stations, property market initiators*

According to the DOAG deeds society (whose weight as regards matters

³⁹ Moreover, this adjustment of social life does not mean mere acceptance of the European model. The latter was put into perspective by the importance of Indian and Swahili houses' inner courtyard and, secondly, by a particular form, i.e. the veranda (*baraza*), which overlooks the street and constitutes a privileged place of male sociability.

of property remains difficult to establish),⁴⁰ the first role-players (linked to the new, developing socio-political order) to acquire property were the two German missionary stations. The Catholic missionary station and its Protestant counterpart made their first purchases even before Dar es Salaam was elevated to the rank of capital. Reverend Grenier, who was responsible for the Protestant missionary station, had already obtained permission to settle on an area overlooking the northern entrance to the harbour in 1887. In 1889, the Benedictines of St. Ottilien chose to settle in the heart of the old city, close to the barracks, and bought two old palaces in ruins, which they proceeded to transform. Those in charge of the missions also banked on the fact that the harbour would become the main port of entry into the colony. As early as January 1889, Father Bonifacius, the Benedictine Superior, was convinced that Dar es Salaam was destined to replace Bagamoyo as the political centre. However, in order to defend the interests of the missionaries, it seemed indispensable to remain close to the power structures.

Dar es Salaam and the surrounding area had also been planned as a domain of missionary activities. The two religious institutions proceeded to buy agricultural land, thus providing their newly converted flock with the possibility of living within a community framework that was more or less isolated from the corruptions of the city. Besides the fact that it was a port city, with all the supposed moral perversions conjured up in the mind of a religious spirit, it was also largely under Islamic influence. The missionaries were thus intent on offering the new Christians a place which would serve both as a residence and a work place, and which was some distance from town. However, it had to be easily accessible for the missionaries who had to live in town so as to be close to the centre of political power. These apparently contradictory objectives determined the importance and the geographical location of the purchases. The land bought by the Protestants⁴¹ in Kisutu and by the Catholics in the Simbasi valley was considered too close to the city. The circle was squared with property bought in Magogoni (by the Protestants) and in Kurasini and Mbagalla (by the Catholics). Indeed, the peninsular nature of these areas made them difficult to access by land, whereas they were relatively easy to reach from the harbour by boat: the Benedictines needed only 30 minutes by boat to get to Kurasini's *shamba*, while the Africans who lived there had to walk for an hour to get to the city.

Despite this point in common as far as location is concerned, there was a difference in scale and in chronology between property investments made by the Protestants and Catholics, partly because of their setbacks during the Buchiri revolt. As early as 1888, the Catholic mission had wanted to settle in

40 The documents consulted do not provide a clear idea of the DOAG's hold on property. It officially administrated the city between August 1888 and December 1890. According to a cadastral document dated June 1906, it owned 15.8 hectares in town, which were divided into 11 blocks. TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 212.

41 A 15 hectare piece of land which was bought on the 1st October 1890 by a missionary called Greiner for 2858 rupees, which was a considerable amount when compared to the price of other acquisitions. BMG, Rapport de Saubertzweig-Schmidt, IV- 1. 10, p. 181.

the interior, at Pugu, some forty kilometres southwest of Dar, to raise the slave children who had been bought back from their masters. A few months later, the missionary station was destroyed by rebels and several missionaries were killed. This traumatic experience had important repercussions on the state of mind of the Benedictines who, for a while, limited their field of action to Dar es Salaam, where they educated children attending a boarding school. From 1894 and for the next ten years, they bought several hundred hectares around the city for settling Christian families. The trauma suffered by the Protestant missionary station was of a different kind. Despite military protection, the station, founded in town in 1887, was destroyed in January 1889. This experience may have put the protective effect of the urban environment into perspective. Furthermore, the Protestant mission wanted to concentrate its efforts on coherent village communities whose contacts with Islam had not been too intense. This explains why, after having acquired two pieces of land of significant size soon after their arrival, the Protestant missionaries did not pursue this policy of acquiring property subsequently.

In total, the missions' acquisitions around Dar es Salaam were of unequal scope during this whole period. The Benedictines bought around 700 hectares, while the Protestants were satisfied with 400 hectares.⁴² This accumulation was only possible thanks to a number of factors working in favour of the missions. Having arrived during the early days of German domination in the city, they were able to buy some 500 hectares of land without any legislative constraints until 1896. In fact, it was sufficient for them to have an understanding with the landowners to acquire the areas which interested them. Their financial power was more than enough to satisfy the Swahili farmers' appetite for cash. The few thousand rupees spent represented only a small part of the annual budget, although the cost of construction materials (for example) was a lot higher.

Even after legislation had been put in place, making it possible to exercise administrative control over the acquisition of property, the Benedictine missionary station pursued its policy of buying land without any great difficulty. In 1901, authorities not only accepted to turn a blind eye to a contentious transaction of several hundred hectares,⁴³ but what is more, missionary societies were largely exempted from the obligation to work the land, required by law from all European landowners.⁴⁴ Besides, this explains why large parts of their land remained fallow or even became savannah again, whereas at the time of purchase it had been fields.

42 These figures are estimates, based to a large extent on documents found in the missionary archives. These 1100 hectares must be compared to the 800 hectares of plantation owned by the Dar es Salaam commune and to the 400 hectares of the first private planter.

43 The land was sold by a local chief without the agreement of the farmers who were working the land. The latter complained to the district chief that, although admitting to the fact, refrained from doing anything to counter the ambitions of the Benedictine mission. TNA, G7 / 204, p. 172-173

44 TNA, G7 / 206, p. 93-102

2. *A few exceptional speculators*

The few purchases made by settlers during the 1890's were often motivated by objectives that were often the exact opposite of that of the missionaries. Few transactions were registered by the administration between 1891 and 1895, due to administrative shortcomings during the initial colonisation period and to the property market's low activity level.⁴⁵ The documentation on these first sales facilitates establishing their authors' profile. The buyers all belonged to the sphere of political power, apart from a settler by the name of Grasse, who lived in the colony for the whole period. Names include senior civil servants like Dr Stuhlmann and *Regierungsrat* Bornmann; District Chief Saint Paul Saint Hilaire; Soliman bin Nasor, an Omani of noble birth mentioned above.

There is no direct documentation of the reasons that prompted these individuals to buy; motivations were probably diverse in nature, ranging from pride in owning a piece of land (like lieutenant Fromm, who was able to say that he owned an island called Matakumbi, even if nothing grew there) to some of the most shameless speculation operations. The civil servants were well-placed for this kind of activity, as all the information that would enable them to estimate a terrain's potential, whether agriculturally or with regard to future urban development, was at their disposal. In December 1895, *Regierungsrat* Boorman, who held a post in Berlin, bought 150 hectares of land in close proximity to the city, just to the west of *Sultan-Schamba*.⁴⁶ This was obviously a speculative operation as well as malfeasance, as the buyer was none other than the father of the civil servant in charge of development plans for the future railway. The son had decided that the rails would cross this terrain.⁴⁷ If need be, civil servants could threaten owners to obtain the coveted transfer. In 1891, for example, *wali* Soliman bin Nasor did not hesitate to use his influence with the colonial powers to force the sale of a *shamba* located in the administrative area. To persuade *Jumbe* Kitembe and two Swahilis, Munimagara and Hamiss, he asserted that in future the government would not accept people living close to official buildings. According to District Chief Leue it was nothing less than extortion, but the owners were scared enough to sell their property.⁴⁸

Once the land had been acquired, the right of ownership of the civil servants in question still had to be recognized by the colonial state. In this game, the most gifted players were not always those one would expect. Soliman bin Nasor had hardly any difficulty getting his property rights for the above-mentioned *shamba* acknowledged (as was the case with regard to many other plots of land). District Chief Leue tried to discredit the *wali* with Governor

45 Most of the transactions, which took place during this period in fact appear in files pertaining to subsequent sales.

46 Where the present-day Ilala quarter is situated.

47 TNA, G 7 / 199, p. 154

48 TNA, G 7 / 198, p. 1

Von Soden, but in vain. The colonial power, which was still in its infancy, could not allow itself to compromise the good relations it maintained with important local people who could be of assistance to them. On the other hand, things turned out differently for civil servant Bornmann who, in December 1895, had acquired a piece of land under his father's name so as to bypass the 10 November 1893 decree. This decree compelled all civil servants who wanted to buy land in the colony to request permission from the central administration. But Governor Von Wisseman refused to play the game and found the tactic somewhat crude. To him it was unthinkable that a civil servant operating within the European administrative machinery could commit what was akin to an insider trader crime as well as malfeasance. He prohibited the transaction from being recognized, categorically refusing to take into account that the acquisition had already been settled. Moreover, this uncompromising attitude had a legal foundation, since the colonial apparatus had set up a legal arsenal towards the end of 1895, making it possible to exert strict control over property sales. The decree inaugurated a new period in the history of the local property market.

II - STATE CONTROL OF THE PERI-URBAN ZONE, 1895 - 1910

Colonial authorities spent the first years of their rule attempting to define the characteristics of what was to become an urban space, before trying to influence the way of interpreting Dar es Salaam's surrounding areas in a decisive way. The state intervened directly in this process, first by improving communications and then by putting a public health policy in place. But above all, the state wanted to organize and control the property market so as to impose certain standards regarding the use of land on colonial society's role-players.

A. First steps in the spatial development policy: space and public health

Putting in place even a modest public health policy was based on three elements: developing regulations, purchasing a number of plots and constructing various buildings in the area around the city. This policy contributed to an even greater attachment between city and periphery.

1. *Inclusion by exclusion*

The affirmation of an intimate connection between spatial organization and public health included the 1896 prohibition of burials within the agglomeration and the creation of community cemeteries on the periphery.⁴⁹ Similarly, the state concentrated various dirty and noisy activities in Upanga, north of the city. The city's communal abattoirs were built there during the 1890s, in the middle of a 155-hectare meadow bought from various owners,

49 Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1896, p. 537.

where livestock arriving in the city were put out to graze⁵⁰. In 1902, the firing range of the colonial army's fifth company and the rubbish dump were also situated in Upanga.⁵¹

The Kinangoni coast, overlooking the harbour, was the ideal spot for setting up various activities and installations that would be undesirable in close proximity to the houses. In the 1890's, some forty installations were set up there. In 1906, new installations were built for the Kinangoni dhows close to the coal depot belonging to the Hamburg company of Hansing & Co.⁵² But the very first installation relocated from the city to the opposite cove bank seems to have been the gunpowder and munitions depot. The lower part of the 1894 building's walls was made of concrete to resist the white ant onslaught. Firemen's workshops and living quarters as well as a small water tower were situated nearby.⁵³ In 1912, the administration also built a leper hospital, which, in 1913, accommodated 90 patients in this area.⁵⁴ Installations such as a quarantine facility and a leper hospital were indispensable, but also constituted a danger to public health; the administration wanted to keep a vigilant eye, while setting them up as far as possible from the city. This seems to have been a consideration shared by the missions when acquiring farmland. In 1896, the government offered to buy the 400 hectares owned by the Protestant mission in Kinangoni. In the end, because of the hostility of the metropolitan mission officials, the transaction did not take place. However, government had started construction work on the gunpowder depot on a section of the land, resulting in illegal occupation of the terrain, until an agreement pertaining to the transfer of 20 hectares was reached in December 1900.⁵⁵ The insular nature of the Kinangoni coast thus paradoxically ensured its noteworthy and premature integration into the peri-urban space.

2. *Water and spatial integration*

Unquestionably, the biggest public health problem the administration faced was water management, how to provide the city and harbour with drinking water or drain stagnant water. Even before Professor Robert Koch's 1898 Dar es Salaam sojourn, it was obvious to the authorities that the permanent swamps and many puddles that appeared during the rainy season carried diseases. At first, the authorities' actions were concentrated in two areas on the periphery of the old urban centre: on the one hand, the administrative quarter, and on the other, the Kitaloni mouth in the southern part of the harbour, near Gerasini. As early as 1893, one of *Forstsassessor* Krüger's tasks was to drain the

50 The linking of Dar es Salaam and Morogoro by railway line in 1907 led to the abattoirs being refocused and transfer red to a place not far from the railway station. RKA, 801, p.60-63.

51 TNA, G 7 / 201, p.229-232.

52 In February 1906, the company rented a few hectares of land from the Protestant Mission for a period of 15 years as storage space for the stock of coal they were selling. BMG, IV. 2.1.1, n.p.

53 RKA, 6466, p. 125-128.

54 TNA, G 7 / 209, p. 90.

55 BMG, IV- 1. 10, p. 181.

swamps in this second zone by planting trees requiring lots of water.⁵⁶ An 1894 map indicates that coconut palms were planted in the area surrounding the mouth and that the land upstream from the sugar cane fields was under cultivation. Purification policies and agricultural development combined to integrate a zone into the city that had previously been rejected. The decisive stage in integrating this swamp into the peri-urban space was only reached in 1906, with the construction of a dyke blocking the Kitaroni. The aim was to facilitate traffic flow in the direction of Kurasini and to set up conditions for filling in the Gerasini cove.⁵⁷

As far as the future administrative and residential quarter between the old town and Upanga was concerned, the authorities were not satisfied with the legal conditions they had put in place in 1891 to ensure its development. Indeed, large tracts of this zone were very humid and had to be purified to improve the living conditions of European civil servants. Earthworks were carried out as early as 1894. These developments were completed by the construction of a network of small, open drains leading to a central, 1.4 kilometre-long ditch that disappeared into the sea between the future government hospital and the European cemetery. As the zone was below sea level the ditch was closed by a lock at high tide.⁵⁸ In 1901, the purification of this quarter continued with the purchase of the village of Klein Bagamoyo, situated close to the Governor's palace. According to Governor Von Götzen, the plan was to fill in the depressions and destroy the huts, which were increasing the surrounding humidity and thus the development of certain diseases, while creating visual and olfactory discomfort.⁵⁹ Efforts to purify the urban environment remained far inferior to the needs of an ever-increasing population. In 1913 and 1914, the European community's main political demand was to start an urban purification project and increase spatial segregation.

To a certain extent, supplying the city with drinking water also contributed towards integrating the peri-urban space, even if the system's shortcomings were noted and lamented during that period. In the course of the 1890's, the city drew water from its own wells. Some fifteen or more were built by the administration in 1893;⁶⁰ the city boasted 36 water pumps by 1899.⁶¹ The situation soon appeared unsatisfactory, however: the water quality was unpredictable and the wells were often dry when the dry season lasted longer than usual. In the course of 1900, they started digging an artesian well to the

56 RKA, 6466, p. 24-39.

57 Today, railroads departing from the harbour cross this previously amphibious zone.

58 RKA, 6466, p. 114-121. For an outline of the network's layout, see map 800 in Berlin's Staatsbibliothek. The principle of open ditches was abandoned in the mid-1900's because epidemiological investigations had shown that they promoted malaria.

59 TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 236-243.

60 RKA, 6466, p. 114-121.

61 TNA, G 8 / 56, p. 1.

west of the city, behind the *boma*, but at 140 m there was still no water. In 1902, new construction work was started in Kurasini. A specialist engineer carried out the research; six thirty-metre wells providing good quality water were brought into service. That did not, however, improve the situation in the city, as this water was intended to provide for the steamboats calling in at the port.⁶² Urban growth certainly did little to improve conditions; in 1906, during a government council, a military doctor declared that the construction of a water distribution network had become necessary and urgent because of the state of health of the 'coloured population'.⁶³ The government made 150,000 marks available for this purpose. In 1909, the search for a supply source was still underway.⁶⁴ Following a severe drought in 1910-1911, the district approached a private German company in 1911 to carry out construction work, but the latter threw in the towel a year later, apparently without having undertaken significant research.⁶⁵ In the end, the district administration contented itself with constructing extra wells in 1913 in *Schöller-sshamba* (the present-day Kariakoo), which was already the city's main African quarter.⁶⁶

3. *The lion, the wild boar and the mosquito*

The State was looking for ways of involving the European community directly in a particular aspect of its public health policies: that of the struggle against the luxuriant nature, considered a permanent danger to man in general and to the white man in particular. To this effect, the administration imposed norms for taking care of the landscape on the settlers. The aim in domesticating the outskirts of Dar es Salaam was to drive back the large numbers of lion and leopard. The wild animals not only fell upon the herds, they did not hesitate to attack people by entering their huts at night.⁶⁷ The problem posed by warthogs was a less spectacular, but equally serious one: their impressive numbers constituted a veritable pest during harvest-time. When a strong, causal link between stagnant water, mosquitoes and malaria was finally established,⁶⁸ the administration saw to it that depressions were brought under cultivation in the form of meadows or rice fields, to clean up the area. The State thus saw to it that European land was well looked after. In 1905, in reaction to a district report stating that a Greek by the name of Theologos was not taking good care of his *shamba*, the Governor requested that he be compelled to tend to it,

62 DOAZ, 31 May 1902 and 13 December 1902.

63 RKA, 812, p. 132.

64 Skt Ot., Saint Joseph's monastery diary, 20 July 1909.

65 DOAZ, 29 April 1911 and 21 September 1912.

66 RKA, 801, p. 82-84.

67 The columns of the Catholic mission and the Dar es Salaam newspaper entitled *Deutsche Ostafrikanische Zeitung* made regular mention of feline misdemeanours in the city's immediate periphery.

68 Robert Koch stayed in Dar es Salaam on several occasions (February 1898, December 1904) to continue his research and make the administration aware of the results of his studies. One of his pupils and collaborators, Dr Ollwig, led a Malariaexpedition in the colony during the 1900's.

threatening him with seizure.⁶⁹ It was a credible threat, as there was legislation in place that empowered the State to control the peri-urban space development to its full potential.

B. The 26 November 1895 land regulations

From the moment they arrived, the Germans tried to get to the bottom of the land situation prevailing in Dar es Salaam and surrounding areas. Leue ordered signs with the owners' names to be displayed on the plots and plantations closest to the town centre. He started from the *a priori* that European private property could be transposed to the Zanzibari system⁷⁰. *Forstassessor* Krüger was given the task of exceeding these initial, archaic measures. Between June 1892 and January 1894, he paved the way for an urban land register by registering and translating property rights or, failing that, granting auditions to witnesses. According to him, his efforts were well received by the population, who understood him better than the Mazuria farmers, where he had already practised his art. He emphasized that these initial steps to clarify the land situation had restored Arab and Indian confidence and that, as a result, they had started building houses in stone⁷¹. This assessment probably fed on a lot of self-satisfaction. It is probable, however, that older inhabitants were reassured by the administration's written notification of land rights, after the arbitrary way in which power had been exercised during the first few years⁷².

From 1894 onwards, the government sought control of the evolution of the colony's land system. Between July 1894 and November 1895, a series of measures were taken, the concrete application of which was not always clear⁷³. What is clear, however, is that the 26 November 1895 regulations became the touchstone for government action regarding land issues. The text recognized African communities as the owners of the farm areas and made provision for establishing a reservation with a surface four times that of the land under cultivation. The remaining, so-called owner-less or *herrenlos* land became Imperial Crown property. At the head of an immense estate, the colonial State was thus able to control and orientate settler settlement, as another of the regulation's articles made provision for any transaction between a European

69 TNA, G 7 / 203, p. 248.

70 The administration stuck to this point of view until 1901; from then on, there was a reappraisal of property rights going back to the Zanzibari period and based on Muslim laws. The aim was having its ownership recognized and thus being in a position to get rent from the owners of houses built on this land.

71 RKA, 6466, p. 24-39.

72 In different situations, the exogenous elite as well as the African population could feel the weight of a document bearing the *Bezirksamt* stamp. For example, from 1 September 1891, obtaining a *Freibrief* or freedom-granting letter was enough to break the ties of subjection between a slave and his master. The power represented by this piece of paper was therefore strong enough to upset the social hierarchy. It is hardly surprising that the very fact of having a letter embellished with the imperial eagle recognizing one's property rights was considered an attractive guarantee.

73 RKA, 6466, p. 79-110 and p. 143-222.

and a *Farbigen*⁷⁴ (a person of colour) to be the subject of prior permission from the administration. The text also made provision for the creation of an urban district where deemed necessary. Within this framework, permission had to be sought from the administration for any purchase exceeding one hectare.⁷⁵

The preoccupation of the colonial State was to control and organize the transition from an African land system, which had been in existence until the arrival of the settlers, to a European land system that had to be developed. Amongst the autochthonous Zaramo and Chomvi populations from the Dar es Salaam region, management of real estate was in the hands of the *jumbe* or local chiefs. Community members wanting to settle down or extend their farms would come and see them; the two parties then agreed on putting certain sections of the land to good use. The *jumbe* could also accept the settlement of people who were foreign to the community, if the latter pledged their allegiance and offered the gifts provided for by custom.⁷⁶ The notion of private land ownership was therefore foreign to this system. However, a farmer owned the trees he had planted and could mortgage them to obtain a loan, sell them or hand them on.⁷⁷ The 1895 regulations pertaining to Imperial Crown land recognized Africans' right to manage their real estate in this way, at least on the reservation, which was recognized as theirs. However, this type of collective real estate management became unacceptable as soon as one of the settlers was involved, at which point it was inevitable that the land would become private property.

Dar es Salaam's land situation was a more complicated affair, however. Since the mid-1860's, the Omani presence had in fact led to the *de facto* emergence of a type of private property. Sultan Majid had asked the local chiefs for the right to take possession of several hundred hectares on the cove's northern bank; he gave the usual presents, but later behaved as if he owned all the land that his slaves had covered in coconut plantations⁷⁸. He gave part of it to Arabs

74 This legally constituted category grouped together all non-Europeans, mainly Africans, Indians and Arabs from Hadhramaut or Oman. Nationals from the Portuguese colony of Goa were awarded European status in 1903.

75 It proved impossible to determine the urban district's exact limits or to establish a chronology of its enlargement.

76 The case history of a plot of land of some twenty hectares in Magomeni could be considered a summary of the land allocation practices being played out. Before the colonial period, *Jumbe* Kitembe gave Msuaheli Jamkunda permission to settle there. The latter's son was farming there in 1905. In 1901, Digo migrants (an ethnic group from the coast, living in close proximity to the Zaramo) sought to establish themselves as farmers on a piece of this land. As *Jumbe* Kitembe's heirs had left Magomeni for another village near Dar es Salaam, they spoke to Muniumkushindo, the new person in charge of land allocation. The same plot was sold to a European in 1905. TNA, G 7 / 203, p. 247, 257-260.

77 Velten, *Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli*, Göttingen, 1903, p. 381. To write this book, Velten made use of an account of Swahili law written by Mwalimu Baraka bin Shomari from Kondutschi, a village near Dar es Salaam.

78 Coconut palms were at the very root of the Swahili coast's material civilization. For cooking purposes or for their thirst-quenching qualities, nuts could be sold fresh without being processed. Dry nuts were made into copra, an oily substance used in European industries. Fermented coconut palm sap could be made into *tembo*, a popular alcohol along the coast.

and Indians, his chosen residents for this new centre⁷⁹. Initially, the *jumbe* protested against this attack on their traditional role as land administrators, but in vain.⁸⁰ Except for the 1891 despoliations, the Germans had no problem recognizing the private nature of these plantations.

However, most of the land around Dar es Salaam pertained to Zaramo real estate. By imposing permission from the administration, the State provided itself with a means of controlling the shape, extent and speed of the transfer between the two systems. In fact, the 26 November 1895 regulations supplied the State with two levers with which to impose various and valued objectives in managing peri-urban space on the settlers. According to the text, the European buyer had to ask the Governor's permission to acquire the coveted land by identifying it in a clear manner (sellers, position, estimated surface). The Governor diligently carried out an investigation with the district chief. The latter or his secretary then visited the plot of land and, with the help of the local *jumbe*, auditioned/questioned the sellers and their neighbours to determine the authenticity of their property rights, ensure the validity of the indicated boundaries and establish the unanimous recognition of the latter. He then wrote a report that, as a rule, put forward that administrative permission with a few added constraints be granted. The settler's private rights were only legally recognized if he subscribed to the conditions posed. The administration could also intervene from the initial stages by contesting the property rights of the African sellers, thus making the transaction impracticable.

C. Administrative goals regarding land

Although this legal framework provided the colonial administration with a tool for efficient property market intervention, no effort was made to textually define a clear policy regarding the management of peri-urban space before the 1910's. It is above all by reading the correspondence between different administrative grades that one is able to glimpse the policy outlines of the colonial apparatus regarding the space surrounding the capital and to note their evolution and constriction.⁸¹ The first series of objectives was typical of a European administration. It was a question of regulating the peri-urban property market to avoid conflicts and protect the general interest. However, the colonial context played an important role in the shape of the regulation in question.

1. *Protecting "the general interest"*

Beyond the fact that the administration sought to guarantee private property, the primary aim of demarcating plots was to avoid conflict. If, in the course of

⁷⁹ The case of Khalid bin Msuo's father was mentioned in our introduction.

⁸⁰ Regarding the land dispute between the local *jumbe* and the Zanzibari sultanate, see Sutton J., "Dar es Salaam: a sketch of a hundred years", in Sutton J. (dir.), *Dar es Salaam. City, port and region*, T.N.R., n. 71, 1970, p. 1-19.

⁸¹ TNA, G 7 / 198 à G 7 / 208.

his visits in the field, the district chief noted disputes regarding the borders of the ceded land, he would encourage parties to come to an amicable agreement. This happened to a settler by the name of Steffens in March 1903, for example: he had just bought out another settler's *shamba* when Munyimkuu Mschindo, a distinguished member of the Swahili community and the first owner, protested that he had not ceded the amount of land reflected by the contract between the two Europeans. Without providing further details, the district chief indicated that a satisfying solution had been found.⁸²

One of the administration's constant worries was preserving the "general interest", which explains one of the conditions almost systematically imposed on buyers: that of cost price or free transfer of those areas necessary for collective development projects. It was a practical, quick and inexpensive way of securing the land required for construction work such as the building and widening of roads or drains without having to embark on lengthy expropriation procedures. Some buyers rebelled against what they considered to be an abuse of power, but without submitting they would not obtain the necessary administrative permission to register their property rights in court. For example, a pharmacist by the name of Brettschneider, who had bought a *shamba* from two "half-Indian" sisters at the beginning of 1905, protested for a long time against his obligation to cede at cost price the land required to widen the roads across his property. Negotiations were dragged out until April 1906, but Brettschneider eventually gave in.⁸³

2. *Encouraging land development*

From the turn of the century onwards, the colonial administration actively increased its efforts to encourage export-orientated agriculture. This involved Dar es Salaam and its surroundings as well as all the coastal districts and inland regions under their control. The objective was unquestionably an economic one. As Bismarck had hoped, Germany's colonial policy was impossibly mean with money. Managing the colonies had to cost the metropolis as little as possible; from the outset, the colonies had to make an autonomous budget available for domestic production. In German East Africa, this was made possible to a large extent by ivory, but exported volumes started dropping seriously at the beginning of the 20th century. It seemed obvious that the hunter-gatherer economy had had its day and that agricultural development was the way of the future. For this reason, since his arrival in 1901, Governor Von Götzen tried stepping up agricultural production in the coastal districts in different ways. The best-known measure was to force every village to cultivate a cotton-field collectively. According to many contemporaries (and echoed by

82 TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 155-156.

83 TNA, G 7 / 203, p. 262-263.

various historians),⁸⁴ this measure contributed to a large extent to the growing popular discontent fomenting the Maji-Maji revolt in the southern part of the country, which had almost reached the capital by the end of July 1905. As far as Dar es Salaam was concerned, however, the economic aspect was not the authorities' only concern. They had to deal with the peculiarities of a colonial urban population. On the one hand, they had to handle requests for land requirements from the settlers, whose numbers had increased significantly since the construction of the railway-line in 1905. In addition, urban markets essential to the city's growth⁸⁵ had to be supplied with fresh provisions to satisfy the demands of the expanding African community. Thus, the colonial administration wanted local farmers to continue stepping up the development of their fields. Lastly, insofar as they agreed to collaborate, the property interests of the old elite (whether Swahili, Arab or Indian) also had to be taken into account. These local imperatives posed the problem of agricultural development on Dar es Salaam's periphery in terms that differed from Governor Von Götzen's overall policy.

3. *Fighting speculation*

Until 1901, however, the administration contented itself with taking an interest in the sole speculation problem. When perusing the Governor's requests for an inquiry, the only real concern seems to have been to determine whether the aim in acquiring a piece of land was in fact to produce. In 1899, the government translator, Ribeiro, who was originally from Goa, had no trouble in getting administrative permission after the district chief had assured the Governor of his entrepreneurial seriousness. On the other hand, in the course of the same year a settler by the name of Zimmermann was less fortunate. Considering that the land he had purchased was close to town and that, moreover, he lacked the financial means to put it to good use, the authorities refused him administrative permission. But when all's said and done, there were only a few cases of transactions being categorically refused by the Governor because of speculation.⁸⁶

From November 1899 onwards, when District Chief Von Winterfeld estimated that an acquisition constituted obvious speculative hoarding, he

84 John Iliffe considers the *Dorfen-schamba* as one of the main factors that triggered the revolt. This analysis is put into perspective by Johanni Koponen: although he does not deny that these compulsory cultivations provoked strong feelings of dissatisfaction, it was just one of many elements. See Iliffe J., *A modern History of Tanganyika*, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1979, 615 p. (see chapter 6) and Koponen J., *Development for exploitation. German colonial policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914*, Lit Verlag, 1995 (chapter 4).

85 The European population was the subject of an annual census; statistics provided by the administration thus do not pose a problem. Dar had 291 European inhabitants in 1904 and 695 in 1910. As for the African population, their numbers were subjected to (often contradictory or doubtful) estimates before the 1913 census. At the end of 1904, a missionary by the name of Klamroth put the number of Africans living in Dar es Salaam at 12,000 (BMG, III- 10. 1, unpublished report for the 4th term of 1904); according to the 1913 census there were 14,500 African residents, plus a floating population estimated at 3 or 4,000 people. (DOAZ, 2 and 9 April 1913).

86 TNA, G 7 / 200, p. 167-171.

resorted to other means of preventing the purchase. He asked his subordinates to investigate the legitimacy of the buyers' rights, which could be contested in case the land had not been put to good use in some form or another before November 1895, the date of the law regulating real estate. It was not so much about protecting Imperial Crown land as avoiding certain speculative slides or fighting procedural perversion by civil servants acquiring land under cover of a family frontman.⁸⁷ However, until 1905, these inquiries into property rights were of no consequence as far as transactions were concerned, as the conclusion in every case was that the buyers' rights were legitimate ones.

The investigating officers were either low-ranking civil servants close to the settlers, or *jumbe*, who often had a vested interest in the sale and thus did not share the concerns of their immediate superior. In fact, the administration considered the heart of the matter to be elsewhere: they were prepared to turn a blind eye to the possible alienation of so-called *herrenlos* land (which, according to law, belonged to the administration), on condition that the latter be rapidly brought under cultivation. This explains why the control exerted by the authorities shifted from fighting speculation to making it compulsory for land to be brought under cultivation.

4. *Developing cultivation*

From 1901 onwards, the colonial power thus preferred checking on the actual development of the land acquired by the settlers, rather than wondering about the speculative nature of their acquisitions. To achieve this, they imposed a precise cultivation schedule in exchange for granting administrative permission, more often than not in the form of a coconut plantation and sometimes in the form of a rice-field. If the new owner did not meet the deadline, his fine was proportional to the surface that had not yet been brought under cultivation. At first, the provided sanction consisted of the administration's option to buy back for cash the *shamba* which had not been put to good use in due course; sometimes the given sanction was even a pure and simple transfer of property. Changing the nature of the sanction made it more credible and thus more of an incentive.

To encourage growth in agricultural exports, the State did not hesitate getting involved in experiments. From 1893, the two and a half hectare park around the Governor's palace, which was used as a botanical garden, asserted its experimental function (*Versuchgarten*).⁸⁸ The government also purchased a 130-hectare *shamba* in Kurasini, which was planted with 110,000 agaves from May 1895 onwards. The first harvest, which was supposed to provide private planters with seedlings, was in October 1897.⁸⁹ The experiments were of interest to the Catholic mission, which owned a neighbouring property.

87 TNA, G 7 / 200, p. 141-149 and TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 187 to 197.

88 RKA, 6466, p. 24-39.

89 Seidel A., Dar es Salaam. Die Hauptstadt DOAS. Ein Kulturbild, Berlin, Messer & Co., 1898, p. 23.

In 1898, they planted a few hectares, hoping to sell the produce to the government's hemp factory.⁹⁰ But world sisal prices were hardly buoyant; both the government and the mission soon abandoned the experiment. The government plantation at Kinamboni, near the munitions depot, followed the same route. 4,500 mulberry trees were planted in 1897, but the tropical conditions did not suit the silkworm moths.⁹¹ On the other hand, coconut trees were added to the common plantation extending south of Pugu road, which was carefully maintained from 1899 onwards. By 1906, 25,000 palm trees per 300 hectares were being counted. Intermediate crops (*Mohogo* and various tubers) promoted the development and maintenance of the trees, as well as being a substantial source of income, considering the high price of foodstuffs on the Dar es Salaam market. A dairy farm of about a hundred head was also accommodated on the *shamba's* 700 hectares.⁹² This example, publicized by the local newspaper, and the success of a few pioneers were not without impact on the settlers' investments in real estate.

5. *Involving all autochthones in property transfers*

During the 1890's, the administration's attitude towards the autochthonous population's property rights was an ambivalent one. As early as 1895, there is an example of such rights being taken into consideration. During that time, a senior civil servant by the name of Dr. Stuhlmann bought a piece of land north of *Klein Bagamoyo* (the present-day Kivukoni quarter) from a Goan trader by the name of De Souza. Waziri Tembasa, a Swahili inhabitant from this hamlet, claimed ownership of part of the land: his case was heard, which blocked the regularization process for a while, until an arrangement was found between the two parties.⁹³ However, what emerges from District Chief Von Wintersfeld's report is that the colonial administration's treatment of the local population was not always as honourable. While preparing the Catholic mission's request for authorization to purchase 315 hectares in 1901, he noted that it would be difficult to refuse as, contrary to government practice, the mission had taken the trouble to provide the evicted inhabitants with financial compensation.⁹⁴

Governor Von Götzen, who occupied the position between 1901 and 1906, seemed more consistent in this regard. He notably ensured a reasonable selling price when it came to particular transactions. On 20 March, 1902, when forwarding a request for authorization from a settler named Devers to the district chief, he pointed out that a sum of 20 rupees was quite inadequate for a transaction involving 10 hectares of land. He concluded his letter by asking the local administration not to forget to take the interests of the local population into account. On at least two other occasions he demanded (in a

90 Missionsblätter, 1899, p. 42-43 : an extract from the Apostolic Prefect's 1898 annual report.

91 Seidel, Dar es Salaam ..., p. 23.

92 DOAZ, 28 April 1906.

93 TNA, G 7 / 199, p. 94.

94 TNA, G 7 / 207, p. 45.

much more peremptory manner) that buyers pay a supplement to authorize the transaction.⁹⁵ However, it is difficult to detect the outline of a global policy from these isolated cases. In addition to the limited number of cases, it would seem that Governor Götzen was particularly touched by the sellers' distress.⁹⁶ Moreover, the fact that he flaunted his concerns during individual transactions did not prevent this same Governor from allowing the State to benefit from the inhabitants of the *Klein Bagamoyo* hamlet's ignorance of property market prices on offer. In September 1901, in response to appeals from the administration, they had asked for 1000 rupees to sell the 2.3 hectares of land they were living on. Von Götzen qualified this as a very attractive price and concluded the transaction without further scruples.⁹⁷

Governor Rechenberg, who supported a free-market economy, refused to take such considerations into account, even when the low price recorded by the district greatly resembled misappropriation of funds.⁹⁸ This did not mean that, under his administration, the *Farbigen's* interests were not taken into account. In fact, since before his arrival, Boeder, Von Winterfeld's successor to the post of district chief, gradually put a policy in place to defend the interests of the locals. In transactions involving several dozen hectares of land, it would seem that, at least from March 1905 onwards,⁹⁹ his administration carried out investigations to determine whether all the legal claimants had shared in the profits. The same procedure was followed in the case of massive protests from the local population. This was notably the case in February 1906, when an investigation showed that an illegal transaction had taken place between *Jumbe* Chambuso and the Catholic mission in Mbagalla. The latter was nonsuited.¹⁰⁰ Following the Maji-Maji revolt, the colonial apparatus paid better attention to these problems, while the government systematically requested the district to carry out this type of investigation. However, the example involving the Catholic mission remained an exception. As a general rule, the district contented itself with getting all those with legal claims to the sold property to share in the profits. At best (i.e. when the investigations carried out by

95 In 1903, a planter called Devers had to pay an extra 50 rupees to a Swahili by the name of Munimkuu bin Mohamedani for a *shamba* of 5 hectares that had initially cost 400 rupees. TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 120. In 1905, a pharmacist by the name of Brettschneider had to pay two sisters a supplement of 20 rupees to be granted administrative permission to buy their *shamba* at Upanga. TNA, G 7 / 203, p. 262-263.

96 Munimkuu bin Mohamedani was forced to sell his *shamba* because of debt and because his two half-Indian sisters were ill and relatively isolated.

97 TNA, G 7 / 199, p. 94.

98 In 1910, the district chief attracted the Governor's attention to the exceptionally low price paid by a civil servant for land belonging to an Indian living in Pemba, whose interests in Dar es Salaam were "protected" by a fellow countryman. The Governor brushed aside his subordinate's scruples, noting that it did not fall within the administration's competence to see to this type of detail. TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 20-24.

99 District secretary Siegel made inquiries about a 50-hectare terrain located at Tabata, purchased by a Greek settler by the name of Loukas from a group of Swahilis. In the course of the *in situ* examination of the neighbours, he was able to establish that two other groups of people could assert rights to the *shamba* in question. To take possession of his property, Loukas was obliged to offer them a share of the profits. TNA, G 7 / 203, p. 221.

100 TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 172-173.

the district chief were done in a conscientious and efficient way), those legal claimants who, at first, had not been included in the sales procedures became *de facto* sellers without necessarily having sought that position. Thus, the aim was not to prevent the transfer of property from benefiting the settlers, but to keep fierce dissatisfaction amongst the African population from coming to light. In this way the administration sought to facilitate acceptance of the process of transferring property in favour of the settler community and to prevent or ease the tensions that the *shamba* sales generated within the autochthonous communities.

No explicit mention is made of those people who were included in the "legal claimant" category. The shift from one property system to another left the State official in charge with a large margin for interpreting the registration process. Establishing landownership according to European definitions made no sense. The civil servant could choose between recognizing the *jumbe's* right to allocate land as a sort of property right or (on the contrary) refusing to take this purely African legal trait into consideration and only upholding the interests of the farmers. As he settled down in his post, District Chief Von Winterfeld (who occupied the position in 1899 and 1904) became explicitly hostile to the chiefs' customary rights.¹⁰¹ But he received little hierarchical support, as Governor Von Götzen seemed to take no interest in the problem. His successor, Von Rechenberg, was hostile to the recognition of any "sovereignty right" in favour of the *jumbe*.¹⁰² However, one can only note that District Chief Boeder (who occupied the post from 1904 to 1909, i.e. mostly under Von Rechenberg's Governorship) pursued a subtle policy, handling the interests of the farmers and the African chiefs with equal care. It could be explained by the hierarchical links between the district chief and the *jumbe*, who executed his orders on a local level. Another reason may be that, without the consent of the local chiefs, property transfers in favour of the settlers could not have occurred without strong resistance from Swahili society. Moreover, Boeder wanted to handle the African farmers with care, having become aware that repeated sales could actually result in economic deadlock. In Magomeni, he noted that farmers were starting to refuse to clear the land intended for cultivation because the *jumbe*, who had the power to allocate the plot, were making rapid sales to the settlers. There was growing demand from the settlers, who preferred buying land already under cultivation. Farmers could be tempted to leave the Dar es Salaam periphery for other, kinder climes; it was thus important for them not to be perpetually despoiled of the labour they had invested in the clearing process. The continuing transfer of properties in favour of the settler community depended on it; also, the administration

101 In a report dated 6 June 1903, he emphasized that, according to him, the administration should not take the old *jumbe* rights into consideration. TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 191.

102 Ich bemerke dabei, dass Ansprüche Eingeborener, die sich auf vermuntliche oder tatsächliche Hoheitsrechte stützen, grundsätzlich nicht anerkannt werden können! TNA, G 7 / 206, p. 100.

was counting on the latter for the region's economic development and for domesticating the landscape. Providing the city with fresh supplies of African farm products, one of the government's early concerns, also depended on it.

6. Supporting the existing production of subsistence crops

At the same time, and often in a contradictory way, the administration was intent on supporting and even developing the African production of subsistence crops. This was already a significant concern in a directive from Governor Liebert to the district chief, following an inspection tour of the Dar es Salaam district in June 1897. The Governor sharply scolded his subordinate, criticizing him for having neglected his constituency. He insisted that, henceforth, the district chief should watch over the organization of the city's food distribution by turning his constituency into a production zone, using the capital as a natural outlet. In particular, he was asked to devote himself to the development of livestock farming, destroyed by epizootics in the 1890's. He also wanted the inhabitants of the Ruvu villages to be encouraged to travel to the capital to sell their abundant production.¹⁰³

This was an even more sensitive issue in 1900, after the famine that had affected many of the coastal districts. There had been little rain between 1898 and 1900. In Uzaramo, the hinterland of Dar es Salaam, the effects of the drought had been particularly cruel because of the sandy soil. It was not long before grasshoppers claimed their dues from the poor harvest, with the result that food shortages and famine soon set in everywhere. As is often the case in similar circumstances, the weakest members of society, the women and children, were the most vulnerable.¹⁰⁴ The memory of skeletal bodies wandering the roads leading to the coastal cities in the hope of finding food probably left a mark on people's minds. In any case, the dossier inspired more or less similar viewpoints between the different administrative levels. In a report dated 20 May 1900 regarding a settler's purchase of 133 hectares, District Chief Von Winterfeld emphasized that the land in question was under cultivation and that one could not seriously contemplate measures, which would compel Europeans to plant subsistence crops. He concluded that, in future, property transfers should be prohibited, even if in this particular instance his suggestion was to regularize the dossier.¹⁰⁵ Governor Von Götzen agreed with his subordinate's analysis. More than the spectre of famine, his greatest fear was that the settlers' purchases would lead to a reduction in the production of subsistence crops and thus, in the medium term, to an increase in the cost of living for the African workers. These inflationist tendencies would have a knock-on effect on salaries, which in turn would negatively affect economic activities¹⁰⁶. But a request (dated 20 March, 1902) to the district

¹⁰³ RKA, 796, p. 48.

¹⁰⁴ See the 1899 *Missionsblätter*, p. 53-58, as well as the Santa Maria cloister Chronicle for 1899.

¹⁰⁵ TNA, G 7 / 200, p. 179-186.

¹⁰⁶ TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 136.

for an investigation regarding a contract between a planter called Devers and *jumbe* by the name of Kinyogori and Kitembe reveals Governor Von Götzen's diverse priorities as far as the Dar es Salaam periphery is concerned: first, he asked whether the transaction did not threaten the provision of fresh supplies to the city; he then emphasized that the purchase price was probably too low and that the locals should be protected against settler abuse; lastly, he wanted to know whether Devers had fulfilled his obligations of putting the land he had already acquired to good use. The absence of any hierarchical organization between the different points allowed the district chief a lot of room to use his discretion. However, in 1902, Winterfeld was much less alarmist about the dossier regarding the provision of fresh supplies, emphasizing that African farmers came from afar to sell their produce on the markets of Dar es Salaam.¹⁰⁷ There was thus no longer a need to limit property transfers to the benefit of the settler community. Von Winterfeld's viewpoint change was not just the result of the local farmers' renewed interest in the urban market. Daily contact with the settler community inevitably led the district official to revise his analyses regarding property matters. Socio-economic analysis gave way to more or less friendly relations established with the Europeans.

Thus, it is not surprising that, for a few years, the arrival of the new district chief, Gustav Boeder, in the course of 1904 resulted in renewed interest in the question of subsistence crop protection. Neither was the city's socio-economical evolution foreign to the topicality of the subsistence crop question. When construction on the railway line between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro began towards the end of 1904, it resulted in a flood of workers who had to be fed, as part of their salary consisted of a daily distribution of food (*posho*). It was made up of rice, mostly imported from India, or cassava. The need for fresh products led Boeder to exert vigilant control over property purchases of an expanding European population always in need of more land. Amongst others, in cases where European pressure was already very strong and thus disruptive, he tried preventing property transfers from being pursued. This was notably the case in Magomeni, as we have just seen. In June 1905, this is where he led a thorough investigation into the purchase of 20 hectares of cassava by a settler called Nette. He advised the Governor not to authorize the sale, and the latter followed his advice.¹⁰⁸ However, decisions prohibiting transactions to protect the production of subsistence crops were few and far between. Like Winterfeld, Boeder rapidly evolved towards a position that favoured the settlers. So when in August 1907 the same Nette repeated his request for administrative permission, the district

107 When compared to the viewpoint held by Governor Liebert 1897, this opinion could lead one to believe that Dar es Salaam had succeeded within a few years in turning its hinterland into a zone which could provide fresh supplies. Among others, this rapid evolution can be explained by the introduction of a housing tax (*Hutteteur*) in 1897, as farmers came to sell part of their production on the urban market to obtain the necessary cash for paying the tax. TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 270.

108 TNA, G 7 / 203, p. 257.

chief supported him, pointing to the fact that the city's provision of fresh supplies had evolved radically since the start of railway operations.¹⁰⁹

7. Forced settlement of farmers on Crown land

Urban market needs and the fact that the land around Dar es Salaam had not been put to good use led the administration to put together various plans aimed at increasing the production of subsistence crops. Under Götzen's administration, these plans took on a more concrete aspect when he proceeded to deport Nyamwezi and Sukuma farmers,¹¹⁰ settling them in different areas on the capital's periphery. Although the project dated back to 1903 at least, it was only carried out in 1905. It seems that it was not accomplished without some amount of violence, as emphasized in a report by *Oberleutnant* Von Schleinitz, but the form and intensity of the violence is difficult to determine.¹¹¹ In spite of the coercion, the experience was crowned with success. The displaced people applied themselves to putting to good use the piece of *pori* (savannah) allocated by their "benefactor", as well as seed, tools, some livestock and food to last until the first harvest. These communities soon occupied an important position in providing the city with fresh supplies. There are several accounts of this. In September 1905, *Akida*.¹¹² Hamiss from Msasani asked the administration to settle some Sukuma on the territory under his responsibility, so that his people, like those of Magogoni, could get supplies at cheaper prices.¹¹³ The Sukuma from Magogoni were in fact living on the *shamba* of the Protestant mission, after the latter had accepted a proposition from Governor Von Götzen in 1905 to that effect. Various reports from the mission to the motherhouse emphasized that their guests were taking the development of the land very seriously. In exchange for right of residence, the Sukuma had to take care of part of the mission's coconut plantation; for this work they received a salary that was far below market price. Their economic success is vouched for by a missionary called Krelle who, in 1913, noted that the Sukuma were getting a large income from their production. He suggested to his superiors to try the same type of cultivation.¹¹⁴ There were two other Nyamwezi communities around Dar es Salaam: one at Pugu, some twenty kilometres from the city, and the other in the Simbasi valley.

The influx of immigrants noted by District Chief Stier in a report dated 28 August 1909¹¹⁵ had its origins in this achievement. He remarked that the

109 TNA, G 7 / 206, p. 110.

110 These ethnic groups live in the centre and in the northern part of Tanzania's high, central plateaux. Because of their involvement in caravan traffic, they earned the reputation of being hard workers. This reputation went beyond portage, extending to agriculture.

111 TNA, G 35 / 1, p. 12.

112 An *akida* was a chief put in place by the German administration to manage a territory, while the *jumbe* were usually the traditional chiefs of a community.

113 TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 10.

114 BMG, IV- 1. 10, p. 195-202.

115 TNA, G 7 / 207, 128-129.

number of Nyamwezi from the Kinandoni community was increasing annually and that the farm area, which was producing crops for the local market stalls, was expanding continuously. He concluded his report by emphasizing the need to protect these European or Indian investment zones. Rechenberg declared himself to be in total agreement and reaffirmed that there was no question of challenging one of the foundations of providing the city with fresh supplies. On the Protestant mission's *shamba*, the demographic evolution was as follows: in August 1905, 35 men and women were settled there; by the end of the first term of 1907, their community consisted of more than 100 people according to a missionary by the name of Kupfernagel.¹¹⁶ Thus, in less than two years, the community had tripled. A large proportion of this population was made up of adult men, seeing as the station's economist was able to recruit up to 75 Sukuma workers in the course of the first term of 1907.

For the first time in the Dar es Salaam periphery, in order to set up these communities, the State had recourse to the 26 November, 1895 legislation which awarded colonial authorities ownership of land which was not occupied or farmed. Until 1905, despite District Chief Von Winterfeld's attempts, the latter had allowed virgin land to be transferred to the benefit of the settler community. What was important at the time was extending the human hold over the environment and developing farm exports. However, the will to develop the production of subsistence crops gave new interest to the so-called *herrenlos* territories. In 1905 for example, a settler was refused administrative permission for land that had not been put to good use, although he had already paid for it. The administration wished to settle a new group of displaced farmers on it, considering this zone to be perfect, as it was not only propitious for subsistence crops, but also relatively isolated from the major roads as well as close to the city.¹¹⁷

Only strong political willpower to realize a specific objective could run counter to the logic of everyday management, globally favourable to the settler community, as was the case with the settlement of the Nyamwezi farmers. The rest of the time, the colonial apparatus satisfied itself with recording settler stances, even after 1905, when Rechenberg had made the development of African agriculture his central policy theme. To understand the process governing the constitution of the peri-urban space during this second phase, one should take an interest in the other role-players within the new colonial society and no longer limit oneself to the role-played by a versatile, often divided and perpetually nit-picking administration.

116 BMG, IV- 1. 10, p. 249-252 and BMG, III- 10.1.1, Dar es Salaam missionary station report, first term of 1907, unpublished.

117 TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 8.

III - COLONIAL SOCIETY AND PERI-URBAN SPACE BETWEEN 1900 AND 1914

The arrival of the German colonizers did not generate the *ex nihilo* appearance of a new type of society, but led to a slow, inevitable transformation of the economic and socio-cultural logic. Although the State's legal redefinition of the criteria of social excellence *a priori* placed Europeans at the top of the social ladder, it could not erase economic and political realities. To keep the country going, the government had to take the pre-existing situation into account. Their power over the people depended on the African and Arab political elite already in place; it was the Arabs and Indians who commanded the better part of the machine and of the economic know-how. Gradually, however, the capital became populated with Europeans with aspirations for economic success. In this regard, the decisive turning point was in 1905, when construction work started on the railway line that would replace the caravans on the road leading to Lake Tanganyika. It then became clear that Bagamoyo would rapidly be supplanted by Dar es Salaam as the economic capital. Moreover, the former, exogenous elite left the old caravan terminus for the colony's capital without delay. Because of its economic potential, the peri-urban space became the scene of rivalry between the different elements of the population. The State had provided itself with the legal means of arbitrating this rivalry, but its apparent interventionist will, barely tempered by Berlin's supervision from afar, was put to the test by a colonial society in the making, in search of various ways to free itself from this corset.

Within fifteen years, the emergence of a European-style property market created new, strong and complex links between the burgeoning city and the space surrounding it. It was not a case of the advent of economic interdependence. On a social, cultural and even symbolic level, new dimensions dictated by the city were taking over the peri-urban space. Colonial society's various role players participated in this movement, although in different capacities. Part of the exogenous upper layers (Europeans, Indians, Arabs) living in town increasingly appropriated peri-urban real estate, continually pushing back its borders. Admittedly, the movement had already started during the Zanzibari period, but it reached new geographical heights during the German colonial period. Although means of soil utilization and development were adapted to the needs and views of the most influential town-dwellers, it would have been impossible without active participation from the local population although, in a global sense, the latter were subjected to more changes than they instigated. What is more, property transfers benefiting those heading the colonial hierarchy did not affect the available peri-urban space at a similar pace. For a long time, certain zones were abandoned because of a lack of interest; on the other hand, other, more attractive areas were able to resist exogenous penetration, which leads one to assume that there was some coherence amongst those communities and that they were able to adapt to the colonial environment.

These introductory remarks on the emergence of an organic link between the city and its surrounding space would not be complete without recalling the fragmented nature of the sources involved, probably resulting in an exaggeration of the role played by European settlers, or more exactly in a minimization of the role played by the other population categories. Next to the State apparatus, the European settlers played the most noticeable role in transforming the city's surroundings. The origins of this bias can obviously be found in the available sources, which are first and foremost of an administrative nature. However, the significance of the number of hectares acquired by the settlers from 1900 onwards as well as the impact of their investments on the peri-urban landscape unquestionably awarded them the status of major role-players. Nevertheless, a few observations reveal the significance of the investments in real estate made by the Indian community. Also, a few sales contracts provide insight into the unflagging initiative of Dar es Salaam's Arab community. Finally, the institution of a tax on land sales between *Eingeborenen* from 1912 onwards gives a glimpse of the complex relations between a new colonial and urban society in the making and the African community's socio-economic customs revolving around land.

A. The emergence of supply and demand in real estate

1. *Setting up supply*

The role of economic monetarisation¹¹⁸

With the exception of the violent means initially used by the government to secure the land they thought necessary for settlement purposes, property transfers were made on the basis of monetized exchanges or by getting into debt. Money was nothing new in the region, especially since the Zanzibari period, but economic monetarisation reached new levels with the development of a wage-earning workforce. Servants, office workers, soldiers, qualified workmen, dockers and, more generally, day labourers: there was no shortage of opportunities to earn a living wage. African town-dwellers who had opted for this choice developed a new type of consumption--the best paid ones having access to luxury products. Local chiefs from the immediate surroundings were keen to participate in this new mode of consumption, which was attractive in itself and also conferred prestige and social meaning. To maintain their social standing *vis-à-vis* those earning wages and salaries, notably during the many rites of passage, which regulated local life, they had to obtain cash resources.¹¹⁹ One of the most obvious ways of increasing their purchasing power was to

118 For an analysis of the effects of monetarisation on 19th century coastal societies, see Glassman; the term used by Glassmann is *merchandisation*.

119 J Glassmann's study provides an excellent illustration of the role played by ostentation in social relations in Pangani during the second half of the 19th century and of its harmful effects on the town's aristocratic families.

sell their traditional right to allocate land, a right they tended to interpret in the widest possible sense by an opportunistic reading of customary law. Thus, they sold sections of *pori* situated far from their village (where the community did not recognize their rights), as well as land that had been cleared by others (where the usufruct did therefore not belong to them). Moreover, the *jumbe* and other heads of families controlled farmland running into dozens of hectares, which had been cleared by them or by their ancestors. They used it to settle members of their families and foreigners who asked for permission to do so. Compared to those areas where allocation rights were being practised, this land, which had been cleared to a large extent, was more valuable than savannah. It was put up for sale for the same reasons.

Locals were attracted by the urban lifestyle. Some considered paid employment in the city to be secure enough to abandon their previous livelihoods and to sell their land. Constant tensions in the labour market, where the search for labour was a perennial one, resulted in an upward trend as far as salaries were concerned. Finding work was easy, especially for those who had undergone technical training. This tendency is well illustrated by a report dated 1911 pertaining to a transaction in Mburahati. The district chief noted that the two sellers were no longer members of the farming community and that they would henceforth associate themselves with an urban lifestyle. One of them, the son of a *jumbe*, was a carpenter; the other, who was himself a *jumbe*, lived on income from a coconut plantation.¹²⁰ Sales between *Eingeborenen* recorded by the administration confirms this tendency for the end of the period in question.¹²¹ Of the more or less sixty contracts concluded between 1913 and 1915, ten involved sellers living in Dar es Salaam. In six cases, the total value of the contract exceeded 100 rupees, and in three cases, more than 225 rupees. The property sold was therefore quite considerable.¹²² This would lead one to believe that certain members of the Swahili elite were living in the city and selling property to maintain their lifestyle. The hypothesis is confirmed when the seller's social status is clearly indicated in the contract which, unfortunately, only occurs in two cases: the first concerns Salima,

Jumbe Munyikuschimba's daughter, while the second involves *Jumbe* Madenge, who worked for the Mtoni administration during the 1900's.

Economic monetarisation weakened African farmers' hold over real estate in various ways. The first scenario stemmed from a combination of the effects of colonial taxation and climatic vagaries. In November 1897, the government initiated a property tax in the pacified coastal districts. Usually, extra work

120 *Die bisherigen Eigentümer* (Mwinyi Mwera bin *Jumbe* Simba and *Jumbe* Mwinikuu Shindo) *haben keine Interesse an den weiteren Besitz dieser Schamba, da sie in Dar es Salaam wohnen und nicht mehr zur ackerbautreibenden Bevölkerung gehören. Der eine ist Tischlerfundi, während der zweite vom Ertrag einer weiteren Palmenpflanzung lebt.* TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 120.

121 TNA, G35 / 55.

122 At the time, a servant working for a European earned 15 rupees per month, while a cook earned 20 rupees.

would make surplus production available that could be marketed at a good price on the Dar es Salaam market. But the drought that ravaged the region from 1897 to 1899 and the many climatic incidents in general reduced this income to an uncertain promise or even to nothing. To pay their taxes, it may be that farmers did not directly sell their land, but they got into debt with the Indian traders from whom they usually got the consumer goods they allowed themselves. Eventually, some could not repay their debts and the land fell prey to the lender.

The social importance of money also weakened families in mourning. Traditionally, the transmission of trees or cultivated plots would take place within the *mlango* or extended family group through the patrilineal line, the contours of which were not fixed once and for all.¹²³ The monetarisation process greatly weakened this type of transmission. If one of the heirs decided to sell what he considered to be his share to a European, it resulted in the transfer of the entire property. Swahili farmers were not the only ones exposed to this type of problem. When a minor from the Arab community inherited a coconut plantation, his guardians often preferred to sell it and administer the money made available, so as not to be liable for bad management. However, several district reports emphasize the extremely low selling prices - well under market price - of certain sales, to a point where one cannot but imagine some malicious arrangement between the guardian and the European buyer.¹²⁴

Sales of a political nature

Following the institutional break between Zanzibar and the continent, the Omani aristocracy who had decided to remain under British rule gradually sold off their coastal property. As early as 1891, the district recorded the first transactions of this kind. But in this case the main seller was undoubtedly the sultan himself. According to a survey conducted in 1898 by British civil servants in his service, the sultan owned some 300 hectares of land, divided into five plantations of unequal proportions.¹²⁵ The largest plantation was situated near the city's western gates. This *Sultan-schamba* extended over 200 hectares; half of it was planted with palm trees. At first, the sultan did not want to sell his property, despite an offer from the German government in 1899. The *shamba* was actually leased to Soliman bin Nasor, the city's *wali* and a close friend of sultan Bargash who had died in 1888. Contrary to some of his other *shamba*, where he rented the land to whoever wanted to build a house on it, it would seem that in this case he respected the fact that this coconut plantation was used for agricultural purposes. In one of its articles, the DOAZ deplored the fact that African migrants arriving in the city found it impossible to settle

¹²³ Glassmann p. 39-42.

¹²⁴ Sherif Omar bin Salim, the guardian of Mohamed Mukhsen's sons, sold one of their *shamba* for such a low price that the district was forced to draw the wards' attention to the matter. TNA, G7 / 206, p.142.

¹²⁵ RKA, 757, p. 63.

there, resulting in an alarming increase in the density of the existing quarters.¹²⁶ However, by the turn of the century, the Zanzibari government realized that the *wali* had long stopped paying for the farm and brought the case before the German court. The legal imbroglio that followed lasted until 1904, when a private German company became the owner of the land: the *Sultanschamba* thus became the *Schöllerschamba* (which, in time, would become Kariakoo).¹²⁷

2. *Economic reasons for the demand*

On the European side

In 1899, an article in the local newspaper recorded that the European population was still not used to venturing outside the city, despite the lovely walks on offer; it provided an example of the ideal recreational destination: the *Sachsenwald*, a forest situated on the main caravan route (*Pugustrasse*), the edge of which was only 7 kilometres from the city centre. However, ten years later, all the land on either side of this route was in the hands of settlers and in 1913, an article in the same newspaper questioned the use of conserving a forest of this kind in such close proximity to the city while settlers were in need of land.¹²⁸ Within a few years, Dar es Salaam's Europeans thus embarked on acquiring peri-urban land and putting it to good use. The low price of property encouraged this evolution. In 1905, a planter by the name of Paul Devers acquired some fifty partly cleared hectares for 250 rupees, a price which, at the time, was lower than that of a steamship ticket on the *DOA-Linie*, or the equivalent of a modest employee's monthly salary. The value of the coconut plantations was much higher: in 1903, the same Devers bought a 5 hectare plantation for 400 rupees, although it had only 95 palm trees as well as various other trees.¹²⁹ However, for Europeans with some resources the plantations were still affordable.

Although almost all of Dar es Salaam's European inhabitants could buy a few hectares of land, they were not equally well equipped to ensure that it was put to good use. Only by bringing a certain number of parameters under control could one hope to succeed in such an undertaking. In the first place, one had to be convinced that the investment was profitable, as was the case for settlers arriving in the 1890's. Pioneers, including the colonial authorities in the forefront, made various attempts to find an export crop that would be easy to develop as well as lucrative. After a number of failures, the Omani example of a coconut plantation finally established itself as the most pertinent solution:

126 DOAZ, 23 December 1899. On this point, subsequent information confirms the article written for the occasion. The journalist's intention was to justify a very expensive acquisition by the colonial authorities in the eyes of the Berlin authorities.

127 For more information on this matter: RKA, 757 and 758.

128 On 5 October 1910, the DOAR noted that Europeans owned more than 160,000 palm trees around Dar es Salaam.

129 TNA, G 7 / 207, p. 106-107; TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 22-24, p. 68; TNA, G 7 / 204, p.120.

the tree adapted well to the region's sandy soil and the nut had a buoyant local and international outlet. Local farming techniques were re-used, but agricultural contractors tried by means of empirical experiments to increase the density of the coconut plantations. They concluded that a young shoot should be planted at a depth of two metres and that it needed 100 m² to develop to its best potential. European plantations thus generally allowed for 100 trees per hectare. This was extremely dense, as the few available examples indicate that there were only 10 to 25 trees on the Arab or Swahili plantations: wherever there was European investment, the arboreal hold over the landscape made a leap ahead. Provided that a lot of care was given during the initial growth period and in particular that the young shoots had enough water during the dry seasons, the trees grew very well and started producing nuts after 5 or 6 years. However, there had to be constant surveillance during the harvest, as thefts were a common occurrence as well as being relatively easy, as the plantations were open and crisscrossed by roads.

It is clear from these conditions that an apprentice planter had to be able to wait at least five years for his investment to start showing a profit. More importantly, he had to be able to mobilize a sufficient workforce for the labour involved in developing the land (clearing, draining and planting), maintaining it (cultivating the land underneath the trees, harvesting) and keeping an eye on the harvest (preventing the nuts from being stolen). During the entire German period, this aspect was far from being anecdotal, as the job market in Dar es Salaam and in the entire colony was characterized by a shortage of workers. In this sense, being well-connected within colonial society was more than useful. One had to be familiar with recruitment procedures to manage taking on a sufficient number of people. That explains why the biggest European planters, those who had been the first to buy land on a regular basis were the *Bauaufseher*, site foremen mainly in the employ of the government, and a few *Kaufmänner*, tradesmen who were used to recruiting porters for setting up caravans. These entrepreneurs were used to giving orders and had secured access to a significant labour force through their primary activity. Local personalities (pharmacists, photographers and inn-keepers) who had lived there since the mid-1890's later followed the example of these pioneers but on a smaller scale. Without a doubt, their reduced capacity in mobilising workmen and the fact that they were unfit to function in the field were limiting factors.

On the Farbigen ("coloured") side

Because of the evolution of the African urban population, coconut plantations seemed to be a sector where profits were guaranteed. In 1911, the entire production from the area surrounding the city was consumed in the form of fresh nuts, leaving nothing to be transformed into copra.¹³⁰ The other dominant and well-integrated groups within colonial society were not

130 DOAZ, 8 March 1911.

indifferent to these prospects. Here and there, sources reveal Swahili, Arab and Indian involvement in intensive production. The investments were not negligible. In 1899, the cost of planting a hectare ranged from 6 to 700 rupees, and approximately 1,000 rupees were needed to maintain this hectare until the trees were fully grown.¹³¹ In order to meet these costs and limit risks, some members of these elite groups joined forces. Thus, Abdallah bin Mohamed el Churmsi, Soliman bin Nasor's successor as *wali*, purchased a *shamba* of 42 hectares at Vijibweni in the mid-1900's and shortly afterwards took a Syrian tradesman called Thoma as a partner. Most likely, the *wali* sought to secure the capital he needed in order to increase the plantation's density, a task for which he had a certain number of dependants at his disposal. In 1909 he formed a new partnership with *Akida* Achmed bin Zahor for a coconut plantation of about ten hectares at Mtoni.¹³²

Some Swahilis participated in this movement, even though sources mention only a few examples. We have already referred to the case of *Jumbe* Mwinikuu Shindo who, in 1913, was able to live in the city on his income from a plantation. The blow dealt by fate to *Jumbe* Udujumbe's destiny gives us a glimpse into his partnership with a Chinese by the name of Rachuvi. In May 1907, they purchased a 40-hectare plantation in the Simbasi valley, the latter contributing his technical abilities as a foreman while the former probably provided labour.¹³³ The third example does not involve another *jumbe*, but a government employee who was particularly well integrated into the colonial economy. Munyi Pingu bin Minyabi from Tungi worked at the central military depot. Together with a number of colleagues, he set up a gunpowder trafficking network that was dismantled in 1909. He was imprisoned and died in 1910, after which the administration proceeded to sell a *shamba* containing 70 adult palms and 165 young coconut palms, which he had probably developed with the fruits of his dual activities at the military depot.¹³⁴ Every time, knowledge of these few cases is due to particular circumstances: the death or illness of one of the owners leading to the sale of their possessions to the benefit of the European settler community, resulting in detailed investigations by the local administration, who were surprised to discover that the *Farbigen* owned coconut plantations which were worth so much. It is more than likely that many others also tried to benefit from such a flourishing sector. These few examples give an indication of their profile: people who were very well integrated into colonial society, close to the authorities (government employees or holders of local political offices), with a well-established local basis (like the *jumbe*) and capable of finding foreign partners with the necessary technical abilities and financial means.

131 DOAZ, 7 October 1899.

132 TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 66 and 83; TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 168; TNA, G7 / 208, p. 123.

133 In 1911, the *shamba* had to be sold because the *jumbe* had become leprosy and had to choose between exile and being shut up in a leper-house; he chose exile and liquidated his assets before going abroad.

134 TNA, G 35 / 3.

There are few indications of the Indian community's attitude in this domain, but it is highly unlikely that they would not have joined in. Wealthy Indian tradesmen had owned large properties since the Zanzibari era. Although Sewa Haji (the Indian community's main figure during the 1880-90's) donated his land to the colonial government upon his death in 1897, Indian hold over land nevertheless remained significant, notably in Upanga.¹³⁵ Directly or indirectly, these Indian tradesmen also had the know-how and the manpower to keep a *shamba* going. Consequently, it is unlikely that they would not have taken part in intensive farming activities that offered some very interesting prospects.

However, for the Indian, Swahili or Arab notables, increasing plantation density was not the only means of increasing profits from the soil. Close to the city, the most lucrative use of land to rent it out to residents. To do this, there had to be enough clearances on the plantation for the building of houses. A report from the local administration dated January 1894 noted the importance of this phenomenon on the *shamba* that were owned by Indians.¹³⁶ They accepted migrant settlement on their land in exchange for rent and for the upkeep of their *shamba*. Very soon, *shamba* owners went beyond allowing migrant settlement on their lands. Many started building houses and renting rooms.¹³⁷ This phenomenon became more extensive with the massive arrival of people from the interior of the colony from 1905 onwards.

3. *Social prestige and the property market*

Economic motivations alone were not the only reasons that prompted the urban colonial society's elite to take possession of the peri-urban space or encouraged the *jumbe* to participate in this process. In any agrarian society, land has socio-cultural value that goes beyond a mere productive dimension. The colonial context does not escape this fact, even if values were not necessary similar from one community to the next.

The Jumbe and household heads

For the local chiefs, the right to allocate land was a traditional prerogative which they were loathe to relinquish, as it enabled them to defend their status within the new social structure which was being put in place and of which money was an inevitable prestige element. Neither were they prepared to give up exercising part of the power on which their authority was founded. The hostility of District Chief Von Winternberg or Governor Von Rechenberg could not change traditions. Most *jumbe* probably tried to find a balance between the role of balancing power within their community and merchandising their right to allocate land. The example of Mwinikuu Shindo

¹³⁵ TNA, G 7 / 204, p 221-223.

¹³⁶ RKA, 6466, p 24-39.

¹³⁷ According to the DOAZ, a house with 8 to 10 rooms cost up to 1,000 rupees; the rental for one room was 1.5 rupee per month. DOAZ, 16 September, 1911.

who, in 1900, was referred to as a “famous land dealer”¹³⁸ by District Chief Von Winterfeld and who resurfaces in town some ten years later, represents an exceptional evolution, but there is no doubt that the *jumbe* were sorely tempted to convert their rights into cash to ensure their social prestige through the acquisition of luxury products.¹³⁹

The Arabs

Soliman bin Nasor continued buying plantations until the middle of the 1900's. Parts of Upanga belonged almost entirely to him and he also invested in Kurasini. Thus, land was his way of making a profit, but there was also a prestige element involved that enabled him to maintain and flaunt his social position. In a letter to the Governor dated 1899, a *pro domo* plea intended to exculpate him of certain accusations he compared his situation to that of his colleague Salim bin Khalfan, Mombasa's *wali*.¹⁴⁰ While (according to him) the latter did not serve his master as well as he did, he earned a large salary, had a personal guard and a quarter of the town land at his disposal. According to Soliman bin Nasor, managing land and being respected for it made it easier to govern men. Consequently, when in 1903 he withdrew from Dar es Salaam politics, he started selling off part of his property holdings to devote himself to his property in Pangania. At the same time, from his arrival in the capital, his successor, Abdallah bin Mohamed, was keen to purchase a plantation where he could settle his slaves.¹⁴¹ The same logic that characterized the Zanzibari period was at work here: the *shamba* was a means of controlling one's *familia* and displaying them to the rest of the social body at the same time.

The Europeans

It is difficult to say in what way land ownership was an element of social prestige for the Dar es Salaam's wealthy Indian tradesmen. The available sources are silent on this point. On the other hand, there are numerous elements in this regard regarding the Europeans. Purchasing property was a way of declaring a connection with colonial society, a value that was respected within the European community in the first place, as not all Europeans owned a *shamba*. For the smaller investors, the important thing about owning a plantation was not so much the prospect of becoming rich as the possibility it offered of holding forth on one's position within society and on that of the other social classes.

As early as the mid-1890's, half a dozen settlers wanted to get away from the urban bustle and settle on the city's periphery. These Europeans dreamed of living a private life far removed from the noisy and colourful urban society, while continuing to work in the city. The desire to be the sole masters of

138 ...einer der Verkäufer ist der berühmte Landverkäufer Munimkushindo ...TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 197. célèbre vendeur de terre

139 TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 120: the district chief's report pertaining to a transaction, dated 9 November 1911.

140 RKA, 796, p. 174.

141 TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 168.

the surrounding space and to leave one's mark on it is obvious from the name given by Karl Zimmermann to the land he purchased in the Simbasi valley: *Karlsbof*. During the 1900's, a number of people tried to follow these examples. If it were not for the obvious differences, the mixture of living space and economic production area of this type of property could remind one of the small Arab plantations of the Zanzibari period. Settlers did not want to surround themselves with a large number of dependants and preferred employing a couple of servants whom they could dismiss at will. Another difference was the importance that European landowners attached to the quality of the existing link between their plantation and the city. They either settled close to the main roads, which gave them rapid access to the city or built a new road themselves. This was the case for a settler named Müller who, in 1899, soon realized that the only path allowing him access to his newly acquired plantation was a private one, use of which was prohibited by the owners. This led him to construct a large road which continued the Leuestrasse extension and which, henceforth, would constitute the main road between Upanga and the city.¹⁴²

Most of the Europeans who bought farmland on Dar es Salaam's periphery from the end of the 1890's onwards nonetheless continued living in an urban environment. But whether they lived in town or in the surrounding areas, settlers who owned land were aware of the social meaning of being the proprietor of a plantation: owning land around the city had more than just economic significance and was not restricted to clinging to the ideal of country living. It was a socially and even politically effective fact within the confines of the city. First of all, the plantation was a way of setting oneself apart from the newcomers, either simple employees arriving in ever-greater numbers from 1905 onwards or European construction or commercial company executives.¹⁴³ The plantation was a symbol anchoring the settler to the land and separating him from other members of the European community. In itself, owning land legitimized the settler's status, emphasized by the fact that plantations were usually named after their owners.

Under Von Rechenberg's governorship, the DOAZ developed a discourse in which land took on different dimension from that of a mere socio-cultural indicator within the European community. In reaction to what it considered the government's negrophile politics, this organ of the press echoed vague feelings within the settler community which were subsequently crystallized into an offensive political discourse aimed at asserting the pre-eminence of the settlers as a group in relation to the rest of the social body.¹⁴⁴ Although land

142 TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 98.

143 The biggest companies were Philipp Holzmann (railroad construction) and Hansing & Co and O'Swald (business).

144 This is not the place to give a detailed account of the extremes to which existing tensions between the government and some of the Dar es Salaam settlers could go. (Ilfie J., *Tanganyika under German rule, 1905-1912*, C.U.P., 1969, 235 p.)

was not the only element taking part in this discourse, it was, however, one of its touchstones. Indeed, plantation ownership made it possible for settlers to stamp their presence on a double temporality that served to disqualify other groups within colonial society. To start with, land emphasized the fact that its owners belonged to the mythical era of origin, when the colony's builders risked everything to settle there and secure the German presence in this part of the world. The plantation was an embodiment of the experiences gained on African soil and of the strength of their local roots – that was what the word *alte Afrikaner* or “old African” actually meant.¹⁴⁵ The title disqualified both civil servants, who only stayed for a short period, and Africans, who had been incapable of developing the land of their birth. Civil servants who were unaware of the African reality had to listen to and serve those who were supposed to have the best grasp of the local situation and whose only concern was ensuring development and prosperity. Africans, who were incapable of innovating, was obliged to serve the settlers. Consequently, the plantation represented the settler's desire to remain in Africa. His long-term presence enabled him to assert himself as the spearhead of Germany's future colonial enterprise. The settler was the supposed contrast of the Indian traders, whose presence in German East Africa could only be explained by the lure of rapid gains, as they treated the interests of the colony with disdain. It was assumed that they, too, were just passing through, and were only doing so for personal gain. Thus their presence had to be limited or even done away with.

This type of discourse, which was common amongst the colony's planters, especially amongst those of Usambara, an area to the north of the country with a large settler population, took on a particularly sharp tone in the capital, although there were no prominent planters. This specific bent was due to the urban context: there were many, partly high-ranking civil servants who set the tone in society, while showing a tendency to keep the settlers at a distance. Some of the Indian traders were far richer than the European private individuals and a few were closely linked to some high-ranking officials. Dar es Salaam's settlers felt threatened by the latter and cheated by the former. Their sentiments were actively showcased by the DOAZ, even though the newspaper acted as an amplifier. They also created an association, the *Wirtschaftliche Vereinigung von Dar es Salaam und Hinterland*,¹⁴⁶ aimed at defending the interests of European economic role-players.

Many factors intervened in the property market's generation of supply and demand. The most obvious reasons seem to be economic in nature. Thus, property transfers in favour of the exogeneous elite linked Dar es Salaam's periphery, its soil and its people to a colonial economy where money played an increasingly important role in social relations. Creating or strengthening the organic link between town and periphery took on the form of intensifying

¹⁴⁵ Settlers who had arrived in the colony in the 1890's were called “old Africans”.

¹⁴⁶ The economic association of Dar es Salaam and its hinterland.

agricultural development, but the Indian and Arab landowners also attempted to benefit from the city's demographic dynamics by accommodating migrants from the continent's interior on their property, something which most Europeans did not allow. The growth in the property market also fed on the symbolic and social values which each of the communities invested in it. That of the Europeans is best documented. Land ownership constituted a weapon for asserting their social pre-eminence, even if an attempt at a prosopographic study shows that not all the Dar es Salaam planters participated in the discourse. In fact, it would seem that some of the late arrivals amongst the settlers used the planters' status as an instrument and manipulated a few of the personalities who had been in Dar es Salaam for a long time, using them as a front and developing a protest discourse which was particularly harsh in tone. Thus, the emergence of an integrated peri-urban space did contribute to the tensions traversing a social body that was still under construction.

B. The peri-urban property market and social cohesion

The peri-urban property market not only mirrored an emerging colonial society, but also contributed to strengthening its cohesion: the various elites showed a common desire to bypass State control regarding the supply of and demand for land. Administrative constraints notably led to collaboration between the planters and the autochthonous chiefs or *jumbe*. *A contrario*, property market development added commercial and symbolic value to the land, fuelling antagonistic appetites: fracture lines starting appearing or deepened around the peri-urban property problem. As far as the supply was concerned, this led to a weakening of the local structures that had existed before the arrival of the settlers. As for the demand, tensions were generated between the groups dominating the new social body.

1. The jumbe and the settlers: agreeing to disagree with the government

Settler stratagems and government shortcomings

Every time there was a change in the property policy, the Europeans looked for a parry to escape the control of the public authorities. Civil servants were the first ones to elaborate similar strategies when the Chancellor's ruling of 10 November 1893 compelled them to ask Berlin for permission when purchasing any property in the colony. To by-pass this obstacle, they resorted to men of straw: fathers, brothers and sometimes even spouses served as frontmen. On the whole, the administration's stance was a relatively conciliatory one, despite occasional ill humour when confronted with these actions. They were satisfied with a situation, which on balance enabled them to regain control of property transfers. The 1893-legislation allowed Berlin minimum control over transactions involving land. Thanks to the civil servants' perversion of

procedures, Dar es Salaam regained its decision-making authority, similar to other transfers involving a member of the colonist community.

The most common procedural perversion, as well as the most effective, was to ask for administrative permission a few years after the fact instead of before the transaction took place, as was provided for by the regulations. The first person that resorted to this method, voluntarily or not, was a Goan government translator by the name of Ribeiro who, between 1897 and 1900, purchased more than 27 hectares in the Simbasi valley. When he asked for administrative permission in 1900, the Governor required the district chief to verify whether these acquisitions were not speculative in nature. The latter replied in the negative, pointing out that, on the contrary, Ribeiro had done an exemplary land development job in an area that, despite its proximity to town, had mostly been neglected. Because Ribeiro had met two important government policy objectives regarding the development of peri-urban space, he was not overly worried about his lack of procedural respect.¹⁴⁷ This soon became general practice, as it made it possible for people to escape the authorities' attention regarding those points that they felt very strongly about. When, at the beginning of the new century, the administration became worried about the consequences of these purchases on the city's fresh supplies, the big land buyers staggered their applications for authorization over time to make them more acceptable. A deferred application for regularization also made it possible to bypass the measures imposed by the colonial apparatus regarding land development. Instead of cultivating his *shamba* within the allotted time (on pain of losing his ownership rights or being compelled to pay a fine), the colonist could stagger the necessary investments over time.¹⁴⁸ When, towards 1906, authorities started balking at the non-cultivated savannahs (*pori*) being disposed of, deferred authorization applications made district investigations into the authenticity of ownership rights more difficult, giving the purchaser enough time to erase the traces of nature's ascendancy by developing the landscape. But even if the inquiry managed to prove that trickery had occurred, it was politically difficult for the administration to refuse the rights of a colonist who had actually invested. It also happened that buyers voluntarily under-estimated the surface of their purchase. District agents conducting a survey on the field were not always able to determine the actual surface for themselves or were not really eager to do so. This underestimate made it possible to give credence to the fact that the sellers well and truly possessed the land that was being sold, as an African farmer hardly ever owned more than a few dozen hectares. An overly large surface area would have meant that part of the purchase was in fact made up of *pori*.

¹⁴⁷ TNA, G7 / 200, p 167-171.

¹⁴⁸ Thus site foreman Joseph Müller waited until the end of 1903 before requesting administrative authorization for land bought in the course of 1899.

In addition to procedural perversion, colonists could count on the frequent turnovers in permanent and temporary staff for changes to occur in official land policy lines. Colonists could bank on the passing of time to obtain what they wanted by re-submitting their application every time the incumbent changed. Thus, after six years of futile efforts, *Regierungsrat* Bormann finally witnessed the recognition of his rights to the *shamba* he had purchased near the city gates. The matter was resolved on the 20th of March 1901, only a few days before Major Von Estorff, who had been acting governor since August 1900, made way for the official new governor.¹⁴⁹ Another acting governor played a similar role. Until 1906, the administration allowed the colonists to have recourse to their stratagems without responding. But the Catholic mission's requests for regularization at the beginning of that year triggered hostile reactions within the district and the high administration. Several high-ranking civil servants rebelled against deliberate procedural corruption and the *fait accompli* policy. One of them asked that an example be made of the Catholic mission to once again impress on people's minds that obtaining administrative authorization was a preliminary condition to any property transaction between the colonists and the native population. However, acting governor Haber contented himself with writing a note to the judge of the court, indicating that he had to attract the two parties' attention to the obligation to obtain administrative authorization.¹⁵⁰ His tone was thus quite distinct from the vehement tone of his colleagues.

Qualified staff shortages in the cadastral service facilitated colonists' use of certain stratagems. Thus the *Vermessungs-Abteilung's* inability to measure the terrain enabled colonists to underestimate its surface at the time of declaration. Due to staff shortages, the administration was unable to verify whether its decision had any effect on the ground. Nette's attitude in Magomeni is revealing in this regard. As indicated above, he purchased 20 hectares in February 1905, but in July the transaction was not authorized in order to protect urban market supplies.¹⁵¹ However, in August 1907, Nette once again asked the government to authorize the transaction. He emphasized that he has invested considerably in the planting of palm trees and that he had allowed the previous owners to continue with their manioc cultivation. Thus, government refusal did not mean the pure and simple nullification of the transaction, but only that it would be impossible to have one's rights recognized officially. This absence of legal guarantee must have been unpleasant for the Europeans, but in Devers' case, it did not prevent him from taking possession of the land that had been paid for and investing in it.

149 TNA, G 7 / 201, pp 121-126.

150 Sales increasingly took place before the district judge. This made it possible to register transactions officially without apparently being obliged to ask for administrative authorization.

151 TNA, G 7 / 203, p 257.

Europeans and Africans vis-à-vis State vigilance

Colonists did not content themselves with exploiting State weaknesses in order to gain unhindered access to the property market. In many cases, they sought out African collaboration as part of their strategy to avoid being subjected to stringent administrative checks. In some cases, rather than to appeal to family members back home, colonists would make use of African men of straw. The most obvious advantage of this manoeuvre was that transactions between members of the native population were not checked by the administration: colonists were thus completely free from supervision by public authorities, especially regarding obligations to develop the land. For civil servants there was a double advantage in that they were not only freed from Berlin's control but also that of Dar es Salaam. Government reacted very severely to this way of doing things. In September 1901, Abdallah bin Saleh, the servant of a minor government official, bought a 4-hectare *shamba* for 260 rupees. When the district got wind of the matter, they summoned the State agent in question to ask him how his servant could possibly be in possession of such a sum (approximately two years' salary). The agent claimed that he had lent his 'boy' the 260 rupees, which were being paid back in monthly installments. The governor refused this explanation and demanded that the local administration see to it that in future this did not happen again.¹⁵² For some of the big planters, making use of an African man of straw was a subtler way of postponing the application for administrative authorization. The case of a colonist by the name of Nette is particularly well documented. In July 1900 he used a Swahili, Mtoro bin Nassor, to buy a *shamba* of one and a half hectares at Upanga, and then officially bought back the land from Mtoro in June 1904.¹⁵³ The Catholic mission also had recourse to this subterfuge. Maji Myingi, a former mission foreman, bought 315 hectares at Mbaragara from *Jumbe* Kambio Moto in 1901 and his former employer officially bought back this vast property in 1905.¹⁵⁴ This allowed people to acquire more land without attracting the district's attention, and therefore to postpone investing in it.

Collaboration between Africans and European colonists went far beyond the latter's simple use of a few dependants or obligees to ensure certain *shamba* outside the legal framework. It started at the time of sale, with the problem of knowing whom one should approach to purchase the land. Colonists who were interested in a piece of land within the strictly African properties category could negotiate with those who were busy farming it or otherwise directly address the *jumbe* who had the right to allocate land. In October 1890, the Protestant mission concluded three contracts with a dozen Swahili farmers for

¹⁵² TNA, G 7 / 202, p 1 c.

¹⁵³ TNA, G 7 / 204, pp 226-228.

¹⁵⁴ TNA, G 7 / 204, p 130.

the transfer of some 200 hectares at Kinangoni.¹⁵⁵ One month later, however, they signed a contract involving more or less the same surface with a string of *jumbe*. Thus it would seem that the local chiefs turned up at the mission to convert their rights into money. The mission preferred to buy them off so as to avoid any kind of subsequent contesting. In a general sense, it is noteworthy that the *jumbe* were involved in almost all the sales contracts, even if it is never stipulated in what capacity, whether as farmers, land-clearers or property managers. In fact, it was in the interest of the colonists as well as the *jumbe* to get on with one another in order to succeed in their respective aspirations as far as property matters were concerned. State pressure encouraged them to elaborate a tacit consensus. Indeed, the *jumbe's* allocation rights, notably as far as the *pori* were concerned, were explicitly questioned by two eminent officials: by District Chief Winterfeld, a future senior official, in 1901, and by Governor Von Rechenberg himself in 1907.¹⁵⁶ In the face of the threat of seeing the disappearance of one of the foundations of their power (as well as one of their main means of accessing currency), the *jumbe* were ready to collaborate with planters seeking to circumvent state control regarding the development and alienation of the *pori*. The State's desire to control all the role-players and all aspects of the property market brought supply and demand close together. The colonists were more than willing to recognize the *jumbe's* allocation rights as a property right, because that enabled them to rapidly conclude sales contracts that integrated the *pori*, which legally belonged to the state. Thus, they avoided officially requesting for land to be attributed to them, a long and costly process, linked to strict development conditions. The close ties between colonists and African chiefs took on concrete form, which went beyond the simple contact generated by commercial exchange. It often happened that a planter would acquire several pieces of land from the same chief every few years, which leads one to suppose that regular if not privileged contact took place. It is impossible to pursue this line of thought, as sources are silent on this subject.

This collaboration between *jumbe* and colonists was all the more effective as they both had the means to carry weight when administrative decisions were taken. Daily, often personal and sometimes friendly contacts between certain planters and the district chief probably enabled the former to put their point of view to the latter. In any case, the position of District Chiefs Winterfeld (between 1899 and 1904) and Böder (between 1904 and 1909) evolved quite noticeably. At first, they had restrictive positions on land transfers to the benefit of the colonists and both showed themselves to be sensitive to the problem of supplying the urban market. Consequently, they evolved more or less rapidly towards positions that favoured property exchanges. It is quite probable that apart from possibly objective elements that could have justified this evolution,

155 BMG, IV. 2. 1. 1., vol. 2, p. 93-102.

156 TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 191 and TNA, G 7 / 206, p. 100 (see notes 108 and 109).

the district chiefs' exchanges with the colonists played a considerable role. The relations they maintained with their subordinates, the *jumbe* and the *akida*, oriented them in the same direction. On many occasions, the district chief noted that he had too little human resources at his disposal to entertain the hope of obtaining a precise overall view of the property situation on the city's periphery. In fact, a major part of his knowledge about peri-urban property came from information communicated to him by the African chiefs. Thus, the latter gathered as a group when they were not simultaneously acting as judge and party in their individual capacity. When they were dealing with a piece of land which did not fall within their competence, they were inclined to keep quiet about undeclared transactions out of solidarity with their colleagues or, in the course of investigations on the field, to keep quiet about the inclusion of *pori* in the contracts. Their collaboration with the colonists was even more frank when it involved a piece of land that did fall within their competence. Thus, in April 1902, *Jumbe* Simba bin Lukali sold 176 hectares at Kistchwele to an African frontman from the Catholic mission who was called Useni. According to law, the transaction did not need to be validated by the public authorities. The mission decided to regulate the situation in July 1907 by officially buying back the plantation and by requesting administrative authorization. In the course of the subsequent investigation, it was *Jumbe* Simba who vouched that Useni's rights were well-founded. Governor Von Rechenberg observed the cunning nature of this procedure, but in the end the administration did not intervene.¹⁵⁷

2. Social tensions surrounding the property market

The conflict surrounding property control between Germans and non-Germans

We have seen that, within the framework of an offensive political discourse plantation ownership was used as an instrument of the European community to justify colonist primacy over other elements within colonial society. This discourse was particularly caustic *vis-à-vis* non-German exogenous minorities, whose competitiveness was accused of all the world's evils. Although the rich Indian community was the target of preference, Greeks were also the object of a few attacks, notably in the DOAZ. Many low-ranking state employees were influenced by the discourse that had been developed by the colonists. Thus, in certain reports pertaining to acquisitions made by Indians or Greeks, the district chief or his secretary deplored the fact that such and such a piece of land had fallen into the hands of someone who was not of German nationality. This was the case in 1901, when Soliman bin Nasor acquired a *shamba* at Upanga from a Swahili man's heirs. However, the local administration abstained from

¹⁵⁷ TNA, G 7 / 206, p. 93-102.

all restrictive measures in the name of free enterprise.¹⁵⁸ However, this principle did not prevent them from refusing a transaction in favour of Kanji Premji in 1903. The verdict was that the piece of land was too close to the city to be left to an Indian's appetite for speculation.¹⁵⁹ However, sources on this subject are not extensive and in the end it is not easy to say to what extent real estate control was truly the object of a struggle between the different, dominating levels of society.

Tensions within the African community

*The *jumbe* face their subjects

When sales of exploited farmland took place between a *jumbe* and a colonist, there were a number of objective reasons for the parties involved (local chiefs, Europeans and farmers) to find common ground.

Colonists needed labour to bring the land under cultivation (land clearing, drainage, planting), to maintain it (weeding, harvesting) and to survey the harvesting process (preventing the walnuts from being stolen). This aspect was far from being trivial as the labour market was characterized during this entire period by a shortage of workers. Similarly, the local population's acceptance level of property transfers could be decisive for the investment to succeed. Having good relations with the local chief meant that his influence could be relied on to find workers when they were needed, but that could only be envisaged if the property transfer had taken place in a manner that was satisfactory to the farmers. The *jumbe* sought to use traditional rights in a new context to defend their rank within a society that was being recomposed and where the basis was money. However, a similar attitude ran the risk of rousing the defiance of their subjects, who could accuse them of promoting their own particular interests rather than those of the community. It was thus in the chiefs' interest to reassure those farmers who had exploited the sold land about their future means of subsistence. As for the local farmers, they were trapped by the way they were portrayed within a society where the *jumbe* played a central role. Their only hope was to get as many advantages as possible from a situation that was beyond their control. This could mean obtaining the right to harvest the crops that had already been planted, continuing to live on the sold land or being paid a certain amount of money within the context of the transfer.

In fact, in many of the contracts, the *jumbe* were associated as sellers with Swahilis of unspecified status, which leads one to conclude that the farmers were sharing in the profits, something that was imposed by the district from 1905 onwards in any case. Moreover, a 1907 local administrative report

158 TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 230.

159 *Es erscheint mir nicht opportun die Inder in diese Art von Landspekulationen hineinzulassen.* TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 205: district chief's report, dated 13 September 1903.

stated that the sellers of a piece of land acquired in 1905 by a colonist named Nette not only continued living on what used to be their land, but continued their food-producing cultivations underneath the palm trees. However, it is uncertain whether this was the prevailing attitude. Sources also highlight signs of a lack of interest on the part of the *jumbe* and the colonists. All things considered, it is impossible to go beyond a qualitative discourse: it should merely be stated that the two tendencies co-existed. Firstly, it must be noted that when District Chief Böder took up his post, it marked a distinct evolution of the problem, as he systematically carried out investigations to determine whether, in the course of a transaction, everybody who had certain rights had been offered a share or not. One can thus legitimately imagine that it had not been the case before. Moreover, there are certain indications that, on a local level, the *jumbe* and the colonists were unconcerned about what would become of the farmers.

Many sources emphasize that the arrival of a European on a finage resulted in the departure – the word ‘flight’ may be more adequate – of farmers from the surrounding areas. Different factors may have commanded this attitude, but there is no doubt that many small urban planters wanted first and foremost to be on their own land and to erase any traces of an exterior hold, even if that would deprive them of their labour force. For an African farmer, living next to a European involved a risk. Moreover, certain *jumbe* showed themselves to be greedy and lacked clear-sightedness as to the middle term consequences of their schemes on the authority they were exercising. An acquisition of the Catholic mission in the 1900’s constitutes a well-documented case, because of the scope of the surfaces exchanged and the radical nature of the expulsions involved. In 1900, *Jumbe* Chambuso sold an extensive shamba at Mtoni to the Benedictines. In 1905, the mission tried to drive off the inhabitants, so as to build Christian villages that would be relatively isolated from the rest of the population. The number of people implicated is an indication that the case came to the attention of the district and then to that of the government. The inhabitants dared to rise up collectively against the authority of their *jumbe* and to address the district. Undoubtedly, this and other, similar, cases left a mark on public life within this community¹⁶⁰ and undermined the position of the chief.

One of Böder’s remarks in 1905 shows what tensions caused by sales all over the place could lead to. He noted a growing refusal amongst the Magomeni farmers to clear the land and to bring under cultivation the lands that were the responsibility of that zone’s chief, because he systematically sold them. Thus the farmers not only found themselves despoiled of the work invested in the clearing process but also of the fruits of what they had sown. The district chief emphasized the dangers of this situation for the town’s fresh supplies. But the

160 Following an investigation, the administration showed that the seller had no right to the land, which made the transaction nul and void. TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 172-173.

acknowledgement of a socio-economic blockade should be added to that of an economic blockade. This could only depreciate the *jumbe's* authority in the eyes of the citizens he was responsible for, and there is no doubt that these citizens tended to leave the area to find more clement subsistence conditions.

*Sales by other farmers

These *jumbe*, who chose to make as much money as possible from their traditional power of allocation without taking into account the potential effects of these sales on social cohesion, were not the only ones searching for ways to enrich themselves. Enquiries from 1905 show that farmers did not hesitate to take up direct contact with the colonists so as to sell them land to which other people also had rights. Once a colonist had shown interest in a piece of land and had put down a certain amount of money, he always succeeded in obtaining the coveted property in its entirety. To achieve his ends, he needed only patience and money and maybe a few threats; he could also count on intervention from the local administration. There is no doubt that a certain group's desire to sell, which was imposed on everybody, generated or aggravated existing tensions within the autochthonous communities. Whether these repeated sales emanated from the authority of local chiefs or from equals, maybe members of the same family who had left to settle in town, farmers were deprived of agricultural land and its produce, which could easily be sold on the market in town where prices were high. These revenues disappeared with every sale. Colonial pressure on the land thus initiated a process of social decomposition by encouraging the development of individualistic behaviour.

*The absence of opposition between new migrants and autochthons

On the other hand, contrary to other colonial cities,¹⁶¹ there does not seem to have been particular tensions between the new African migrants and the Swahili communities. This stems from the fact that most of the land close to town where the Africans settled was no longer in the autochthons' hands, but in the hands of members of exogenous groups.

In order to reach its various objectives, the district administration resorted to those structures closest to the local reality, the *jumbe*. The latter were not, however, simple civil servants applying to the letter the orders of a hierarchy that would be their only membership corps. Often, they remained the chiefs of communities whom they continued to lead. Faced with the sudden emergence of the colonizer, they tried to defend their social position to the best of their abilities by trying to acquire the new criteria of social power, the first of which was payment in cash. Rapidly, one of the most obvious ways of getting hold of it seemed to be by transforming their right to allocate land into private land rights. In the inquiries launched by the administration, the *jumbe* were thus party as well as judge, in charge of representing the administration's point of

161 A good example is that of Douala (Eckert A., 1999).

view on a local level and defending their socio-economic interests in the face of colonial pressure. However, their action should not be limited to the defence of their single economic interest: through their conduct, they were acting according to their understanding of their power as *jumbe*. As far as the file on land sales is concerned, they worked hand in glove with the colonists for as long as the government did not follow a clear political line.

IV - A SOCIO-SPATIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE INTEGRATION OF PERI-URBAN SPACE IN 1914

A. Zanzibari plantations integrated into the urban tissue

Plantations created from the 1860's onwards by people from Zanzibar formed a crown of a 2 to 3 kilometre radius that hemmed in the small harbour town. This arboricultural belt, which became a rice-growing belt in Upanga's eastern part, was divided into two almost equal blocks: to the west, the plantation of the sultan of Zanzibar, where the present-day neighbourhood of Kariakoo can be found; to the north, at Upanga, much smaller plantations belonging to Indians, Arabs and Swahilis. Although this area did not suddenly or even totally disappear, it was here that the town found the necessary space for its development.

1. Defining a new type of urban tissue

The first step in the profound mutation of the Zanzibari plantations coincided with the violent establishment of the colonial State at the beginning of the 1890's. As a result of the 1888-1889 Buchiri uprising, the town was nearly deserted by its inhabitants. The latter lived in the plantations for the most part. There is no doubt that the human occupation of the area was profoundly modified by this event, all the more so since people, notably the Arab owners, returned only gradually. The violence perpetrated by the colonial State and the arbitrary nature of their actions contributed to this mistrust. Indeed, the administration did not hesitate to take possession of areas that were of interest to them to erect their own buildings, inciting those who needed these buildings to settle on those plantations closest to town. These measures were supplemented by urban legislation. The 14 May, 1891 edict defined three architectural areas in the future town: only European type buildings would be allowed in the first; in the second, Indian or Arab constructions; and lastly, in the third, African huts could be built. A roads network put the finishing touches to the future framework of the town by ensuring that social life was kept in check.

The framework thus established would not have amounted to much if the inhabitants did not take an interest in the potentialities made available by State actions. It was the Indians, Arabs and Africans who contributed most to the town's development in the course of the 1890's by executing the gradual

eroding of the plantation area. The administration built many administrative buildings in the European area, but there were very few colonists and their financial means were most often limited. Most of them were content to rent lodgings from an Indian proprietor, with the result that the neighbourhood which was supposed to be theirs retained a marked forest character – all the more so since that was where the government created an experimental botanical garden. What is more, many of the previous inhabitants continued to live there. The transformation of this area into an urban neighbourhood was in fact a process spread out over a period of some fifteen years, entailing the opening of new streets, the construction of public buildings, followed by family villas, concurring with the gradual expulsion of the African residents. The transformation of the urban tissue was much more rapid in the plantations situated behind the present-day *Samora Avenue*, as Indians, Arabs and Swahili had erected houses on both sides of the street layout. As early as 1894, some one hundred adjoining constructions existed along the first semi-circular axis. This development was not carried out according to the logic of ethnic segregation, even if, because of their economic interest, the harbour and the new covered market neighbourhood attracted many Indians and Arabs; beyond that, as shown by the sales contracts dated from the beginning of the 1890's,¹⁶² there were Indian constructions built of stone and Swahili houses built of *makuti*¹⁶³.

2. The creation of African neighbourhoods¹⁶⁴

During the 1890's, a large part of the African population lived in the neighbourhood behind the harbour, characterized by an inextricable interweaving of buildings emanating from different architectural traditions and by a strong population mix. Europeans rented rooms from Indian proprietors; less fortunate Indians and Arabs did not think twice about building Swahili houses. Towards the end of the 1890's, specifically African neighbourhoods did, however, start developing. These were densely populated areas with strong links to the urban body, but also an internal operational logic that conferred a certain autonomy on them in relation to the remainder of the town. The lifestyle and sociability were largely dictated by the African population, although other groups also participated.

Processes of neighbourhood creation

Three series of factors governed the creation and location of these neighbourhoods. The first is demographic in nature and will not be discussed

162 On 29 December 1893, Abdulhusen Ibrahimji, an Indian merchant, bought a Swahili house in Wismann Street for the sum of 270 rupees; the seller was the widow of a Sudanese soldier. TNA, G 7 / 201, p. 253

163 The walls of houses built of *makuti* are constructed from a trellis of branches filled in with earth.

164 Information in this regard is scattered and difficult to interpret, notably because of sources' extensive use of the term *shamba*. Indeed, it is still being used to indicate a property, even when the latter has partially or completely lost its agricultural character and has been integrated into the urban tissue.

here in detail. Let us simply say that not only did the African population show notable growth, increasing from 3,000 inhabitants in 1888 to 19,000 in 1913, but that the numbers gradually stabilized, as the migrants gradually tended to extend their stay in Dar es Salaam. The number of Africans seeking to live in an urban space which they could more or less call their own was swelled by Swahilis slowly being evicted from the European area or who were leaving the Indian area because of rent increases. The second series of factors may be qualified as *possible* factors, elements characterizing the town's immediate outskirts and imposed on the migrants. The first of these *possible* factors is the status of the land as defined by the colonial authorities: it was more or less impossible to build an African neighbourhood in area 1. The second, which is even weightier, is linked to real estate structure, or more precisely to the economic ambitions of the real estate owners. Most of the European colonists favoured a strict - and intensive - development of agricultural land, while Indians and Arabs were more flexible and were prepared to rent their land to African migrants, and very soon after, to rent them rooms in the houses they had built on these same properties. The third series of factors determining the location of the African neighbourhoods is linked to the needs and desires of the migrants. In geographical terms, the choice of location can be seen as a compromise between the desire to minimize the distance to work on the one hand and the distance to the recreational facilities on the other hand, but also to reduce the rent costs. In socio-cultural terms, the triangle of desires seems to have contained the following elements: the attraction of the European town; the desire to escape colonial control and increase their level of autonomy, notably as far as recreation was concerned; the quest for "regions" so as to enjoy a solidarity facilitating the integration of the urban social body. The combination of the three series of elements inextricably combined, resulting in the first African neighbourhoods. This process was approved and reinforced by the administration's development of streets to innervate neighbourhoods where there had been no previous link to the roads network.

The neighbourhoods

According to available German sources, Kisutu, Dar es Salaam's first specifically African neighbourhood, was structured and developed around the prolongation of *Leue-Strasse* to the north of town. This street was built in 1899 by a certain Müller, a colonist who wanted a direct link between the town and his plantation of residence. Swahili houses soon appeared¹⁶⁵ on either side of the southern part of this main road, which cut across Indian properties. According to Leslie, the neighbourhood developed around the Shomvi village of Upanga.¹⁶⁶ Thus, the migrants found a main road allowing them rapid

165 In May 1913, the district planned to repurchase the small Indian *shamba* in *Leuestrasse* for the sum of 24,000 marks. TNA, G 7 / 209, p. 24 ; TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 102

166 Leslie J.A.K., *A survey of Dar es Salaam*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 158

access to the town's European neighbourhood as well as to the African social structure in place; the newcomer was rapidly inserted and the space greatly humanized, something that was far from trivial in a place where lions still ventured to the city gates. It was a lively neighbourhood, the residential area of preference of the unmarried salaried employees, notably the servants of the European civil servants and colonists. Far away from the whites' inquisitive glances, they found bars and other nocturnal entertainment. There were many places to dance.¹⁶⁷ The western side of the neighbourhood, which was called Danguroni, was renowned for being the biggest prostitution centre in town. There were also bars selling *pombe* (millet beer) and *tembo* (palm wine).¹⁶⁸

Development was limited in this first neighbourhood, however. Colonial society weighed too heavily on it to blossom. The autonomy the African population strived for was also limited by government's influence. In 1906, the government settled a group of Manyema, loyal clients, consisting of a few hundred people, in the neighbourhood; at an unknown date, some of the inhabitants were evicted to accommodate African policemen. Prostitution was supervised, also to an unknown extent: the community owned houses that were rented to women engaged in this activity. The attraction was limited by this police presence, and that of elements that were traditionally close to the powers that be.¹⁶⁹ However, the real estate structure and the proximity of Area 1 played roles that incurred disfavour with the neighbourhood's development to an even greater extent. The many European properties along the principal roads (the structural importance of which was illustrated above), *Leuestrasse* and *Upangastrasse*, blocked any development towards Upanga where numerous Indian and Swahili properties could, however, be found. European appetites in this area were gradually whetted. As early as the end of the 1890's, a brewery was established in the southern part followed by several industrial businesses, resulting in the area being called, somewhat pompously, *Industrieviertel*.¹⁷⁰ In 1912, the Protestant mission noted that the intense construction activities taking place in the area had prompted them to divide up their 70 hectares in the neighbourhood and start selling.¹⁷¹ Missionary Wentzel observed as early as 1908 that the European neighbourhood competed with the African neighbourhood in that area.¹⁷² However, this development was interrupted by the war and it was not before the fifties that Kisutu was destroyed by the colonial administration to allow for the extension of the business area.¹⁷³

167 In 1903 and 1908, Protestant missionaries wrote several reports on the neighbourhood to inquire whether conversion actions should be undertaken or not. BMG, IV- 1. 10, p. 72-88 and BMG, IV. 2. 1.. 1., p. 108-112 ; 114-116

168 DOAZ, 27 February 1904 and TNA, G 21 / 153.

169 Leslie, J, *A survey of Dar es Salaam*, p. 168; DOAR, 6 December 1911 ; RKA, 801, p. 36 and p. 129

170 DOAR, 10 August, 1911

171 BMG, IV. 2. 1. 1., p. 240-255

172 BMG, IV. 2. 1. 1., p. 108-112

173 Leslie, J, *A survey of Dar es Salaam*..., p. 158

The Kitumbini neighbourhood also developed in a precocious way, but unlike Kisutu, due to insufficient sources we have no in-depth knowledge of it: it had no land belonging to a mission, there were no transactions involving Europeans. The neighbourhood was the subject of references scattered in local papers, and it is also mentioned sometimes with regard to judicial cases. On the other hand, we have much better knowledge about the way in which present-day Kariakoo, situated just to the west of Kitumbini, came into being. In a way, its evolution was the opposite of that of Kisutu. Until 1901, this area was a coconut plantation belonging to the sultan of Zanzibar, and it continued to be farmed as such. As early as 1899 the DOAZ denounced the pernicious effects of this situation on urban development, because the immediate outskirts to the west were closed to the expansion of the African neighbourhoods.¹⁷⁴ In 1901 it was sold to a Berlin businessman by the name of Schöller, who entrusted its management to a few DOAG representatives, i.e. not colonists, but tradesmen. The latter chose a means of development that seemed most profitable to them and close to that being used by their Indian colleagues. It is not possible to provide a precise date for when the plantation was opened to migrants, but several “*tembo* huts” could be found there as early as 1905. In 1913, the *Schöller-schamba* constituted Dar es Salaam’s first African neighbourhood by far. Indeed, its more or less 200 hectares were divided into three unequal surfaces, all linked to the town and its needs: a quarry, a plantation for the production of *tembo* and a residential area covering some one hundred hectares.¹⁷⁵ On the latter, the administration counted 1600 African houses accommodating two thirds of the town’s African population.¹⁷⁶ The area’s real estate situation, which had been unfavourable to urban growth during the 1890’s, was transformed during the mid-1900’s; 100 hectares opened up to urbanization from one day to the next. At first, urbanization took effect between a property owner who agreed to keep land rent low and African migrants looking for land while Kisutu was being kept within narrow margins. The State recorded this evolution and gradually created a roads network and a few collective installations such as wells.¹⁷⁷

B. A differentiated peripheral space

Beyond the first belt of plantations gradually being integrated into the urban fabric there was a space with few links to the town during the Zanzibari period and which was mostly occupied and developed by Swahili communities. Indeed, the town did not constitute a significant outlet at the time: few caravans stopped in Dar es Salaam, and its inhabitants, who were mainly slaves, had to see to their own needs. Three large peri-urban spaces, differing in shape and integration rhythms according to their position in relation to

¹⁷⁴ DOAZ, 23 December, 1899

¹⁷⁵ DOAZ, 25 March, 1905 and TNA, G 4 / 11, p. 215-217

¹⁷⁶ TNA, G 4/ 11, p. 215-217

¹⁷⁷ See map 1.

the town and the way communities responded to urban pressure, can be distinguished.

1. The integration of the creek system

Dar es Salaam owes its existence to its natural deep-water harbour, followed by its promotion to the rank of colonial capital. The development of port activities led to the early and progressive integration of the overall area. The most integrated zone was of course the harbour itself, which was constantly under construction during this period, the decisive modernisation phase being linked to the construction of the railway-line and the arrival of thousands of tons of building material. A modest arsenal was set up in the southwestern part of the harbour. It was moved to Kurasini between 1906 and 1909, but a bridge was built across the Kitaloni to facilitate the crossing of the large workforce living in the city.¹⁷⁸ To provide passing steamships with a service level worthy of a capital city and to exercise efficient control over their passengers, the administration had a large number of installations built right around the creek. Their location depended on the significance of having them far away or, on the contrary, in close proximity to the urban centre. Dirty installations (such as the coal warehouse, built in 1906),¹⁷⁹ noisy ones (like the floating dock brought into service in May 1901)¹⁸⁰ or potentially dangerous ones (such as the dhow or steam ship quarantine) were built on the other side of the creek, on the Kinangoni bank, so as to reduce the danger and inconvenience. Moreover, Kurasini supplied the water, which was indispensable to the steamships.

The development of the public buildings and works sector in this capital city under construction generated more astounding examples of this integration of the creek banks. At low tide, Africans exploited the foreshore of a little Kurasini cove in search of coral stones, which they loaded onto their dhows. The high tide put the boats afloat, enabling them to unload their cargo on the Dar es Salaam building sites¹⁸¹. A more classic example is that of the carpenter, Günter, who bought a piece of land close to the port for building a sawmill. He saw it as a way of reducing costs related to unloading the wood he was importing from Scandinavia.

The missions proved themselves to be sensitive to the particular quality of the creek banks even earlier than the government itself. Their peninsular character kept them far from town, but the isolation was relative if one had boats to circulate in. In 1890, the Protestant mission in Kinangoni and in 1894 the Catholic mission in Kurasini purchased some *shambas* intended to become small Christian villages, isolated from the city and its temptations,

178 At the time, Kurasini was separated from the town by the Kitaloni river mouth. DOAZ, 2 June 1906.

179 BMG, IV-1 – 10, p. 217-220: Superintendent Klamroth's report, 13 September 1905.

180 Mascarenhas A., "The port of Dar es Salaam", SUTTON JEG (dir), Dar-es Salaam..., pp. 85-118.

181 "Bilder aus Dar es Salaam" in *Missionsblätter*, 1897, pp 342-346.

while the missionaries could continue to live in the city in order to represent their institution to the political power. While waiting for their plans to be carried out, they tried to develop part of the purchased land so as to offer an “educational activity” to those freed slave-children who had been entrusted to them as well as to increase their budgets which were tight when compared to their needs. In the 1890’s the Protestants started planting coconut palms, but these beginnings were accompanied by many disappointments: the absence of farming technique skills, a long period of drought and the endless rotation of their European staff prevented any continuous effort in this area. In 1897, the same disappointments awaited the Catholic mission’s ten or so hectares of agaves. Here and there, the missions’ efforts were crowned with some success, such as the Catholics’ cattle breeding and the Protestants’ few hectares of coconut plantations. But on the whole, they did not have the human resources required to exploit the hundreds of hectares purchased on the creek’s perimeters. Directly or indirectly, an increasingly strong pressure made itself felt to put an end to this situation. For lands purchased after 1895, the administration insisted on greater agricultural involvement. Public opinion, that is to say the colonists, openly blamed them for their speculative designs. The missions then started looking for a workforce to intensify the cultivation.

The missions followed a different route to increase the development of their plantations. In 1905, the Protestants willingly accepted a proposal by the Government to accommodate dozens of Sukuma in Kinangoni, so that the latter could apply themselves to food-producing farming which would provide fruit supplies for the urban market. Within a few years they had cleared several dozen hectares, maybe even a hundred. In return, these farmers provided the mission with a stable source of workers who were reliable and inexpensive and who gradually planted and then maintained 6,000 coconut palms on some sixty hectares. This way, the *Berliner Missionsgesellschaft* succeeded in cultivating at best a third of their property. The Catholics went another route. From 1907 onwards, they started to buy back elderly slaves whom they set up in Mbagalla as farmers. The latter remained debtors to the mission until they had refunded their full repurchase price¹⁸². Overall, the experiment was a failure, however, and nature reclaimed a large part of the *shambas* bought at Mbagalla and at Kurasini.

2. *Magogoni and Kurasini’s near peninsular ties with the town*

Apart from the installation of port-related activities, colonial presence was relatively discrete as soon as one left the creek surroundings. The colonists invested little and belatedly in this area. In fact, the greater part of the land looking out onto the creek was bought before 1895, maybe even before 1893, by the mission and a government official called Saint-Paul Saint-Hilaire. Not

182 Every now and then the DOAZ echoed these critics; see, for example, DOAZ dated 21 September, 1901.

much developed, the land formed a sort of glacis between the town and those territories that could have whetted the colonists' appetite. Communication difficulties and a lack of comprehension of local realities did not incite Europeans to look any further, all the more as there were some attractive areas closer to the town. The location of undesired activities close to town (the leper-house, ammunition depot and quarantine) also deterred interest.

Magogoni

Contrary to Kurasini and Mtoni, Magogoni was characterized by a small population. The humidity of the area made it favourable to malaria; behind the ocean view facade, the landscape was mainly composed of savannah and a few trees that every now and then left some room for fields stretching out in the areas around the footpaths.¹⁸³ Generally, colonists were looking especially for already cultivated land, because they had no wish to clear the land, which would require a large workforce and was not directly productive. One could add the low level of the local offer to this low level European demand. In 1913, part of the land running along the oceanfront for several kilometres was farmed as a coconut plantation. It reached a width of some 700 meters in places (such as Mjimwema), but the depth was usually only about a hundred meters or so.¹⁸⁴ A few sales contracts registered towards the end of the 1900's show that a part of these plantations belonged to Omani nobles living in Zanzibar: they had thus been established under Zanzibari rule.¹⁸⁵ These individuals were inaccessible to the average colonist. If the Europeans did not get (much of) a foothold in this area, it was also because of the dynamism of the local society who initially adapted well to the intensified monetarisation of the economy. Arab tradesmen who also owned small plantations lived in the fishing villages spaced out along the coast (Magogoni, Mjimwema, Mboamaji) and scattered the quasi-peninsula (Chaputa, Tungi, etc) lived. Their presence testifies to the area's economic interest which lay in the income which Swahili fishermen derived from the sea, all the more important in the light of the growing urban demand; in the sale of coral stones destined for the booming city's building sites; and of course in the coconut palm harvest. Well-to-do Arab and Swahili tradesmen thus had some financial means to maintain and develop the plantations. Working on behalf of the government could also be

183 The situation was not without its dangers: around 1900, a farmer by the name of Munimkuu decided to stop farming a *shamba* close to that of Saint Paul, already farmed by his grand-parents, because the presence of lions was becoming too much of a threat. TNA, G7 / 202, p. 188.

184 See map 2.

185 In September 1912, Mwinyigogo bin Diwani Sagamba, who was residing in Dar es Salaam, bought a *shamba* at Magogoni from Wakili wa Hylal, Chalyd bin Mohamed and Rachid bin Mohamed, who were living in Zanzibar, for the considerable amount of 6250 rupees. TNA, G35 / 55, p. 55.

a way of obtaining the financial means necessary for investment.¹⁸⁶ Europeans started buying in this area around 1909, leading one to suspect that difficulties were starting to surface. The deterioration of the socio-economic situation is mentioned by two district reports in March and July 1914 on the subject of *Jumbe* Nyungi, who was no longer in a position to ensure the exploitation of his two *shambas* at Tungi.¹⁸⁷ Through lack of money, he was forced to abandon his 1,700 palm trees. One of the most likely explanations for this break in local dynamism must be sought in the progressive disappearance of the obliging labour force as a result of the legal arsenal put in place by the colonial authorities. Although slavery had not been abolished, renewing the dependants' workforce was illegal and more or less impossible by the end of the 1900's.

Mtoni

In 1913, Mtoni was characterized by strong development, with fields prevailing to a large extent over savannahs and plantations. The fact that exploitation in the area had started a long time ago could also be seen in the number of footpaths and in the scattered African settlements. Although the landscape was dotted by many trees, it was more within the context of open *mohogo* fields than that of closed coconut plantations. Swahili farmers were not only represented by coconut palms: sales contracts also mention the presence of mango trees. The fruit of the mango tree sold very well on the Dar es Salaam market because it constituted an important (although temporary) part of the diet. There were also other types of trees, but their species was never explicitly mentioned. Agricultural production was thus diversified. Plantations were not completely absent from the landscape, but they were scattered and relatively small. They belonged to Indians and Arabs as well as to Swahilis.

Even if records regarding this region are incomplete, it seems that, just as at Magogoni, few European colonists were interested in this area, and the few who were appeared belatedly, from 1912 onwards. The biggest European planter, Devers, who bought a farm from Kigiragira's heirs for the sum of 2500 rupees, once again puts in an appearance, so it was probably a plantation.¹⁸⁸ Five other plantations changed hands between 1909 and 1914, three of them going to European colonists and the other two to the Arab community. In total, however, colonists did not really get into the area. This was also due to the farming communities' coherence and vitality. Indeed, the presence of Indian landowners was probably a sign of the indebtedness of certain Swahilis. But

¹⁸⁶ We can mention the case of Salim bin Sef, an *akida* who held an appointment in a little village situated several hours from Dar es Salaam, who bought three pieces of land forming a block of several dozen hectares at Vijibweni between 1903 and 1910. This investment which, a priori, was difficult to control for a person living far away, makes one think that Salim had strong local anchors. Perhaps he was one of the brothers of Mohamed bin Sef and Zahoro bin Sef, whose father was already present in Chaputa.

TNA, G7 / 208, p. 162.

¹⁸⁷ TNA, G7 / 209, p. 115 and p. 161.

¹⁸⁸ TNA, G 35 / 55, p. 147 and p. 149.

the fact that this well-cleared zone resisted the colonists' economic penetration is a sign of its capacity to adapt to the new colonial order. Food and arboreal production enabled them to earn enough money on the urban market and to deal with the increasing monetarisation of Dar daily life. The solidity of these communities also expressed itself in political terms, with *jumbe* able to resist the temptation of easy money. Thus, *Jumbe* Madenge refused to back his colleague, Chambuso, when the latter made a sale to the Catholic mission. Having investigated the matter at the request of the district, he concluded that his colleague, Chambuso, had had no right to sell this *shamba*, thus making the transaction null and void.¹⁸⁹

3. Pugu Road and the Simbasi (Msimbazi) Valley

This second area, the privileged main road for the city's development, is orientated in a northeast / southwest direction. There had in fact been reciprocal influence between the colonial town and this space: the town's development contributed to reinforcing its coherence, while the area's geographical characteristics left its mark on urban growth. This orientation is dictated mainly by the Simbasi valley, which is one kilometre wide in the vicinity of Tabata, and which gets narrower towards the river mouth. Two elongated hills (Tabata, Kigogo) divide the valley in two. On its northern slope, the layout is complicated by a few small, tributary valleys, especially in the vicinity of Magomeni, contrary to the southern side, made up of a strip of land stretching out along the town's extension. The simplicity of the southern slope's layout explains why the main roads from Dar es Salaam followed the edge of this valley: the Tabora caravan route and then, from 1905 onwards, the railway.

Judging by toponymic density, human occupation was especially concentrated on the stretched-out hillocks in the middle of the valley (Tabata, Kigogo) and on the northern side of the valley (Mburahati, Makurumura, Magomeni). The complementary nature of the narrow finages to the north between low-lying, humid zones (favourable to rice-growing and grazing) and higher zones intended for fields and trees was probably more attractive. This seems to be supported by the Digo migrants who settled at Magomeni at the beginning of the 1880's as well as by the Arab plantations developed along the valley's northern edge. The lack of exploitation of the southern side is emphasized by a district report dated December 1902, when 33 hectares of land were purchased by a Greek colonist by the name of Kroussos. In reply to the Governor, who wanted to know whether this transaction was not partially challenging the urban market supply, the district chief replied in the negative, explaining that the greater part of the purchased land was lying fallow.¹⁹⁰ However, this southern slope was not exploited. Based on land sale

189 TNA, G 7 / 204, p. 172-173.

190 TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 42-44.

prices, it appears as if there were three types of *shamba*. The first consisted of quite large fields recently recuperated from the surrounding savannah. The purchase price for these fields was between 2 and 10 rupees per hectare, according to the period of purchase and the distance from the city. There were also smaller *shamba* where there was a more intimate mix of trees and cultivation, the price of which was about 15 rupees per hectare.¹⁹¹ Lastly, mention is made of six coconut plantations of between three and six hectares, located along *Pugustrasse* and bought by urban dwellers between 1903 and 1909. Their prices ranged from 60 to 125 rupees per hectare. Four belonged to Arabs and two to Swahilis, one of whom (*Jumbe Abdallah bin Fundi bin Abdallah*) had bought it from an Arab in 1882. These plantations were not necessarily very dense: the 5-hectare plantation of a Swahili by the name of Munimkuu bin Mohamedani was sold in 1903 for 400 rupees (90 rupees per hectare), although it only contained 95 palm trees and a few other trees, while European plantations had 100 trees per hectare on average.

As the colonial town developed, this area reinforced its coherence, tightening links with the southern side of the valley and beyond while at the same time turning resolutely towards the city. The Simbasi valley's southern slope constituted the most propitious zone for extending the crown of Zanzibari plantations from the city. A busy main road, well-known to colonists, ran through it. Furthermore, it was situated right behind the *Sultan-Schamba* on sandy soil of like nature. As early as 1892, a colonist by the name of Grasse had the idea of imitating the Omanis by buying a *shamba* south of the Pugu road, in the vicinity of Geresani. Another colonist followed his example, but resold his property of some 300 hectares in 1897 to the City of Dar es Salaam.¹⁹² Then, in 1895, Bormann appeared and purchased between 80 and 150 hectares (estimations differ in the reports). The former owners were all Swahili, who thus sold fields situated closer than 3 kilometres from the city. However, most of the purchases took place between 1899 and 1906, peaking during the railway construction years. Between 1904 and 1906, more than 500 hectares changed hands. By the mid-1900's the area was almost entirely in colonist hands. Only five *shambas* were still owned by Indians. In fact, two role-players had a deciding role in this process. A colonist by the name of Devers bought more than 300 hectares situated north of *Pugustrasse* between 1899 and 1905 for an amount ranging between 2000 and 2300 rupees (but he had to invest a lot more to transform these fields or this savannah into a plantation).¹⁹³ The Commune started buying lands next to its *shamba* in several stages; in 1906 the surface increased from 300 to 700 hectares. In


191 For example, a 5-hectare field carrying 78 fruit trees of different sizes was sold in 1906 for 80 rupees, a good price compared to other transactions during the same period. In 1905, the City bought 300 hectares for 600 rupees in the same area. Chances are that these were uncultivated lands devoid of trees.

192 TNA, G 35 / 10, n.p.

193 TNA, G7 / 201, p. 270-280; TNA, G7 / 204, p. 120; TNA, G7 / 207, p. 106-107; TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 22-24, p. 68, p. 72, p. 75 and p. 142.

1913, across this whole area, a strip of land measuring one kilometre in width and eight kilometres in length, the African fields and the savannah had given way to a vast European plantation with a known density ranging from 80 (the commune) to 120 (Devers) coconut palms per hectare.¹⁹⁴

Figure 6 - Land use in areas surrounding Dar es Salaam in 1913



Some landowners tolerated the presence of a few African farmers on their plantations, so as to dispose of a minimum workforce for maintaining them. Moreover, the best way to ensure development that favoured trees was to cultivate the land on which they were growing, aerating the soil and enriching it with nitrates. In different DOAZ articles, mention is made of dairy cows on these plantations, as well as poultry.¹⁹⁵ The main objective of this space was thus to produce fresh nuts and copra, but diversified, mixed farming was also practised, contributing to town supplies. This may explain why the authorities' initial concerns with regards to supplies were, if not brushed aside, at least put into perspective. The landscape and the economy of this area were thus profoundly changed by the involvement of a few Europeans living in the city. This integration took place on an approximately 7-kilometre wide stretch of surrounding land. The expansion of this huge plantation was halted by the presence of a state-protected forest, the Sachsenwald, the edge of which was

¹⁹⁴ See map 2. There was less density on the commune's *shamba* than on Dever's lands where, in 1906, some 25,000 palm trees could be counted on 300 hectares. DOAZ, 28 April 1906.

¹⁹⁵ DOAZ, 28 April 1906; 2 November 1909; 11 December 1909.

some 7 kilometres from the *Pugustrasse*, and by the presence of a few areas reserved for the Nyamwezi farmers from 1905 onwards. This is why the colonists, starting with Devers, pursued their undertaking of concentrated land ownership in the Simbasi valley. It was thus a reversal of the earlier logic because, previously, land on the southern slope constituted a reserve for the northern communities. But land transfers in the Simbasi valley were also done from the city. Most of the purchases were done between 1901 and 1905, a period during which transactions involving approximately 450 hectares were registered. Subsequently, the market was less active and its importance is rather badly documented. The main buyers were Devers (a hundred or so hectares) and especially the Catholic mission, who purchased more than 200 hectares from 1902 to 1903. Contrary to land situated on the southern slope, Arabs, Goans and Indians invested in this area. Because of its humidity, the valley was mostly allotted to market gardening: vegetables and rice were produced, and cattle breeding took place on the prairies. However, following some drainage work, Devers could devote a few hectares to coconut trees.

Transactions in the Simbasi valley had profound repercussions on the economy and the social life of the African communities of Magomeni, Tabata, Kigogo... On the one hand, buyers did not always want the local population to stay on. This was the case for the 200 hectares purchased by the Catholic mission who thought that no labour from outside their community would be required. At first, the 100 or so boarding school girls were enough to develop a huge vegetable garden producing European vegetables; subsequently, Christian couples came to live there.¹⁹⁶ In a general sense, the arrival of a European was not an amusing prospect and many farmers preferred to leave rather than risk a daily confrontation with such neighbours. Relations within the African communities were affected by these land transfers. Some *jumbe* wanted to convert their right of allocation to Europeans into as much cash as possible and greatly abused their subjects' confidence. At Magomeni, the scope of the phenomenon was such that farmers refused to clear the *pori*, because this was a sure indication that the land would be sold to a colonist. It is very likely that the villages of the Simbasi valley experienced a demographic decline, as people started looking for milder climes, whether in the city or on less coveted land. As for the *jumbe*, they found the necessary financial means to make their plantations denser, according to the European model, or to acquire more land. The best known example was that of Mwinikuu Shindo: described by District Chief Von Winterfeld as a famous land seller, he was living in Dar es Salaam in 1911 and was referred to as a *planter living of his private income*.¹⁹⁷

196 *Missionsblätter*, 1897, p. 338-342 and Skt Ot., the Santa Maria cloister Chronicle.

197 TNA, G 7 / 202, p. 197 and TNA, G 7 / 208, p. 120.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Assessing the integration of peri-urban space

The four characteristics (recent, colonial, tropical, disposing of a harbour) of German East Africa's capital combined to have a strong effect on the evolution and growth of its peri-urban space.

The city's recent character explains the relatively weak links between the tiny city founded by Sultan Majid at the beginning of the 1860's and the surrounding space. Beyond the crown of plantations, man's ascendancy over the environment was only partial and confined to a small area, thus making its tropicality all the more appreciable. Village *terroirs* and individual fields were subjected to the fortunes of the moment and the number of available hands, which determined development in the area. Economic development during the second half of the nineteenth century certainly made it possible to acquire a servile labour force, but many areas around Dar es Salaam remained unexploited because of low human density. The city's few decades of existence had familiarized the local population (and in particular the chiefs) with the presence of powerful foreign elements whose relation to the land was very different from their own. The vitality of the property market organized by the colonial authorities is partly explained by this fact. The *jumbe* had grasped that, like the Omanis, Europeans attached a lot of importance to the concept of private land ownership. Thus, they knew that any possession of land taken up by the new masters constituted an alienation of the soil, a final retrenchment of the collective land, against which there was nothing to be done. Thus, it was better to convert into money their traditional right of allocating land. Some did not content themselves with this simple use of a common prerogative, but extended it to sections of *pori* on which their community could not claim any rights. This was facilitated by the fact that they were the prime informants of the administrative apparatus as far as land matters were concerned and by the fact that the latter depended on them for applying their decisions on a local level.

When it became obvious that Dar es Salaam would become the capital of Germany's principal colony, Catholic and Protestant missions sought representation there in order to be close to the future political power. This explains why, in the early stages, they bought a lot of land close to town. In addition, the fact of becoming the capital of a colonial territory in the process of being constituted gave this centre a dynamism it had never known before. This notably translated into considerable demographic growth: from 3 to 4,000 people at the end of the 1880's to approximately 15,000 at the turn of the century. This evolution necessarily encouraged local farmers to intensify exploitations, even if such tendencies were frustrated by extreme drought during the period 1897-1899. The arbitrary elevation of Dar es Salaam within the hierarchy of the region's cities resulted in the improvement

of the roads network radiating from it, although the improvements were admittedly of varying quality. However, for their property investments, the city's European residents favoured those peri-urban sectors with the best links to the agglomeration. As a colonial capital, Dar es Salaam was subjected to strong interventionist willpower within the administration. As early as 1891, for reasons of prestige and culture, colonial authorities defined new norms as far as town planning was concerned; these norms governed urban space integration within the Zanzibari plantations closest to the agglomeration. This process was organized around a roads network and architecturally defined zones. Linked to the flight of a large part of the Arab community following the Buchiri revolt, it contributed to the decline of a certain type of plantation which had been experienced as a total space, a place of residence for members of the family, dependents and the dead, a place representing the social surface and a place of production.

The colonial state started intervening in the city's immediate surroundings as early as the 1890's to ensure that its staff (including many senior officials) was adequately protected against dangers linked to the tropicality of the area and to harbour activities. Installations that were undesirable in town for reasons of hygiene and public health (such as the port's quarantine) were set up in the outskirts. In addition, drainage work was carried out rapidly, but it was an enormous task that far exceeded the colonial administration's limited financial means and human resources. Moreover, during the 1890's, ignorance about malaria transmission resulted in development errors, which were only gradually detected and dealt with. Mosquitoes were not the only enemy. Lions and warthogs also threatened man's existence. It soon became obvious that the best way of fighting an over-present tropical nature was to manage it to a certain extent by means of agricultural development. At the turn of the century, two other types of logic were moving in a similar direction. On the one hand, the administration sought to reinforce the city's social and economic stability by ensuring a good food supply level. On the other hand, they wanted to develop a colonial agriculture orientated towards the export market. To achieve these ends, the 1895 edict pertaining to the organization of property management in the colony provided a privileged instrument. When colonists showed initiative, i.e. from about 1899 onwards, this law made it possible to impose development standards on them, so that coconut plantations could be expanded as quickly as possible. However, even if it would be simplistic to oppose food producing and export agriculture in view of plantations' recourse to undergrowth cultivation so as to maintain the soil, the appearance of an imbalance between the two main lines of the peri-urban zone's development policy was to be feared. Indeed, the colonial state was unable to protect local African agriculture in the face of jointly organized land transfers by the colonists and the *jumbe*, who were very good at giving the state the slip. This is why, in order to improve city supplies, it was decided

in 1905 to settle farmers from the colony's interior on savannah zones close to the city; deportations were organized to this effect. It is a characteristic feature of colonial administrations, who are largely dependant on their African subordinates: they change their positions and are often unable to impose certain policies without profoundly disturbing the social fabric.

As the political capital and principal point of entry into the colony, Dar es Salaam enjoyed significant power of attraction from the very beginning of the 1890's. However, the issue was much more sensitive for the African population than for the other communities. That changed when Dar es Salaam was established as the territory's economic capital at the turn of the century. The previous economy, founded on the marketing of ivory, was on the wane and Bagamoyo, the port, which traditionally depended on its trade, along with it. The balance of power between the two cities tilted around 1904, with the start of construction on the Dar es Salaam-Tabora railroad. Dar es Salaam's economic development resulted in a reinforcement of colonial society, with a notable influx of Indians and European colonists. At the time, land ownership on the periphery was not just an investment in the colonial economy, but also a means of distinguishing oneself in society. The development of peri-urban real estate provided the European group with the means of justifying their social pre-eminence, not only in relation to the Indians who were presented as parasites, but also in relation to the administration, by putting themselves in the service of the colonial community and not impeding its initiatives.

On the field, the process was geographically differentiated: Europeans preferred to invest in zones which were well connected to the city, where partial development had taken place, but where the population density was not considerable (Pugu road), which would enable them to create plantations of several dozen hectares. In these zones, private property borders replaced the open boundaries of the African fields. There was belated interest for those plots that were far from town (Magogoni) once the first zones had been saturated. However, the coherence of the African communities influenced the extent to which European land ownership penetrated the urban periphery. Thus, the *jumbe* from the Simbasi valley (Kigogo, Magomeni, Tabata) preferred selling land to the colonists on a massive scale, while it seems that the *jumbe* from Mtoni were better able to resist temptation. The difference in attitude can also be explained by the various choices made in the course of the integration process into the budding colonial society: the former favoured new economic opportunities, while the latter tried to preserve their political position. The resistance can also be explained by local farmers' ability to adapt: they understood the significance of producing food for a fast-expanding urban market.

Dar es Salaam's assertion on an economic level had an impact on the African immigrant population. The available population figures do not indicate strong growth during the 1900's, but the collected qualitative data proves

that the migrant origins were diverse, linked to the administration and the army's opening up of the colony, as well as a stabilization of the population, as sojourns were extended for longer periods. Coupled with the progressive expulsion of those African groups who were still residing in the area that had been defined as European in 1891, these tendencies led to the creation of new African districts. Thus, between 1904 and 1914, the integration process of the crown of Zanzibari plantations close to town continued because of the African migrants. However, this process was also a differentiated one. When the plantations belonged to Indians or Arabs, transforming a *shamba* from an economic area to a residential space happened gradually, as the line of trees lost ground over the years while the line of houses advanced. But those plantations that were European-owned did not evolve in the same way. Colonists refused the presence of residents on their property, with the result that the city suburbs showed spatial discontinuities reflecting the property structure. This situation explains why the African districts' centre of gravity was displaced. At the beginning of the 1900's, Africans resided in the entire area behind the business district, but the centre of African social life was in Kissutu. However, the expansion of this district was held in check by European properties situated along the major communication routes. On the other hand, when around 1904 the *Sultan-Schamba* to the west of the city became the property of a Berlin businessman, an area of more than 100 hectares became available for migrant settlement. It was significant enough to give rise to a real district, the coherence of which was strengthened by infrastructure works (roads and wells) undertaken by the administration around 1910. The birth and importance of present-day Kariakoo thus owes a lot to the property structure outlined during the Omani period and transformed during the period of German domination. *A contrario*, the extremely weak African presence in Upanga can most probably be explained by the fact that European colonists owned the land along the principal roads leading to that quarter.¹⁹⁸ Other immigrants settled in Dar es Salaam's more remote periphery, usually asking for the right to do so from the *jumbe*. Their presence and efforts to clear the fields made their chosen zone attractive to same origin immigrants, who consequently became their customers. Integration into the neighbouring Zaramo community was facilitated by the adoption of Islam and by matrimonial alliances. There, these African migrants had land to produce their own food and a surplus destined for the urban market. They could also work on the neighbouring European plantations. This phenomenon, which is not easy to date but which seems to have started after 1905 or even 1910, is at the origin of many present-day African neighbourhoods.

198 A British archives document shows that there were about a hundred huts in Upanga in the 30's. TNA, 1946 (*Native Affairs, 1933-1946*); *Native huts in non-native areas of the township of Dar es Salaam*, 16 December, 1935.

An initial reorientation in the State's use of peri-urban space

The creation of a strong, organic link between the agglomeration and its surroundings was carried out on two levels: near the old centre, it took the shape of an emerging urban fabric with holes in places where the colonists refused to give up their plantations to make room for African settlements. Besides which, a combination of factors (local farmers' response to the city's demographic growth; colonists' property investments and other exogenous elements within colonial society; State initiatives) resulted in intense agricultural development in the area, reaching a depth of almost ten kilometres in places. The agricultural activities of Dar es Salaam's surroundings were increasingly dictated by the needs of the colonial agglomeration and its inhabitants, whether to satisfy the needs of the urban market or the colonial economy.

From 1912 onwards, spurred on by District Chief Eggebert, the administrative apparatus decided not to content itself with favouring and supporting this twofold evolution, but to re-orientate proper use of the peri-urban space by means of a direct definition. Abandoning the logic of agricultural intensification (which, thanks to the railroad, had in a way lost its *raison d'être* with the disappearance of the constraints of substantial local supplies) the administration wanted to manage the town as it saw fit and freely plan its expansion. Already in 1905-1906, a first initiative of this kind had come into being without, however, being able to impose itself.¹⁹⁹ The plan which was settled on in 1912 was much more ambitious. It pertained to the most distant peri-urban zone, as the administration wanted to secure all possible options for the city's long-term development. With this in mind, the administration had recourse to an acquisition policy. On the one hand, these land ownerships would make it possible to develop an area as they saw fit when the time came; on the other hand, they would have exchangeable objects at their disposal. To limit the difficulties as far as future negotiations with the owners were concerned, property transfers in favour of the non-indigenous population in the area around the cove were prohibited from 28 February 1912. The measure was extended to Msasani in October 1912, and to Mtoni

199 On the occasion of a property sale request in October 1905, Governor Von Götzen asked the district for a development project involving Kurasini, which would combine a barracks, harbour installations and Indian, African and European quarters. A few months later, the local administration turned in their report. The future quarter had to be structured according to a grid pattern, which would adapt to the coastline, while the intersections between the main roads would take the shape of small squares. The European zone would be built along the shore, so as to benefit from the ocean breeze. Between the European, African and Indian zones, provision was made for a 265-meter wide cordon sanitaire. In its northern part, it would accommodate a barracks. Thus, colonists would be doubly protected from the Eingeborenen, on a medical as well as on a military level. The plan, which was submitted for assessment to the government's official in charge of health matters, head doctor Meixner, was modified so as not to relegate members of the Indian population to the proximity of the African quarter, but allow them to live next to the European quarter. In addition, Meixner proposed that a certain type of inner courtyard be imposed which would enable the administration to check sanitary conditions from the outside. TNA, G 7/206, p. 20.

and Kitschwele in April 1913.²⁰⁰ At the same time, the administration sought to prevent local farmers from developing what remained of the savannah in the same area, especially around the cove. In April 1912, the government instructed the district to draw up a mapped report on the *herrenlos* land to the southeast of the city. It was clearly a question of providing government with the means of managing the city's expansion by henceforth preventing the natives from developing new land.²⁰¹

In the city's immediate vicinity, it was a question of taking control of all the Zanzibari *shamba* destined for urbanization, so as to guarantee controlled, coherent and above all segregated growth. The administration wanted to turn Upanga into a European quarter, starting with the sea front area. However, the latter belonged mainly to Indians and Arabs. Negotiations were undertaken with the Indian communities to buy out the properties while, in order to bring pressure to bear, authorization for any new form of outlay was refused.²⁰² In March 1913, the Governor also requested that provision be made for a 40,000 marks credit, the value of the many properties owned by Soliman bin Nasor and Seyid Khalid, a sultan who had been deposed by the British. He justified this policy by increasing property prices, the level of which would make it impossible for colonists to acquire land, according to him. In the west, property in the African quarters was not to be left in the hands of private individuals, even if they were Europeans, so that they would not have the power to fix the price for renting land, because that would carry serious risks for social peace. Moreover, property control in the African quarters would make it possible to accelerate heightened racial segregation, which growing numbers of colonists were calling for in an increasingly insistent manner. It was a question of creating a *No Man's Land*, a *cordon sanitaire* separating the city's African part from the central districts. In this spirit, a series of acquisitions was settled in 1913: the administration owed 400,000 marks to the *Schöller Schamba* and a series of neighbouring plantations for 250,000 marks.²⁰³ Finally, it would seem as though only the acquisition of *Schöller Schamba* was concluded in 1914, a few months before the start of the First World War, but in the end it was the British who carried out the *cordon sanitaire* planned by their predecessors, the present-day *Mnazi Moja*. Thus, this re-orientation of state action did not have immediate practical consequences. In fact, it constitutes the beginnings of peri-urban history during the British period rather the result of evolution during the German period.

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200 TNA, G 7/208, p. 185; TNA, G 7/208, p. 200; TNA, G 7/209, p. 33.

201 TNA, G 7/208, p. 7-8.

202 TNA, G 7/209, p. 7-8.

203 TNA, G 7/209, p. 24.

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Public Housing Policies: Decentralization, government policies and the people's solutions

Marie Ange Goux

For the past forty years, accelerating urban growth has been a common phenomenon in all of Africa's big cities. Nairobi and Dar es Salaam have not escaped this continental tendency and have recorded huge population increases. However, the duration and scope of the phenomenon differ noticeably between these two cities.

The population of Nairobi, a city that sprang up in 1898 around a new railway station on the Mombasa-Kisumu line, increased relatively quickly due to the labour needs of British colonization. The city's appeal was coupled with rural 'abhorrence' as the monopolization of real estate progressed and colonists appropriated the best land. In addition, in the central and western parts of the country's rural areas, already affected by this excessive appropriation of property, the available land was gradually divided into smaller units according to an inheritance system based on the principle of sharing out. Consequently, residents from these areas moved to Nairobi to look for employment, the only urban centre which really appealed to them. After Independence, migrant waves increased with the lifting of controls on the movement of Africans.

In Dar es Salaam, capital of a mandate relinquished by the Crown, the pace of development was slower; German occupation and English trusteeship did not fit the community population model, land requisitions were not such a common occurrence and the industrial and commercial outlay was more limited. However, since the early seventies, there has been an increase in the migration to Dar es Salaam of country people looking for salaried employment.

The urban population of these two cities has thus increased dramatically, particularly in the course of the past twenty years. From 1978 to 1988, Dar es Salaam's population went from 270,000 to close on 1,400,000, and now stands at about 2,000,000 people.¹ As for Nairobi, its population had already reached 834,000 in 1979; this number went up to 1,342,570 in 1989,² and is now situated somewhere between 2 and 3 million.³

1 Kironde (J.M.L.), Land policy options for urban Tanzania, Land Use Policy, Vol. 14, No2, 1997, London.

2 Kenya Population Census 1979, 1989.

3 Taking a census of the urban populations has become an eminently political issue, particularly when it comes to residents from the informal settlements. Many researchers are asking us to consider official statistics as being greatly under-estimated and to use this wide margin when characterizing Nairobi's current population.

Figure 7: The population in 1988





Figure 8: The population in 2001



Accommodating and integrating such a mass of new arrivals in the city poses many problems, one of the most sensitive being that of housing. The contradiction between growth in demand and the stagnation of offers has led to an increase in (illegal or unauthorized) informal settlement zones. These zones are home to between 40 and 60% of Nairobi's population and more than 75% of that of Dar es Salaam. From a sociological point of view, the population living in this type of settlement is quite heterogeneous, with middle class and very poor people living right next to each other. It should also be remembered that poverty is not the only explanation for existing informal settlements. Legal access to urban land is obviously a serious problem when the middle class starts participating in building unplanned houses. However, the vast majority of people living in these settlements are poor; any kind of legal housing would be inaccessible to them; they congregate on vast, densely populated sites, devoid of the most basic structures (water or electricity conveyance, tarred roads, schools or sanitation). In both these cities, the sites are referred to as "slums".

The aim of this article will be to examine how the housing problem that emerged from this real urban explosion has been managed. The comparative approach enables the researcher to observe certain subtle distinctions resulting from different political and economic orientations. However, it has to be noted as a preliminary that the main orientations followed in the housing domain apply to all developing countries. Policies pursued by the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments are akin to a gradual disengagement on the part of the State. Although the colonial period and more particularly the post-independence period were characterized by extensive town planning projects and housing schemes for the poor, the failure of these initiatives and progressive economic degradation have led to a gradual reduction in State intervention regarding urban housing delivery. In a correlative way, this disengagement has resulted in alternative property initiatives taken by the people.

The administrative structure responsible for urban management is marked by the British model for local communities, which grants an important place to municipalities endowed with their own counsellors and budget since the colonial period. This relatively decentralized model differentiates between British and French colonies, the latter being characterized by the centralized Jacobin model. Alongside the municipalities, East-African governments put in place para-statal organizations to deal exclusively with the town's housing problem for the masses. We will thus examine the organization of relations between the different ministerial organs (both para-statal and municipal), as well as the process of elaborating and implementing housing programmes and allocating the necessary resources for these programmes.

Subsequently, we will study the various housing policies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Since the colonial period, the two cities have successfully followed three main orientations. The first, which covered the entire period from 1950

to 1970, was characterized by social housing projects and the demolition of the poorest informal settlements. The second orientation, symptomatic of the late 1970 to 1980 period, witnessed a general endorsement of programmes for the selling of rehabilitated, planned plots with a basic infrastructure. The last, very topical orientation, much more diffuse and difficult to define, consists of renovating a number of informal settlements and eventually obtaining their legal recognition, at least in part. We shall study the effects of these different options, the identity of the role-players and the elements that influenced the shift from one option to the next.

Parallel to government action, city-dwellers looked for indirect (and inevitably imperfect) solutions to improve the badly deteriorating urban living conditions. The State solicited popular participation at an early stage, as soon as the policy for attributing plots for building purposes had been endorsed. Henceforth, governments would recognize every future owner's potential and give up their exclusive role as property developers. Today, the idea of exclusivity as regards town planning is also progressively being called into question: there has been implicit recognition of the vast, informal settlement zones and a measure of autonomy has been granted to large-scale, private interventions. It will be an interesting exercise to identify these role-players in society, to reflect on the appropriateness of their actions and the consequences of the way they approach the political and democratic space of the cities concerned.

I - URBAN MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION

A. Housing: the role of the municipalities

From the beginning of the 20th century, British colonies started decentralizing on a vast scale. This tendency was clearly reaffirmed by the British Colonial office with its 1947 declaration that "an efficient and democratic system of local government" would be developed primarily to help the metropolis control the increasing demands of the nationalist movements. In Tanzania and Kenya, English administrative divisions were taken over by the major local communities (districts, county councils⁴ and municipalities). As a result, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam became municipalities or City Councils in 1920 and 1949 respectively. Their new status would produce a local government system with a municipal council and its own budget. As a fixed quota of appointed white members had to be respected, council doors opened up to blacks painfully slowly. The fact that the two countries became independent contributed little towards solving the inherent decentralization problems, as the central government failed to provide its local counterpart with the actual means of carrying out the responsibilities delegated to them.

Shortly after Independence in the two countries, the one-party systems pushed for the establishment of a more centralized power structure that would

4 These correspond to rural areas consolidating villages and scattered settlement areas.

be easier to control. In Kenya, in spite of a 1963⁵ statute that guaranteed real autonomy for local communities, the latter were progressively dispossessed of their main prerogatives to the benefit of the central State. Political control from the top led to the emergence of state bureaucracy marked by corruption and political life⁶ ingested by local 'godfathers'. It also prompted James E. Ngoba to assert "in Kenya, the history of local communities fuses with that of vote-catching".⁷

In Tanzania, the evolution followed a different route: the entire administrative structure was reviewed. In the 1967 Arusha Declaration, Julius Nyerere proposed a new Socialist orientation that was clearly hostile to urban populations, considered as capitalists who were likely to become oppressors in the future. Understandably, this conception of the city had significant consequences for urban management, as most of the national budget was spent on rural development. In 1972, on the advice of a large consultancy firm, McInsey and Company, Inc.,⁸ Tanzanian authorities decided on an ambitious decentralization programme. During same year, J. Nyerere wrote a book entitled *Decentralization*⁹ to highlight the problems local communities were experiencing and to emphasize the benefits of increased popular participation:

"Our nation is too widespread for the central population in Dar es Salaam to always fully comprehend local problems or experience the urgency thereof ... The local population, very much aware of these problems, is prevented from using their own initiative to find appropriate solutions ... (local) civil servants currently have very little local power". (Quoted in Stren, 1987).¹⁰

It is important to understand to what extent decentralization is profoundly anchored in the ideology of *ujamaa*¹¹ which serves as a basis for all government actions, more particularly so in the 1970's.

In 1974 an apparently paradoxical decision put an end to local urban and rural communities until 1978; during this four year-period, they were replaced by regional councils and districts strictly controlled by central party officials. As a result, Dar es Salaam's municipality was dissolved while the city was

5 Local government regulations, Nairobi, Government Printer, 1963.

6 Bourmaud (D.), Histoire politique du Kenya. État et pouvoir local, Karthala, Paris, 1988.

7 "[...] l'histoire des collectivités locales au Kenya se confond à l'histoire du clientélisme".

Ngoba (J.E.), Centralisation administrative et clientélisme: le développement sans participation au Kenya, *Annuaire du Tiers Monde*, pp.165-171, 1982.

8 Kulaba (S.M.), "Les collectivités locales et la gestion des services urbains en Tanzanie" in Stren (dir.), White (dir.), Coquery (collab.), *Villes africaines en crise. Gérer la croissance urbaine au Sud du Sahara*, L'Harmattan, Coll. Villes et entreprises, Paris, 1993.

9 Nyerere (J.), *Decentralisation*, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1972.

10 "Notre nation est trop vaste pour que la population au centre, à Dar es Salaam, comprenne toujours les problèmes locaux ou en sente l'urgence ... On empêche la population locale, très consciente de ces problèmes, d'user de son initiative pour trouver des solutions ... à l'heure actuelle les fonctionnaires (locaux) ont en réalité très peu de pouvoirs locaux". Stren, "Les collectivités locales urbaines en Afrique", in *Villes africaines en crise*, op. cit.

11 The term *ujamaa* comes from the Swahili word *jamaa*, meaning family, and represents the family community and all its values.

managed by the three districts responsible for Ilala, Temeke and Kinondoni. This measure is an illustration of one-party distrust of urban populations, which also prompted the transfer of the country's capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma, and which explains the total inadequacy of national investments in the city of Dar es Salaam, less than for a rural district,¹² during those four years.

In 1978, however, the local communities were resuscitated, and a decree was adopted in 1982 regarding these communities and the principles according to which they should function. The decree envisaged the constitution of a municipal council of elected counsellors from each municipality, members of parliament representing the city's electoral district, five or six people appointed by the ministry of local communities and the national member for parliament, elected by the city's region.¹³ The council, which is supposed to meet every three months, governs by means of executive commissions generally consisting of six members.¹⁴ Dar es Salaam inherited a specific organization within this framework. The division between Ilala, Temeke and Kinondoni was maintained, but in time these three zones acquired an administrative maturity that culminated in the municipal process of 1 February 2001, with each zone electing its own mayor. The *Dar es Salaam City Council* thus represents a community of communes that oversees the three municipalities. This administrative transformation forms an integral part of the national programme to strengthen local communities started in 1996 and represents one of its first significant reforms. Each municipality designates a member of parliament, thus totalling three (one per commune), to which should be added the Dar es Salaam region's member for parliament. These four members of parliament form the nucleus of the City Council; the remaining constituent parts are modelled on the other councils described above.

The municipal councils of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi are responsible for all city services, development planning and the management of basic school and sanitation services (primary schools and health centres in particular); each year, they vote for the budget needed to perform these tasks. In the case of both cities, this budget has to be approved by the Ministry of Local Government. At the end of each year, the municipality's finances are examined by the Auditor-General. During the 1980's,¹⁵ municipalities' dependency on the Ministries of local communities would cause some of the numerous clashes with the mayor of Nairobi.

Considerations regarding municipal budgets lead to questions on the type of resources available to the two municipalities.

Like other Kenyan municipalities, the *Nairobi City Council* has experienced

12 Dar es Salaam's subsidies for the period 1974-1978: 16,037,000 Tsh (Kulaba, 1993).

13 The latter necessarily had to be a resident of that particular region.

14 These 6 commissions are as follows: Administration and Finance, Health and Social Well-Being, Education and Culture, Public Works and Commerce, Town Planning and Commercial and Economic Planning.

15 Bourmaud D., *Histoire politique du Kenya, État et pouvoir local*, 1988.

a significant reduction in taxes and collectable income. Until 1973 the municipal tax base was based on *Graduated Personal Tax*, personal income tax involving all adults older than eighteen. However, the various urban councils' repeated deficits prompted the state to take over this particular tax collection before redistributing it to local communities. For the municipalities, it represented a considerable loss of autonomy, as they became totally dependent on the subsidy from the Ministry of Local Government, which generally pays badly. The remaining revenue collected directly by the Nairobi City Council or NCC represents a mere tenth of the total budget and is based on land taxes, the introduction and collection of which pose serious problems. State subsidy share in the NCC's budget is increasing progressively.

Development tax is the principle resource of the *Dar es Salaam City Council* (DCC) but as in the case of many other municipal receipts, collection procedures are gradually becoming less efficient. Municipalities' fiscal and financial situation is being weakened by the central government's propensity for appropriating easily deductible taxes, while local communities are held responsible for the trickiest tax collections, politically and administratively speaking. This explains the relatively low municipal tax collection rate in the cities under discussion. Between 1991 and 1995, the DCC could only recuperate an average of 57% of the sums owed to it while, during the same period, the NCC collected only 71% of the predicted receipts.¹⁶

In the course of the 1980's and 90's, in addition to all these financial constraints, both the DCC and the NCC had to face numerous corruption cases, which sullied their reputation, deprived them of a substantial part of their revenue and led to further weakening of the institution. To prevent misappropriation of municipal funds, the Kenyan government had to dissolve the NCC on several occasions (notably between 1983 and 1992) because of "poor current management of council funds and very poor service to residents".¹⁷ At the time, the NCC was run by a council appointed by the central government. For the past eight years, the situation has returned to normal, although the mayors elected since have had to face numerous accusations of corruption and misappropriation of funds. Limited financial means and municipal counsellors' poor management skills have resulted in the daily deterioration of the two cities' quality of service.¹⁸

For the time being, despite the time it has been in existence, the municipality system or *municipalization* remains a bitter failure due to a lack of necessary funds being transferred, the lax attitude of elected representatives when it comes to judicial control, and municipal workers' frequent involvement in embezzlement and in vote-catching networks. It may be surmised that if there

16 World Bank, *Financing Cities for Sustainable Development* with specific reference to East Africa, Nairobi, 1997, p45..

17 "[...] mauvaise gestion actuelle des fonds du conseil et de piètres services aux résidents". Weekly Review, 11 March 1983.

18 For a view on the question, please refer to the chapter entitled "L'administration des services urbains", Stren, in *Villes africaines en crise*, op cit.

is no democratic progress within the entire political structure, decentralization will lead to the creation of new locations for hoarding wealth.

The financial needs of the housing sector far exceed the funds made available by small municipal budgets. Consequently, it was only during the colonial period that municipalities played a role in the domain of housing. At the time, pressurized by the residents, they initiated small programmes intended for the most indigent informal settlements. The Dar es Salaam and Nairobi municipalities have now become powerless role-players without any means and deprived of all prerogatives in the face of demographic growth. Their role, which is far removed from the town planning and habitat regulation decision-making process, is (at best) to provide the necessary labour for carrying out projects selected by other authorities. In addition to the municipality, there are three other institutional role-players who actively participate in putting housing programmes in place for the most impoverished members of society: the central government's Ministry of Housing, para-statal institutions responsible for housing construction programmes and, lastly, a very powerful international role-player, the United Nations' Department of Housing, which plays an increasingly important role.

B -The National Housing Corporation (NHC) and the Ministry of Housing and Habitat: an active partnership

Municipalities are unable to react to the effects of urban growth or more particularly to the increase in informal settlement zones: The Kenyan and Tanzanian governments thus entrusted part of the task of formulating a housing policy and turning it into a reality to specific structures. In Kenya, a similar para-statal structure was created at an earlier stage, since the *Central Housing Board* dates from the colonial period. However, the structure was not a very active one and its courses of action soon became pathetic when confronted with Nairobi's post-Independence growth.

In 1962, the Tanzanian government also created an institution intended to provide housing for the poorest of the poor, i.e. the *National Housing Corporation*. Kenya replicated this initiative by creating a similar institution in 1967. The two structures were mandated to respond to the housing demand by providing a sufficient number of housing units. Their main concern was to respond to the growing informal settlement sectors. Their directors knew one another and met on several occasions to compare their respective initiatives. Numerous differences in the approach of the two NHC's were, however, noted. Although the Kenyan organization had 170 employees in 1975, Tanzania had several thousand employees in this sector. In 1972, Wells observed that:

"Contrary to the Kenyan NHC which is essentially an institution for transferring funds to private builders, the NHC in Tanzania immediately set out to develop the necessary capacities for setting up construction projects".¹⁹

19 Wells, 1972, quoted in Stren (R.), Urban Policy, in Barkan (dir.), Politics and public policy in Kenya and Tanzania.

This is revealing about the differences between the respective ideologies of the two governments: Tanzanian socialism advocates autonomy and the power of the public sector, while the Kenyan tendency favours the public sector, which is deemed capable of steering the country's development. It also results from a fairly general attitude amongst researchers who, during the 1970's, tended to idealize the Nyerere regime as being as Africa's road to socialism and to successfully discredit the Kenyatta and the Moi regimes, considered as being profoundly corrupt. Nonetheless, it is true that divergences observed in the delegation (or non-delegation) of building sites for public works to (private) firms should be linked to divergent political conceptions.

The creation of these state organs for property promotion was accompanied by banking institution promotions of house loans. The latter, intended to provide the largest possible number of people with access to property, required relatively flexible lending and repayment conditions. Funds collected by means of the loan system were partly used to fuel the NHC's construction programmes.

Western public opinion was struck by the poverty of the southern countries at an early stage. In addition, institutions such as Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (developing countries' largest creditors) soon instituted programmes to activate economic development and the fight against urban poverty, considered as one of the main factors preventing an economic take-off. In 1975, this orientation was made a reality in Vancouver by international institutions, at the first United Nations conference on human settlement, which would study the problem of urban poverty. Similarly, between 1972 and 1981, the World Bank financed 62 urban programmes in developing countries (of which fifteen were African²⁰) and 36 were devoted to the reduction of shantytowns.²¹ Practically speaking, discussions took place between the governments and bank officials to determine the programmes to put in place that would closely follow the orientation of the international organization's specialists. Lender organizations exercise strict control over the smooth running of these programmes financed with Western money. These projects dealt with Nairobi and Dar es Salaam by means of two substantial action programmes (Phase I during the 1970's, and Phase II during the following decade) which both included a number of important sub-projects.

Municipalities are excluded from the way this type of programme is formulated and executed. When the World Bank outlined its new orientation during Istanbul's Habitat II summit in June 1996, its representatives were "insistently" requested to "establish a permanent dialogue between the

20 Stren (R.), *L'État au risque de la ville*, p 80, *Politique Africaine* no 17, 1985.

21 Cavallier (G.), *La nouvelle politique urbaine de la Banque Mondiale: un essai à transformer*. *Les Annales de la Recherche Urbaine* no 86, 2000.

Bank and local communities”.²² Will this recommendation have any effect? Will municipalities play a more decisive role in the housing programmes implemented on their territory?

The involvement of national and international role-players’ in housing programmes or town planning thus far outweighs that of the Dar es Salaam or Nairobi municipalities, whose role is limited to that of dealing with everyday matters.

Having examined the involvement of different role-players in the implementation of public housing policies, we will now provide detail on the latter’s special features; in the name of popular participation, there is a noteworthy evolution towards a progressive withdrawal of the central state.

II - DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES

The aim here is not to establish an exhaustive catalogue of the various housing policies implemented in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, but rather to attempt to highlight certain general characteristics and understand the conceptions of urban space and poverty which govern them. For this reason, we chose to group together all the policies implemented in the two cities under three large category-headings coinciding with three chronologically identifiable periods. The first of these categories is the public action of shantytown “clearance” and the extensive construction of so-called social housing. The second involves projects for providing “rehabilitated plots” with amenities. The third and most recent category represents processes for improving facilities and services in the informal settlements and their painfully gradual official recognition.

A. Clearances and social housing

The colonial government considered providing the African population with shelter in town as a temporary measure. Initially, housing for Africans was totally prohibited within the confines of the city; consequently, permission was granted to workers only, in neighbourhoods that were meticulously identified and demarcated. The development of the African quarters soon posed a serious problem for the administration, which initiated vast clearance operations in the two capitals’ most impoverished zones that presented a real social danger. Bulldozers were sent into these very dense sites without any prior notice and immediately started with their demolition work. This policy left thousands of people homeless and had a profound effect on the population; in both countries, the policy was still implemented for a long time after independence. Because Tanzania’s ideology of *ujamaa* was opposed to any particularly violent action against the poorest members of the population, clearances were not as widespread in Tanzania as in Kenya. In Nairobi or Mombasa, clearances were a frequent occurrence until a few years ago. The underlying perception was

22 “[...] instaurer un dialogue permanent entre la Banque et les collectivités locales”. Cavallier (G.), op. cit, p 151, takes up the official report of the Commission II sessions in the proceedings of the Istanbul summit.

that poor people were undesirable and had already been excluded from the city's expected development process. The authorities thought it best for them to return to their countryside of origin, as they were not integrated into the modern urban sector. In this sense, Tanzanian authorities were more tolerant: they carried out fewer clearances and (in theory at least) granted benefits to the evicted *squatters*.²³

The term *squatters* is used to mean a group of illegal occupants (without the legal title to occupy the land they have settled on) or illicit occupation (by people without legal authorization for building a house on the land in question). There may be huge differences in the squatters' social status, ranging from extremely poor to very wealthy. Squatter status poses the problem of East African cities' intricate property rights.

In Nairobi for example, to mention only government land, its development simultaneously falls under the *Building Code*, the *Building By-laws* (of 1948, revised in 1978), the *Local Government Act*, the *Land Planning Act*, the *Land Control Act*, etc.²⁴ In 1963, Tanzanian land in its entirety was declared inalienable state property to be allotted according to particularly strict conditions and by means of an extremely unwieldy²⁵ administrative process. These factors all contribute towards making the legalization of the urban population's occupation of a developed plot of land a complex and confusing process.

Public opinion's perception of the clearances of the poorest urban populations changed progressively during the 1970's and 80's. For example, the huge wave of clearances carried out by the NCC in the course of 1982 sparked hostile reaction from the biggest daily newspapers.²⁶

However, from the colonial period onwards, authorities became aware that the problem of housing for the poorest of the poor had to be dealt with and no longer merely ignored, all more so as poor habitat zones were potential anti-colonist areas. This explains why, alongside the clearances, policies for building social housing were put in place. The post-independence clearances as well as the clearances of the poorest urban populations are part of a purged representation of the city according to which informal settlements should not exist. The slums are, however, an obvious indication that the government's housing policies aimed at housing the poorest of the poor have failed.

Nevertheless, the clearances serve other purposes than simply getting rid of illegal settlements. Whether on the city's threshold or an integral part of it (as in the case of Nairobi's Mathare Valley or Dar es Salaam's Manzese) the sprawling slum-areas represent a tremendous stake as far as not only town

23 Regarding problems experienced by squatters evicted during the 1970's, see Stren (R.), *Urban ine quality and housing: Policy in Tanzania, the problem of squatting*, Berkeley: Institute of International studies, 1975.

24 Mazingira Institute, *Nairobi's environment: a review of conditions and issues*, Nairobi, 1994, p.19.

25 Kironde (J.M.L.), *Land policy options for urban Tanzania*, Land Use Policy Vol. 14, no 2, 1997, pp. 106-108.

26 Daily Nation, 1972.

planning, but also the interests of the notabilities, whether on a local, national or municipal level, are concerned. The clearances started decreasing in the 1980's and have now²⁷ practically ceased, notably under pressure from the international humanitarian organizations.²⁸

Social housing policies were introduced by the British according to the principle of allocating small houses built by the colonial authorities, often in the very centre of the informal settlements (as was the case, notably, in the Kenyan capital's Kibera or Dar es Salaam's Manzese) at a reduced price. In theory, citizens who were displaced during the course of building operations take priority when lodgings are allocated, providing the latter are within their means. Initially, the fact that the two countries became independent did not change the situation at all.

The Tanzanian NHC, which was created in 1962, devoted its first action to recovering the 4,389 social housing units built by the British. The aim was to eradicate shantytowns by re-housing their population in one-roomed houses rented from the NHC. The following year, all private property was nationalized and the occupants became tenants of the government. During its first five-year plan (1964-1969), the NHC supervised the construction of 5,705²⁹ houses in an effort to get rid of the capital's slums. Indeed, these houses made it possible to re-house the slum-dwellers who would make up 70% of their tenants. However, the new Tanzanian government had limited means and the building costs for social housing were very expensive. In addition, the idea of decentralizing numerous functions outside of Dar es Salaam led to a huge drop in the budgets allocated for urban development. Which is why, for its second plan (1969-1974), the NHC fixed the construction threshold at a maximum of 300-350 £ per house. During this time, the aim of the Kenyan NHC (which came into being in 1967), according to its 1970-1974 development plan, was to build houses at prices of around 600 £.

Umoja I's social housing programme is an expression of this new orientation. The project concerns land situated some ten kilometres from Nairobi's city centre, to the east of the city. It was decided within the framework of the Urban II urban housing programme and is financed by the UN's development aid organization or USAID. Construction work on the 3,000 one-roomed houses started in 1975 and was completed three years later. Each plot is 100 by 120m², which is relatively spacious when compared to the property structures of Nairobi's working-class sectors. Likewise, the standard of the services provided is high when compared to the Kenyan lifestyle: the roads are tarred, there is water conveyance, drainage and electricity. To meet KNHC criteria,

27 Property developers are finding new ways of obtaining coveted spaces; arson is a frequently used solution in Nairobi's Mathare Valley shantytowns and in Dar es Salaam.

28 Moreover, it is worth mentioning that, although it applies to the old informal settlements where the NGO's are omnipresent, it is not a rare occurrence to see bulldozers going about their business in more recent quarters, which are not targeted to the same extent by the humanitarian organizations.

29 Stren, *Urban Policy*, op. cit.

building costs are high, which has certain repercussions on the sale prices. Thus, the project is not aimed at the disadvantaged classes without the means of acquiring similar housing, but at the middle class who get quality service at a much lower price than from public housing development's property market.

In Kenya, the budget allowance for a house is twice as high as in Tanzania. According to Stren, only 17% of the capital's population has access to it.³⁰ Various factors explain the price difference between the two countries. In addition to the difference in living standards, the influence of the *ujamaa* ideology has led to greater Tanzanian resolve to actually reach the poor members of the population; in addition, Kenya's urban policies indirectly favour the middle class, thus touching on the essential problem of most so-called "social"³¹ housing projects. These programmes, intended in theory for the poorest section of the urban population, could or were only able to reach the middle class, as the housing was beyond the means of the original beneficiaries. Thus it was said that the newly empowered governments considered building houses as a way of making moral headway on a national and international level and of enabling them to form an alliance with the urban middle-class in frequent opposition to authority³². In 1988, with regard to developing countries as a whole, J.-F. Tribillion observed that "the type of housing we call 'social' and which is supposed to provide the people with accommodation ... serves only a few, handpicked people."³³

In addition, numerous malpractices regarding housing allocations have led to the operation of a social filter, which provides access to housing. The municipality's civil servants who had to decide about allocations not only allowed themselves to be corrupted so as to favour certain citizens, but also proclaimed themselves the owners of a section of the available housing before sub-letting it at a price far exceeding that of government housing. This practice is widespread in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and similar scandals are often breaking news on the front pages of the national daily newspapers. Certain members of the wealthy class were also able to obtain concessions for a number of social housing units before sub-letting them. These land-grabbing practices partly explain why, according to Kironde³⁴, in 1992, more than 70% of Umoja I's occupants were tenants rather than owners. What should also be taken into account is the general *core house* philosophy, according to which the original

30 Stren, Urban Policy, op.cit.


31 Concerning these general considerations, refer notably to No116, t. XXIX of the Tiers Monde review: Le logement des pauvres dans les villes du Tiers-Monde, October-December 1988 and Osmont (A.), Garcia-Oriol (G.), Gorayeb (M.), Jaglin (S.) and Rocher (C.), La question sociale urbaine dans les pays en développement, Institut français d'Urbanisme, cahier de recherche no3, 1992.

32 Cf R. Otaeyek's analysis regarding Burkina Faso's social housing policies in Otaeyek (R.), Dieu dans la cité, dynamiques religieuses en milieu ouagalais, CEAN, 1999, 172p.

33 "[...] l'habitat qu'on appelle 'social' qui a pourtant vocation à loger le peuple ... ne sert qu'une toute petite partie du peuple, trié sur le volet."

34 Kironde (J.M.L.), Creations in Dar es Salaam and extensions in Nairobi, the defiance of inappropriate planning standards, Cities, August 1992, p 221.

Figure 9: Informal Housing and Housing Program Sites in Nairobi



one-room house was supposed to boost the occupant's confidence to add extensions on his own or even to encourage building houses for rental purposes.

The construction of social housing on a massive scale corresponds to a post-independence period that was marked by a profound belief in future economic development, which would require massive input from the authorities. However, the informal settlements continued to mushroom, because government housing could not absorb the masses of people flocking to the city. In what may be considered a partial admission of failure, the authorities of the two countries in question resolved to try a new approach to the urban housing in question while uninterruptedly building houses in the meantime. The new approach consisted of renting (in Tanzania) or selling (in Kenya) plots equipped with all the basic infrastructures, the so-called *sites and services schemes*. The new occupants would be responsible for the actual building; they would nevertheless have to comply with some rather strict rules and architectural standards.

B. "Sites and services schemes"

Because of insufficient state funds to provide enough houses for the poor, international backers invited Kenya and Tanzania to devote an increasing part of urban development funds to this new approach. From 1970 onwards, the allocation of rehabilitated plots, referred to by the English term "sites and services", represented 33% of the budget of the Kenyan NHC's first development plan, while Dar es Salaam decided to implement a development plan for 5,000 plots. In 1978, the second Kenyan plan reflected 61% of the budget and 20,000 plots, while the same expansionary tendency was also

visible in the neighbouring country. People are encouraged to build their own houses; the government thus surrenders its role as a property developer and entrusts the community with the building of houses.

The population is thus supposed to build their own houses, at their own pace and according to their own means. The initiative thus takes a long-term view of the indigent housing problem. From a project designers' perspective, informal settlements would initially remain in existence during the formal housing construction phase and were destined to disappear upon completion of the latter. This type of project showed spectacular development between the early 1970's and the 1990's. The World Bank (an increasingly active role-player as regards housing policy financing and development, as mentioned above) is particularly interested in this type of approach, which is cheaper than social housing and is delivered key in hand. Financing this type of approach will thus be prioritized and extensive programmes for plot rehabilitation in East Africa and in other developing countries will be put in place.

The first problem that individuals who want to participate in plot rehabilitation programmes have to face is firstly to collect the necessary funds for plot allocation, and then for construction work. This explains why, as soon as the first programmes were implemented at the beginning of the 1970's, the two governments created specialized banks, the *Tanzanian Housing Bank* and the *Housing Finance Company of Kenya*, to provide financial and technical assistance to develop these plots to their best advantage.

The *sites and services* project of Kijintonyama, Sinza and Mikocheni (KSM)³⁵ exemplifies the general characteristics of the first programmes of this kind in Dar es Salaam, comparable to programmes in Nairobi. KSM chose Dar es Salaam's first rehabilitated plot site for its low population density, considered ideal for testing this type of programme. The project, which started in 1972, consisted of developing 7,800 plots equipped with the basic facilities (water, electricity, sewers, etc.), but of a high standard when compared to living conditions in Tanzania. Similarly, the programme's building material requirements are expensive (modern building material such as breezeblocks, PVC pipes, etc). Consequently, a zone intended for disadvantaged people is in fact occupied by well-to-do members of society, and 30% of the occupants are tenants, while the owners live outside the planned zone.

Sub-letting, which is extremely frequent in Kenya, is rooted in the gap between public sector and private property market property prices. This is why well-off individuals, who succeed in appropriating a number of public plots, notably by corrupt means, build on them and then sublet them at market prices. It also happens that plots are allocated to members of less privileged social classes but that the latter prefer to live in one of the city's unplanned zones while sub-letting the developed housing in question at a good price.

In addition, initial building standards were often too expensive for the most

35 Kironde (J.M.L.), *Creations in Dar es Salaam and extensions in Nairobi, the defiance of inappropriate planning standards*, Cities, August 1992, pp. 222-224.

impoverished members of the population; once again, the programmes thus failed to hit their initial targets. Sometimes building standards were not at all adapted to the traditional type of house, which was problematic for state beneficiaries who did not have the know-how to build modern-style houses and were thus obliged to hire outside workers to do the job. This explains why, after construction work had been started all over again several times, authorities dealing with housing questions and in particular the NHC had to lower standards and allow the use of traditional materials.

For the first implemented programmes, the state was responsible for the relatively high fixed expenses, which would have been financially unbearable for the organizations involved. For this reason, newcomers' expenses in subsequent programmes increased. The increase resulted in the modification of the social level of the project's beneficiaries. The *sites and services schemes* gradually reached fewer and fewer members of the underprivileged population while benefiting the middle classes.

Public sector initiative in providing plots equipped with basic infrastructure was meant to be only temporary or at least minimal, acting as a stimulus for the private sector's rapid conception or duplication of the same type of project. This did not happen. The overwhelming majority of the *sites and services* programmes that were implemented were initiated by the public sector.

The slow development of plots or total lack thereof can also be deplored. Firstly, the fixed objectives were not reached, despite the creation of banking institutions which would supposedly make it possible to assign flexible, accessible housing credit to as many people as possible. Due to a multitude of constraints, credit conditions remained limited to a small, privileged number of people. Building a house often represents the work of a lifetime for disadvantaged populations who were allocated land by the government. From that point onwards, they prefer allowing themselves sufficient time to build as big and as solid a house as possible, while continuing to live in an unplanned zone. Government control structures are inadequate and under-utilized when verifying whether a plot is actually being developed to its full potential; this type of institutional weakness encourages the proliferation of similar situations. In the short-term, the objective of implementing projects for plot-rehabilitation, i.e. with the aim of reducing informal housing, has not been reached and may be considered a failure.

Apart from the structural defects in the rehabilitated plot programmes, there are also the numerous management weaknesses on the side of the administrative staff. In Nairobi as well as Dar es Salaam, inequities occur regarding plot distribution; certain plots are allocated twice, non-existent plots are allocated, plots are under-evaluated and compensations for people evicted by the programme are paid late, take on bureaucratic complexities, extreme forms, etc.³⁶

36 Kironde (J.M.L.), The evolution of the land use structure of Dar es Salaam: 1890-1990: a study in the effect of land policy, Thesis, University of Nairobi, Department of Land Development, 1994.

In addition, the idea that the granting of rehabilitated plots would favour “auto-construction” by the people themselves without the help of paid labourers is a relatively false one. To quote P. Canel and C. Girard³⁷ on the subject of southern countries as a whole: “in fact, what usually happens when it is not a programmed operation is that a general appeal is made to the artisans of the building industry regarding almost all construction jobs”.³⁸ The use of labourers necessarily leads to an increase in production costs, which in turn slows down housing development. As stated by the two authors at a later stage, the very principle of “auto-construction”, promoted by the World Bank, depends in part on an ethnocentric and totally fantasized vision of “noble savages building shelters with the help of their family.”³⁹

The limited *sites and services* programmes combined with the budgetary restrictions of the 80’s and 90’s prompted the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments to opt for a strategy of unofficial recognition of the informal settlements, notably by providing infrastructure and services within these settlements. These policies aim to improve the living conditions of people living in these areas as well as, by example, to encourage them to renovate their houses. During the 80’s and 90’s, these *slum-upgrading* programmes played an increasingly important part in the domain of public town planning.

C - Slum upgrading projects

The shift from plot-rehabilitation to slum upgrading projects reflects clearly in the budget structures of the Kenyan and Tanzanian housing ministries.

In Kenya, the 6,037 housing units erected for Urban I (1972), consisted of a vast *sites and services* project in Dandora, while Urban II (1978) provided for the creation of 14,274 VRD-linked plots on the one hand, and equipping 17,685 informal dwellings on the other. There was a similar evolution in Dar es Salaam where first 8,800 and then 16,000 informal dwellings were authorized between the two phases of the 1973-housing project.⁴⁰ The two types of project often co-exist in close proximity, as plot-rehabilitation projects are undertaken as near as possible to the shantytowns to attract residents’ attention.

The rehabilitation project of one of Dar es Salaam’s biggest, oldest shantytowns, Manzese, exemplifies what this type of project entails. Since 1976, 7,600 houses have been rehabilitated at a cost of 3,500 Tsh per plot. Tarred roads, a water conveyance network, two clinics, schools and markets have been put in place. Apart from the direct development of 7,600 plots, the

37 Canel (P.), Girard (C.), L’ “autoconstruction” en ville africaine, Revue du Tiers Monde No.116, vol XXIX, October December 1988.

38 “[...] en fait, comme cela se produit habituellement hors opérations programmées, l’appel à l’artisanat de la construction est généralisé pour la quasi-totalité des tâches constructives”.

39 “[...] bons sauvages construisant des abris à l’aide de leur famille”.

40 Schmetzer (H.), Slum upgrading and sites and services schemes under different political circumstances: experiences from East Africa, African Urban Quarterly, Vol. 2, No3, August 1987.

new infrastructure also had indirect benefits for some 70,000 adjoining plots. This operation was generally considered to be a real success-story. However, research conducted by S. Katilla has shown although quality of life indeed improved in this shantytown, no houses (or almost none) were subsequently improved by their inhabitants. Katilla's research, which refutes many received ideas, shows that rehabilitating a neighbourhood does not automatically entail that of its habitat and that insecurity as regards property is not a major obstacle when it comes to improving housing. According to interviews conducted in Manzese, housing development is slowed down most by shortages, the cost of modern building materials and the lack of technical know-how to use these modern materials, rather than the absence of a title deed and the lack of security regarding property. Traditional materials have been totally denigrated in favour of cement and breezeblocks, which have powerful connotations of modernity, progress and social status. People with the necessary means buy these industrial building materials at inflated prices and in small quantities on the open market, which does not lead to the area's appreciable or rapid renovation. Even if this type of project does not reach its final target, it could be termed efficient up to a certain point, to the extent that it is implemented within the very heart of the informal settlement areas, i.e. where housing problems seem to be most acute. These projects improve the living conditions of the disadvantaged population, whose numbers are increasing incessantly and who benefit from the projects' basic infrastructure: if not in their own homes, at least in their neighbourhood.

Regarding the rehabilitation of the shantytowns, many limitations need to be noted. To begin with, the scale of the problem makes government action seem like a drop in the ocean, all the more so as state budgets for social action have yet again been reduced since the beginning of the 1980's, when the structural adjustment plans imposed by the World Bank were implemented. The political contradiction between long-term financing of housing projects for the poorest of the poor and a drastic reduction in public spending seems an obvious one here.

Furthermore, although government authorities implement public policies within the informal settlement areas, they award them no legitimacy. At best, these zones remain illegitimate, and very often illegal. Although Katilla concluded that insecurity regarding property was not a perpetual threat weighing down on the occupants of Dar es Salaam's⁴¹ shantytowns, this is not exactly the case in Nairobi, where clearances continue in many places in the city. A. Durand-Lasserve, who esteems well-considered land regulation to be the precondition for any development action inside the informal settlements, declares, "Once the legality and security of occupancy has been

41 Nowadays, state intervention against informal settlements in Tanzania is a rare occurrence.

guaranteed, people can start building amenities and houses.”⁴² In addition, residents experience their illegal status as an infamous stigmatization. They are fully conscious of the fact that denying them security of property is equal to refusing them citizen status.

To date, all state housing programmes aimed at the poorest of the poor have been conceived as projects decided and imposed by the highest authority, by government, without consulting the residents concerned. In Tanzania as well as Kenya, the central state lacks resources and action strategies; it would be in their best interest to revive the decentralization process, as in Dar es Salaam, or to return the allocations to the communities concerned. That is why popular and humanitarian action is increasingly solicited to resolve the housing question in the informal sector, while authorities slowly retreat from the incredibly delicate and costly field of urban poverty. Numerous NGO's have taken over the field abandoned by central government and have in turn initiated projects to improve living conditions within the most impoverished zones. Although NGO's often commit the same mistakes as their institutional predecessors, they sometimes develop original strategies based on realities of society and property in the neighbourhoods concerned. Even more interesting (because it comes from the people themselves) are the many successful initiatives observed in the housing domain.

III - INFORMAL SETTLEMENT ZONES: THE PEOPLE TAKE ACTION

A. Should one really talk about 'shantytowns' in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam?

Informal settlement zones represent a multitude of situations, landscapes, forms and widely different statuses.

Initially, these sectors could be unplanned and illegal. 'Unplanned' means that residents were not given state approval to settle in an area for which, in addition, they acquired the property rights, while 'illegal' refers to the unlawful appropriation of public or private space. There is a vast amount of unplanned housing in Dar es Salaam due to a lack of available plots on the one hand and the difficulty of obtaining legal construction permits on the other. The administrative steps required for a legally allocated plot within Tanzania's public space is time-consuming, requires money and a high level of education. It also involves 14 different stages in many municipal administration offices, not to mention the many instances of procrastination and possible file losses in the course of its numerous transfers. This explains why, within the context of a city with a high tolerance level of informal settlements, popular housing or more comfortable dwellings multiply. Dar es Salaam is a sprawling city where the problem of high-density areas is actually inexistent. Although both

42 “[...] la régularité et la sécurité de l'occupation garantie, la production (populaire) des équipements et du logement peut suivre.”

Kenya and Tanzania use the term “slums” to mean urban quarters, it refers to different realities in the two countries concerned. “The term *slum* or hovel applies to greatly differing realities, whether referring to their exterior aspect or to their human content.”⁴³ Schmetzer points out the difference between Kenyan and Tanzanian slums in his description of Manzese, one of Dar es Salaam’s largest and poorest neighbourhoods:

*“First-time visitors to Manzese do not realize that they are entering one of Dar es Salaam’s biggest informal settlements. The landscape is green and there is a lot of vegetation. The houses are generally well-built and are separated by small gardens. Coconuts, bananas and mangoes from trees growing there provide the owners with a good dietary supplement. Manzese cannot be compared to depressing sites like Nairobi’s Mathare Valley or the informal settlements of Bombay or Calcutta. Rather, one’s impression is that of a rural zone, even though it is near the city centre.”*⁴⁴

Thus, the term “shantytown” does not really seem to apply here as in the case of Kenya, where it refers to extremely poor, exceptionally dense living areas such as Kibera and Mathare Valley, the two biggest shantytowns in Nairobi, home to more than a million people. All forms of agriculture (or almost all) agriculture had to make way for new buildings. Entire, large families squeeze into the only room of their precarious dwelling, where there is no water or electricity and no modern conveniences. There are numerous epidemics, widespread perpetual poverty and unhealth

The difference between the two cities is almost certainly the result of Nairobi’s strong pressure on property, which, in this over-developed form, is practically non-existent in Dar es Salaam. Since colonial times, renting out houses in the Kenyan capital has been an extremely lucrative source of revenue. The segregation of colonial urban space, which reserved only a small part of the city for African populations, encouraged property speculation. Very soon, the city became the only refuge for many rural inhabitants who could no longer live on their land or who were looking for a supplementary income. Nowadays, all city space is extremely expensive and is owned by a number of important landowners who have every intention of securing a return on their investments by sub-letting at a very high cost. The property crisis has thus benefited a small number of people who are also the (informal) owners of huge plots of land in the very heart of the shantytowns. In Nairobi, most of the

43 “[...] Le terme *slum* (taudis) ... s’applique à des réalités très différentes les unes des autres tant par leur aspect extérieur que par leur contenu humain.” See Y. Lacoste’s article *Bidonville* in the *Encyclopedia Universalis Larousse*.

44 “Les visiteurs découvrant Manzese pour la première fois, ne se doutent pas qu’ils ont pénétré dans l’une des zones d’habitat spontané les plus importants de Dar es Salaam. Le paysage est vert et la végétation nombreuse. Les maisons sont généralement bien construites avec des petits jardins les séparant. Noix de coco, bananes et mangues fournies par les arbres qui s’y trouvent fournissent un bon complément alimentaire à leurs propriétaires. Manzese n’a rien à voir avec les sites plus décourageants tels que Mathare Valley à Nairobi ou les zones d’habitats spontanés de Bombay ou Calcutta. L’impression ressentie est plus celle d’une zone rurale, bien que situé à proximité d’un centre urbain.”

inhabitants in the poorest informal settlements are tenants. Local authorities tolerate this type of property speculation, very often in return for financial compensation. However, at any given moment they may decide to demolish a whole quarter or at least part of it. The population thus lives in constant fear of this happening, which does not contribute to improving the quality of the housing, which very often remains precarious. In general, houses are built according to traditional building standards, which have the advantage of being cheap, as it is mostly dry earth, and wood that is required. Usually, one concession is made regarding industrial building materials: using corrugated metal sheets for the roof is allowed. These sheets make up the biggest expense when building a house.

Schmetzer's positive view of Dar es Salaam must be put into perspective. The given quotation dates from 1987 and many changes have taken place since then. Manzese's density has increased and in many cases the gardens have disappeared to make room for houses that are even more precarious than the previous constructions. Houses are usually built according to the Swahili model: a vast construction of 6 to 10 rooms, each occupied by a different family, to which two small constructions must be added - a kitchen and a toilet, in the middle of a small courtyard situated behind the main building.

Outside the old informal settlements, where various renovation attempts have resulted in a measure of legitimacy and recognition within the public municipal area, small, new, illegal living areas without much structure appear regularly, the first victims of future clearances. This new generation of disadvantaged zones bears the scars of the current social problems: single-parent homes, orphans living in groups, extreme destitution, etc.

B. Rapid assessment of people's actions in response to the housing and urban services crisis

Part of the resilience of popular action is the incrustation of precarious, non-standard, illegal and informal constructions within the very heart of planned, equipped zones. J.M.L. Kironde⁴⁵ has convincingly demonstrated that what is called extensions in Kenya and new creations in Tanzania responds to the lack of available and equipped plots. Government programmes for housing development or plot rehabilitation have demarcated a number of large plots while leaving other public spaces undeveloped. The planned and equipped quarters attract a lot of interest, which explains why the unoccupied spaces in Dar es Salaam are often gradually invaded by occupants without any legal authorization, without the Tanzanian government taking any steps towards efficient suppression. In Nairobi, it is the private plots which have been taken over by informal settlements, to the great advantage of the legitimate occupants. In Umoja for example, the same plot boasts houses built by the

⁴⁵ Kironde (J.M.L.), *Creations in Nairobi, extensions in Dar es Salaam*, op.cit.

Kenyan NHC alongside small, informal buildings, several storeys high, sub-let at a substantial price considering the quality of the plot's infrastructure. Thus the population found its own answer to ill-adopted policies.

In addition, for a long time, a certain number of residential collectives with varying outlines and life spans have been formed to respond to repeated failures from government to deal with urban poverty and the difficulties of everyday life. It is also worth mentioning associations with multiple economic aims that continue to develop in Kenya within the most disadvantaged societies. Thanks to a flexible money-collecting system which makes it possible for everyone to participate, informal credit associations resembling the West African tontines could be put in place, as well as small processing companies or commercial enterprises, etc. Also, associations were created to respond to the state's disengagement in providing urban services. Groups of specialized young people can be seen constructing houses and maintaining the sewage system; women gather to deal with the dirt problem in their filth-covered neighbourhoods, etc. For a long time, the one-party hold over Dar es Salaam's entire society prohibited this proliferation of associations, but the first signs of popular groupings can now be seen in the city. For example, a number of CBO's were able to get their neighbourhood connected to the municipal water conveyance network (Messer, 2005).

C. State disengagement and humanitarian actions

As governments gradually disengaged themselves from the problem of informal settlement areas, humanitarian organizations started taking over the deserted terrain. Moreover, the World Bank supports this modification by its sponsorship of a number of programmes initiated by non-governmental structures, in the same way as it supported public housing policies in the past. This humanitarian involvement in the disadvantaged zones is greatly encouraged by the governments themselves, who shy away from their responsibilities a little more each day. Various organizations, whether secular or religious, national or international, are trying to improve conditions in the *slums*. Programmes conducted in these zones notably deal with the equipment and provision of services in the form of donations. At present they try and rely as much as possible on local and endogenous social groups, who are consulted in an effort to find more appropriate solutions.

One of the criticisms most often levelled at this type of humanitarian action is that, like governmental actions, it is totally removed from economic reality, notably that of the property market. In the long run, does the provision of services and financial means by western NGO's perpetuate the economic dependence of the South on the North, without mobilizing people's latent capacities for development which have gone largely unnoticed until now? In order to integrate extremely marginalized residents from the informal

settlements into the modern economy, a new type of project has become part of the action taken by a number of non-governmental organizations, i.e. micro-credit operations. The latter's objective is to develop the poorest members of the population's ability to save money by making the banking system accessible. Despite efforts by the official banking system to create home loan institutions, it remains quite exclusive and offers lending conditions that are totally out of reach of the disadvantaged members of society. Like micro-credit companies elsewhere, East-African companies rely on people's mobilizing actions to make credit available to the most impoverished members of society. Credit is usually fixed at world market rates for the project to remain realistic and completely financially autonomous. It serves merely as a link between an already active population with many development plans and the banking system, and a monitoring and advisory organ. Micro-credit is not without its problems, as became apparent in December 2000 at the World Summit on Micro-Finance in Agen. It is true that humanitarian organizations always lag behind popular initiatives and never include all of them. The main constraints encountered by micro-credit actions are the same as for preceding actions: they are often aimed at the only social class likely to put money aside for personal savings, and rely too much on intermediaries inside the poorest quarters. However, more often than not these intermediaries, who belong to the wealthiest group in the neighbourhood, are instrumental in offering the type of assistance and proposing the type of projects that increase their prestige, not to mention their profit.

The local population did not wait for the spotlight of humanitarian aid before trying to solve their own problems: they are very active in a number relatively recent quarters, as yet uninvaded by crowds of charitable institutions. Every day, they find imperfect, sectoral solutions which are limited in time and space and which are a threat to the environment. One should not however, fall into the trap of overly glorifying these popular actions that, like the government's policies, also have their weaknesses and indulge in vote-catching practices, which is not conducive to democracy.

CONCLUSION

For the last 40 years, the strong demographic growth of Africa's principal cities has resulted in a housing crisis that has found expression in extensive shantytowns that now form part of the landscape. African states responded by following the main urbanistic tendencies, corresponding to a particular conception of urban poverty, in chronological succession. In general, the governments managing Nairobi and Dar es Salaam's growth have appropriated the main trends encouraged by the World Bank and have adapted them according to their own conceptions of economic and social development. Kenya chose to rely on the partnership between public and private sector,

benefiting especially the middle classes, to ensure the country's economic take-off, while Tanzania prioritized the eradication of social differences and the constitution of a vast (supposedly egalitarian) public sector. Both these political orientations have been largely modified by corruption and vote-catching which have completely taken over the wheels of government.

After repeated failures and budgets cuts (notably as a result of the application of structural adjustment programs) governments gradually lost interest in housing problems. Having given up the fight against the development of illegal or informal residential zones, they are now proposing to attempt to rehabilitate them, notably by counting on the assistance of a growing number of non-governmental organizations. Popular action, which exists on the fringe of national policies, invents many case-by-case solutions to daily problems. The interest of decentralized housing policies that are attentive to local populations lies here. The present failure of decentralization in Kenya and Tanzania proves, however, that any delegation of power on a local scale is inefficient without the profound democratization, not only of the whole political structure, but also of the popular mentality.

Mixity and Territoriality in a Rapidly Expanding City: How Dar es Salaam was shaped by its Suburbs

Adrienne Polomack

How is a city formed? How does a multitude of people unite and develop around an initial seat of power, a control centre born of political will; how do they make their mark on the isolated rural periphery and eventually put down urban roots? How does a residential area's dense tissue spring up, how is it set in motion, how does it grow from what is initially an arbitrated, demarcated gathering of people, until it becomes an insolent defiance of the most ambitious urban development? And finally, in the confused babbling of local communities discovering their own existence, how do community identities and urban territories emerge from this gathering of people, from this accumulation of men and equipment?

The striking contrast between the present reality of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania's economic capital, with its three million souls living on 16,000 hectares) and the discrete enclave of a 1920's town controlled by colonial powers on the Tanganyikan coast, spontaneously gives rise to questions regarding the modalities of such remarkable demographic and territorial growth. During the twenties, Dar es Salaam was limited to the centre and peri-central quarters of Upanga and Kariakoo, but gradually extended to areas that were increasingly further away from the centre. New administrative districts were created, shifting the city's borders and opening what could be considered as a succession of colonization fronts. The idea of peri-urban space being conquered by a movement from the centre is apparently reinforced by the shape of the communications network: the lines hardly branch out, plunging into the hinterland and seemingly guiding the city's progression. Indeed, present-day settlements are concentrated on either side of a few main roads (Nyerere, Morogoro and Bagamoyo roads), as though Dar es Salaam had spun its web and attached it to this network. In a ten-kilometre radius around the centre, distances separating the two highways are smaller and residents gain access to settlements that are virtually spread out over the entire surface of the intermediate spaces by means of secondary roads. Beyond this point, narrow strips of constructed space alternate with large, vacant pieces of less accessible land. This narrow part of the constructed area, situated at a marked distance from the centre, closely follows the main roads

layout, giving the city its singular shape, which resembles fingers on a hand.¹ Slender-tipped fingers on a hand, which seems to come out of the water: the wrist is attached to the harbour; the palm with its prominent articulations extends across the interior, ready to expand.

The modern-day city that, at first glance, astounds the onlooker with the undifferentiated spread of its settlements, appears to be a compilation of anonymous, successively created and extended fringes. *A priori*, the hypothesis of a movement advancing from the centre would be in keeping with the model of urban space shaped by the “*peripheral redistribution of the population and the peri-central quarters towards quarters that are further away from the centre and of the latter towards the peripheral quarters*”,² as has been observed elsewhere. Urban communities and urban quarters developing along the periphery would therefore be a more recent formation; identities would inevitably be less marked than in peri-central quarters. But is Dar es Salaam just the area between the coast and these shifting margins, conquered by the advancing front of urbanization? Has its spread-out character reinforced the classical opposition between centre and periphery, or has it allowed a different form of structuring to emerge? What kind of balance were they able to establish and what forms of territoriality did this process of urban formation give rise to?

A ROADS NETWORK THAT PROVIDES LITTLE STRUCTURE

The lack of physical landmarks within the spread-out constructed area immediately impedes the identification of individualized spaces in Dar es Salaam itself. The main roads, which allow the flow of urban traffic and converge on the business centre and harbour were not intended to serve or demarcate the residential areas. They provide a link between the country's interior and that window on the Indian Ocean that the Sultan of Zanzibar, Majid ibn Sa'id,³ wanted to turn into the principal port of his sultanate and which has since become the nodal point of the country's economic activity. Even the bypass does not demarcate administrative units (such as Mabibo), but rather divides them. This type of layout is a first attempt to respond to the city's obvious internal communication needs, but it needs to be supplemented. In the present state of affairs, its main function is to link up with the main service roads of Bagamoyo, Morogoro and Nyerere.

1 Bernard Calas, François Bart, “Dar es Salaam: du port au territoire swahili”, in *Iles et littoraux tropicaux*, dir. Guy Mainet, Actes des VIIèmes journées de Géographie tropicale, Brest, 11-13 Sept. 1997, Ouest Editions.

2 Pierre Venetier, “Centre, périphérie et flux intra-urbains dans les grandes villes d'Afrique noire”, *Annales de Géographie*, no. 547, May-June 1989.

3 His father, Sa'id Ibn Sultan, ruled from 1804 to 1856. It was he who, in 1840, transferred the Busaidi dynasty's power, which was traditionally established in Oman, to Zanzibar. During his own rule (1856-1870), Majid also turned towards the coast and, in 1865, ordered the first constructions on the site of Dar es Salaam. For more information, see J.E.G. Sutton's article, entitled “Dar es Salaam. A sketch of a Hundred Years”, in *Dar es Salaam: City, Port and Region, Tanzania Notes and Records*, 71, 1970 pp.1-19 and that of Abdul Sheriff, “Le peuplement et l'islamisation”, in Colette Le Cour Grandmaison and Ariel Crozon, *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, Karthala - IFRA (pp. 21-33).

In Dar es Salaam, all paths lead to the main roads. But as there are few of these, city dwellers are obliged to perform the same exhausting ritual of using the same itineraries, which is anything but simple. Two systematically congested roads may be used as an example: Azikiwe, which crosses the business centre and runs into Ali Hassan Mwinyi main road in the direction of the north coast, and Msimbazi, which crosses Kariakoo and provides access to the Morogoro main road towards Ubungu and the university and the Nyerere main road which goes to the airport. This inadequate network now limits what people who live and work in the city can see of it. It generates the feeling that the city's users have a highly functional relationship with the space that accommodates them. At the same time, it hardly facilitates the visualization of either intra-urban variations or the location of a possible graduation in space: for example, the graduation of human density levels. Under these conditions, nothing seems to change one's first impression of a space without any demarcation where decoding is difficult and internal graduations get lost in a continuous spread of people and activities. Not only is there a lack of roads, but their uninterrupted façade of shops and displays also masks the city's inner faces. The roadsides lined with shop-fronts offer hardly any views of the inhabited areas. Of course, these access difficulties for people leaving the main roads, and the professionals' need to be positioned along the roadside to enlarge their clientele are the main reasons for this type of commercial colonization. Hence the roads only separate seemingly inaccessible urban hinterlands. In so doing, they form strong, physical barriers that have to be crossed and not followed, to enter the city.

THRESHOLDS, DIVISIONS AND CONTRASTS IN A CITY WITHOUT FRAMEWORK

Although the communications network hardly contributes to Dar es Salaam's structuring, important facilities located outside the city centre and peri-central quarters mark a threshold between the intermediate and outer periphery's on-going urbanization process. These are the international airport towards the southwest and the university as well as the big industrial plants of Kawe and Ubungu towards the north and the west. The fact that the *daladala*⁴ line terminals from the centre and outer periphery are located not too far from these large facilities supports this distinction. Towards the south, the Mzinga-river marks the intermediate periphery's physical limits.

An internal administrative network divides the city into *districts* and *wards*, which provide a framework for any kind of official intervention such as town planning or the censuses that, have marked the city's history. The urban commune of Dar es Salaam is made up of 52 administrative entities (called wards, or residential areas) divided into quarters that are situated

4 Daladala - public transport vehicles.

within the region's three districts. The foundations of this territorial division (which is hardly noticeable within the landscape itself) are not easy to guess. A few interpretations are put forward by the toponymy. Kariakoo would be a distortion of the English "carrier corps", a reminder that African carriers or porters were stationed here during the 1914-1918 war before the sector was developed by the English authorities. The name Ilala supposedly originated in Nyasaland where Livingstone met his death and was the homeland of many of the Yao soldiers, who served successively in the German and British armies.⁵ Another example is Buguruni means small huts in the Zaramo language, evoking the cultural origins of the sector's first residents. On the other hand, the coconut-tree evoked by the word *Mnazimmoja* has little to do with the history of its area of reference. In fact, this is where the Germans put in place a *cordon sanitaire* or "buffer zone" to isolate the European community from the other communities; demobilized soldiers were sent here at the end of the First World War before being transferred to Chang'ombe towards the south of the railroad which runs through the city today.

At least the urban landscape speaks for itself. Amongst other things, it reflects local topographic variations that, in part, determine different forms of land occupation. A short distance from the centre, cultivations on the flood-prone depressions of the Kigogo residential area mark a break with the spread of constructed sites. There are also strong contrasts between the built-up areas, enabling one to distinguish between planned and unplanned zones: the former show constructions aligned with the street layout that separates geometrically laid-out blocks; the latter shows a surface chaos of narrow and winding streets which hardly allow cars to pass. The roads network is the most reliable indication that official planning is taking place, more so than the condition of the constructed sites (dominated by the same residential style and the same diversity of aesthetic levels and of construction materials, whether durable or not). From this standpoint, town planning history is an essential source of information. For a long time, informal settlement zones that sprung up beyond zones planned by the authorities had been excluded from the official city. No mention was made in the 1949-plans of communities settled in the greater Manzese sector. In the 1968-plans, which were preparing new integrations, it was revealed that the human density in this sector was equal to that which had been recorded in divisions that had formerly been integrated into the city (such as Magomeni) or even formerly planned zones (such as Ilala, 1926) and far exceeded levels recorded in other divisions such as Temeke and Kinondoni.

Urban reality thus far extended the limits that the municipal authorities had intended to assign to Dar es Salaam in the course of the city's history. And yet, Manzese was not integrated into the urban commune of Dar es Salaam before the 1979-urban development plans. The morphology of the residential

5 Letter from the Dar es Salaam district bureau, December 1931.

areas bears witness to these discrepancies: it shows that the authorities were not alone in stimulating the city's territorial formation and induces a search for other participants amongst the city dwellers themselves. Who are they? Where do they come from? And how did they contribute to urban expansion?

TABLE II: NOMENCLATURE OF DAR ES SALAAM'S ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

English denomination	Swahili denomination	Matching toponyms	
		In Manzese	In Ilala
Neighbourhood	Kitongoji/mtaa	Muungano, Uzuri Mlimani...	Ilala, Bungoni, Sharifu shamba...
Ward	Kata	Manzese	Ilala
Division	Tarafa/Jimbo	Ubongo	Ilala
District	Wilaya	Kinondoni	Ilala

TABLE III: SURFACE AREAS AND OCCUPATION OF OFFICIAL RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN 1968 CITY CENTRE, PERI-CENTRAL QUARTERS AND INTERMEDIATE PERIPHERY

District	Total surface area	Surface area occupied in 1968	Population numbers 1965	Density 1965
Oyster Bay	1921	773.5	3,274	3,9
Upanga	818	276.4	15,221	26,9
City, Centre	885	204.3	17,964	22,6
Kivukoni	120	37.0	262	3,0
Kurasini	1813	302.0	9,354	16,2
Temeke	2750	473.0	29,116	22,5
Chang'ombe	1390	213.7	6,332	8,4
Buguruni	746	246.2	12,64 6	44,5
Ilala	767	236.0	24,501	57,0
Kariakoo	332	274.7	50,338	167,2
Magomeni	979	499.6	42,047	60,3
Kinondoni	1475	364.6	6,051	12,6
Regent Estate	961	128.2	1,149	6,1
Msasani	600	91.4	1,190	7,2
Mwananyamala	783	135.2	3,726	27,6
Manzese North	240		12,800	55
Manzese South	50		3,000	60
Total	16340	4,255.8	223,171*	29,3

According to the *National Capital Master Plan*, Project Planning Associate Ltd, Dar es Salaam, Toronto, 1968.

SEGREGATION OR MIXITY: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE NATURE OF GROUPINGS WITHIN THE CITY

By extension, studying the forces behind this growth gives rise to questions about the type of social formation produced by a constant and massive influx of immigrants to the city. The intermixture of populations on Africa's East Coast and on the neighbouring islands that, in the 8th century, had already given birth to the Swahili civilization, was intensified by urbanization. Immigrants from all the various regions in the country settled in Dar es Salaam, adding to the so-called Swahili population: the local Shomvi and their Zaramo allies, as well as the Indians, Arabs and their former slaves who, since the 19th century, have been living in this part of the coastal region. In this context, what logic was followed by the city dwellers: was it a logic of community regrouping based on (ethnic or cultural) kinship, or was it a logic of mixity? How were the racial and cultural differences handled? What was the connection between "foreigners" and people of coastal origin? And what is the role of Swahili-ness today in integrating non-coastal populations? The theme of the economic integration of households raises the same type of questions. How did the employment and housing market respond to urban growth? What regulations resulted from this household influx? What individual and collective adaptations were prompted by the change in activities, the availability of land, the existing facilities, as well as by the authorities? And lastly, on what criteria are the present economic inequalities based and what is their spatial expression?

The theme of urban and social formation is therefore considered from different angles: internal differences, their spatial distribution and the forces behind the latter. As a result, references to political choices by the authorities and individual behaviour constitute an essential element of the following analyses; urban space is seen as a territorial issue: the issue is appropriation by role-players with contradictory interests and unequal powers.

AN ANALYSIS OF DAR ES SALAAM'S TERRITORIAL SCALES AND FORCES

What emerges from the theme of social and spatial formation resulting from urbanization is in fact a pivotal question about role-players and scales of territoriality in Dar es Salaam. Reflections set out in this text are divided into three parts, each of which values a particular type of spatial structuring and its role-players. Part one shows the type of structuring stemming from town planning history since the twenties. Here, arbitration by the authorities is decisive. It results in marked oppositions between races, between centre and periphery, planned and unplanned zones, property and customary laws. These (initially radical) oppositions were gradually toned down in the course of ensuing political developments. Part two is an attempt to interpret the type of territoriality that results from city dwellers' settlement acts and from local settling modes. It showcases established communities, their means of co-existence as well as forms of collective mobilization at a residential area,

neighbourhood and accommodation level. The last part attempts to analyze kinship-related group distribution (including family kinship) within the city, as well as the distribution of social classes. It includes analyses of degrees and conditions of social mixity, forms of isolation experienced on a neighbourhood scale and the answers put forward for each individual's resulting search of an identity. The section outlines the territories based on cultural identity, generated by the urban life-style and by a type of 'Swahili-ness', which is occasionally redefined by the city dwellers themselves.

Components of these considerations result in part from a 1999 eight-week long investigation into three of Dar es Salaam's residential areas within the intermediate periphery, i.e. Manzese, Buguruni and Ilala. These three residential areas enable us to understand two different territorial formation processes: a process driven from the city centre and by official planning, illustrated by Ilala's residential area (and particularly the eponymous neighbourhood where planning started in the twenties), and a barely lawful process driven by squatters which has produced the residential areas of Buguruni and Manzese.⁶ Located between three and ten kilometres from the centre and in close proximity to one another, these three residential areas developed simultaneously, but also separately. Today, they are clearly distinguishable on a morphological and socio-economic level, particularly in the case of Ilala and Buguruni, although they are merely separated by a (badly maintained) drainage canal. The contrasts observed in such close proximity indicate straightaway that the process of territorial formation was not interactive, prompting an investigation into the history of local communities and the spaces they occupy.

Fieldwork was conducted particularly in the Muungano quarter within Manzese (279 heads of households including 111 house-owners were interviewed), in Ilala and in Bungoni, which is the extension of the Ilala quarter within the Ilala residential area (157 heads of households including 82 owners were interviewed). Within Buguruni, next to the Bungoni quarter, a cursory survey was conducted amongst 309 owners. The work was accomplished with the help of assistants from the neighbourhood who (in some cases) had the status of "Ten Cells Units Agents" or *majumbe wa nyumba kumi kumi* in Swahili, agents from the local government unit who were quite well integrated into the area. Data from the national archives or from previous (unfortunately very scarce) studies on Dar es Salaam, quoted in the text, enabled the author to expand on the following analyses.

⁶ This reconstructive task was facilitated by documents from the national archives, but lack of time prevented a full analysis of the available material. The groundwork required a lot of input as far as contacts, surveying of the different quarters and interview time was concerned, particularly in Manzese, which had a reputation for being marginalized and unstable and where nothing was undertaken without receiving some kind of benevolent pledge from the residents. Before carrying out the investigation by means of questionnaires, repeated walks were undertaken with high-profile residents as guides and relaxed interviews took place with former residents who constitute the neighbourhood's living memory. Although some people reacted with (polite) reservation, here and there tongues loosened and made up to a certain extent for the lack of a written, historical trace of the unplanned quarters.

I- A CITY MARKED BY DUALITIES


During the colonial period, the city of Dar es Salaam was designed like a compartmented box with jealously guarded structures. For a long time, the will to confine was so strong that, in addition to the business and administrative centre, the greater part of the official town was made up of three zones: the European zone (zone I), Upanga (zone II) which was “Indianized” when Africans were excluded from it, and lastly the African zone, Kariakoo (zone III). Three residential areas, which were subsequently completed, by new residential areas developed on the adjoining periphery: Ilala in the 1920’s and Oyster Bay in the mid-30’s, before a new extension was developed to the south in the mid-40’s. In 1947, the official town stretched over an area bordered by the old aerodrome in the south, the veterinary station that was erected near the railway south of Ilala’s residential area, and the banks of the Msimbazi. To the north, beyond the Selander Bridge across the Msimbazi, it joined the Oyster Bay⁷ residential area.

Highly selective public development was concentrated within this area, which had hardly expanded since the German period. Manzese was already accommodating Africans from the city centre as early as the 1920’s proving that colonial town planning was inefficient from the start and the seeds of the periphery’s uncontrolled urbanization had been prematurely sown. Despite what the colonial administration wanted to believe, Dar in the 1930’s was not limited to the city centre and to recent extensions such as Ilala, but included settlement communities being formed at a distance from the officially allotted plots, communities who were divided but destined to meet. It comes as no surprise that contemporary cartographers gave such an inadequate representation of this shattered urban structure. Cartography was actually an instrument in the hands of the colonial administration that used it to assert their role as the project managers of urban construction, for which they claimed both authorship and control. Municipal authorities simply ignored this new periphery, made easier because it was separated from the official town by vast tracts of plantation. These spontaneous regroupings were excluded from the urbanization process envisaged by the authorities; they were relegated to rural realms and effectively placed under the jurisdiction of the Mtoni *Wakili*. However, according to the testimonies of the oldest residents, these regroupings developed at the same time as the official town and absorbed part of the urban growth whenever a crisis occurred.

The city’s belated openness to the reality of settlements outside public development areas was decided long after independence; the accumulated delay created a dangerous discrepancy between the *de facto* expanse of urbanized space and official town planning. Today, this gives the exercise of managing Dar es Salaam the appearance of a disorderly catching up policy.

⁷ The idea of incorporating the Temeke sector between the former aerodrome and the site of the new airport near the Pugu road would only be put forward after 1947.

Figure 10 - Dar es Salaam: the city's growth



A. Differentiated relations with the centre

The colonial experience of Dar es Salaam's town planning is characterized by the combination of an inability to project population growth and a refusal to grant city status to the majority of applicants on the city's threshold. Also, an arbitrary definition of reserved domains, a desire to control its forms and strict, administrative codification of the city's uses by the creation of rigidly partitioned residential areas. In response to the housing needs of the ever-increasing African population, only one residential area, Ilala, was divided into lots as an extension of Kariakoo during the Twenties.

1. Ilala or an example of a formerly planned quarter

At the beginning of the English period, zone III had to be restructured because it was reserved for "natives" (according to colonial terminology). During the war, it had served as a carrier depot, which explains why it inherited the name Kariakoo ("carrier corps"). In particular, there was talk about reorganizing a burgeoning commercial sector around the market in zone III. At the time, Kariakoo extended to Msimbazi Street in the west and was bordered by the buffer zone (a neutral zone established by the Germans between zone II, the city centre and business district and zone III) in the east. Initially, 600 temporary permits (called *Kiwanja*) to settle in the neutral zone were awarded to Africans, in anticipation of the creation of new residential areas that would provide accommodation for them. In 1923, a 500-acre terrain was considered for the creation of a new residential area west of Msimbazi Street (previously Karavan Street). It was the old Borman field, enemy property acquired by the British authorities for carrying out public works.⁸

As for Zone III, which included the new Ilala zone, directives were clear: Africans were allowed to sell houses to each another, since the zone was reserved for "natives" only; it was declared a residential area; non-African (i.e. "Asian") commerce was prohibited; no unoccupied plot could be sold to "non-Africans" (except for plots situated in Kariakoo's commercial sector); the government reserved the right to prevent the transfer or sub-letting of plots by "Africans" to "non-Africans".⁹

The whole sector situated west of Msimbazi Street was accordingly declared a residential area and buildings were monitored by an inspector who was

⁸ District Officers Reports, Dar es Salaam District, 1931-37.

⁹ In fact, the regulation was relaxed and the restriction became a financial one, as non-Africans were subjected to a higher rent than Africans, corresponding to prolonged occupation rights reserved for them by law. They thus had a different land status: Africans were awarded annual, sub-economical rent titles (also called *viwanja*) according to the Land Form 17 Rights of Occupancy, while those awarded to non-Africans pertained to the Land Form 8 (a) Right of Occupancy, land rent being adjusted according to economical rent. In the 50's, it was recommended that three-year (i.e. short-term) leases to non-Africans, renewable on an annual basis, be authorized within Ilala's residential zone (letter from the District Commissioner to the Land Office, 1954). Land title registers for 1954 distinguished between Native Right of Occupancy and others. The administration carried out verifications on a regular basis; cases that did not conform were treated individually (Municipal Township Authority Correspondence, 1946-1954).

officially appointed to this function in 1925. Shop sites were established near the new market on Kichwele Street (modern-day Uhuru Street) and along the main streets. Occupation rights were granted along with the obligation to build according to norms laid down by the municipal authorities. 168 lots were distributed in 1929, totalling 580 in 1931. The new zone was called Ilala.¹⁰ It was wholly created by the colonial authorities.

Ilala accommodated those Africans who had provisionally been settled in the neutral zone, as well as squatters who had recently been cleared out of the Gerezani sector. The plots were measured, registered and made available sequentially from 1926 upon payment (of course) of a "Right of Occupancy" which authorized the construction to begin. At the same time, services were provided in Ilala: a school on the former Kichwele Street, two cemeteries, a paediatrics centre, as well as two *Quarters*, one African, the other Asian, both of which were dependent on the railway company.

Today, Ilala's residential area (or *kata* in Swahili) is situated within the eponymous district and is bordered by Buguruni, Kigogo, Kariakoo and the railroad. Also within this residential area is a quarter (*mtaa / kitongoji* in Swahili) bordered by Bungoni, Sharifu Shamba, Mchikichini and Kariakoo. It is one of only a few quarters in Dar es Salaam where buildings conform to the street layout, forming a regular and geometric pattern of successive blocks. This rigorous grid pattern is the result of an urban model imposed by colonial town planning which contrasts sharply with the morphology of the neighbouring residential areas. Bungoni, which is situated within the Ilala extension, was divided into plots and constructed at a later stage (in the seventies); it was developed according to the same model, but imperfectly so, because the planning was preceded by constructions along the quarter's northern fringe.

Of course, in Ilala, priority was given to Africans who were closely connected to the colonial system: civil administration employees, but also servicemen or even former mercenaries, including the Ngoni who had come from the country's southwestern Highlands, and especially the Manyema from Central Africa and the Great Lakes region who had been forced to work and had served in the colonial armies. They even had their own cemetery in Ilala, situated between Bukoba, Nyasa and Tabora Streets, proof of the privilege granted to them. Ilala, which was in close proximity to the city centre, primarily accommodated employees who were vital to and involved in running specific city services and maintaining order, and were therefore *de facto* assured of a job. Beyond the image of a middle-class, well-to-do neighbourhood often associated with Ilala, its special feature remains job security. Investigations

10 Letter from the Office of Dar es Salaam Province addressed to the administrator of land affairs, dated December 1931, including notes specifying the sector's history and its settlement conditions, written after a meeting between the chief Secretaries of the Province and of Native Affairs, the Province's High Commissioner, the District representative, the director of sanitary services, as well as a certain Baker, who had been appointed to conduct investigations into Dar es Salaam's social issues.

carried out in the Ilala and Bungoni quarters illustrate this point: 45% of the 82 owners interviewed are employed by the civil service, are private or semi-public company executives, established heads of companies or businessmen. Professional activities declared by residents interviewed in Bungoni are more diversified and include, for a significant part (1 head of household out of 5) that of farmers with a fluctuating income, living on the produce of their cultivations on Dar es Salaam's outer periphery. More often (for 1 head of household out of 2) they also include small, independent traders and craftsmen. While road works to extend Uhuru Street were underway, access to real estate close to the town centre (four kilometres) was offered to these categories typically found in informal settlements. Buguruni residents who were involved in small trade at the time were displaced and settled in the only available space, between Ilala and Buguruni. And so the Bungoni quarter was born, making a breach in this domain reserved for the chosen few of the official urban employment market.

2. The countryside of the Zaramo region

For a long time, the city in the process of developing seemed unaware of this stretch of countryside. And yet, when the first buildings ordered by Sultan Majid got underway around 1865, this part of the coast and its hinterland were not uninhabited. The Shomvi group (who governed the town of Bagamoyo) had settled there at the beginning of the 13th century. This group had emigrated from southern Arabia at the same time as the Shirazi, whose migration left such an indelible mark on the history of the coast¹¹. Like Bagamoyo, the Shomvi villages, including Mzizima (which was stifled by Dar es Salaam's growth) as well as Kunduchi, Msasani, Mjimwema, Mboamaji and Kaole had developed during the 19th century.

The Zaramo, led by the Pazi-clan, were also present from the beginning of the 19th century. They had left Kutu, their homeland to the south and southwest of Mount Uluguru. Legend has it that they came to assist members of the Shomvi aristocracy (also known as Diwan) against an attempted foreign invasion led by the Kamba, a group from present-day Kenya. After that they settled on land offered by the Shomvi as a reward for their bravery. Consequently, they were present on the coastal fringe between Kisiju (about 80 km south of Dar es Salaam harbour), at Kisanguru in the Rufiji delta and almost 160 km west of the Indian Ocean. Since becoming allies in the war against the Kamba, the Zaramo and the Shomvi had established mock family ties (or *utani*, in Swahili) strengthened by matrimonial and economic exchanges. In addition to trading in salt, dried fish, ivory and slaves, the economic power of Bagamoyo's Diwan was based on the trade of copal,

11 Abdul Sheriff, "Le peuplement et l'islamisation", in Colette Le Cour Grandmaison and Ariel Croson (eds), *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, Karthala - IFRA, 1998. The Shirazi are also called al Barawi because they stopped off at Brava on the Benadir coast (present-day Somalia) in the course of their migration.

produced by the Zaramo and exported to Zanzibar. The Doe, who had come from further up the coast, had also settled in this sector. According to legend, they too had fought alongside the Shomvi and given land as a reward.

Amongst these different groups, living separately was not customary. Their respective community members' residence was not so much determined by clan origin as by economic activity. Their cohabitation in the area surrounding the new city was a reflection of what could be observed along the coastline. The Shomvi settlements were on the Ocean Road hospital site at Upanga in the Msimbazi cove and at the harbour entrance, while the Zaramo had settled near the present-day Mtoni and at Gerezani.

In addition, these populations were joined by Arabs from Maskat and the Hadramaut in southern Yemen. As far back as the 13th century, there is proof of their presence on the Swahili coast (where they introduced a Shafe'ite Sunnite Muslim trend differing from the Shi-ite trend first introduced by the Shirazi).¹² From 1840, the transfer of Busaidi¹³ dynastic power from Oman to Zanzibar persuaded the Hadrami to settle on the coast and to develop activities there. The Hadrami were closely associated with plantation economics (mainly cloves), which were in full expansion in Zanzibar at the time, as well as the Muslim religion. The community's commercial networks, henceforth Zanzibar-based, stretched all the way to Arabia, India and the Far East.¹⁴ According to José Kagabo's description of this part of the Swahili coast's population, they "kept away from the native populations, isolated [themselves] within networks which were not very accessible to Swahilis of old coastal stock".¹⁵ They maintained complex and economically dependent relations with traders, bankers and financiers from the west coast of India, who were also present on the coast. They identified with the Arabs; politically and culturally and they came under the sultanate of Zanzibar enjoying the protection of the Sultan's agents or *Liwali*.

The new city would extend across countryside entirely held by the Zaramo. Their villages and hamlets, based on extended families, would be the starting points of the periphery's urbanization. A case in point is Kiboko in the northern part of Manzese's present-day Muungano quarter. Its name (the same as one of the neighbourhood bars) is a reminder of the hippopotamuses that frequented this site (*kiboko* is the Swahili word for 'hippopotamus') as well as of the original Zaramo hamlet. Muungano's oldest residents still remember those places reserved for traditional dances (called *Ngoma*) and ceremonies (mainly circumcision and excision) led by local spiritual leaders called *Makungwi*. Mwembemkole in Manzese is one of these places, and Mwemesindimba in the Temeke sector is another. Old city dwellers recount the memory of these

12 Abdul Sheriff, *op.cit.*

13 This dynasty was established in Oman in the mid-18th century and continues to rule to the present day (Abdul Sheriff, *op.cit.*)

14 Farouk Topan, in *Les swahilis entre l'Afrique et l'Arabie*.

15 José Kagabo, in "Réseaux d'ulama 'swahili' et liens de parenté. Une piste de recherche", in *Les Swahili entre Afrique et Arabie*, Paris. CREU-Karthala, 1991.

sites, in the same way as the local toponymy testifies to their existence; most of Dar es Salaam's quarters and residential areas bear the names of those rural communities who preceded them. The Mwananyamara residential area and the Mwembechai quarter in the heart of the Magomeni residential area serve as examples. These villages were placed under Kunduchi rule, under the authority of the Zaramo chief (title: *Ndewa*) at the time.

Kiboko is one of the Zaramo villages around which Dar es Salaam's present-day suburbs developed. At an early stage (from the twenties, according to the evidence gathered), non-indigenous elements, including the Ngindo from the Lindi region and the Nyamwezi from the Tabora region, were gradually integrated. People from Kariakoo who came to seek permission to settle in the tranquil countryside arrived in a state of exhaustion, their dreams of becoming city dwellers having turned into the nightmare of impoverished, badly housed third-class residents condemned to a precarious city life.¹⁶ From this viewpoint the Manzese example is a good illustration of the development process of Dar es Salaam's residential areas.

3. Builders of other suburbs: in the beginning was the dream...

In the course of the investigation, it was not surprising to find that some of the oldest residents of the Manzese quarters were the sons of those carriers or porters who had worked in the harbour during the transitional period between the two world wars, at a time when the extent of the housing crisis made the inadequacies of the zone III developments all too obvious. The porters had come from the interior. The coveted city of their dreams had disdainfully offered them paupers' lodgings. As the first city dwellers, they had naively believed that, within the expanding network of the Ilala quarter, they would be allowed to build four walls, to take the initiative to erect a roof and enjoy the intimacy of an essentially decent home and get accustomed to city life. But the municipality had responded to their quest with a list of impossible norms and tariffs or with the pretext of unbearable delays. In the mid-thirties, when the shortage of residential space for the African population began to be felt, the colonial government decided to make available those building sites belonging to the railway company situated within the official city compound. At the time, the city's only decision pertaining to extensions concerned the Oyster Bay residential area, which was reserved for Europeans.¹⁷ The logic of ostracism and of segregation prevailed over expansion and urban integration.

16 In 1928, 1,000 plots were marked out in Ilala. In 1931, about 600 properties earmarked for construction were allocated and built on; 200 applicants were waiting for stands. By 1932 the number of properties put up for sale had run out. At the same time, squatting was developing in the Gerezani sector (106 huts were counted in 1929). In the heart of the rural district, the African population's numbers were increasing. They went from 124,130 to 148,000 people between 1921 and 1938 (source: District Officers Reports, Dar es Salaam District, 1931-37).

17 Tanganyika Gazette, 5 July 1935, Proclamation no 12 of 1935, and 31 July 1936, Building area in Dar es Salaam Township. Oyster Bay Residential Area, in 1933-1946, Native Affairs, National Archives, Dar es Salaam.

However, it was not an easy logic to impose and necessitated recourse to measures of expulsion on a regular basis. This was the case, for example, of 99 African huts listed in Upanga's residential area in 1935.¹⁸

The members of the most underprivileged urban classes, caught in a pincer movement between discomfort and scarcity, held at arm's length by the Europeans, had to affect a strategic withdrawal beyond the constraints of the official town. While Kariakoo was overpopulating its unhealthy lodgings with crowds of badly integrated people, the hospitable countryside seemed to welcome all able-bodied men. It offered the promise of seasons without food shortages, reaped between rivers and swamps: a choice terrain for the daily rice of the families living from hand to mouth in town. There was settlement room left between the palm groves, coconut plantations and pastures exploited by enterprising Indians on Zaramo land. The promise of fruitful peri-urban agriculture held out a prediction of better days to come.

During the thirties, as the economic crisis continued, porters and other packers in search of a better life began acquiring land in the surrounding countryside that fell under the Zaramo village communities. Manzese's oldest residents, some of whom are still alive, followed a path which bears witness to these precocious settlements. One of the sector's five *wazee* (meaning "old man" in Swahili, "notable" by extension) I met during the investigation related his father's experiences as follows: the man, who was a porter and a modest tenant from Kariakoo, acquired a piece of land in the Muungano sector at the beginning of the thirties. With his own hands, he constructed a simple hut (*kibanda*) which would not have met Ilala's building standards but served as a shelter. The land was immediately brought under cultivation. Together with a few other Nyamwezi, Sukuma and former coastal residents, he produced rice, cassava, sugar cane and fruit, which he sold on the markets of Dar es Salaam. This income enabled him to resign from his badly-paid and distant urban employment, while supporting the family in town using the Kariakoo lodgings. His son, who was born in Kariakoo, was sent to school in Kichwele Street, in the new Ilala quarter.

Resources from agriculture enabled the father, who had joined this sector to reduce the hardships of urban life, maintain his links with the latter, like others had done elsewhere. These pioneers, who had been city dwellers from the onset became neo-country people due to circumstances, were an essential part of the urban process. The land they were farming in the countryside was

18 Native huts in Non-Native Areas of the Township of Dar es Salaam, 16 December 1935, in 1933-1946 Native Affairs, National Archives, Dar es Salaam. At that time, Upanga was a vast coconut plantation acquired on freehold, i.e. as unlimited property. Some of the settlements had been in existence for more than 25 years. These Natives (unilaterally) proclaimed about 60 individual plantations; the matter gave rise to detailed research on land distribution and the corresponding property deeds. The titleholders included a large number of Arabs and Indians, as well as a member of the Daya family whose traces were found thirty years later in the context of a property dispute leading to the creation of the Bungoni quarter between Ilala and Buguruni.

functionally linked to Dar es Salaam, directly contributing towards satisfying the household's needs and maintaining and consolidating the family unit in town. This new foothold showed a willingness to break with the instability, uncertainty and celibacy imposed by the precarious living and employment conditions of most Africans in Dar es Salaam. Providing children with schooling was proof of a desire to offer them knowledge adapted to the urban situation and to the jobs associated with it, and so encourage their insertion into the city and modern society which was then in the process of formation.

The solution of a double foothold in town and in the (still rural) periphery paid off economically, as it diversified the family's resources. These individual initiatives also had geographical consequences. After this, the pieces of Zaramo land that had been made available to the city dwellers formed as many countryside enclaves. Plucked from their communal and basically rural heritage, they were now placed within the city sphere, although beyond its official development area. By transferring their productive value to the city they became an essential means of promoting Kariakoo's tenant families, while expanding their economic (and eventually, residential) space. Dar es Salaam likewise extended even further into these spaces occupied on the periphery. However, development policies were about to impose a separation by laying the foundations for a radical duality that would be imparted to the modern-day city.B. A sold-out city

Under English administration, the distinction between the city and the rural sector of the Dar es Salaam district was clearly established in 1934 when certain local authorities such as the Zaramo chiefs (title: *Ndewa*) as well as Mtoni, a member of the Chaurembo family, were officially recognized.¹⁹ After the Second World War, three town planning projects succeeded one another. The intention was to shape the city and control its expansion. The town planning projects were presented in 1949, 1968 and 1979 respectively, and each was put forward at a turning point in the country's history: the 1949 master plan concerned the post-war years and the transitional period before independence; the second national development plan, launched in 1968, reflected the principles defined by Julius Nyerere in the 1967 Arusha declaration; lastly, post-villagization took place against the backdrop of an economic crisis and the 1979 war against Uganda.

1. Confinement strategy, or the colonial city as a place of privilege in 1949

There was no talk about an eventual expansion of the municipality's borders before the McCleery report, produced in 1939 at the request of the Eastern Province.²⁰ The aim of this report was to identify land tenure in force outside

19 In 1935, 19 Native Administrations grouped together the 133 Zaramo chiefs of Dar es Salaam's rural district (source: District Officer's Reports, Dar es Salaam District, 1931-37).

20 Provincial Commissioner, "Notes on Mr McCleery's Report, Provincial Office, 25 June 1940", in Native Affairs 1933-46, National Archives, Dar es Salaam.

the official city, particularly in the Temeke rural district with its settlements of African populations who were economically dependant on Dar es Salaam. Another objective was to investigate the possibility of placing these lands under the jurisdiction of the municipal authority. The conclusions of the report, considered innovative, were still being discussed in 1944. It is true that restrictions imposed by the colonial administration (racial segregation and the refusal to grant freehold rights to Africans) were complicating the integration of lands coming under customary land tenure. However, these restrictions were reaffirmed at regular intervals. The question of granting freehold rights to Africans, was brought to a firm decision by referring to section 15 of chapter 47 of the Native Ordinance which stipulated that no "native" was allowed to plant trees or practice cultivation on a continuous basis, and revoking individual rights on land which remained unoccupied for more than a year. The integration of Temeke section into municipal territory finally became official in 1948; 360 acres were made available for construction.²¹

It is within this context that a new core development plan was drafted in 1949. Allen Armstrong has shown the extent to which this plan and the following ones were marked by Western town planning styles.²² In fact, the 1949 plan, formulated under the supervision of London consultant Sir Alexander Gibb and financed by the British government, combines town planning according to Western conceptions peculiar to this period with priorities specified by the colonists. It reveals a combination of architectural concerns prompted by the era's engineers, garden city and zoning models clearly separating the city's residential and economic functions: the concept of adjoining units implemented in American suburbs at the time, the principle of racially-based spatial segregation and lastly the sanitary syndrome with its fear of contamination. Although racial distinctions had been discreetly concealed by a density criterion, this development plan reasserted the separation of the three residential zones (European, Indian and African), since in fact the low-density area corresponded to the European zone and the medium density area to the Indian zone, while Africans found themselves confined to the high-density zone.

The conception of the 1949-development plan was profoundly inegalitarian. It provided for the extension of the low-density zone to the most salubrious and best serviced sites: the most detailed project for the implementation of the concept of neighbourhood units would be reserved for this zone, while other projects that met the needs of the elite (improving the business centre, building luxury hotels and an airport) would be considered.²³ The African population was doubly disadvantaged: the high standard of construction on

21 Government Notice No 91, 21/5/48, The Township Ordinance (Cap. 29), Supplement to the Tanganyika Territory Gazette, Dar es Salaam.

22 Allen M. Armstrong, "Master Plans for Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania", in *Habitat International*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp.133-145, 1987, Pergamon Journals Ltd., Great Britain.

23 Allen M. Armstrong, *op.cit.*

one hand, impeded access to the zone which had been reserved for them, and on the other, developments considered for this zone were significantly inferior to those that were contemplated for the European zone. Indeed, some of the measures under consideration were limited to supervising the building line according to the street layout, erecting public fountains and reducing population density. However, based on a survey of eleven Kariakoo streets (674 houses and 3661 rooms in total) overpopulation in the African quarters was already a problem and had been the subject of an exchange of letters between public health officials and municipal authorities from 1947. It involved 68.8% of the houses in zone III and its logical implication was the addition of a new extension to the city.²⁴

This conception of developing African residential areas based exclusively on sanitary concerns was not peculiar to Dar es Salaam. African housing standards had been defined by a circular dated 21 November 1938, signed by the colonial government's general secretary and distributed to all officials in the provinces of the Tanganyikan territory.²⁵ The Ilala quarter, situated in the high density zone reserved for Africans had been developed since the twenties, but was hardly mentioned in the 1949 core development plan, while in fact 20% of the urban population were gathered there.

The town planners, who were busy preserving the security and privileges of the colonial elite, chose therefore to ignore the prospect of significant urban population growth. From this viewpoint, no city extension was anticipated. Domestic quarters near the colonists' residential zone were the only constructions under consideration, while the emphasis was on low-density zone intervention. People were mobilized in Oyster Bay especially. This difference in treatment conveyed more than merely incapability to anticipate urban growth. It revealed a highly elitist and exclusive view of the city; a notion shared by other colonial administrations on the African continent.²⁶ From 1950, Sir Alexander Gibb's agency in the Mtoni and Yomboni Creek sectors put forward a new extension, which seemed logical, as a new reservoir for the city's water supply was supposed to be installed there. However, in his response, the chief town-planning officer clearly questioned the eventuality of significant development in this zone, even in the distant future.²⁷ The local English press nonetheless reported a growing space shortage problem regarding African housing in town and echoed the controversial fifties' debate about possible solutions in this regard.²⁸

24 Secretariat Circular Letters, 1946-47, National Archives, Dar es Salaam.

25 About 35 square metres (21 by 5 feet) for six people, according to this document dated 21 November 1938 (National Archives, Dar es Salaam).

26 Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "Villes coloniales et histoire des Africains", in *Revue d'histoire*, Oct-Dec 1988, pp. 49-73.

27 "Apart from such sporadic development, I cannot see much chance of the Yomboni and Mtoni areas developing on any significant scale for a very long time ..." Chief Town Planning Officer, Department of Surveys and Town Planning, letter to the local government secretariat dated 14 July 1950.

28 In this connection, an article in the *Reader Opinion* dated 25 February 1953 denounced the solution recommended in an article which had previously appeared in the *Tanganyika Standard*: to reduce the surface of houses intended for Africans.

2. DECOMPARTIMENTALIZING AND OBSTRUCTING THE SQUATTER QUESTION IN 1968

The 1949-master plan was reviewed for the first time in 1958 while the *Sites and Services* project was developing services in the residential zones of Ilala, Kinondoni, Magomeni and Temeke.²⁹ But it's only in 1968 that a Canadian team worked out a truly novel master plan that was ambitious, rigorous and methodical. At the time, the official town had 250,000 residents spread out over fifteen residential zones: Oyster Bay, Upanga, City Centre, Kivukoni, Kurasini, Temeke, Chan'gombe, Buguruni, Ilala, Kariakoo, Magomeni, Kinondoni, Regent Estate, Msasani and Mwananyamara. The chosen approach was radically different: the concept of an urban region was emerging for the first time. Created in 1961, it was then divided into three districts: Temeke, Ilala and Kinondoni. Thus, the plan took notice of current urbanization and urban population growth underestimated in the predictions twenty years previously. It anticipated that the city would be extended west-, north- and southwards and urban structure would become more complex. Besides the original centre and its extensions, it would henceforth include satellite units such as Kibaha and Kisarawe, which would channel urban growth and relieve congestion in the peri-central zone. A plan to create adjoining units extending to this enlarged perimeter resurfaced, while the concept of corridors airing the urban tissue was re-endorsed, although in a very different spirit from the *cordons sanitaires* drawn during the colonial period to separate communities. Also, the desire to break with the spatial segregation of social groups coordinated by previous town-planners was expressed clearly. For the first time, partitioning urban space into three compartments corresponding to different levels of human density (*de facto*, to different race groups), was called into question. The town planners' strategy for breaching this compartmentalization from the past was to attempt to reduce the distance between the density levels and favour population intermixture by diversifying cadastral patterns, building standards and the availability of housing within each residential zone. In the meantime the city's population went up from 69,277 in 1948 to 128,742 in 1957 and to 272, 515 in 1967.³⁰

The service development and distribution program started far away from Dar es Salaam's traditional development areas in the Mikocheni, Kijitonyama and Sinza residential zones as early as 1972 (as regards the plan's execution phase) is a good example of the way in which town planning principles and measures were relaxed.³¹ Indeed, in this operation sector, plots of 288 square metres on average were allocated for individual housing construction, according to standards that allowed the use of cheap building materials and for a population with limited income to settle there.

29 J.M.L. Kironde, "Creations in Dar es Salaam and Extensions in Nairobi. The defiance of inappropriate planning standards" in *Cities*, August 1992, pp.220-231.

30 According to Recorded Population Changes 1948-1967, Tanzania, Central Statistical Bureau, 1968.

31 J.M.L. Kironde, "Creations in Dar es Salaam and extensions in Nairobi. The defiance of inappropriate planning standards." in *Cities*, August 1992, pp.220-231.

In spite of an undeniably progressive spirit when compared to previous plans, an authoritarian temptation prevailed in dealing with the squatter question. There was no recognition for the squatters nor for the spaces they occupied beyond the developed areas. Some of the measures put forward by the town planners to resolve the squatter problem included eviction without compensation and refusing to resettle people who had been driven off the land. Again, the exclusion reflex manifested itself by erecting a barrier between legal and illegal settlements. In fact, the duality between the switch was just as strongly marked as that between the official and the informal town.

The *Master Plan Section*, created at the request of town planning division members designed the plan but nonetheless made some adjustments. Indeed, the first years of the plan's implementation were marked by an increase in squatter house registration. But the integration of large, squatter-occupied sectors into the town only became official with the 1979-master plan.

3. Official recognition of squatter-occupied spaces in 1979

This radical change in Dar es Salaam's urban policy is probably intimately linked to recommendations expressed during the 1976-Vancouver Habitat Conference, which, instead of the usual evictions, advocated legalized action, renovation and cleaning up of informal settlements. In addition, since the 1972-ILO report on Kenya and Hart's 1973 research on Accra, informal settlements had been established as part of the research and intervention field as far as development was concerned. In Dar es Salaam, this new look at a world that found itself on the sidelines of official town planning and the official economy led to the creation of the *Residential Buffer Zone* concept. The wording was clever: without providing an explanation of squatter status, it made allowances for the global integration of squatter settlement sectors, which would henceforth be placed under the authority of the municipal council, founded in 1978. Instead of being evicted, squatters were offered the possibility to renovate their residential zones, which the protracted experience of exclusion had turned into a mammoth task.

In fact, integrating residential zones originated and developed without any form of planning into the official town posed the tricky problem of juxtaposing spaces that were unequally equipped with infrastructures, and different levels of urbanity. The image of a ghetto, a "pocket of poverty" or a parenthesis between two authentic city sectors seemed to loom behind the designation of a "buffer". For example, there was no comparison between Manzese's residential zone, nicknamed "Soweto" by the end of the sixties, and Ilala, where planning and development dated from colonial times. Municipal authorities trying to homogenize the formerly segregated town inherited new inequalities which were difficult to deal with.

C. Accessing land: official land laws, customary laws and squatting

During the colonial period, when compared to other communities, the land situation of Dar es Salaam's Africans was an unpredictable one which obviously hindered urban settlement and the construction of durable structures. In this regard, press reports from the fifties relate that, as a rule, Africans lived in adobe houses and were only given one-year lease contracts on their plots. The press also echoed the animated municipal council debates that opposed the most hostile opponents of accelerated construction and those who defended housing rights for Africans.³² Thus, there was a strong comeback of the same preoccupation with sanitation as an argument previously used during the colonial period to organize racial segregation on a city scale. Henceforth, this preoccupation, backed opposition to massive African settlement, and served as an argument against the densification of constructed sites on a residential zone scale.

I. LAND LAWS

Land laws were one of the instruments of social control required by English administration, mainly in the town itself. The 1923 *Land Ordinance* formed the legal framework of its interventions. It is obvious that it was also a reflection of colonial policies' arbitrary power. Firstly, access to *Freehold Rights* which corresponded to property was a "non native" (European and Asian) privilege. Renting land was the only system open to all social categories, including Africans. According to this system, lease-specified property rights were fixed for a given period not exceeding ninety-nine years. The beneficiary obtained a *Right of Occupancy*, certified by an official document, the *Certificate of Occupancy*. Land regulations were supplemented and specified by various texts. For example, the 1926 *Land Regulations* made it compulsory to develop the allocated plots within a period of three years, beyond which the acquired rights would be cancelled. It also established the rules for transferring rights between successive occupants.³³

Although these regulations conferred an official character on settlements taking place within this legal framework, it contributed in practice to placing and maintaining the African majority in a state of land insecurity that was unfavourable to urban settlement. As they were often granted short-term (one year) lease contracts, *Land Registry Ordinance* registration procedures

32 The former advocated a reduction in the land occupation rate, which was then fixed at 50% in the high density zone; the commercial zone benefited from the same tolerance level, as opposed to 25% in the so-called "purely residential" zones such as Oyster Bay (Tanganyika Standard, "Town Planning in Dar es Salaam", article dated 6 February 1953, to which Abdulkarim Y.A. Karimjee, T.W. Tyrrel, Percy Everett and D.K. Patel responded in a letter published in the Tanganyika Standard's Reader Opinion column on 25 February 1953).

33 This regulation involved stands with a surface inferior or equal to 300 acres (Source: G. Mgongo Fimbo, "Incidences of Land tenure Systems on Resource Exploitation and Conservation: The Right of Occupancy System in Tanzania", in IDEP, Workshop on environment and rural Development in East Africa, 11-30 Nov. 1974, p.63.

were hardly open to them, being reserved for holders of leases exceeding five years.³⁴ In the fifties, it was still unusual to grant long-term lease contracts (from thirty-three years upwards) to Africans³⁵, who were subjected to strict building standards (the use of durable materials and approval of the plans by local authorities). This inequality in property ownership was not limited to Dar es Salaam's urban area. This is illustrated by the 1960-distribution of long-term deeds for crop and livestock farming amongst the communities of the entire colony: 2 and less than 0.7% for Africans (almost as much for Arabs), as opposed to (respectively) 17.8 and 10.5% for Indians, 6.7 and 14.8% for Greeks, 34.6 and 60.5% for the British (including those from South Africa), while the rest was mainly divided between other European nationals and religious missions.³⁶ Despite the principle of defending "native" interests and laws contained in article 6 of the *Land Ordinance*, *Freehold* areas in "non native" hands were still expanding. Between 1948 and the end of the English period, the problem areas in the colony as a whole rose from 970,132 to 1,300 000 acres.³⁷

President Julius Nyerere was opposed to the principle of private land ownership,³⁸ therefore *Freehold* deeds were converted into 99 year-long leases after independence. The few amendments included mostly gave the President the power to revoke title deeds in the public interest and pay compensation corresponding to the value of what the previous occupant had invested in the plot. During the sixties, the revocation of rights claimed by several Arab and Indian families who were extensively involved in cattle farming in Sharifu Shamba, Mchikichini, Bungoni and Buguruni, resulted in the development of these sectors.³⁹

Today, the official procedure for acquiring a plot must, theoretically speaking, be carried out in several stages. The applicant fills out an application to acquire a plot to the authorities, upon which he receives a written offer. The offer specifies the fixed building standard, the compulsory construction deadline, as well as the tax amount (for issuing the title deed, registration and boundary markings) and property rent. The right obtained entitles the applicant "to occupy the land" for a specified time, may be short (up to five years) or long (thirty-three years, sixty-six years and ninety-nine years). The sizes may vary according to the type of residential zone: up to 400 square metres in the high density zone, 800 square metres in the medium density

34 Section 15 of the Land Ordinance of 1923. In 1954, only 27 Rights of Occupancy with regard to a place of residence had been registered in the name of Africans from Ilala, as well as 1 in Kinondoni, 14 in Magomeni and 22 in Temeke (source: Land survey, 1954).

35 Tanganyika Standard, op. cit.

36 According to G. Mgongo Fimbo, "Incidences of Land tenure Systems on resource Exploitation and Conservation: The Right of Occupancy System in Tanzania", in IDER, Workshop on environment and rural Development in East Africa, 11-30 Nov. 1974, 63p.

37 Idem.

38 The measure was implemented in 1963.

39 Notably the Daya and Sundarji families (1999 survey).

zone and starting from 750 square metres in the low density zone.⁴⁰ In 1999, plot rental intended for housing was set within a range of 10 to 35 shillings per square metre per year, including the upper-crust neighbourhoods of Oyster Bay and Msasani, a low price which, in theory, made it accessible to less well-off households.⁴¹

Parallel to this evolution in land regulations, some development had occurred. During the fifties, creating residential zones (or “neighbourhood units”) driven by community spirit became one of the fundamental objectives of urban development plans. At the same time, the administration tried to facilitate African access to housing. Towards the end of the forties, *residential areas* had been created to this effect, including the Ilala quarter (1947-48) built on land acquired after the revocation of rights claimed by two Arabs in this sector. Likewise, the *African Urban Housing Loan Scheme* had been put in place.⁴²

After independence, the State remained involved in this financial assistance sector with its huge needs: African access to housing was impeded by the cost of renting land and insufficient supply. For example, in Magomeni, 200 names were put on a waiting list for housing in 1958.⁴³ As early as 1962, the government launched the *National Housing Corporation*, a program providing low-cost housing; cleaning up and rebuilding of shantytowns and for the rental and purchase of buildings. Its actions in this domain included contributions to financing private constructions. Credit systems were established: the *Roof loan* and *Revolving Fund for Senior Civil Servants* aimed at the administration's cadres, the *Permanent Housing Finance Company* for financing durable (and therefore costly) constructions, and lastly, since 1973, the *Tanzania Housing Bank*. The independent Tanzania's administrative efforts were also perceptible in its *Sites and Services Schemes*. However, the latter also heralded the end of the Welfare State, as beneficiaries had to refund the infrastructure costs.

Today, the State has been designated as the sole landowner by the legal land system. Theoretically, this allows the State direct intervention in transactions to the advantage of individuals and acceptance of the role of development project manager serving the communities. In fact, from colonization to independence, the land was officially transferred from the crown to the presidency. Practically,

40 J.M. Lusugga Kironde, “Access to land by the urban poor in Tanzania: some findings from Dar es Salaam”, in *Environment and Urbanization*, vol. 7, No 1, April 1995, pp.77-95. In Ilala, the surface average is 270 square metres (source: Ilala District, registers of the Land Office, 1999). Surfaces allocated in Nairobi are well below this level (from 100 square metres upwards). Prices are higher in Nairobi, but so is the facility level (according to J.M. Lusugga Kironde, “Creations in Dar es Salaam and extensions in Nairobi. The defiance of inappropriate planning standards”, in *Cities*, August 1992, pp.sp220-231).

41 Ministry of Lands, Valuation section, “Do you occupy a piece of land in Dar es Salaam region? Then know and pay your land rent promptly”, April 1999.

42 Towards the end of the forties, the housing crisis was intensified by the return of demobilised soldiers after the Second World War. Transitional solutions had to be improvised. The creation of hostels in Mgulani Camp in 1953 was one of the accepted solutions (Correspondence: Government to Hostel Transit Camp, Mgulani).

43 Government Notice, 1958.

however, the urgency and scope of the needs required different agents to manage land inheritance and territorial formation.

2. Competing with the State for the power to divide into plots

Initially, applications could be addressed to the *Ministry of Lands* and to the person responsible for land affairs on a district level. The former allocated long-term rights and, also had exclusive Certificate signing rights; the latter allocated short-term rights. Since the setting up of local governments (*Local government Act* of 1982), land affairs authorities within the municipal councils may act independently from the *Ministry of Lands*. Besides which, they can allocate long-term rights, as neither party has a clear vision of the real land availability situation.

The land market has become lucrative because of demand pressure and activates personal initiative. The increase in cases of doubly registered plots, which has been severely criticized since the eighties, proves that dividing the prerogatives in this activity sphere has rendered plot-allocating procedures even more obscure.⁴⁴ The administration seems to have become a place for legalizing irregular procedures. Title deeds allocated by incompetent administrators have given rise to controversy. These practices testify to a shift from the institution of the State to its own individual agents regarding the ability to mark out, register and allocate boundaries. When confronted with the personal powers within the administration, applicants were obliged to enter a trade era with fluctuating deadlines.

This breakdown into individual operations of the State's power within the context of a frantic land scramble makes it impossible to predict the instigated proceeding results. It encourages future applicants to anticipate public action by prospecting vacant spaces themselves and taking the initiative to ask the town planning director and the land registry services to divide the land that they plan to acquire into plots. Once the ministry's permission has been obtained and the plot's boundaries marked out, the application procedure for a Right of Occupancy is set in motion and the plot is allocated. This is what happened in the Kijitonyama-Sinza-Mikocheni sector, which was developed at the beginning of the seventies. In the course of the eighties, this type of procedure gained considerable ground. According to J.M.L. Kironde, it effects almost 20% of the 4,540 lots allocated in Sinza in 1990.⁴⁵

The fact that industry has been granted plots within residential zones is another indication that something is wrong. In other cases, plots that had initially been earmarked for setting up collective services (schools, sports grounds, etc) were granted to private housing construction. These actions, carried out with the complicity of local administrators, limit town planning

44 G. Mgongo Fimbo, Double allocation of urban plots: a legal labyrinth, citizen puzzlement and nightmare, The Law Association of Tanzania, Text of public lecture, Central Library, 3 Sept. 1988, 24pp.

45 J.M.L. Kironde, "Creations in Dar es Salaam and extensions in Nairobi. The defiance of inappropriate planning standards" in *Cities*, August 1992, pp. 220-231.

effectiveness. Individual enterprise is resolutely stealing a lead over the authorities.

Lastly, in Dar es Salaam, squatting is not a marginal phenomenon confined by town planning; rather, it has become one of the main means of land occupation. Squatting notably expanded close to planned areas. The Mchikichini quarter, which started developing near the Ilala quarter at the beginning of the seventies, can be used as an example. Faced with an insufficient official supply of building plots, squatting and unauthorized building activities inside and outside the municipal domain are in fact the only possible alternatives. Thus, between 1978 and 1992, fewer than 7% of plot allocation applications were successful. Today, more than 70% of the city dwellers live in unplanned residential zones.⁴⁶

In fact, the conflict between squatting and official settlement ties in with the contradiction between customary and official land laws, which is difficult to resolve. The colonial administration tried to define the position of customary law within the legal land tenure system at an early stage. On this level there was no ambiguity. The 1928 *Customary or Deemed Right of Occupancy* recognized its existence ... but only as a minor right! It fell within a different type of arbitration, that of customary authorities and district councils, confining it to the rural domain. But it was also inferior to the right established within the framework of the *Land Ordinance*; the latter had the power to revoke it in case of a double claim.⁴⁷ Any dispute was therefore automatically settled in favour of the holder of a right emanating from the *Land Ordinance*. But the severity of the law could not withstand the force of opposing claims indefinitely. A dispute brought before the courts in 1985 narrowed the gap between these two opposing legal sources. The revocation of customary rights that, until then, was implied by the simple decision to develop a residential zone, then became conditional. It was subjected thereafter to the obligation to compensate: the State (in the absence of the applicant), or the applicant (if a claim was formulated) had to provide the occupant found on the site with the value of the constructions carried out on the terrain in question. Customary law, defended by jurists who were determined that the law should move forward, had just marked a decisive point: jurisdiction finally legalized the existence of an urban creation which did not depend on State action, whether prior or parallel to the latter. From then on, arguing about a necessary convergence between planned and unplanned zones could take place within a debate that had been unquestionably dominated by a strict opposition principle for a

46 Lusugga Kironde, "Access to land by the urban poor in Tanzania: some findings from Dar es Salaam", in *Environment and Urbanization*, vol. 7, No 1, April 1995, pp. 77-95.

47 G. Mgongo Fimbo, "Incidences of Land tenure Systems on Resource Exploitation and Conservation: The Right of Occupancy System in Tanzania", in IDEP, Workshop on environment and rural Development in East Africa, 11-30 Nov. 1974, p. 63

long time.⁴⁸ It was long overdue, and as part of the population had long-since progressively occupied peripheral land, they drew support from customary law. They had built their own houses there and had finally created real residential zones with a density and a surface area equivalent to those zones that had been developed by the municipality.

II-A PERIPHERY AND ITS TERRITORIES ARE BORN

The movement towards the periphery, started by a few pioneers in the thirties, attracted a very large following during the accelerated urbanization of the fifties and sixties. It involved Manzese and Buguruni, like so many other sectors on the periphery. To the south of the city, Makaburi, Gerezani and Keko as well as Kivukoni and Kigamboni also experienced significant development immediately after the war.⁴⁹ This period marked the start of habitat expansion and densification, stimulated by the new infrastructures put in place on a hitherto abandoned periphery. The movement manifested itself by the development of informal housing, outside and inside the official town. It proved that the municipality's arbitration of land occupancy and building progress was less than perfect. The scale of the flow towards the city and the Africans' incompressible desire to put down roots despite unfavourable regulations would rival the municipality's claim of stimulating and controlling urban territorial development.

A. The driving forces behind housing development on the periphery

Accelerated population growth on the periphery occurred towards the turn of the fifties and sixties, before the concept of an urban region was born. The process was triggered by improvements to the roads network and the restructuring of industrial activities that accompanied it. The developments required the repurchase of *freehold* property titles privately held in the sectors concerned. At first, those developments were concentrated in the northern and southern parts of the city.⁵⁰ Industries that had previously run parallel to the railroad (mainly in the Chang'ombe sector), and along the Pugu road, developed in the Wazo and Kawe sectors on the Bagamoyo road to the north of the city centre. Southwards, the Kilwa road renovations preceded the development of the Temeke residential zone, which was well under control. But elsewhere municipal power and control were overtaken by a spontaneous land occupation movement that resulted in an increase in constructions on

48 The Land Act of 1999, which is more specific about the position awarded to customary law, reflects this attitude change by insisting that it should conform to the Village Land Act and by stating the revocation conditions of customary rights as well as the obligation to compensate.

49 J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam*, East African Institute of Social Research, Oxford University Press, 1963, London, N.Y., Nairobi, p.305

50 The southward extension of the city's limits, which henceforth included Temeke, was in fact decided according to industrial construction development along Pugu road (source: correspondence between the provincial and city authorities, April and May 1948).

the periphery. The development of industrial plants would profoundly change the face and role of the periphery that, by definition, was considered a rural and outlying space, and laid the foundation for a new balance between centre and periphery.⁵¹

1. Industry and the Manzese market lie westwards

Before the accelerated urbanization of the fifties, Manzese's early communities were made up of a scattered countryside population consisting of household heads who had gone back to working the land after the inconclusive experience of city dwellers living in Kariakoo. Agriculture and extensive livestock farming largely dominated. There had been at least three big farms north of the Morogoro highway: one was run by a Mkondo man from Mozambique who produced cotton in the university sector; the other two were devoted to extensive livestock farming in the Muungano sector.

Following the 1953 construction of a bridge across the Msimbazi River, little more than a kilometre west of the city-centre, Manzese was caught up in the urbanization frenzy. This late construction was as important as that of the Selander Bridge, which paved the way to Oyster Bay. Afterwards, industries were developed about ten kilometres to the west of the city-centre, including the Chinese-built Urafiki textile factory. After 1963, independence year, there was an increase in people setting themselves up in business; most of them set themselves up during that period previously and found accommodation in Kariakoo and Magomeni. Gradually, the flow of people from the country's interior ended up in Manzese without passing through these neighbourhoods.⁵²

The Dar es Salaam-Morogoro highway was resurfaced in 1974 and industrialization towards the west was reinforced by new plants set up in Sinza and Vingunguti between 1978 and 1982. Plants were being developed in Manzese as well. In 1993-4, the Morogoro highway was widened after its residents had been relocated to Boko and after the old kapok tree (*msufi* in Swahili) that had stood on the bridge's present site had been cut down. Today, the Morogoro road separates Manzese's poor neighbourhood in the north from its well-off neighbourhood (epitomized by the impressive Tip Top Hotel) in the south. In Manzese, one of the informal settlements resulting from this flood of people was named Muungano in honour of the 1964 Union between the Islands and Tanganyika.⁵³ The name was officially adopted by local representatives of the recently founded single party, the C.C.M., in 1977. However, a 1969 aerial photograph shows that settlements in the area were already dense, like the Mvuleni quarter, the western half of the Uzuri quarter, the Medizini and Mnazi Mmoja quarters and the centre of Manzese's present residential zone. Eastwards, it extended as far as Tandale and Argentina.

51 Mzizima's rural district only ceased to exist in 1975.

52 From the middle of the seventies, Chagga from Kilimanjaro who had been driven from their own region by strong demographic pressure and appreciable shortages of land, arrived on a regular basis.

53 Muungano means "union" in Swahili.

In fact, Manzese experienced the classical peri-urban countryside evolution: an industrial breakthrough, a flood of households, housing development and the revitalization of local activities. The path followed by *Mzee* Mtoro, one of Muungano's oldest residents, serves as an illustration. As early as the thirties, his father had received permission from his Zaramo neighbours to farm a piece of land in this sector. When his father died, he inherited these rights and has arbitrated 44 settlements on the land since the fifties. According to his testimony, 18 other pioneers living on adjoining "domains" followed his example. The agreement was customary in nature: it was concluded orally and the price (called the "price of respect"⁵⁴) was within reach of even the least well-off candidate. Of course, *Mzee* Mtoro had to relocate his cultivations to other peripheral sectors: first to Kigogo (two kilometres from his first plot), then to Kibaha (near the Morogoro highway) and finally to Ruvu (near the railway line, more than fifty kilometres away). But in Muungano, where his home was, he opened a bar.

For in Manzese, urbanization particularly expresses itself in a profusion of bars involving prostitution. There is nothing trivial about mentioning it here. In fact, these bars say a lot about Manzese's dominant family model at the time. In the absence of basic services like schools (the first schools date from the seventies), women and children remained in town while the men stayed alone on their newly acquired plots. Households were fragmented and building durable housing was a slow process. *Mzee* Mtoro had been farming the land inherited from his father since the beginning of the fifties, but it was only in 1970 that he could buy the first metal sheets for the roof of his Manzese house, vouched for by the invoice drawn up by his Kariakoo supplier. Of course, bars were not the only type of non-agricultural activity going on in what would become an informal suburb. *Mzee* Mtoro had built a stall with his own hands at an early stage and rented it out, first to a trader of Arab origin, as he was quick to point out.

The fact remains that Manzese's urbanity was a noisy affair. The local toponymy, which distinguishes between blocks within the Muungano quarter, bears witness to this. One of these blocks, Mbokolo, owes its name to one of the bygone bars in the area. At *Uwanja wa Fisi* (literally Place of the Hyenas), landlords were in the habit of turning back the clocks to keep the guzzlers "working" for longer! As for *Mafichoni* (literally Hiding-place), situated in the quarter next to Mvuleni, its traditions were summarized by the enigmatic smiles people flashed at me, punctuated by a few onomatopoeias well worth a linguistics thesis! Mama Mere ran the show in the area along the road, where Uzuri Street intersected with the Morogoro highway. There she kept a bar that specialized in debauchery. Then, the accursed day dawned when she was no longer able to keep her (female) regulars in check. On that day, the illustrious procession accompanying president Nyerere and his guest at the time, Haile

54 The price of respect: *Bei ya Heshima* in Swahili.

Selassie, who was on an official visit to the country, took the main Morogoro road. There is no way to describe the emotion aroused by this event. According to some accounts, upon leaving Mama Mere's, a few lovely ladies, excited by alcohol, felt the need to demonstrate their patriotic feelings. Which they did ... by improvising an unlikely dance, in scanty dress, yelling for joy, with an expressiveness that was not appreciated in the higher echelons! Mama Mere was ordered to close her establishment and forced into exile to Muungano's seedy (and less visible) areas, at a respectable distance from the road. She provided the aptly named Place of the Hyenas with an illustrious history. Other bars previously located near the present market⁵⁵ would soon follow suit.

However, one cannot play down what Manzese meant to the people who flocked in droves. Although distance from the official town (and thus from the law) encouraged these attacks on public morality (although the night life in other peri-central quarters was as immoral), the real effect involved the law, land law to be precise, and from a social viewpoint its impact was largely beneficial. Because Manzese was not close to the new activity centres created by the city, neither waiting list nor building standards, it enabled thousands of convinced people (whether neo city dwellers or not) who had decided to live in town, to earn a decent living in a decent way. *Mzee* Saidi was one of them. He settled in Manzese in the sixties; it was the fourth stage of his residential route, which had led him from Kariakoo (while he worked in the harbour) to Chang'ombe and then to Magomeni (while working for the Department of Water Affairs). In 1965, a new job in Ubongo's industrial sector prompted a last relocation, to Manzese. There, he acquired a plot and built his own house, putting an end to the uncertainty and discomfort of a tenant's life for the first time. During the same period, the perspective of permanent settlement had also motivated a certain *Fuga Mbwa*, a former hotel employee, a trader in market garden produce and a butcher in succession.

The influx of people towards Manzese was not unexpected: due to insufficient urban transport any household head with limited income was closer to his place of work. Besides, colonial and post-colonial town planners applied the same principle. The decision to create industrial units generally implied the development of new residential zones nearby, which is why the Sinza area next to the *Urafiki* industrial unit was divided into lots. Again, this spontaneous movement towards Manzese proved it was not just the municipality set up. In fact, the new activity centre stimulated two new colonization fronts: one to the north of the *Urafiki* industrial complex (Sinza, Mwenge) which progressed to the rhythm of official planning and plot creation, and an informal one to the east and to the south of this complex (Manzese). This second front, was

⁵⁵ The tradition of Manzese's bars and hotel business was significantly modernized and upgraded in the Kingston, Paris and Sunrise bars on Kingston road south of the Morogoro highway and especially in the Tip Top hotel, which replaced the Uluguru bar in 1971.

activated by a population evading land law obstacles, totally escaped municipal arbitration.

As a matter of course, the Manzese market, created in the mid-seventies, inherited the function of employing the residential population; especially because the industry was unable to absorb the extent of the demand. From the onset, it was a place to get supplies and but also a workplace where everyone came to supplement their means of survival. Much later, Muungano residents converted to light manufacturing industries as a means of attempting a new economic diversification. Many went bankrupt (*firisika* in Swahili), but some of the better-managed units succeeded in staying afloat by stocking up on grain from the wholesale market next to Muungano and acting as suppliers for the Kariakoo market. Today, these small businesses are situated along the backstreets converging towards the market place. However, the declared activities of people interviewed in Muungano show that market activity is still the main incentive for remaining in the sector. Of the 168 tenant heads of households interviewed, about 70% were engaged in local activities (mostly commerce, but also craft). Activities pertaining to industry and the harbour, representing 12% of professions declared by land-owners (of whom 111 were interviewed), occurred more frequently than those in the tenant category, but it is still a lower level than that occupied by services in general and by commerce in particular.

The seventies and eighties were marked by a surge of people towards Manzese, a movement triggered by the market opportunities on offer. It was the third of its kind, after the more discrete and limited wave of the thirties' pioneers, followed by the one that set the accelerated urbanization of the post-war years in motion culminating in the industrial development of the sixties. The market opened up rapidly as residents took the initiative and immediately monopolized it. Activities were further stimulated by the widening of the Morogoro highway, which would become a major access route to the city centre. Subsequently, the intense daily traffic made development and diversification of commercial activities more propitious there than in other parts of the city. It took over the sidewalks, stretching out in a long line, offering the street the astonishing sight of an endless stall. Within this flood of activities, one of the important market sectors in job creation for the youth is second-hand clothes. The other sectors include wholesale, spare parts and food trades offering many other forms of employment, not forgetting the trade in manufactured products (kitchen equipment, leather products, clothes, etc.). Added to this are different types of services on offer, varying in quality but corresponding to real needs; however insignificant the profession, assiduous market visits will improve chances of building up a clientele.

Notwithstanding, no job seems improvised in these surroundings; positionings and functions have a pre-distributed air about them; even the least important dealer reigns over a specific sector, however small. These

practices bear witness to concerted organisation, deserving of meticulous study and provide an account of internal, semi-official (payment of trade tax, in compliance with the initial market plan) and semi-officious regulation. Although time constraints imposed on the investigation prevented us from confirming the existence of pre-determined trading “patches” protected by groups of security guards, there are clear indications that the local supply of products and services is virtually monopolized by the residents of Manzese. Could this be the result of defensive practices or is it just a coincidence? The question remains unanswered. When we first visited the neighbourhood for survey, a “welcoming committee” made up of fairly young, well-built men was posted at crossing between Mabibo and Manzese. The display of aggression (more precisely, verbal) towards any unknown person (including Tanzanians) may suggest that access to the manna would certainly not be left to non-residential initiatives: this was an attitude of defending what was perceived as an actual territory.⁵⁶ We sounded a diplomatic retreat with feigned smiles, walking along the backstreets until we reached the main Morogoro road where the first of the “casserole queens” or official cooks (called “*Mama Nitilie*”⁵⁷ in Swahili) sat enthroned on their stools in the roadside area. Specializing in cooked meals, they put on a welcoming face as they scanned the passers-by for clients. The services sector at the market is marked by an abundance of technical assistance in any field and any time. This involves transporting goods (either by trucks, buses or display-sporting *daladala*) while the prohibitive prices of new goods makes repairing, recycling and selling live products (rendered indispensable by the absence of a refrigeration system) extremely important. The thousands of marketable local trades also include that of wheel-barrow or push-cart master, knife grinder or “three-legged cycle” champion⁵⁸, knife handler (a cut-throat of chickens with the option of plucking, or even meat mincer or disemboweller of fresh fish) or forge master manufacturing spare parts that cannot be found in the workshops. In fact, an occupation is defined *in situ* by the tool in the hands of its owner or user. The authority and the competence resulting from it are implicitly contained in the term “jobber” (“*djobeur*” in French, to quote an expression by Patrick Chamoiseau in his moving description of market hands in Martinique’s Fort de France; the post-war context described by the author presented similar difficulties⁵⁹). Here, the agent is especially a tool-

56 During our first visit, my Tanzanian guide was in fact unfamiliar with Manzese’s residential zone. As a result, we were received with, shall we say, mixed feelings? Which explains why the list of professions that follows includes that of “specialist in guiding lost researchers”: a job which is closely watched and is reserved for residents only. I played according to the rules, for efficiency and prudence’s sake. Thus the Manzese survey was conducted with the exclusive assistance of residents from the quarters concerned, as suggested by the neighbourhood authorities, while in Ilala and Bungeni it was only after several days of interviewing people, for the sake of convenience and without having been harassed in the interim that I turned to them.

57 “Mama nitilie” can be translated as “Mom, give me some”; these female cooks offer hot dishes to passers-by an improved reference these days is “Mama/Baba Lishe”.

58 According to the Swahili expression, the *baiskeli ya miguu tatu* or *maguta* is a three-legged cycle which makes it possible to operate the grindstone.

59 Patrick Chamoiseau, *Chronique des sept misères*, Gallimard, 0.221p, 1986.

master (*mwenye* in Swahili, literally “the one who is with”), and he is referred to by this tool. Therefore the wheelbarrow pusher who more often pulls it (*mkokocheni*) or the one who pulls the push-cart (*buta*) is primarily a *Mwenye mikokocheni* or a *Mwenye buta*. The meat cutter is a *Mwenye kisu*, “he who is a knife master”; ditto for the knife-grinder with his grindstone (*kinoleo*) who operates his *maaguta* (or *baiskeli ya miguu tatu*: three-legged cycle) on which he remains perched the whole day, pedalling all the while!

The tool specialist differs from the vendor or *mwuuzaji* who sits in front of his stall and sells his merchandise. Any so-called “table-owner” forms part of this group, in the same way as the *Mama Nitilie*, the official “casserole queens”. From their spot near the market displays, they provide clients with a meal and a seat at the table, which, in some cases, also provides shelter from the elements. The same applies to the medicine stockists whose tablet-filled jars without labels, in close proximity to the other displays, are exposed to sunlight for hours on end.

The uncertainty remains for those who are not established: the street peddlers without tools or a marked workplace, who sell their labour or small quantities of a reduced number of products to passers-by, are found next to the established “table-owners” (they are seated at a table, and therefore established). This is the realm of the carriers promoted to strongmen of the school of chores, spectacularly muscular and sweaty, with powerful lungs and legs, and who have a following of young admirers. The ‘criers’ belong to the same category. They associate with a certain vendor and product, exercising their resounding talents as comperes and publicists, sellers of second-hand clothes or anything else, just shouting for the pleasure of it or especially to disturb public peace. The more discrete sellers of *chapati* or grilled cassava trade directly, like the second-hand plastic bag dealers or the *Daily News* collectors. They watch out for clients in search of wrapping and become “packer-wrappers” on request, sometimes in association with one of the traders. As for the most mobile sellers of all, the famous *Jua Kali*⁶⁰ spend the whole day in the sun (hence the name), carrying their goods in their arms and mostly operating as a group, specializing in the re-sale of some mysterious machine or other.

But there is also a more serious type of roaming which takes the shape of derisory, improvised tasks: selling lost property, looking for the right change, pointing out buses, pretending to be a body-guard or an alleyway-guide who specializes in guiding researchers who have lost their way. These deceptive members of the working population sometimes switch to activities not easily confessed, such as guarding the ancient tradition of stealing or being experts at hunting tourists. Thus, the superactivity of the market is also the consequence of idle citizens in search of some quick cash. When tasks are limited, they are all the more precarious. At the same time, splitting up activities makes it possible to increase the number of money-earners. In this sense, it is a reflection of

60 “Jua kali”: the sun is beating down!

work and resource-sharing: the role-players are linked by economic solidarity. It is solidarity with its own rules, including market positioning which can be deduced through observation.

The local job market is therefore essentially characterized by ultra-specialized functions, the infinity of which is equalled by the exuberance of the supply. It generally combines with job uncertainty, the status of tenant being one of the most visible signs. For those involved, setting up in Manzese seems merely a temporary solution while waiting to reach the ultimate state of security or of property ownership, if at all. To describe the life city dwellers dream about, one would first have to lay down the four corners of a private construction. This is any tenant's ideal; it was also that of the suburban pioneers of the 1930's. At the time, the availability of land made it possible for these pioneers to fulfil their dream of building their own house, because the only limitation was the ability to acquire building materials. But the last to arrive found only rooms to rent; denied access to owner privileges such as property income, they were compelled to pay rent. Today, the densification of constructed areas and urban expansion have pushed agriculture back to more distant frontiers, increasingly complicating access to this other resource that was available to the pioneers. Between Magomeni and Ilala, the agricultural land of Kigogo is a rare exception within Dar es Salaam's urban area and the dream to build is more justified than ever. In these conditions, it is not unexpected that the possibility of relocation translates into a promise of housing and this is not experienced at all as coercion. Therefore whatever the residential zone, the tenant category must be considered a drifting population group. Investigations in Muungano revealed that their strong predominance within the resident community constitutes a source of instability that weakens Manzese's social corpus.

2. Buguruni and urban transport dynamics

Where have all the little huts in the "Buguruni" suburb gone? This is translated literally from the Zaramo language, which preserves the memory of its pioneers. [It has] gone to the straight lines of modern architecture and to perfectly smooth, cemented walls in order to survive the renewal of time and the alternating seasons. All that remains is a model of the layout of these constructions, founded on the principle of buildings which face each other, which is somewhat unexpected in such close proximity to the rows of houses along the parallel streets of Ilala. Buguruni, originally a small Zaramo hamlet, developed on the doorstep of the city and of colonial planning and the built-up areas were in fact freely conceived by those who occupied these spaces.

One of Buguruni's pioneers, born in Kisutu in 1898, was still watching over it a century and one year later. In the course of the interview he granted me between spells of weariness and drowsiness, Mzee Malapa introduced himself as Mohamedi Afandi Abdalazizi Achimboko Anamalapa. He settled in Buguruni after having spent his youth working for the colonial police force;

he said nothing in this regard, except that he was proud to have kept the title of Afendi. The name Malapa (from “*anamalapa*” in Swahili, meaning “has shoes”) was given to him locally because of his travels and distant origins. Born into the Zulu traditions of South Africa, he kept his father’s clan name of Achimboko; his father had died during the interwar years. He had retained enduring ties with Bagamoyo, the city where his mother was born, ties that were strengthened by his own marriage with a native from the same city. These ties opened up the way to the peri-urban countryside of Dar es Salaam. Indeed, his uncle on his mother’s side, a landowner in what was to become Buguruni, encouraged him to secure the land rights by settling there. It was the early forties and a few herds had taken shelter in Buguruni. As he grazed the herds in the humid bush grass, he kept an eye open on the upheavals in the city in such close proximity to its first suburbs. Acting on the hunch that new clients would very likely be arriving, he wasted no time in opening a bar next to the road, while continuing to watch over his livestock and land. Mnyamani and Madenge, also from the coast, soon settled in the sector. On their respective domains, they both welcomed all those displaced, common-class individuals who had been rejected by the official city. The arrival of people increased during the fifties and so did the housing blocks, which were built in what was gradually becoming one of Dar es Salaam’s informal suburbs. In the mid-fifties, the municipality paid for the digging of a canal, thus isolating Ilala from the Buguruni informal settlement.

Although Malapa peacefully managed those settlements, which would become the Buguruni Makaburini⁶¹ quarter, also called Buguruni *kwa* (= at the house of) Malapa, Madenge had a few brushes with land laws and lost control over some of his land. In fact, he had authorized a certain Daya, a member of an influential Indian family in Dar es Salaam, to settle on land that would later become the Bungoni quarter (integrated into Ilala’s residential zone and separated from Buguruni by the canal). Although Malapa peacefully managed those settlements, which would become the Buguruni Makaburini quarter, also called Buguruni *kwa* (= at the house of) Malapa, Madenge had a few brushes with land laws and lost control over some of his land. In fact, he had authorized a certain Daya, a member of an influential Indian family in Dar es Salaam, to settle on land that would later become the Bungoni quarter (integrated into Ilala’s residential zone and separated from Buguruni by the canal). According to the oral contract, hence the dispute, the beneficiary’s only right was to work the land. However, Daya had this right of *freehold* and around 1957, he was allowed to create a Daya Estate, according to the accounts of some of the old residents from the sector who still remembered the case. Daya proceeded to put stands up for sale, a step contested by Madenge. Then, the latter also started selling plots within the area he considered having exclusive arbitration. Finally, towards the mid-sixties, the case was brought

61 Makaburini: in the cemetery; the cemetery was indeed in close proximity to his house.

before the courts and was not settled in favour of either of them, because private and unlimited land ownership was not recognized by an independent Tanzania: the State had requisitioned the entire domain, to put its stands up for sale and control building activities in this sector, without offering to pay any compensation. This arbitration gave birth to the Bungoni quarter in 1973, where the first legal constructions got underway near the railway line. Buguruni households, who had been displaced from the new Uhuru Street route, were the first to be accommodated. However squatter shacks also started appearing because it was close to the centre, and Bungoni offered easy access to the city centre with all its activities, a relevant detail to those candidates looking for integration into the urban economy.

Buguruni gradually found itself once again at the junction of vital arteries serving the city and the large periphery due to the housing and transport development: a strategic position which led to a boom in local employment and in construction, of course. According to statistics provided by local authorities, Buguruni accommodated 72,000 residents in 1998, which included 11,100 people in the Buguruni *kwa* Malapa quarter alone. At the time of this survey, transport and catering were obviously very dynamic, turning the bus station into the residential zone's principal centre of activity, with the incessant squeaking of tyres, roaring of engines and cries from apprentices.

Here, traffic can catch its breath again and take a break from the city's panting respiration, between reckless trips up the coast and nervous city centre links. All day long, criers haul themselves up against car doors like human flags, ragged shirts flapping in the wind, knocking on the bodywork with their palms, making the sheet metal sing. Hailing the fares, they announce the next epic journey, yelling its final destination and swearing that there are still seats available, that there are still more seats available, that there will always be available seats, even if it involves squeezing in between two passengers sitting back to back or under someone's arm-pit, or being drenched in sweat before the vehicle moves off. Promises kept while looking those blessed passengers in the face, besides, *twende dadangu!*⁶² At the junction between the outer and intermediate periphery, subjected to waiting while the cars fill up, the unlikely backwash of departing vehicles together with the ferocity of the arrivals, give rhythm to the bus route life. Situated between the ever more densely populated city and its increasingly widely spread out suburbs, Buguruni is a vital stopover and an intersection serving the west, the south, the city centre and the hinterland. Its status is confirmed by the surge of arrivals and departures at regular intervals, its pendular curvature and rush hour frenzy. At the same time, on the other side of the bus station, the bustle of the traffic provides a living for about two hundred "cook-shops" officially registered at "Buguruni station". It brings in clients, fans the flames, feeds the fire under pots containing the *Mama Nitilie's* simmering dishes on offer,


62 Twende dadangu: Let's go, sister!

which keep them, devoted. During the short stops, cutlery clinks on tables draped in plastic, noisy conversations are followed by famished silences under the metal sheet shelters as clients take their seat for a *supu*, a *chipsi mayai* or a *wali kuku*.⁶³ Between arrivals, departures and an equal measure of eagerness, the bus station provides food for thousands of starving passengers. There was no time to investigate the “casserole queens”, their “cook-shops” or their clientele, but transport is probably the driving force behind the local economic activity, which can certainly encourage settlements and stimulate expansion and housing densification, as it did in Manzese.

Meanwhile, on an urban scale, the developed area between the centre and the outer periphery that is currently becoming urbanized was profoundly transformed. In the past, it was made up of small population groups living far apart; the centre and its adjoining residential zones formed an individualized whole separate from the other developing suburbs (Manzese, Buguruni). Subsequently, the influx of new households overflowing into the interstitial spaces gradually disrupted this multi-noduled structure. This structure steadily coalesced into an endless stretch of dwellings. The Manzese and Buguruni examples show that Dar es Salaam’s urban spread resulted from the meeting of different colonization fronts, boosted by the centre and by housing units developing on the periphery at an early stage.

63 Supu: soup / Wali kuku: rice and chicken / chipsi mayai: omelet and chips.

Figure 11: Formation of the residential cover Longitudinal cut along the Morogoro highway from the city centre to Manzese



3. UNCERTAINTY PERSISTS: THE RENTAL SYSTEM VERSUS THE NEED TO SET UP HOUSE

The increase in centres of economic activity is a recent phenomenon that makes the question of urban transport a crucial one, but the lodging crisis weakens the least solvent members of society to become a permanent feature of Dar es Salaam's history. In this context, there were two urban regulation modes in operation.⁶⁴ The first was regulation by means of recourse to customary law

⁶⁴ Here, according to Robert Boyer's definition, regulation mode is understood as a dynamic process for adjusting imbalances and implementing a set of individual and collective procedures and attitudes. It reproduces social relations while supporting the current accumulation policy. Roger Boyer, "Aux origines de la théorie de la régulation", in *Théorie de la régulation. L'état des savoirs*, La Découverte, 1995, p.568

or *squatting*, as illustrated by the example of Manzese that, on occasion, proved its ability to resolve those contradictions intrinsic to the city's social role players. In fact, in Manzese, the conflict between the desire of groups closest to the seat of power for exclusive and personal reservation of the available space, and the desire of the poorest of the poor for their share of that space on the other, resulted in a provisional solution. Within Dar es Salaam as a whole, Manzese has become an area of compromise *par excellence*, absorbing urban poverty by freeing itself from the rules defined by land laws and offering the first residents the possibility of social advancement. Building ownership was one of the means of this advancement. It enabled owners to rent out rooms in their house and therefore benefit from the extra source of revenue. This was an advantage in the sixties and seventies context of economic insecurity and accelerated urbanization, a time when the time-honoured idea of agriculture as a support system was beginning to lose ground. Thus Manzese, a space of compromise on an urban scale, also became a place of increased economic prosperity, a veritable springboard for some of its residents, in particular those who were most active in professions involving trade as well as the owners themselves.

The rental system not only served owners' interests, it was also useful to urban regulation as a second mode of integrating those who were excluded from property sharing into the city. The rental system replaced recourse to squatting wherever real estate became saturated, since it invented the necessary space for new settlements within developed sites. As early as 1967, more than 70% of Dar es Salaam's population was made up of tenants,⁶⁵ thus providing a solution to the integration needs of the most desperate migrants. Today, as illustrated by the Muungano, Bungoni and Ilala quarters, there is no need to demonstrate the efficiency of the room rental system within the Swahili house: two thirds of the interviewed residents are tenants. This regulation mode translated into the veiled densification of these neighbourhoods: its capacity for absorbing the housing demand is therefore huge, particularly in Manzese.

The typical Swahili house had to be adjusted to some extent for this to happen: the main building was divided into independent rooms, which simultaneously led to the disappearance of the family sitting-room; the back courtyards, formerly reserved for the residential community, were taken over by other rooms to let; lastly, the front canopies which provided shelter for sociable neighbours also disappeared, and were replaced by shops and craftsmen's workshops, also to let. The Swahili house therefore offered space for accommodation and commercial activities, proving itself to be very suitable as a response to urgent social needs. In addition, the rental system proved to be a model of flexibility, offering different housing standards (from the height of luxury to makeshift) at varying prices and adaptable to everyone's need for space (the number of rooms available to each family is adjustable); it also

65 G. Mgongo Fimbo, Double allocation of urban plots: a legal labyrinth, citizen puzzlement and nightmare, The Law Association of Tanzania, Text of public lecture, Central Library, 3 Sept. 1988, p.24

harmonized the variability of each tenant's stay (rent may be paid per month, per quarter, per semester or even per year, according to the owner's rules).

Rent remains comparable from one residential zone to another. The system's most surprising result is probably the diversity of its comfort levels and rent for same type rooms within the same neighbourhood. These variations may be explained by the unequal comfort levels in close vicinity and the state of the building when compared to the infrastructures in place. Differentiation criteria take on various forms: the quality of the construction work (cement or *makuti*), the finishing (paint, false ceilings), access to water and electricity supply networks, the distance to the main roads and the public transport stops, and lastly the distance to the Manzese market. The rental system integrated and capitalized on the buildings' quality variations and accessibility to open up to the wide range of city dwellers' living standards. Its efficiency in including households previously excluded from sharing in urban real estate is borne out by the length of stay. Sometimes, a long stay equals the time during which an individual rented accommodation in the same residential zone or quarter or Swahili house. The perpetuation of settlements within a rental framework is one of the feats of the system, and proves its ability to offer society's most impoverished members the chance of urban stabilization: the cost depending on a landlord. Tenants usually dream of acquiring property in town (except when they have plans of going back to their birthplace). Also, renting is only a short or medium-term commitment. It is linked to the promise of mobility, which is even incited by the desire for promotion. However, this stability is relative because paying rent drastically reduces their budget and prevents them from having the extra income. Furthermore, when people are down on their luck, finding money to cover the rent can be distressing even to the detriment of other equally vital expenses. When tenant status endures, it has to be viewed as persistent precariousness and an obstruction in the mode of access to the land market within the city.

Today, access to land in all its forms (Law laws, Customary rights) still constitutes the main constraint to the local urban regulation mode; it suggests that land for building purposes is of prime value, as it ensures accommodation and guarantees that residents will settle in town, while allowing them a measure of progress. This is a permanent feature of Dar es Salaam's history. For several decades, the Manzese zone was the poor man's Eldorado, offering him a chance to settle, acquire property and build. Today it still absorbs urban poverty, but it no longer offers the possibility of building on its soil. Although market activity allows some of society's most destitute members to live there, promotion by means of property acquisition has been blocked. For its residents, any hope of changing their status locally seems impossible, thus condemning tenants to accept their status or move to sectors where land reserves are still available. It could also condemn Manzese to perpetual precariousness, until it is dominated by it. The latter possibility involves the risk of inciting those of

its residents who have “made it”, to turn to other residential zones. Significant owner absenteeism suggests that the temptation to leave is already a reality. It indicates an onset tendency to disinvest in what had been a coveted space for a long time. The drift towards speculation is another reality: It expresses itself in multiple ownerships and renting out houses whereby rented houses are used to finance the construction of a second residence. The extent to which certain owners live in rented houses or with a relative while waiting for a new house to be built in another residential zone where they plan to settle. After having been a major integration zone, Manzese may become little more than a springboard for owners, bold entrepreneurs and traders, and the temporary refuge of society’s least fortunate members: merely a stopover on the city dweller’s residential route. Twenty years after Manzese’s integration into Dar es Salaam’s urban sphere, the above-mentioned realities are marking a turning point in its history: that of social differentiation and rampant precariousness.

In the meantime, the process of territorial formation had taken its course. Territorial alchemy had found the indispensable ingredients of its composition in a local issue or common ambition. The hard-core resident owners and local representatives tried taking advantage of it by organizing a collective demand and working on developing a social consensus.

B. From inhabited space to territory

Collective demand can be viewed as the natural culmination of any community formation. Bearing in mind Dar es Salaam’s history of grouping people together, residential zones and quarters should constitute *a priori* the most solid support base for social and political mobilisation and provide the greatest claims potential, as suggested by the Manzese case in particular. During the sixties and seventies, maintaining the zone’s established households was an act of politics, part of the dissidence with regard to established land laws and denounced by the authorities as a squatting movement. To what extent did residential and professional forms of cohabitation stemming from this experience and that of other residential zones give rise to territorialized communities who were able to mobilize around collective projects?

1. Local employment as a foundation of territoriality: verifying a hypothesis

In Manzese and Buguruni, the market and bus station meet a need to survive and have created a local issue where, previously, it was just a matter of distance in relation to the city: these spaces have become the principle instruments of social reproduction, with considerable impact. Hence, the Manzese market provided the foundation stone for the centrality needed for organizing the available space. Because residents gravitate towards these spaces everyday, it reaffirms their centrality, which operates as a redistribution point. This is illustrated by the secondary activities (such as processing and craft industry)

displayed and crystallized in the reticular roads structure converging towards it, and the redistribution of values produced by commercial activities amongst the population. In Muungano, the central role reserved for the market contrasts with the current marginalisation of places associated with alcoholism and prostitution. This marginalization is not only geographic (seedy bars are moved to the quarter's fringes) but also economic (there is a gap between these activities and the type of trade which has recently emerged) and social (their social actors and regular clients are maintained in a sphere of celibacy). Thus, the economic revival made it possible to structure the available space, which now boasts a centre, a market, a peri-central suburb of mixed functions (residential, commercial and productive) and a periphery which differs from the rest by its strict specialization in either a residential function (rendered unsafe by the threat that its fringes may be inundated) or the discredited universe of prohibition.

Before the market, Manzese's only landmarks had been its seedy bars and prostitution houses, elements that did not contribute to the structure of the inhabited space. Their impact was both limited and ephemeral. Rumour associated the saucy reputation of these places with Manzese's established population, confirming a geographical vagueness that matched the marginality imposed on an originally isolated quarter. This association reflected a situation of territorial void following the residents' exclusion from the urbanistic project that the authorities had worked out. The Manzese zone was something of an anti-territory recognizable by its absence of auto-designation, like the Soweto of Dar es Salaam! By default of urban integration, it was made up of parts belatedly baptized by its residents. The Muungano quarter that emerged from it serves as a good illustration. Manzese went from a state of non-place, an expanse with imprecise contours, a zone that stood apart from the official territory (the city and its initial centre), to that of a space that had been objectified by a centrality conceived from within. This centrality, embodied by the market and validated by residents' repeated commercial and ambulatory practices (whether they are close residents or not) is a matter of custom-instituted practicality. It was heralded by the increasing widespread use of the trade professions during the pivotal years of the seventies and eighties. The recurrent evocation of the market, as a place of economic activity, today reveals that there is collective support and that a strong consensus has been built around it.⁶⁶

Thus it would seem that, in Manzese, identity feeds on commercial functions established on the sites where these activities take place. It is apparently based on residents' exacting and at times disastrous economic dependence on the market. In a way, the history of the market carries with it the chronology of what will eventually become a collective identification, triggered by the population's widespread trade activities, gradually grafted by

66 *Unafanya kazi gani? / Nipo sokoni!* What do you do for a living? I work at the market!

thousands of adjoining professions. Through a sense of belonging (while laying claim to appropriation), identification could lead to a sense of patrimony, a decisive step along the attractive but extremely complex road to territoriality. Because Manzese's market is more than just a place of trade, it could therefore encompass an identity potential, a source of connections that cement a group together and enable it to evolve from a simple collection of scattered personalities struggling for survival to a united community casting itself into its living space. A detailed investigation about past and present players involved in this market would be needed in order to verify such a process. For now, it can be established as evidence that there is broad, internal recognition of this centrality in practice. It shows the emergence of an inner eye, perceiving and organizing the space around it, guiding daily, individual strategies and itineraries. By means of its rallying power and ability to create collective support, Manzese's market is achieving results that, on a similar scale, would seem inaccessible elsewhere. Residential zones with a similar coherence are indeed a rare occurrence. Oyster Bay and Upanga, are examples of this occurrence, thanks to their own, peculiar unifying functions: leisure activities within a private club framework as far as the former is concerned, and schools plus Indian cultural associations as regards the latter. Connections between the quarters in Ilala's residential zone (including the quarter which is also called Ilala) seem artificial, despite having been formalized by an impressive seat of administration.

Parallel to its internal structuring, prompted by the market, a process of repositioning within an urban space is taking place in which Manzese is engaging in a polarisation exercise on a novel scale. In certain domains of specialization (agricultural products, second-hand clothing and spare parts) Manzese's own markets exercise an attraction contradicting the marginality that previously sullied the area's reputation. The reception given to migrants is characteristic of the image improvement on an urban scale. They can be accommodated directly, without a detour via those residential quarters closest to the former centre, because of the considerable supply of rooms to let. For now, marginality resulting from distance and erstwhile rurality has been transformed into a strategic position within the city, providing a source of substantial rent which benefits all landlords, absentee or not, provided they possess buildings suitable for subdivision and substantial accommodation capacity. The employment opportunities offered by the scope in trade, this open door leading to improvised survival, are directly linked to this promotion. Manzese has become an ideal destination for low-class neo-city dwellers: the local supply of rooms to let gives access to the commercial benefit with its concomitant unreliability. Because of this, it would seem that the former city centre is now being marginalized by Manzese, hence the terms of the original disparities are reversed on occasions.

Manzese could therefore be defined as a fortuitous meeting-place of individual intentions in search of a means of survival; this explains their

foothold in temporary arrangements and their convergence on the same source of cash: the market. Social relations are formed around certain places (schools, health services, places of prayer). Manzese manages to find fulfilment in the constant renewal of its population, making it difficult to analyse its territorial formation. Can one talk about territory when there is no stable social body? Basically, can a territory shape itself according to its one permanent feature, the ritual of inhabitants passing through? Manzese's originality lies in the course of this ritual of 'passing through'; a population settles down which was initially attracted by trade. Throughout this ritual, a sense of belonging is forged, as intense as that boasted by established communities. The market income becomes crucial, arousing greed so that the residential group gradually substitutes their reason for living. Thus the population's fixation on this aspect succeeds in creating a territory experienced in the present, albeit short-lived and stimulated by the sole desire to make money, merely greed thinly disguised as collective history; a temporary territory periodically renewing its social stock, living on continuous undertakings. Therefore Manzese possesses an invariant that forms the basis of its existence: a marketplace patrimonialized for the sake of a thousand practices and where consensus is tacitly reached.

Today, Manzese's territorial reality is formalized by the administrative division. This distinguishes it from the adjoining residential zones, and a political framework that has become effective throughout the residential area and its neighbourhoods with the installation of a C.C.M. party antenna and as a result of the daily activities of its representatives. Thus each of Manzese's neighbourhoods is linked to a local government cell. Territorial divisions of a social nature are further strengthened by other local structures: Manzese has three primary schools, several places of worship and cemeteries north of the main Morogoro road. Within these neighbourhoods, the smallest community is made up of a neighbourhood unit supervised by a *jumbe wa nyumba kumikumi*: one representative for every ten houses, literally, but in theory the representative is responsible for more than this. It is also worth mentioning that Manzese's official division does not exactly match the picture in its residents' minds. For example, Tandale, which forms a separate ward within the Kinondoni district, is still called Manzese-Tandale.⁶⁷ Subsequent investigations will probably enable researchers to establish whether this designation is symbolic, or stems from associative practices and whether the aim is social, economic or political. It is nevertheless the commercial cohabitation, which is open almost exclusively to people living in greater Manzese (thus including Tandale), that strengthens the hypothesis that communities and territories form around local employment. Occasionally, formation transcends administrative divisions, which are themselves created after the event.

67 In the 1988-census, 58,413 people were counted in Tandale.

In spite of this, a possible collective future without questioning its adequacy in relation to the urgent individual needs cannot be envisaged. From an economic point of view, the instability of the households complicates the interpretation of settlement perpetuation, which (despite people's departures) can be observed in the property market and within the context of rented accommodation. The cramped accommodation, the quest to survive the daily (and at times pathetic) hustle and bustle is a constant reminder of one of the social edifice's extreme fragility, made up as it is of an uninterrupted multiplication of households. Also, in a context where the employment structure within each residential zone reduces the supply to a limited number of activities and where transport costs are high, the cost of individual and professional promotion is generally that of successive relocations. Thus, residential mobility and economic promotion are closely linked, the latter being determined by the former. These vital strategies turn the city into a temporary space-time collection where city dwellers' socio-economic trajectories are divided into an equal number of stages and successive settlements. These observations lead to questions about the nature of the situation being created by any grouping within the city. If the semblance of a community masks contradictory intentions, resistance to individuality or fundamental instability, what perspective can the settlement act draw in terms of city dwellers' social or political investment in their residential space? What is territory on this scale used for, and who benefits from it? What are its residents searching for? What promptings are they responding to?

2. Territory as a political argument: mobilization and inertia on an infra-urban scale

Within the city's fifty-two residential zones, the population is supervised by one representative for every ten houses, the famous *wajumbe wa nyumba kumi-kumi* or *ten cells units* (the number ten is theoretical, in practice it is much higher) who fall under local government. Through them, official information is conveyed to residents and the latter formulate specific demands. Despite the fact that a multi-party system was established in the country, the supervision has kept the political complexion of the former one-party system, the C.C.M.⁶⁸ if only because its agents are affiliated to this party. Of course, their daily actions, proximity to and familiarity with the residents consolidate the C.C.M.'s influence. But behind the partisan discourse accordingly asserting itself on a local level, another equally important issue is emerging: the representation and defence of owners' interests, which has its use in a context where tenants make up the majority of the population. The supervision system is therefore exploited for two reasons.

The investigation has shown that the representative office is often granted to former occupants, owners by definition, or even to people who let furnished

68 C.C.M.: Chama Cha Mapinduzi or Revolution Party.

rooms. It is the case particularly of those pioneers who are still living in the Muungano quarter currently. This infiltration has proven profitable on more than one account. Firstly, the effect is symbolic, as this role confirms elders' moral authority and guardianship over the social group they gave birth to and over the "territorial undertaking" being fulfilled as the settlements advance. Because they personify the group's origins, they serve as active intermediaries in supervising the population and may be perceived as an element of social cohesion. They are living monuments to local history, a significant factor in the absence of other references. However the power of supervision also has physical implications: Representatives intervene in registration procedures pertaining to plots and building allocations in their sector. That's why, the drift towards speculation (multiple property development, absenteeism amongst certain owners who rent out their entire house, leaving it to close relatives or debtors to keep a watch in their absence) cannot merely be considered as the result of private, isolated initiatives. It is maintained by a certain transaction control system. Nevertheless, speculative practices are nothing new. During the investigation, examples were reported of people who were able to buy several houses in the Ilala quarter in the eighties before reselling them and leaving the area: quite an achievement which, in the light of the property supply scarcity, is cause for surprise. Access to property is subjected to the spreading of information regarding supply thus the strategic nature of a representative's office can be assessed. In addition, since owners become local representatives it makes it possible to neutralize any claim emanating from the tenants, particularly regarding questions of maintenance or the renovation of rented buildings. Certain landlords should be sued for the deteriorated state of the accommodation they are renting out, and yet they are not. The Muungano quarter has quite a few of these buildings where the roof caved in while tenants were still living in them. Despite this, access to the office of representative is not blocked by the owners. One of the local representatives we met in Muungano was the head of a family, not even 40, and just an ordinary tenant but also an active member of the C.C.M., which could serve as a strategy for acquiring urban property.

The representatives' action is of paramount importance in the sense that, at any given moment, households are reminded that, whatever their personal plans, they belong to a territorial community. In the Muungano quarter, owners were encouraged to ask that their stands and houses be registered so as to secure their rights. These acts could enable residents avoid the application of measures forcibly removing residents from informal settlements as announced in the 1968 urban development plan and thus protect the community as a whole. Thanks to the Bungoni quarter's supervision, a collective claim was organized for the municipality to accept financial responsibility for repair work on the drainage canal separating Bungoni from the Buguruni residential zone. Every year during the rainy season it overflowed, flooding residents'

houses. The mobilisation was so effective (a residents committee was formed, a delegation was even sent to the president) that President Mwinyi visited Bungoni in his official capacity (1995) and in 1996 and work was started. Unfortunately, the expected objective was not reached: funds allocated for the restoration of the canal proved insufficient, and the work that was indeed carried out did not stop the flooding. Nevertheless, collective action had gotten under way. It was fully motivated by the risk of insalubrities and the effects thereof on residents' health. It was also justified by the threat that housing, including tenant housing, would deteriorate.

On the other hand, Bungoni's mosque-building scheme, which several renowned people claimed as their own, proved to have much less public support. In contrast to the previous project, it was more symbolic and the implications were more of a political nature, whereas they were physical in the case of the canal. Considering the relative proximity of the Ilala mosque attended by Bungoni's Muslims at the moment, there is hardly any other justification for the project other than the ambition of the local prominent people to clearly dissociate themselves from the Ilala quarter. Bungoni has the double handicap of being Ilala's appendage and Uhuru's annex. It does not seem to exist on its own: there is no market, school, place of worship, or local employment except for a small, embryonic trade. The lack of services has the effect of dispersing the local population for their livelihood. Residents effectively have to leave Bungoni to stock up on supplies, send their children to school, pray and work. The neighbourhood's lack of consistency is obviously transferred to its representatives who, as a result, have nothing to either defend or promote, hence their obstinacy regarding this project, formulated as early as the mid-eighties and submitted to the municipality on numerous occasions. Its objective seems fundamentally linked to politics and identity. In fact, the religious claim expresses an ambition to create a territory and (their own) power structure in what is now nothing more than a vague transitional space between two neighbouring entities. Having a rallying place in Bungoni at last would kick-start the process of building a community identity and would be beneficial to them. It must be emphasized that the local population hardly identifies with either the project or the symbols being promoted by the local notaries. The majority of the population knows nothing about the conflict that pitted Daya against Madenge and marked the birth of the neighbourhood; to them, Daya is just the name of an Indian who used to own land in this sector, and Madenge is the name of a Zaramo family from the surrounding area. This absence of unifying symbols is indicative of an identity crisis with political impact. If the local population says yes to salubriousness and public hygiene, one may ask what use territory on such a scale would be to them? There can be no question of a territory if consensus has not been created around it.

This is exactly where Muungano's strength lies, as well as that of Manzese's residential zone in a broader sense. When it comes to building community

spirit here, one should not underestimate the role of the societal fringe and the ghetto image. For a long time, Manzese's residents shared the destiny of a marginalized zone. That's the community survival idea, which was first established when they were faced with eviction threats, but is now motivated by local employment. As a result, local notables do not feel the need for recourse to other arguments to justify themselves. Manzese and Muungano exist as territories because they survived everything. Their legitimacy, and consequently, that of their notables (pioneers, local government members) is rooted in this premise. Thus, the fact that society's memory is resolutely anchored in the short stretch of recent history, the market poses no problem at all. Indeed, most residents have no knowledge of history's preceding stages as witnessed by the pioneers: the time of the Zaramo villages, of pioneers cultivating their fields for the urban market and settling in what was then peri-urban countryside, the time of the bars, and of the very first restorations. Society has a fragmented memory with little structure that is unequally perceived and heard by residents. Here, within territorial legitimation, daily experiences outweigh other reference points in local history. Also, strengthened by a strategic position between the inner and outer periphery and by commercial strength, these quarters may unashamedly demand to be rehabilitated. That's why the canal linking Uzuri and Muungano was dug in 1975.⁶⁹ The canal separating the Muungano quarter from the Tandale residential zone dates back from 1985 and In 1999, construction work began on a new, state-financed canal. If, in Manzese, the image of a ghetto linked to delinquency is a persistent one, and if the complicated disorder of the building pattern curbs other vague desires to intervene, it is not because the neighbourhood does not have a life of its own.

In fact, the Buguruni, Ilala and Muungano experience proves that city dwellers have a wonderful capacity for coming up with appropriate answers to their physical needs. By developing construction and speeding up urban expansion in passing; by the creation of jobs at local community level, enabling everyone to draw a regular income from local resources and to bypass the constraints of urban transport; by generalizing the system of rented accommodation in Swahili houses and, also by means of this highly flexible residential system, creating an alternative to accessing housing by means of private property, plus providing a solution to the saturation of the property market; and lastly, by forming themselves into communities and resorting to the territorial argument in their claims for improved well-being.

But it would be simplistic to limit oneself to the physical problems of urban integration. Social ties are an important aspect of integration in a culturally diverse context, with its implications of isolation and loss of points of reference for the individual. Neighbourhood relations are a feasible form of social connection. Who are Dar es Salaam's social actors? An essential

69 People who were displaced during construction work were resettled in Sinza.

source of information can be found in the communal components within residential zones and quarters, the forms of sociability that stimulate them and the identities that emerge from them. But there are multiple forms of sociability and each one defines its own particular context and achievement scales. That's why they cannot be reduced to neighbourhood relations and the context determined by settlement structures. In fact, in order to broach the question of the spatial dimensions of social connections, one should invert the terms of the equation linking space to a social group. One could quote Xavier Piolle's analysis according to which "*Territoriality does not constitute the group, it works the other way round*", although the group "*is not a given, but has to be built up*".⁷⁰ Where and on what scale are social relations built up in Dar es Salaam, and what is the basis for forging city dwellers' identity? These two questions cannot be evaded. Territoriality's achievement scale also depends on them.

III- INDIVIDUAL INTEGRATION WITHIN A CONTEXT OF MIXITY

The originality of Dar es Salaam's social model is pitted against structuring set up by the Swahili civilization within the coastal city framework and stemming from the colonial model. The Dar es Salaam model is characterized by great mixity and specific forms of cohabitation favouring the emergence of a particularly flexible urban culture. Far removed from the colonial city's segregated centre and fed by the country's diverse populations, the periphery was the place where social improvisation was achieved as migrants arrived⁷¹. It was developed and applied on a neighbourhood scale (the street, the famous "Swahili house" and even on a resident household level); the resulting model and the cultural values it generates are truly novel. So much so that the essential Zaramo elements are sometimes difficult to detect and that, for now, Swahili-ness has swapped its ancient garb for something better suited to Dar es Salaam's sociological reality.

A. Cultural diversity versus Swahili and colonial social models

From an early stage, groups from the Morogoro, Utete and Bagamoyo region joining the large contingents of immigrants to Dar es Salaam had followed the same coastal road, which, according to Leslie, had brought Sultan Majid's slaves to his new plantations.⁷² To the south from Kilwa, the main road had a history of carrying the influx of immigrants. It showed the way to populations with a lot in common: the Swahili language and culture, Islam

70 "Ce n'est pas la territorialité qui constitue le groupe mais l'inverse"; "n'est pas donné mais à construire". Xavier Piolle, "Proximité géographique et lien social, de nouvelles formes de territorialité?", in *L'espace géographique*, 4, 1991, pp. 349-358.

71 Leslie's sample listed 67 of Tanzania's 113 ethnic groups. Added to it were nationals from Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Congo and the former Rhodesia.

72 J.A.K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam*, East African Institute of Social Research, Oxford University Press, 1963, London, N.Y., Nairobi, p.350

and dietary habits. The Congolese-born Manyema, former convicts whom the colonial forces subsequently employed, and Nyamwezi and Sukuma carriers had travelled along the central road (from Tabora on the coast, across the Unyamwezi towards the Congo basin). They accompanied Dar es Salaam's first residents, the Zaramo and the Shomvi-Shirazi. Another important influx came from the southern Highlands, carrying the Ngoni and the Yao from Nyasaland. To these groups were added the Baluchi (former soldiers of the Sultan), the Shihiri Arabs from the east coast of the Aden protectorate who had served in the Sultan's armies, and lastly the Banian, Bhora and Khoja Indians. These populations settled in town and formed a community whose originality in terms of urban structure can be compared to the two models, Swahili and colonial.

1. Swahili coastal city structuring

This model, the fruit of a double phenomenon of *métissage* and social stratification born of the encounter of Arab-Persian and African populations, covers the east-African insular and coastal area, which has been its historical cradle roughly since the 8th century. In this domain, research results by social scientists indicate that Islamic values and the Middle Eastern cultural heritage are fundamental here.⁷³ These values made it possible for the Shiraz and Arab elite which had been constituted there centuries ago, an elite which was as much cultural as they were economic and political, to be recognized and multiply. But above all, this model is constructed according to the principle of historicity. Social differentiation is therefore based on the history of the Arab-Persian Diaspora and its political and religious domination of the coast. The resulting notability has ascendancy as its principal argument, which leads to a stratification of the groups making up the society. Thus, the Swahili model establishes a direct relation between ascendancy, notability and hierarchy.


Stratification opposes two extremes: African-ness (contained in Swahili-ness) and Arab-ness. Swahili-ness is placed at the bottom of the social pyramid, and Arab-ness at the top. A Shirazi group, securely anchored in the coastal universe while being drawn towards an idealised exterior by the genealogical reminder, comes in between the two. This idealisation places the fundamentally local Swahili-ness in the position of the dominated party with regard to Arab-Persian externalism. This logic justifies individuals' reflex to identify with specific history and places of origin and at the same time maintains this reflex. These places include the coastal islands and former city-states such as Lamu, Bagamoyo or Zanzibar, which make up the stratification's geographical points of reference. They enter into the identification mode associated with it, in the same way as the over-eulogized references to Shiraz and Oman. Thus, these references provide arguments for self-promotion, perfectly demonstrated in the

⁷³ Françoise Le Guennec-Coppens and Pat Caplan, *Les Swahili entre Afrique et Arabie*, Paris, CREDU-Karthala, 1991.

case of the Zanzibari Shirazi who set themselves apart from the African group.⁷⁴ Within this interpretation mode, Swahili-ness is of a sociological nature. It fits into the stratification and includes only a fraction of the coastal society.

But as a cultural or even a biological reality, Swahili-ness espouses the entire coastal society, summarizing the two extremes, uniting them around Islam and the Swahili language. Swahili culture's inherent contradiction becomes apparent here: it is a culture divided between a founding *métissage* and a certain purity coveted for the social distinction it brings. There is permanent tension, as is revealed by the oscillation between endogamy and mixed marriages. In this sense, marriage is a major promotional instrument: promotion to the elite or maintaining one's elitist position by marrying into the Arab community; promotion, too, for marginalized groups within the sphere of Swahili-ness. That is how Robert Peake explains the marriage strategies used by Malindi's Giriama women to escape performing subordinate duties in town.⁷⁵

Figure 12: Referential spaces of local identities and stratification of the coastal society in the 19th century



The fit between social stratification and wealth distribution is an imperfect one: the Arab category includes big planters, small traders, and even poor, lowly farmers or packers employed in the various sectors of the local economy, like the Shihiri from the southern Arabian peninsula. Along the coast, the importance of social stratification is linked to the symbolic power of racial and cultural criteria in a society that has been profoundly marked by the intermixture and *métissage* of populations.

Social stratification and references to Shiraz and Oman find special expression in an urban context. It should come as no surprise that political

74 Ariel Crozon, "Les groupes sociaux avant la révolution", in Colette Le Cour Grandmaison, Ariel Crozon (dir.), Zanzibar aujourd'hui, Karthala - IFRA, 1998.

75 Robert Peake, "Comment on devient swahili. Stratégies des femmes giriama en ville", in Françoise Le Guennec-Coppens and Pat Caplan, Les Swahili entre Afrique et Arabie, Paris, CREU-Karthala, 1991.

power has always been concentrated in cities. The arithmetic of filiations (reactivated by the Omani intrusion into 19th-century politics) was especially active in town because its notability, wealth and power were more apparent there. In Mombasa, it was social hierarchy that distinguished between the Mazrui clan (of Omani origin) in power and Swahili notables.⁷⁶ Similarly, in 19th century Bagamoyo political power was held by the Ndiwan Shomvi of Shirazi origin. They shared the wealth of maritime commerce and the booming plantation economy with the Omani, who arrived at a later stage. The rest of the population formed a heterogeneous group made up of related coastal residents such as the Zaramo, Luguru and Doe, Nyamwezi and Sukuma carriers from the interior, the Sultan's Baluchi and Hadrami soldiers, and of course the Indian traders of various faiths (Hindu, Bohora, Ithnasheri, Isamili Khoja and Sunni as well as Catholics from Goa).

The dividing lines running through Swahili society are also visible in the morphology of the old coastal towns. Research indicates that these dividing lines can be seen on different levels: within the context of a town area, with the Zanzibari example of the contrast between the old stone town occupied by Arabs, Indians and Comorans⁷⁷ and the African Ng'ambo⁷⁸, and even within the old part of town, with the example of Lamu's *mitaa*, genuine quarters inside the city which correspond to specific historical groups.⁷⁹

Whatever the social, demographic and spatial transformations brought about by 19th century political and economic upheavals, these towns offer the best synthesis of the different components of coastal society. They most faithfully reflect Swahili-ness' two dimensions, sociological and cultural, through a social identification code, territorial marking and a specific life style. Dar es Salaam, a coastal city founded by the Sultan of Zanzibar, could have become a new centre of Swahili-ness on this part of the coast called *Mrima*. It was intended to stimulate interactions and thus could not leave the local populations indifferent. Besides, according to Sutton, the respective interests of the Omani, Shomvi-Shirazi and Zaramo had been sealed by an early economic alliance. The alliance was maintained after Majid's death and was consolidated in the face of colonial ambition. The 1898 uprising showed that local notables intended to thwart colonial ambitions. It was crushed, and Dar es Salaam was surrendered to an urbanistic model that was foreign to coastal culture. On this new urban stage, the application of an organizational model for Swahili cities would henceforth be hampered by a foreign power

76 Colette Le Cour Grandmaison, "L'héritage arabe, XVIII^e et XIX^e siècle", in Colette Le Cour Grandmaison, Ariel Crozon (dir.), *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, Karthala - IFRA, 1998.

77 Gérard Prunier, "La révolution de 1964", in Colette Le Cour Grandmaison, Ariel Crozon (dir.), *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, Karthala - IFRA, 1998.

78 Bernard Calas, "Ng'ambo: le double oublié de la ville de pierre", in Colette Le Cour Grandmaison, Ariel Crozon (dir.), *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, Karthala - IFRA, 1998.

79 Françoise Leguenec-Coppens, *Femmes voilées de Lamu (Kenya). Variations culturelles et dynamiques sociales*, "mémoire no 22", CRELU, Éditions Recherches sur les civilisations, 1983.

that had confiscated the keys to social control and intended to preside over urban construction.

2. *The colonial model*

This model was based on two essential principles: racial segregation and the separation of urban functions. The former was put in place during the German period.⁸⁰ In 1933, the city's division into three zones was reasserted by the English colonial authorities that had undertaken to redevelop the centre and the peri-central quarters. The first sign of a break with the Swahili coastal city model was the colonial authorities' distinction between "natives" and "non-natives"; a distinction which moved away from the typical social classification prevalent in Swahili towns. This distinction had two compellingly symbolic consequences: the two-tier Swahili city was replaced by a city made up of three components, the European, "native" and "non-native". The other was the distinction between "natives" and "non-natives" shattered the glass tower the Arabs had built around themselves over many centuries of social prestige. Indeed, it led to their assimilation with other "non-natives" that included Indians, without acknowledging the pre-eminence given to them along other parts of the coast. The new classification thus amounted to social levelling coupled with a trivialization of the former elite, which now faced the new, European elite in the process of asserting itself.

The classification was problematic in other ways when the question of regulating access to land in the African residential zones was raised. The 1923 *Land Ordinance* allowed some ambiguity regarding Arab classification: the term "native" used in chapter 113, section 11 included Arabs, but the same term, used in chapter 114, excluded them. Would Arabs be allowed to settle in residential zones reserved for "*natives*" or not, and if so, under what conditions? Who could legally be considered African? During the forties and fifties, this confusion was the subject of regular correspondence but was resolved by a reminder that the *Land Form 17 Rights of Occupancy* title deeds excluded Arabs.⁸¹

Segregationist logic regularly raised application problems. For example, it was discovered that property transactions had been carried out in the suburb of Ilala between "natives" and "non-natives", or more precisely between Arabs and Africans. Expropriation was the only recourse. Similarly, McCleery's 1939 report on Temeke's rural district revealed that Arabs had settled on Zaramo land.⁸² In administrative circles, the case sparked a surrealistic debate on whether Arabs born on the continent were "natives" or not, whether Zaramo land rights worthy of the name actually existed, and whether the

80 See Franck Rimbault's article in this same publication.

81 Municipal Secretariat correspondence, 1953.

82 Provincial Commissioner, "Notes on Mr Mc Cleery's Report, Provincial Office, 25 June 1940", in 1933-1946 Native Affairs, National Archives no. 53, file no. 1/17, Dar es Salaam. For the purpose in hand, Mc Cleery suggested that these non-natives simply be declared Natives!

local Wandewa court was capable of handling property cases on clan land. The adopted solution was to declare that the settlement of “non-natives” on all land within a radius of eight kilometres around Dar es Salaam⁸³ was prohibited (except in the case of written authorization by the local Zaramo authority) and to exert control on transactions through Mtoni’s *Wakili*. Segregationist logic was reaffirmed in 1943 by an ordinance prohibiting “natives” from selling land to “non-natives”, “except for a valid reason”.⁸⁴

It came as no surprise when large Arab and Indian farms were set up at a distance from the city. Some specialized in extensive cattle farming for the lucrative Upanga and Kisutu meat markets. Daya was one of Bungoni’s large-scale farmers. Like the Indian minority, the Arab minority were also able to preserve their economic superiority with regard to the Africans. However, they had to come to terms with a new type of marginalization: part of the economic apparatus concentrated in the harbour and the European centre was lost to them. Arab activities in Dar es Salaam contributed to the economic accumulation networks they maintained between the coast, the islands and the Indian Ocean’s supplies markets. Because the rules of the game had changed, their presence did not have the dimension of community that it had elsewhere having been thwarted by the colonial order. In the largest city on the Tanzanian coast, urbanity as a product of asset-building, behaviour and a distinctly urban way of life had thus slipped through the same Arab hands, which had dominated it within the Swahili coastal and insular sphere. Within the colonial city, the Arabs had been unable to build up a strong community or a prevailing cultural model. Significantly, present-day popular speech does not recognize an “Arab quarter” in Dar es Salaam, only an “Indian quarter”, thus confirming the disappearance of the Arabs as a local territorial community.

The novelty of colonial logic would also express itself in the treatment of African populations. Anthropological and historical research has provided valuable analyses on the origin of ethnic groups as a colonial creation. This research draws its arguments from strong, lineage-related structures, age-old clan codifications and the equally old practice of forging alliances (including mock family ties); it happily contradicts the strong ethnic presupposition that contributed to a compartmentalized vision of African societies. Ethnic groups were long presented as an obvious fact, an intrinsic product of local civilizations and a fundamental identity-marker; here, it loses its supposed authenticity with regard to identity supports such as clan and lineage. For example, Samory Touré’s attempt to invent a Malinke country on the savannas of the Upper Niger in what was no more than a juxtaposition of territorial identities based on lineage, is a recent and laborious illustration of just how artificial ethnic groups as a social reality really are with regard

83 5 miles.

84 Restriction on Transfer, Ordinance no. 7 of 1943.

to Africa's long history.⁸⁵ In East Africa, as in other parts of the continent, colonial intervention was decisive in establishing an "ethnic culture". In the context of Dar es Salaam, it results in classifying immigrants according to an "ethnic" criterion. The administration chose its official interlocutors from within these groups and entrusted them with passing on their directives. They were particularly sought after for supervising mortuary practices.

There was no separation between the ethnic groups listed.⁸⁶ The same representative could be assigned to different groups while the African residential zone was not really partitioned; no particular space within this zone was attributed to specific groups. In fact, documents consulted in the archives did not mention any debate regarding the eventuality of a strict separation of the identified ethnic groups, nor any measures taken in this regard. The effect of formalizing cultural differences by means of an identification system and group representation was to divide the city's African population by splitting them up into identity groups without their own territory.

TABLE IV: ETHNIC GROUPS REPRESENTED IN THE COLONIAL TOWN

Groups and their origins	Town representative
Ndengereko, Rufiji, Zaramo	Chaurembo
Ngindo, Makonde, Makua, Shirazi and Nyasa	Litewa
Kutu, Zigwa, Bondei, Kwere, Nyika, Doe and Luguru	Kumra
Sukuma and Nyamwezi	Sultani
Gogo, Haya, Rundi, Ganda Bembe and Manyema	Wakati
Yao and Matumbi	Simu
Ngoni and Nyakyusa, Fipa Wemba and Ngindo (in part)	Faranyaki (Ngoni)
Chagga, Luo and Lubyā	Kumra (because of the alliance with the Luguru)

According to J.A.K. Leslie, 1963. Source: survey compilation

⁸⁵ It took him twenty years to make his presence felt. When he died, his plan to unify the Malinke clans became obsolete.

⁸⁶ In 1931, 167 ethnic origins were counted amongst the 22, 734 Africans present in the city (source: District Officers Reports, Dar es Salaam District, 1931-37).

3. The Zaramo antecedent: a predisposition to intermingle and integrate

Dar es Salaam's suburbs arose in the heart of Zaramo land, out of recent creation from the neighbouring territories' viewpoint. The flexibility of a newly introduced social formation to the region, without fixed geographical or cultural frontiers, was added to the mixing inherent to Swahili-ness and to the population intermixture induced by the coastal situation. This is borne out of remarks recorded during the investigation. Indeed, none of the interviewed Zaramo spontaneously introduced themselves as such. They all first recalled the village of their birth, an identity support which is no doubt more significant than the mere reference to an ethnic group, and later claimed that they shared cultural relations with other coastal groups, such as the Ndengereko or the Kutu and, to add to the confusion, that there was no fundamental difference between these groups because, in actual fact, everyone was Swahili!

Such views reflect the ambivalent Zaramo position along this part of the coast. Once they had settled there, intimate relations (including matrimonial exchanges) brought them closer to the Shomvi. However, British officials describing the city and its surrounding area towards the end of the last century established a link with the Washenzi or "savages" from the interior. In 1970, Sutton used more objective arguments to distinguish the Zaramo peasantry from the Swahili coastal-dwellers, without however assimilating them with the other hinterland populations.⁸⁷ The Zaramo would thus be placed at the interface between the Swahili world and African societies from the continent's interior: aligned with the Shomvi coastal-dwellers, Islamized since the end of the 19th century, and sharing clan origins and matrilinear traditions with the hinterland's Kwere, Luguru and Kutu.

This culturally and geographically intermediate position predisposed them to a dialogue with those foreign, coastal households, which the city did not fail to attract. The Zaramo village communities, isolated amidst the vast lands of a generous and under-utilised countryside, had the required space to accommodate anyone who came along: it became a new melting pot of the original Zaramo-Swahili population and the non coastal-dwellers.⁸⁸ Within the context of Dar es Salaam, the Zaramo actually served as a link between the coastal and non-coastal populations. According to Swantz, they constituted 30% of the city's African population, 95% of whom were living in a radius of eighty-four kilometres around the city. Their territory became the privileged scene of these encounters, a space where another urban social model, now

87 J.E.G. Sutton, "Dar es Salaam. A Sketch of a Hundred Years", in *Dar es Salaam: City, Port and Region*, Tanzania Notes and Records, 71, 1970 (pp. 1-19).

88 In the twenties, they still largely dominated Dar es Salaam's rural district: more than three quarters of the African population recorded in 1921 (89,000 out of 124,130). With the Ndengereko, Rufiji and Ngindo, the coastal-dwellers thus largely dominated the countryside. (Source: Provincial Commissioner's Reports, 1921-30). The intermixture was thus an later phenomenon. In the city the African population amounted to 135,031 out of a total of 139,594 people.

based on mixity, was improvised. The highly varied origins of the 44 people who were settled there during the fifties by Muungano's oldest resident, whom we met during the investigation, indicate that the regroupings were prompted by new arrivals.

The option of community regrouping was, however, a possibility. A case in point is the Kagera quarter, situated in the centre of Manzese and founded at the same time, accommodated many nationals from the Kagera region near Lake Victoria in the country's far western regions. The determining factor for regrouping was probably the need to rely on traditional solidarity to face the urban world's anonymity and compensate for the discomfort of foreigner status in the coastal region. It can probably also be attributed to the influence of Dar es Salaam's roads network. The rural exodus was channelled and guided from the regions of origin to the city centre's doorstep, which thus tended to homogenize the flow of people being disgorged onto Dar es Salaam's periphery. The central railway line and the Morogoro road transported nationals from the country's westernmost regions. The forming of a "Kagera" quarter in the vicinity of this main road was therefore anticipated. The same observation can be made about many Ngoni who settled in Keko and Kiwalani, near the Kilwa road passing through the colony's southern regions. It also applies to the Nyamwezi in Kinondoni, on the Morogoro road.

But these factors were not really decisive from the viewpoint of the mixity observed in Muungano, Ilala and even in Buguruni, which had originally been ruled by traditional Zaramo chiefs. Today, the most striking aspect of these residential zones is the fragmentation of groups sharing the same culture; the resulting mixity is particularly successful in = Manzese, despite its indisputable Zaramo background

B. Mixity: a success story on the scale of residential zones and the housing sector

A study of population composition in Muungano, Ilala and Buguruni reveals a strong tendency amongst the original groups to fragment, contradicting both the Swahili community model and colonial segregation. In this case, the reality of mixity is analyzed on a scale of administrative divisions and that of the Swahili house. It is measured according to the criterion of geographic origin (coastal or non coastal) and standard of living. Here, neighbourhood units form a social mosaic, the delicacy of which is explained by the widespread renting of rooms inside the Swahili house. Varied samples from socio-professional and identity group categories co-exist within this environment.

1. Observations from landscape to social cohesion, and from container to contents

The setting changes from one division to the next. Buguruni is the most amazing of the three divisions selected for this investigation. The spatial

organization is not determined by the streets or the positioning of the buildings. In this sense, Buguruni presents an original environmental conception characterized by the elementary space unit formed by the courtyard: not the private courtyard of the Swahili house, but an exterior courtyard delimited by other houses. The inhabited space is made up of a succession of seemingly pre-planned courtyards to determine the order of the constructed sites, and as if the constructed sites had complied with this order, for the setting of a pre-existing sociability offering its materiality to the need to delimit the experience of human relations. According to this system, neighbourhood relations seem to result from preceding social relations and not the reverse. Here the constructed sites, structured as individual houses arranged across from or perpendicular to one another, convey much more than cohabitating. It is a manifestation of the autonomy of the households occupying each dwelling, but it also defines a sphere of intimacy and of privileged relations between them.

The cursory investigation conducted in this residential zone made it impossible to define the foundations of this seemingly intended intimacy.⁸⁹ Is it family-or clan-related? This organized juxtaposition is a contradiction of individualism as a dominating cultural model, if only through this invitation to extend a daily, mutual glance between residents. The absence of cars, owing to a lack of access roads, facilitates meetings or dialogue from one threshold to the next. Above all, this system highlights the peripheral position of buildings when compared to the central position of the courtyards. Oddly, development seems to have constructed a void for the most part, with social issues being relegated to the building's exterior. Passageways between two buildings allow access to courtyards and can be crossed freely at any time. Using these passages means going from one intimate area to the next, before emerging onto the nameless rifts formed by the zone's few streets.

Conversely, Ilala's constructed sites are organized by a grid pattern.⁹⁰ It consists of a regular, orthogonally shaped weft separating adjoining blocks of houses closed off from each other. Ilala's houses open onto a passageway. The connection from either side is thus blocked by a street that has to be crossed, while austere walls cut off the houses on the same side. This is a neighbourhood that opposes rather than unites, strengthening individual personalities through physical barriers: walls surrounding private courtyards at the back and the street layout in the front. There is hardly anybody on the street except for children playing and even they have to use secondary roads where there is less traffic. And yet the real premise is that, since its creation, the zone's residential vocation has weighed so heavily that there are few spaces not intended for this purpose. Ilala is associated with human movement and

89 The purpose of this investigation conducted at the end of the exercise was to verify the cultural mixity observed in the two remaining residential zones.

90 There are almost a thousand houses between Newala and Bungeni streets.

accommodation rather than employment. Development rationality hardly left room for local community life to express itself, and it seems to have had a rough time. Does it actually exist? One has one's doubts when seeing small groups getting together on an infrequent basis on the piece of wasteland next to the mosque, except on prayer days. Indeed, in this less than industrious sector, male absence during business hours and female courtyard life do not make for strong neighbourhood relations.

Noise conjures up the intensity of human relationships, whether courtyard conversations in Buguruni or the silence of Ilala's residents waiting for vehicles to pass. Muungano's winding alleyways are more often filled with residents' voices. Here, people live very closely together. At times, they have to struggle through the narrow passageways between two buildings; constructed sites have invaded every available space where foundations can be laid. This results in perpetual confrontation subjecting everyone to glances from their peers, providing them with pound seats for society's show: children playing, masons erecting scaffolding, the sound of trowels, the smell of culinary improvisations, the gestures of tailors bent over their sewing-machines- scenes are played out while people pass by as usual; faces float by as the roll of the alleyways accelerates or slows down; backstreets fill up with residents, bustling activity is followed by hours of waiting before filling up at last with the sound of clients' footsteps. Neighbourhood sociability draws most of its essential substance from this obstinate (if uncertain) or at times even pathetic clientele, which takes advantage of all the opportunities offered by the accumulated households occupying the innumerable nooks and crannies created by disorder and dense building sites.

The layout of constructed sites therefore determines the identity and character of each residential zone. Although this character may be marked, it does not in any way erase internal differentiations, as illustrated by the contrasts between constructed sites which mirror social inequalities. The example of Muungano, which integrates all types of houses into its backstreet landscape, is an extreme one. Durable constructions have appeared in all of the quarter's sectors. Built with breezeblocks, their painted walls and metal sheet roofs can be seen next to the humble structures supporting the rough adobe walls of the poor. The most recent development in Manzese is the advent of "informal permanent structures".

Conversely, Ilala's planned sector landscape seems more homogeneous, because secure settlements (protected by property laws and the professions of the formal economy, more frequent in this area) expressed an early predilection for a transition to durable construction. However, differences in living standards are apparent in the finishes: panes in the plastered windows and painted outside walls, an elaborate architectural style, high walls, the presence of a second storey. Here as well, one is taken by surprise by the luxurious interiors rather than by the buildings' outside walls. Doors open onto long, tiled corridors leading to a private courtyard. The latter gives access to a second

building, situated at the back, while also serving as a garage opening onto a road perpendicular to the property's main entrance (secured by adding high, metal gates). There, one discovers an impressive reservoir linked to a motorised pump. A staircase leads to the upper storey of the second building, which is also where guests are received. The height of the light, spacious sitting room shields it from envious passers-by. There are discrete servants and Persian carpets; precious fabrics adorn the walls and the windows; besides the leather armchairs and sculptures, telephones and video equipment, free time in the middle of a working day, is proof of the occupants' wealth. Of course, none of the tenants are allowed here; the family's income comes from outside activities: their networks stretch all the way to the Middle East (Yemen or Saudi-Arabia, via Zanzibar of course), but also to Europe and the United States.

Bungoni's wealth is even better concealed, probably as a precaution, because the population is largely dominated by the lower classes. A case in point is the elderly widow of mixed Arab-African race, belonging to the Doe clan, who lives in an ordinary and relatively comfortable house. Her late husband was a brilliant, London-trained doctor who specialized in primary health care. In the course of his career, he practised in many Southern- and East-African countries, as a hospital superintendent and a health programmes director. The modesty of this family home (built while he was travelling the world) and the choice of Bungoni (more upper-crust suburbs were obviously within his reach) can be ascribed to personal convictions or even a certain disdain for social prestige. However, this refusal of anything ostentatious despite significant financial means that enabled him to travel frequently to Europe, conceals family connections with a coastal network that used to be as powerful as it was prestigious (according to the norms of pre-colonial Arab-Swahili culture). The widow proceeds to recall a certain grandfather on her father's side who had trained as a *Liwali* during the German period, or some other illustrious great-uncle who had been Sheik of Bagamoyo and whose reputation stretched all the way to Tabora. She throws in a comment about vast coconut and clove plantations along the coast and on the islands, and about links with Zanzibar's political class, established through marriage and (of course) business in Dar es Salaam: the hotel business, trade in rich fabrics from West-Africa intended for members of the Tanzanian elite. Naturally, the humble Bungoni house is not the only one; she admits to owning three others in Dar es Salaam, two of which are rented out, and a few others between Zanzibar and Tanga complete the property assets. However, cursory assessment of the larger floor area and a veranda full of flowers are the only features which distinguish this house from that of the neighbouring *squatters*⁹¹ next door. A couple and their three children live in this house with its three tiny rooms, built illegally by a relative. Further on, an elderly couple lives in an adobe house

91 They introduced themselves as such.

2. Mixity affecting land distribution and accommodation

The neighbourhoods' social composition is characterized by a great mixity, as indicated by the geographic origins of the residents, tenants and owners. Indeed, the entire diverse coastal population is represented here, including the Zaramo and the Ndengereko, the Muera, and other island populations from Kilwa or Zanzibar. One also finds samples of the original populations of continental Tanzania's hinterland, from the northeastern regions of Kilimandjaro, Tabora, Singida or Dodoma in the central part of the country, from the distant regions of Musoma or Mwanza near lake Victoria, or even Kigoma near lake Tanganyika, as well as the southern part of the country, such as the Ngoni from the Ruvuma. There are also households from less distant regions, such as the Luguru from the Morogoro region. To which may be added not only Arabs whose families (like the Hadrami) had founded a line on Africa's eastern coast many generations ago, but also Indians.

When it comes to co-habitation, this mixity does not exclude the relative predominance of one group over the local population. This is effectively illustrated by the Bungoni quarter, where resident owners include a significant number of Zaramo representatives, or 40% of the 66 owners interviewed. This is not surprising, seeing as the Zaramo developed the neighbouring Buguruni quarter where many of these owners come from. On the other hand, Bungoni's tenant population is not dominated by any one group. Above all, inside the same house, owner and tenants' origins only concur incidentally, which shows that access to rented accommodation is not subjected to the criterion of individuals' geographic or cultural origins at all.

The most striking example of mixity can be observed in the Muungano quarter, where half of the 111 owners interviewed are from the coast, thus assigning an honourable place to the non-coastal dwellers where land distribution is concerned. Moreover, household heads from the Morogoro region, where the trade in market garden products to supply the capital experienced a sharp upward trend over the last few decades, benefited significantly from this opportunity, as they represent almost 25% of all the owners interviewed.⁹²

Mixity should be observed in the intimacy of the Swahili house, which best illustrates the fragmentation of the original identity groups. With a few rare exceptions, coastal-dwellers and inland residents cohabit on this scale in all their diversity, sharing the same courtyards and assuming their differences in an overcrowded space on a daily basis. Cohabitation is also marked by religious differences. In the end, Muslims, Christians, coastal-dwellers and inland residents all live together in the Swahili house. This is the dominating

⁹² For more on the traders from this region, see Jan Kees van Donge "Waluguru traders in Dar es Salaam. An Analysis of the Social Construction of Economic Life", in *The Journal of the Royal African Society*, vol. 91, no. 363, April 1992.

model in the three quarters investigated, even though certain Zanzibari, Arab and Indian families have broken this rule in Ilala and Bungoni, and even some of Muungano's Chagga households have regrouped themselves inside a house where they rent out rooms.

Property in Dar es Salaam is certainly not an exclusive coastal-dweller privilege. The *madalali* (property agents or informal prospectors who go looking for houses in the quarter at the client's request) owe their superior skill in the housing market business not so much to their origins as to their long-term experience of the city. The one we met in Ilala was born in Dar es Salaam and had worked for municipal services since the fifties. That, and not his Zaramo origins, made him the indispensable go-between for land and property transactions in his sector.

3. Neighbourhood relations within the Swahili house

By emphasizing the lack of privacy, the rental system introduced social mixity within the residential units. As a result, owners and tenants, wealthy and underprivileged households, families and unmarried people learned to rub shoulders with each other in life's most intimate space, the Swahili house. But can this space still be called intimate? The silent corridors, the closed doors which act as a barrier, the practicality of backyards where people learn to improvise their own discreet gestures; where meals are prepared in a corner, washing hanged to dry and where tenants slip past to take a shower: This type of collective accommodation is interesting for foreign, female researchers who are received with some reluctance. Elsewhere, it's a place where people chat, plait braids, cook *chapati* or roast groundnuts and offer cups of tea. In houses occupied by only the owner's family, corridors echo with the shared, everyday moods and gestures of people who are bound by something other than geographical closeness. But sometimes, they discover certain affinities during the shared rental period; they may even start to like certain tenants; a fond feeling of solidarity may develop. Forced inactivity or childcare compels the women to have a routine life from the courtyard to the street and from the street to the courtyard. Because there is no privacy, they readily surrender to complicity eventually. Therefore they can be found side by side, chatting, with the street as their witness; spontaneous laughter staves off the bitterness of having to suffer want. They plait and unplait their braids or spend an hour of their life curling their hair, twisting words into it, murmuring their hurt into a wisp of hair. Words and woes: at last they can express themselves.

The respective rhythms of life are out of step in a context where work and public transport are hard to come by, where domestic life is nothing more than the neglected counterpart of life on the outside that brings in the basic minimum wage or even physical well-being. As a strategy for further education, it is hardly useful to linger behind in a room in the hope of some social interaction. The only people who can afford the luxury of

immersing themselves in the neighbourhood world are dress designers and other craftsmen who live close to their workbenches, because it provides them with a living. All other able-bodied people have to obey the following rule: leave early; return only when there is nothing more to be changed into cash or when public transport threatens to stop for the day. This is why, during the day, neighbourhoods very often exude a cloistered isolation and the industrious humour of small workshops and construction sites. This is also where Manzese's alcoholics, who no longer want to hold on to reality, execute their erratic and long-winded peregrinations.

If work pressure impedes neighbourhood interaction, living in rented accommodation teaches one about overcrowding and social differentiation. As such, it is an initiation into urbanity, at times into its most disagreeable aspects: no running water, uncomfortable rooms, buildings and surroundings which become unfit for habitation when stagnant water or heaps of uncollected rubbish start accumulating near the houses. The initiation may thus be brutal, but it has the virtue of being made possible by means of rented accommodation. It may even reveal a talent for aestheticism. The value attached to a home, however modest, can be seen in the skill shown by those who act as interior designers, using bits and pieces from the street, inventing a *kwetu*⁹³ warmth for themselves by hanging pieces of fabric on the walls or in front of the half-open doors, thus camouflaging the bareness of a floor with no covering. Sometimes the cleanliness behind the doors is commendable. Mister Plastic governs absolutely when it comes to mats with well-ordered designs, artificial flowers and trinkets in a disharmony of chosen objects. Moreover, the presence of these ornamental objects serves as an indicator: the fewer the objects, the more recent the move. But the investments also differ according to financial means. So, to one's surprise, behind discreetly closed doors you sometimes find televisions, videos, hi-fi systems, solid beds and armchairs, and numerous stacks of dishes near a clattering of empty cupboards. They echo the promise of relocating to more spacious accommodation, and thus of a house of one's own in the line of sight. On the contrary, the neighbour's door opens onto a straw mattress lying on the floor, covered by nothing more than a sheet, and pieces of cardboard serving as mats. Therefore, the furniture may change radically from one room to the next, proving that the rented accommodation system has the ability to absorb inequalities without keeping social levels⁹⁴ apart. The ability of Dar es Salaam's residents to cope with and accept the difference is probably not foreign to the situation they find themselves in.

Thus the neighbourhood unit is made up of a complex socio-cultural mosaic. When confronted by difference, even at the core of the Swahili house, every household and every individual forms a cell, isolated by its own specificity. On

93 "*Kwetu*": home.

94 Not without taking the necessary precautions, however: everyone's possessions are secured with locks; some bedroom doors even have padlocks attached to them.

this level, the social link remains weak as long as physical needs continue to hinder neighbourhood sociability. Within this context, Swahili-ness and the extended family constitute the last two remaining ramparts against individual isolation, providing them with a social and cultural identity and placing them in an intimate relationship with the city they live in.

C. SWAHILI-NESS AND THE EXTENDED FAMILY AS SPACES WHERE INTEGRATION TAKES PLACE

The extended family and Swahili-ness claimed by the city-dwellers favour individual settling in urban space and provide them with reference points that are essential to their social and cultural identity within this environment. Although they differ in nature, both are instrumental for the individual to open his mind to the city as a whole particularly where the family members are dispersed. This re-interpreted form of Swahili-ness serves as an integrating force for each of them, playing a role on an urban scale, and the city which Dar asserts its territoriality is just one of them.

1. Families: putting down roots is like a multiple adaptor; connections on a city level

Within the residential zones and quarters, family structures depart from the extended family model; the big city experience for some people does not last long nor does it enable them to interpret this as a cultural phenomenon which would be a simple urban product or a prolonged break with the norms of rural life. Here, the predominance of the family as a nucleus and the uncommonness of celibacy can be explained in more material terms. Their parameters are the cramped lodgings due to the saturation of the housing market and the burden of rent on the family budget, plus insufficient services which limit children's access to local schools. Muungano, where isolated individuals represent more than 45% of the 168 tenant households interviewed, provides an extreme example. Tenant households number 2.5 people on average, as opposed to owner households' 3.3. Furthermore, the huge difference between these two categories of residents suggests that tenant status or the insecure nature of the accommodation tends to limit the size of the residential family unit. In passing, one cannot help thinking that owners strictly limit the number of persons per room within their houses.

The investigation reported several cases of children sent to schools far from home because of a lack of space in the particular quarter's school, or income to enable the parents to rent several rooms from the host owner. They are then entrusted to other members of the extended family in quarters previously occupied by the parents, or in other towns along the coast. Therefore, children do not always follow adults when employment necessitates relocation. This is

frequently the case with Zaramo or Ndengereko parents from coastal villages where there is easy access to schools and the children's upkeep is not as high. These cases of having roots in two places are not new. Sutton shows that the Zaramo shifted between city and countryside for a long time in Dar es Salaam in the forties until they set up the connection between the city and the village of Kisarawe.⁹⁵ In addition, the monolithic and specialized structure of local employment (such as trade in Manzese, for example), which hardly accommodates the diverse professional skills of the adults within every family unit, requires the latter to break up, so as to get closer to the centre of activities most suited to each of them. It causes the break-up of the generational group formed by the category of elders (parents and their collaterals: sisters and brothers, blood or marriage relations) and the dispersion of children once they become active adults. It would seem that the latter's choice of places to settle in the city is determined by the urban distribution of economic activities rather than by their elders' home address. Generally, with each relocation a member of the family group may be left behind for a particular reason: a local employment offer, attending school, the possibility of living with a relative. So for the most part, the households we visited in Muungano, Ilala and Bungoni are mere detached segments from family groups scattered across several quarters or even residential zones: parents without some or all their children, older children without their younger siblings, married couples who have sometimes been separated from their children, the husband and wife commuting between the various homes.

The lodging crisis thus directly penalizes the family by compelling it to reduce the number of family members within the house. As an economic and residential unit, the extended family hardly gains acceptance in the city once it has been divested of its possibility to unite people and confronted by the difficulty of accessing social services and by employment constraints. It is segmented at best, and these segments are dispersed. The split family thus resembles an urban archipelago; its territoriality progresses by means of multiple, simultaneous as well as successive connections. The shape of the family archipelago, made up of the positions occupied by each member or segment of the related group, embodies the family unit present in the city as well as the residential itinerary completed by the head of the household since his arrival in Dar es Salaam.

Maintaining relations between these segments is an indication that the extended family is surviving as a social reference against all odds. Moreover, it is sought out by migrants arriving in Dar es Salaam, who often find their first lodgings with the close relative they have come to join. For all that, individuals' intention is not to reproduce community life in the city according to the model of the extended family, but to support themselves with the help of their

95 Joan Vincent, *The Dar es Salaam Townsman. Social and political aspects of City Life, in Dar es Salaam; City, Port and Region*, Tanzania Notes and Records, 71, 1970.

(dispersed) relatives. Indeed, none of the residents interviewed complained of living far from their family members. The physical separation could even serve as a strategy, by turning these different anchorage points into as many possible recourses in case of difficulty (being evicted from one's lodgings for unpaid rent, for example, or because of a neighbourhood squabble). One of the female residents interviewed in Bungoni had successively sought out lodgings from close family members in different residential zones, which enabled her to put an end to a solitary life in Indian employ, followed by that of a woman abused by her fickle husband, and even to escape the cantankerous moods of an elder sister. In the end, the extended family forms a rampart against an individual's failed urban experience due to segmentation and dispersion.

At the same time, the Dar es Salaam family network's efficiency and vitality encourages integration (there is a reception committee on arrival, increased experience of the urban space thanks to repeated visits) and provides support for every network-linked individual in town. Sometimes this single factor explains gaps in amplitude between areas of urban familiarity described by city-dwellers when travelling across town. For example, certain Muungano residents evolve within an area that is all the more limited as their family networks are established in the Manzese residential zone, where their relatives have also found lodgings. This fitted the pattern for more than 40% of the 111 owners interviewed. In Ilala's lower middle-class milieu, those who are integrated into more widely distributed urban networks more often move from one residential zone to another, and this despite the fact that they have no professional activity. In the case of rich Arab families, the dispersal and the scale of the family network, which stretches the length of the coast towards the islands and the Middle East, elucidates the incredible mobility of certain individuals (and of men in particular) to the same extent as do their economic activities.

But the related group's segmentation introduces a conflict between the space of family relations on the one hand and that of housing on the other: the former is on a city scale or even on that of the coastal region as a whole; the second is on the scale of the inhabited quarter. Daily social relations can only be expressed within the space of the quarter. When this relation is inhibited by the constraints of daily survival and the absence of leisure, having no family on this level reduces individuals' chances of becoming a part of the community, thereby weakening the process of community forming which local employment nevertheless seemed able to revitalize. Moreover, when work and the activities of daily life take place elsewhere, the distortion becomes extreme and the spaces or even the levels of intervention start multiplying. Upanga's Indian families, who have grouped together in impressive houses, obviously depart from this model. But as a general rule, families' territorial foothold is only perceived on the global scale of Dar es Salaam. In fact, every quarter

resembles what Guy Di Meo calls *the adjoining space of daily life*,⁹⁶ representing only a fraction of the discontinued space outlining the family network in- and outside the city. In addition, only a tiny part of the inhabited quarter enters into this network of anchorage points, that tiny part situated in everyone's immediate vicinity: namely, simply a few streets.

In the end, on a scale of territorial actualization, quarters and residential zones are deprived of this nonetheless essential power of integration, even of the family as a nucleus. Therefore, it will become part of the large-scale, diverse urban space. In so doing, every segment of the family is referred back to his individuality in his most ordinary daily actions and relationships. Although the quarter is a vital space of integration on an everyday level, the city is the space for re-establishing a necessary identity. Nonetheless, neither the political framework nor references to past episodes are enough to provide cultural arguments that will enable each individual to recognize and assert himself other than through his own activities and his accommodation. The quest for identity resulting from it finds a more skilful response in Swahili-ness which, just like family, once reinterpreted and adjusted to Dar es Salaam's social reality, opening up city-dwellers' space of reference to that of the entire city, or even the coastal region as a whole.

2. SWAHILI-NESS' NEW FLAG - TAKING POSSESSION OF THE WHOLE TOWN

With the exception of certain groups whose original identity is expressed in a stronger and more spontaneous way, such as the Chagga or the Arabs, everyone in Dar es Salaam claims their Swahili-ness, as proof of belonging to the city. I was often given the following answer: "*Sisi sote ni waswahili*" (We're all Swahili), with the conviction of someone with a valid viewpoint. This type of declaration emanated from the Muslim Zaramo and the Christians from regions far removed from the coast. The assertion was founded on simple arguments: "*We've been living in the coastal city for a long time, so we speak Swahili with our children, our neighbours and in the course of our daily activities. Therefore we are Swahili*". And then: "*Swahili is the national language. We speak it and have a place in this city because we are Tanzanians*".


Here, Dar es Salaam's residents have achieved a real *tour de force* by transforming an identity (particularly in the 19th century and compared to the Arab model), which had been placed in the dominated and thus belittled party into a positive and simple value, based on two criteria: the use of a common language and settling down in a coastal locality. Once Swahili-ness was separated from Islam and deprived of references to individuals' geographical origin, cut off from its roots and taken away from this arithmetic of filiations, which the coastal-dwellers had elaborated over generations, Swahili-ness

96 '[...] l'espace contigu du quotidien'; Guy Di Meo, "De l'espace subjectif à l'espace objectif: l'itinéraire du labyrinthe", in *L'espace géographique*, 1990-91, no. 4, pp. 359-373.

was in someway freed from its “origin label”. Stripped, its nature changed, became functional, operational and, likewise efficacious. Today, in its flexible and less restrictive form, it undeniably possesses a few trump cards to charm the foreigner arriving in town, to ensure his rapid integration into the urban environment, fashioning his own life-style on this basis. The city-dwellers have achieved a successful cultural recycling process here, propelling a value from the past into the modern day, without any qualms about rejecting all the impeding constraints and opening up to the greater Dar es Salaam’s social and cultural mosaic. According to this definition, becoming Swahili means becoming a member of the urban community. One “enters Swahili-ness” as one would “enter urbanity”, by putting down roots in Dar es Salaam. In this sense, Swahili-ness and urbanity are entirely synonymous.


For certain nationals from other regions in the country, integration into the coastal world goes beyond simple discourse. Indeed, it also becomes evident through a certain dress-style and the Swahili names they adopt in town. It is also apparent in the intimate relations they entertain with the coastal dwellers: they marry Swahili women, regularly visit their parents-in-law’s home in villages along the coast and participate in the ceremonies which take place. By obeying the local rules of family solidarity, these allochtones succeed in fitting into their spouse’s network. Besides which, the matrimonial union allows them easy and lasting access to property in the surrounding countryside, and to take up agricultural production to add to the resources of the household established in Dar es Salaam. They thus achieve their integration into coastal culture, the economy and the geographical space of the coast. Besides which, the matrimonial union allows them permanent access to property in the surrounding countryside, to take up agricultural production in adding to the resources of the household established in Dar es Salaam. They therefore achieve their integration into coastal culture, the economy and the geographical space of the coast.

Figure 13: The diversion of Swahili-ness to the advantage of Dar es Salaam’s city-dwellers



This Swahili-ness revisited by city-dwellers was built on the cultural void created by the fragmentation of the original identity groups in town, beginning with the extended family. In the town, couples not originally from the coast declare themselves as Swahili, confirming the idea that the interpretation of Swahili-ness is simplified and attaches little importance to individuals' geographical and family origins. This explains its ability to compromise with cultural difference and redefined in this way, Swahili-ness both homogenizes and integrates. Therefore, it turns away from the classical definition of distinctive identity of ethnic group. While the latter was based on the principle of differentiating from others, Dar es Salaam's Swahili-ness seems to be unaware of otherness as a mode of assertiveness. Furthermore, adhering to it does not imply a break with their original regions and cultures. Thus in Dar es Salaam, access to Swahili identity is free and both incredibly adaptable. By relinquishing the restrictive principles of ancestry, cultural heritage and traditions for the appreciation of each individual, the city is able to Swahilify without ethnicizing.

Fig 13: Diversion of Swahiliness in favour of residents of Dar es Salaam



Through their statements, city-dwellers also show a remarkable inclination to free themselves from the boundaries of the ethnic group by promoting citizenship. In this, they succeed in resolving the paradox between nation and ethnic group, which was quite a painful experience in other societies. Swahiliness in Dar es Salaam is hence associated with concept of urbanity, citizenship and therefore integration on a local and national level. By serving both as an identity framework and a citizenship support, it provides the latter with a cultural colouring lacking elsewhere.

But above all, city-dwellers use Swahili-ism to show their willingness to become a part of the city as a whole, thereby indicating a different form of

belonging to a society than by living in a neighbourhood unit or a residential zone. Through its promotion of this integration ideal, the “new Swahili-ness” is able to transcend infra-urban divisions and put an end to reclusive isolation. By placing the city-dwellers in an egalitarian relationship and weaving cultural links between them, the social mosaic is unified, compensating for the inequality of the urban space’s individual networks and true conventions. Through its power of suggestion, it enables everybody to imagine a city beyond the limits of his own experience. And the city keeps its promises, in part: it becomes a space where familiarity is allowed, a territory where its exact boundaries are unknown in order to be recognized and certified as belonging to it.

CONCLUSION

Three suburbs, three geneses, three urban compositions depict the mixed image of their components to the city centre and its core: obedient Ilala, a descendant of the model imposed by colonial town planning, freshly rid of the initial principle of racial segregation; populous Manzese, which for a long time bore the nickname ‘Soweto’ as a constant reminder of its rebellious ghetto spirit and lack of discipline, yet searching for a rehabilitation that seems difficult in the light of its complicated building chaos; and then there is Buguruni, lodged between the two like a third path: its fabric woven for conviviality’s sake, a chess-board of courtyards boxed in by houses, and arranged like countless mats provided for the whispered exchanges of neighbourhood chit chat.

When considering these three residential zones, the city seems to be the result of a composition arranged without coordinating the whole. As though ill-matched hands had picked up the thread of the initial piece of weaving and made a patchwork of town planning, capable of absorbing diversity and numbers. Blessed were the pioneers: outside the municipal domain, on the vacant canvas offered to them by the rural communities they found where they could design their own fabric and settled down in the blessed time of exclusion! Today, the expansion of the city’s frontiers stands in the way of any improvisation for the latest arrivals. Considering the delay in procedures for acquiring stands, the dream to build one’s own house seems far from certain. Renting out rooms or taking over houses seem to be the possibilities on offer for those who want to move in. Otherwise one moves away from the centres of activity that have developed, where informal jobs are invented daily and (above all) allow people to survive. For those who have been excluded from the official job market, such a wager sentences them to work in peri-urban agriculture for a while but at the same time leaving them with this unfulfilled city dream that the first suburb builders still remember. At the same time, the well off are orienting themselves towards the city’s edges. Thus, in Mbezi Beach, the new upper-crust suburb situated more than thirty kilometres from the business centre and quite far from the tightly woven mesh of the working-class quarters, impatient hands are carrying on with the work, showing that the urban fabric’s

unfinished patchwork keeps on getting larger and changing its character.

In the meantime, the property crisis within a context of accelerated demographic growth never ceased to force people to improvise on the type of individual and collective solutions largely responsible for present urban forms. Indeed, the city is the result of such popular solutions, in answer to property demands far outstripping the building development achieved. The property crisis has always been a constant in Dar es Salaam's history, and the need is becoming increasingly urgent. In response to this crisis, official arbitration and city-dwellers' initiative capacity came out strongly, making it the principal restraint of the regulation mode particular to Dar es Salaam. Therefore the principles of property law (inaccessible to the majority) plus the lack of available space within the urban commune's official borders led to an increase in settlements outside the commune and the development of suburbs far removed from the centre. In so doing they speeded up the urban spread. The distribution of economic activities was also decisive since it motivated the stabilization of settlements around a few centres of activity. Today, those urban territories most in demand combine the most dynamic (and even informal) residential and economic functions, marvellously contradicting the principle (which dominated colonial town planning) of keeping the different functions separate. In fact, the dualities resulting from colonial town planning have become blurred. On the Dar es Salaam site, multi-polarity and the social and cultural mixity intensified by the offer of rented accommodation within the Swahili house have combined to compose a delicate social and territorial mosaic, one that is more complex than what was initially envisaged by the municipal authorities.

Successive regulations and the strategies deployed by city-dwellers who invade the urban space and expand it if need be, by-passing existing laws, indicate that in the course of Dar es Salaam's history, there has always been confrontation between the population and the authorities. From this perspective successful integration is (and was) always in the hands of those who benefit from it and as far as this confrontation was concerned, the issues at stake were numerous. The future of the different types of segregation, the place allocated to the less fortunate, access to employment, property and housing, an open mind to cultural diversity: in fact, urban society's values and organizational principles depended on it. Although territoriality was only touched on in the present text (with the precautionary measures involved in a selective investigation), it is also the result of this confrontation and appears to take on many forms. This includes the diversity of its role-players and its subjects; and also the diversity of the spaces designated by its own vectors. Work and daily survival, leisure, worship and culture, the experience of living in an urban space, the town's social networks, Swahili-ness: each of these provides city-dwellers with the possibility to identify with the inhabited space. At the same time, they describe spaces of realization and levels of belonging

that are peculiar to them. When simultaneously standing on the same pedestal, the resulting territorial forms become muddled, are superimposed or dissociate themselves. They are differentiated by size and structure or the uniqueness and contiguity of those territories constituted by habitat within the neighbourhood universe: an archipelago of family locations on a city scale, the networks, the twists and turns involved in the settlement, trade and matrimonial exchange of the Arab and Shirazi communities stretching to the edge of the coast, the islands and the Middle East; the vague contours of a Swahili-ness belong to the citizens rather than to a geographically bounded area (the coast); a city imagined and finally appropriated by city-dwellers who espouse the nation in all its forms. However, whatever the impact, nature, formalization and recognition levels of these territorial forms, they are far from being final, as negotiation in the field is following its course.

	espaces verts urbains, □ zone arborée ou cultivée		CBD : affaires, administrations zone commerciale de Kariakoo		lotissements irréguliers, □ habitat spontané □
	mangrove, □ marais, zone inondable		logements de fonction		zone industrielle, □ portuaire, □ administrative
	récif corallien		lotissements réguliers		routes, □ chemin de fer
			lotissements semi-réguliers		

établie par Guilène RÉAUD-THOMAS
et Bernard CALAS, 2000




Plate 2 - Urban growth



La comparaison des trois extraits de photographies aériennes offre une idée de la très forte densification et extension des quartiers de Namanga et Msasani. Le "Drive in" est aujourd'hui remplacé par la nouvelle ambassade des États-Unis (l'ancienne a été détruite par l'attentat de 1998).



En périphérie, croissance en grappe constituée de bâtiments en dur mais sous-équipés (Yombo) (clichés Bernard CALAS)

Plate 3 - The city centre: an architectural conservatory...in danger?



Jamburi Street



Asia Street



Makunganya Street



Zanaki Street



India Street



Railway Street



Kisutu Street



India Street

Plate 4 - Urban morphology, from old to new



Kisumu



Gerezani



Samora Avenue



Kisumu

(clichés Cecile ROY)



Masaki

Upanga



Plate 5 - Blue-collar housing and Swahili influence



Mwananyamala

(clichés Cécile ROY et Bernard CALAS)

Installation d'infrastructures et de nouveaux habitats



Maison swahili
à Kijitonyama
Huit pièces : huit familles



Dans les cours, à Kiwalani



Kunduchi, Bagamoyo Road



Plate 6 - Intraurban agriculture



Auréole maraîchère périphérique : cultures en planches et puits



Bas-fonds rizicoles, comptant des versants avec manguiers



Maraîchage intra-urbain



Pépinière de plantes ornementales le long des rues des quartiers aisés

Revente d'oranges



(clichés Cécile ROY et Bernard CALAS)

Plate 7 - The coastline opens itself to tourism



Balisage de l'espace



Des équipements lourds



(clichés Jérôme LAGEISTE)



Le front de mer intra-urbain



Le prétexte tropical et swahili

Plate 8 - Shopping centres and markets



Des centres commerciaux récents



aux marchés locaux



deux façons de consommer et d'acheter

(clichés Cécile ROY)



Plate 9 - The informal sector



Petit commerce le long de la voie de chemin de fer



Centre-ville : femmes vendant des petits déjeuners



Petit commerce de charbon de bois



Centre-ville : petit commerce de boissons, de montres, de cacahuètes...



Coiffure à Kigilagila

(clichés Cécile ROY)

Plate 10 - Schools



Kisutu primary school

Un héritage indien dans l'architecture



Olympio primary school

Une école du centre bien dotée

(clichés Cécile ROY, 1999 et Bernard CALAS)



Travaux d'agrandissement en partie réalisés
par des parents d'élèves



Upanga : enseigne d'un jardin d'enfant

Yombo primary school

Une école périphérique
Élèves de standard V

L'école se perd dans le paysage, ici la cour sert également
à faire paître les chèvres.



Plate 11 - Water Supply...

Un réseau défaillant et non entretenu

Une rue inondée à Buguruni
par les fuites des canalisations



Par manque de maintenance les robinets publics installés
dans les quartiers ne fonctionnent plus (ici, à Temeke).



Les populations les plus pauvres utilisent une eau gratuite de mauvaise qualité

Un simple trou permet de récolter l'eau
de la nappe phréatique affleurante,
eau contaminée par la pollution fécale.



La lessive s'effectue dans les petits cours d'eau
qui traversent la ville.



Les revendeurs sont un maillon indispensable de la desserte en eau des quartiers



(clichés Valérie MESSER)

À Buguruni un charretier remplit ses jerricans chez
un particulier qui a installé un réservoir à l'entrée du quartier ; il les livre ensuite chez ses clients.

Plate 12 ... and its distribution

Les équipements collectifs : l'exemple du mini-réseau à Kijitonyma

Face aux défaillances du réseau, les habitants du quartier, avec le soutien financier des Nations Unies, gèrent un mini-réseau de distribution de l'eau, composé :

- d'un forage profond muni d'une pompe électrique,



- d'un réservoir,



- de 15 robinets répartis dans le quartier.



Pompe manuelle dans le quartier de Mchikichini, gérée par un collectif d'habitants, la vente de l'eau finance sa maintenance.



Dans les quartiers périphériques, certains puits sont encore gérés par le Ministère de l'eau. Muni d'un cadenas, l'eau est vendue le matin et le soir (Yombo Vituka).

L'extraction individuelle de l'eau souterraine : révélateur des inégalités sociales



Ce puits rudimentaire, installé par un habitant de Mbagala, est profond de quelques mètres : l'eau y est gratuite.



Cette habitante de Mchikichini a installé un puits à manivelle manuelle. Le forage et la mise en place du tuyau ont coûté 200 000 Tsh. Elle revend l'eau à ses voisins.



Ce puits à pompe manuelle puise l'eau à plus de 20 mètres. Cet équipement coûte plus de 700 000 Tsh. L'eau est revendue aux autres habitants le long de Kilwa road au sud de la ville.

(clichés Valérie MESSER)

Plate 13 - Transportation

Le port



Le S à gauche



Vu vers le centre-ville

La route

Les daladala aux heures de pointe

La voile toujours d'actualité



Le chemin de fer

La gare de marchandises de la Central Line

La route

Les daladala aux heures de pointe



Le ferry entre Kivukoni et Kigamboni

L'avion



L'aéroport, un équipement majeur
(clichés Cécile ROY et Bernard CALAS)



La voile toujours d'actualité

Pêcheurs et commerçants utilisent encore ce type de pirogue à balancier entre le continent et Dar es Salaam

Plate 14 - Daily life and Indianness at Upanga and Kisutu

(clichés Cécile ROY)



Plate 15 - Models and exemplars on the walls and in the street



Des universels en swahili

(clichés Cécile ROY et Bernard CALAS)



Plate 16 - The city as shown in Tinga-tinga



Schools: facilities and places structuring urbanity in Dar es Salaam

Cécile Roy

When considering schools in urban areas, two complementary points of view can be adopted: firstly, a spatial point of view to observe the distribution and spatial integration of schools within the city; secondly, a social point of view to analyse the population's access strategies to a public service which is becoming increasingly segregated. The conjunction of these two perspectives enables one to understand the position that education and schools occupy within the territorialization process of urban society.

Because of the issues at stake, schools are a socially crucial facility; schools and schooling are at the heart of present-day urbanity. As such, whether public or private, schools form part of places which structure the city, inasmuch as they polarize part of the mobility, frequent contacts and financial and emotional investments of Dar es Salaam's inhabitants. Here, spatial structuring extends to two scales: the neighbourhood and the city as a whole.

Our aim is to study those facilities and places which structure urbanity in Dar es Salaam. For a start, Tanzania's school history is sufficiently original to qualify as essential study material. Next, we will attempt to understand how schools are integrated into the urban environment and participate in the way it functions. Finally, the observation of practices and spatial representations of role players in education (pupils and teachers) will enable us to render a more subjective, but equally interesting view of the city.

I – ORGANIZING THE TANZANIAN SCHOOL SYSTEM

In general, schools “show great singularity when compared to the rest of the world” (Lange & Martin, 1995) because of the importance of the difficulties, strategies and issues involved. Whether public or private, Dar es Salaam's schools do not depart from the rule and deserve our attention. Indeed, Tanzania has a unique school history within the context of the African continent: firstly, it was marked by omnipresent religious missionaries during the 19th century; later, after Independence, it benefited from *Ujamaa*, the socialist politics of the government in power, led by a charismatic personality: Tanzania's president, J. Nyerere, nicknamed *Mwalimu* (Swahili for schoolmaster or teacher).

A. Setting up schools under colonization


At first, colonization favoured the rural areas for setting up schools. From 1862 onwards (the date marks the creation of the first mission school in Bagamoyo

by the *Holy Ghost fathers*), missionaries were in charge of Western education. They officiated in the schools, which were mostly situated in the bush. These were called *bush schools* and were located along the trade routes or not too far from the small urbanized centres. These schools, which were established well before the creation of territorial States, were linked to the mission stations and enjoyed total freedom at the time.

The 1891 creation of German East Africa led to competition between public and religious (mainly mission) schools. The German state wanted to set up a secular school as soon as possible that would propagate Western culture and customs, in accordance with the wishes of the central government. Julius von Soden, German East Africa's first governor, laid the foundations of this system, which was partly financed by the Office for the Colonies or *Kolonialgesellschaft*. He gave concrete expression to various decisions leading to the creation in 1892 of the first secular school in Tanga. In 1894, a secular school was only set up in Dar es Salaam. A modern educational system was gradually taking shape. However, the colonial government was limited to taking note of the extent of the missionary phenomenon, subsidizing Christian schools on condition that the official programme be followed. In 1934, there were 2,668 mission schools – mostly located in the rural areas, neglecting Tanzania's black urban population – as opposed to 84 public schools. Nevertheless, the relative urban void was dealt with, thanks to Indian and Muslim (especially Ismaili) evergetism. In 1929, the Aga Khan inaugurated Dar es Salaam's first secondary school for girls. During the 1930's, Christian missionaries began to respond to this movement by opening secondary schools in town.

The fact that Tanzanian schools started out as rural establishments and products of missionary institutions Fig. 14 explains the number of school facilities around Moshi and Arusha. However, as Tanzania's capital, Dar es Salaam also boasts numerous establishments. They are often the prerogative of a community (European, Indian) or a religion (such as Islam, for example): public schools developed considerably after Independence and under the influence of certain socialist orientations.^B From socialist Tanzania to the present: the educational system's zenith and crisis

At the time of Independence, the educational system was marked by substantial inequalities as well as huge gaps (only 28.2% of children actually went to school). At the time, two thirds of the primary schools and teacher training colleges as well as half of the secondary schools were in the hands of the mission stations. That is why in 1967, the year of the Arusha declaration, Nyerere launched a programme called *Education for Self-Reliance* (ESR) while at the same time nationalizing all schools (except schools for the handicapped and technical schools).

Figure 14: School facilities in 1947

The project's objective is based on practical considerations: in a country where, in 1948, only 2.8% of the population were living in urban areas, the government wanted first and foremost to train good farmers. Thus, Nyerere declared: "The education we are offering in the primary sector must be a complete education in itself. Its main objective must no longer be promotion to the secondary school, because it has been clearly recognized that few pupils actually go to these establishments" (CREPAO, 1986, p. 76). From the double perspective of socialism and the *Self-Reliance* policy, schools become truly independent organizations. Parents, teachers and pupils have to assume part of the running costs. From this perspective, various initiatives are put in

place, such as the creation of *school shamba*, gardens cultivated by the children; the yield of these gardens is used to cover part of the schools' running costs. These practices are also found in some of Dar es Salaam's outlying schools: parents of pupils are invited to participate in maintenance and even building extra classrooms with basic materials provided by the State. The school thus becomes a facility giving structure to local community territories in the same way as other services such as access to water or clinics. In 1969, J. Nyerere decreed another programme, known as *Universal Primary Education* (UPE). This ambitious project was aimed at offering all children between 5 and 13 years of age the possibility to access primary education, which became free in 1964 and compulsory in 1978 according to the *Education Act*.

However, the balance sheet of this generous policy is not heartening. Despite genuine efforts and innovative ideas, despite the drop in illiteracy and widespread enrolment of children in primary schools, there is a desperate lack of facilities at present, and only 5% of the children in a class succeed in crossing the threshold to secondary school! This problem is all the more difficult to solve since the country is experiencing rapid demographical growth. Moreover, expenses have increased to such an extent that pupils' parents now have to pay school fees, which are constantly being raised (fees were introduced at the end of the 1970's). In the 1980's, the intervention of large international bodies did not curb the decline of the school system and the "current (situation) shows all the signs of an involution. It would seem that the disintegration of the State, the slowdown in the growth of economic activities, and the decline in educational systems are symptomatic of an involution" (Lange & Martin).

In town, the *Ujamaa* policy regarding education correlated with a degradation in teaching and learning conditions. Indeed, urban establishments received very little government assistance, particularly because policies targeted the countryside in particular. This is why, since the beginning of the 1980's, Dar es Salaam's population spontaneously started participating in the building of schools, especially primary schools. Thus, one can put forward the hypothesis that schools are one of the fundamental elements of urban territorialization. Later, in response to strong demand and pressure that was both political and demographic in nature, government authorized and encouraged the building of private schools and acknowledged their competence. At present, schools are the concern of religious organizations, NGO's, investment cooperatives of rural origin¹, businessmen (Fares Kisingo invested some of the profits from his garage in the F.K. School he opened in Mbezi) and the Tanzanian Parents Association (TAPA). In Dar es Salaam, 19 of the 46 secondary schools listed are the concern of religious institutions, 6 belong to businessmen, 4 are managed by the TAPA, 4 by the army, 1 by a cooperative and 2 by a council of directors.²

1 Only one school in Dar es Salaam, Nurukyalini in Temeke, falls in this category. But in certain coffee plantation regions (Bukoba and Kilimanjaro in particular), trust funds participate actively in the schooling process.

2 Information on private schools is quoted from B. Choux's 1999 master's thesis.

II – URBAN INTEGRATION OF SCHOOLS

In a context of rapid demographic growth, the population of Tanzania and even more so of its economic hub, Dar es Salaam, voices increasing demands as far as education is concerned. Since 1985, due to pressure from sponsors and economic liberalization, the State has disengaged itself from the educational sector, thus prompting a drop in the quality of public education. The conjunction of these factors favours the emergence of new role players in education who stress the competition between the public and private educational sectors. This competition increases segregation in urban schools and, by the same token, socio-spatial inequalities.

A. The distribution of public establishments

The urban distribution of primary schools (Fig. 15) shows them to be quite scattered. Being public and compulsory, they have been disseminated by the State, even into the heart of the city. There are, however, a few core areas with a high concentration of schools. The schools are distributed quite equally amongst the three districts, with a larger number of schools for the Kinondoni district, not because it is bigger or more populated, but probably because children from these relatively well-off areas attend school in greater numbers.

TABLE V: PRIMARY SCHOOLS REGISTERED IN DAR ES SALAAM

	Ilala		Temeke		Kinondoni	
	Rural area	Urban area	Rural area	Urban area	Rural area	Urban area
Number of schools	9	37	25	24	18	48

(Source: Dar es Salaam City Commission, 1998 - 1999)

The history of the schools illustrates the progression of school facilities from the centre towards the outskirts, a classical progression modelled on that of the urban fabric. Schools in the centre were built at least 15 or 20 years before those in the outlying neighbourhoods. There is, moreover, a relative concentration in the pericentral and central areas of Upanga, Kisutu, Kariakoo and Kivukoni. The Kariakoo schools were built in the 1950's because of demographic pressure and migration to the city. School density, particularly that of primary schools indicates neighbourhood age and participates in affirming central significance.

This observation enables us to discern what could be termed scholastic voids. Certain areas, such as Msasani bay, the Keko and Changombe neighbourhoods and more generally the area situated south of Mandela Road are still underequipped. Several explanations can be put forward: Temeke is an area where industries monopolize a lot of the activities and space, leaving no

place for schools. Msasani bay, however, is essentially a rich residential area; few schools have been built there and those that are located there, such as the *Tanganyika International School* which accepts young pupils for the most part, the sons and daughters of expatriates living in Dar es Salaam, are private and costly. Public school vacuums were partly filled by opening private schools. All things considered, there is no extensive concentration of schools (except in Upanga and in the centre); rather, a spatial integration in the heart of the residential areas.

B. Local integration of schools

In the outskirts, neighbourhood schools constitute one of the centres of community life. The examples of Yombo Primary School and Mikocheny PS³ emphasize the role of community life centre played by school facilities in the outlying neighbourhoods. These two schools have various points in common: they attract pupils from quite homogeneous, intermediary socio-economic classes who will not go attend secondary school, allowing for exceptions. The schools are well-integrated into their environment, because there is no fence, with the result that it is almost impossible to determine their exact delimitations. The playgrounds are used by the inhabitants of both neighbourhoods. Sometimes, as at Yombo PS, children graze their goats on the grounds. This almost public space also contains squatter houses, i.e. permanent structures for which the owners have no title deed, however. Pupil and inhabitant activities are thus reconciled. Headmasters would of course like to see these people disappear from within their establishments, but the government remains powerless in the face of this real estate problem dating from the 1960's. Setting up boundaries would make it possible to mark the territory belonging to the pupils and the teachers, which would thus be individualized as a school space and no longer function as a public place in the eyes of the population (public in the sense that anyone has access to it). Imposing boundaries would mean finally copying the schools in the centre and in the richer areas.

The two schools appeal to inhabitants because they propose services or have facilities that cannot be found elsewhere. Thus people from the neighbourhood get their water from the Yombo PS schoolyard; Mikocheny PS's classrooms are used for adult education and the vicinity of a hospital makes it possible for some children to get medical care.

3 The acronym PS refers to primary schools and SS to secondary schools.

Figure 15: Location of primary and secondary schools in Dar es Salaam's urban area districts from 1998 to 1999




Enrolment registers indicate pupil recruitment areas, reflecting the integration space of the schools (Fig. 16 and 17). At Mikocheni PS, almost all the pupils (more than 90%) live in the neighbourhood, while the remaining pupils come from neighbourhoods in the immediate vicinity: Regent Estate,

Kinondoni, Kawe, Mwanyamala and Kijitonyama. Yombo PS's recruitment area is also very limited: half the enrolments indicate that pupils mostly come from Kiwalani itself; the other pupils usually live in Yombo. Moreover, surveys conducted on the Standard VII classes of each of the two schools indicate that the majority of pupils go to school on foot (e.g. more than 90% of Yombo PS's pupils). The average journey time is also the shortest of all schools included in the study, i.e. an average of 20 minutes for Mikocheni PS and 22 for Yombo PS, which proves the role which proximity plays in the measure of a school's integration within a local space. Indeed, the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods belong to a socio-economic class with little buying power. Having to pay for daily *daladala* trips for one's child/children would drastically reduce one's resources: as far as education is concerned, the choice is therefore limited.

In the town centre, an analysis of relations between public schools and their surroundings shows a different configuration to that of the outskirts. Kisutu PS is located right in the centre of town, in the Indian quarter. Olympio PS, on the other hand, is located in Upanga, only a few minutes from the town centre. It's a residential area with a surprising concentration of schools, public and private, primary and secondary, and all of them have a good standard. It could almost be called functional specialization. The recruitment areas of these schools (Fig. 18 and 19) are quite scattered and there is a very wide radius. Even though a small minority of pupils do indeed live in Upanga (about 20%), the rest are quite well spread out throughout the city, coming from neighbourhoods as diverse as Kariakoo, Tabata and Oyster Bay. As for Kisutu PS, it is even more widespread: there is no recruitment area of preference, to the extent that all the figures obtained remain low and the living areas are extremely diverse. If school appropriation is not as strong here, it is because the pupils do not live in the area where it is located. At Kisutu PS and Olympio PS, surveys indicate that there is a radical change in transport means when compared to Mikocheni PS and Yombo PS. At Olympio PS, buses and cars are the dominant means of transport, accounting for two thirds of the pupils. At Kisutu PS, most of the pupils arrive by bus. The Posta stop is only five minutes away on foot; congestion in the centre prevents certain parents from dropping off their children. Transport costs are thus no longer a limiting factor. In any case, parents can thus choose the place of instruction which seems most appropriate to them; if the pupils attend Kisutu PS, it is often because it is convenient for the parents who work in the town centre; if others send their children to Olympio PS, it is because it is the only public English medium school in the city; the teachers use English and not Swahili as the language of instruction.

Figures 16 and 17; Recruitment areas of Mikocheni & Yombo Primary Schools



This explains the poor integration, or even the absence of integration, of these well-off schools in their space. To parents and pupils, it is merely a space one travels through every day, while at Yombo PS and Mikocheni PS, the school belongs to an appropriated space in the vicinity of the domestic space. Thus, a pupil playing in the Yombo PS schoolyard will go back to get water that very evening; at Mikocheni PS, for some, the school is the only means of receiving medical assistance.

Private schools share the characteristics of these well-to-do public schools to the extent that their neighbourhood links are tenuous in most cases. Apart from a few spin-offs related to the presence of the children (small shops selling sweets and drinks) or efforts to equip these schools (office crafts, school stationery, etc.), private schools mostly seem to operate in isolation from their immediate surroundings. The frequent building work done at private schools shows the dynamic nature of these establishments, underscoring the current trend of privatizing schools. As a rule, private schools are not subsidized, either by local representatives of political parties or by neighbourhood committees or by the municipality. If it so happens that the churches become involved in running private schools, it is not done as a result of their spatial proximity to the schools. For example, the Archdiocese of Dar es Salaam, based in Saint Joseph, i.e. in the centre of town, gives financial assistance to Saint Anthony of Mbagala to the south of the city, while it seems as if the parish of Mbagala does not. The logic here is more of a reticular than a territorial nature. Even if private schools (particularly of religious persuasion) succeed at times in mobilizing international finance networks – whether charitable, humanitarian or cooperative – the budget is mainly provided by registration fees, that is to say, by contributions from parents. The absence of involvement of residential collectives in the building and running of these private school facilities shows the individual nature of reproduction strategies. It starkly underlines the degree of isolation which the majority of these households is suffering from and of the schools operating according to the territorial mode. The latter seems to be dictated by the necessities of poverty more than by an actual strategy.

TABLE VI: SCHOOL FEES FOR 1998 – 1999, PUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLS
(IN TANZANIAN SHILLINGS: TSH)

Name of school	Yombo	Mikocheni	Olympio	Kisutu
Expenses (Tsh)	2,000*	6,000	60,000	5,000

Source: interviews and conversations with school headmasters, 1998 – 1999. Contributions to construction costs of new buildings are not included.

Figures 18 and 19; Recruitment areas for Olympio & Kisutu Primary School




TABLE VII: SCHOOL FEES FOR 1998 – 1999, PRIVATE PRIMARY SCHOOL
EXAMPLES (IN TANZANIAN SHILLINGS)

Name of school	International School	Laureate	Academic	Al Muntazir	F.K. School
Expenses (Tsh)	4,000,000	555,000	500,000	360,000	340,000

The proliferation of private schools is explained by a rejection of the public sector and the appeal of the private sector; a conjunction of factors favours the latter, notably because of the fact that teaching is done through the medium of English while Swahili is the accepted medium in public schools. With the privatization of schools comes the discrediting of the country's official language in favour of the language of globalization. Linguistic and cultural adjustment is the corollary of structural adjustment. The language barrier is a real social discriminant in Dar es Salaam; speaking English is an undeniable indicator of urban integration. Furthermore, the success of private schools is explained by the fact that their exorbitant school fees enable headmasters to pay teachers three times more than in the public schools. Thus private schools headhunt the best teachers in the public schools sector, thereby confirming their lead and consolidating the vicious circle of school segregation. Moreover, the success of the private secondary schools is explained by the strict selection process for entry into the public secondary schools. This selectivity, which is approved by the system, is emphasized by the extremely small number of establishments.

All things considered, and in the light of the school fees, one can say that parental wealth has an influence on the extent of a school's spatial insertion into its environment. Mobility induced by affluence does not favour a school's integration into its immediate environment. Conversely, recruitment within a captive population favours the establishment of links (however tenuous and fragile) between facilities, schools and the environment. As for public schools, this geography also tallies with a centre-outskirts outline: schools in the town centre are attended by pupils from quite diverse neighbourhoods and are thus not regarded in the same way as establishments in the outskirts. It is not the same for private schools, where location does not necessarily comply with this model.

C. Social discrimination and Dar es Salaam's public schools

The following table makes it possible to compare teaching conditions according to the location of schools, classified according to their distance from the centre (Kisutu PS is situated in the most central neighbourhood and Yombo PS in the most outlying area).

TABLE VIII: SCHOOL FACILITIES AT FIVE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

	Kisutu PS	Olympio PS	Changombe PS	Mikocheni PS	Yombo PS
Number of children per school level group	57	89	106	100	213
Number of children per teacher	33	49	23	44	80
Number of children per toilet	57	56	64	160	498
Number of sessions	1	2	2	2	4
School fees (Tsh)	5,000	30,000	12,600	6,000	2,000

(Source: surveys and personal calculations, Dar es Salaam, 1998 – 1999.)

A school's location within the city partly determines the standard and quality of its facilities. In general, Tanzanian school facility standards are not very high and certain rural areas have only the most rudimentary buildings. In Dar es Salaam, demographic growth accompanied by migration to the city has resulted in overpopulated schools (*Daily News* of 6/10/98). The most difficult conditions are found in the outlying areas, because attempts to equip the schools have largely been exceeded by neighbourhood demographic growth. Some schools stand out, such as Kisutu PS: it is the only school investigated with only one session per day. (In the best cases, a session equals a day of lectures. In some schools, the connection between pupil numbers, teachers and available classrooms forces the school to have several sessions per day.) Moreover, at Kisutu PS the average number of children per teacher is 33. Changombe PS has a favourable ratio thanks to the proximity of a Teacher Training College.

In the questionnaires, the fact that several indications tally indicates that the lack of school facilities, which becomes more dire as one leaves the centre, has an influence on pupil education and contributes to a veritable socio-spatial segregation. Thus, at Yombo PS, the ages registered for a Standard VII class range from 12 to 18 years (12 to 17 at Mikocheni PS), while at Kisutu PS and Olympio PS the ages are between 11 and 15. Not only do the gaps narrow when one moves from the outskirts to the centre, but there is a drop in the average age (from 13 years at Olympio PS to 14.5 years at Yombo PS). Lastly, pupils from Yombo PS quite often express themselves only in Swahili, unlike Kisutu PS where children converse more readily in English. The number of pupils per class explains this situation. Age limits are not really respected; the proliferation of such cases contributes to a situation where adolescents

are kept in classes they should have finished long ago. One last observation corroborates this situation: only Yombo PS and Changombe PS have a *school shamba* that belongs to the school and is cultivated by the pupils in accordance with agriculture classes. When all is said and done, this trivial, but original element confirms the ever rural character of some urban schools: at Yombo PS the *shamba* produces potatoes, tomatoes and maize, the profits of which are used to prepare a huge collective meal. This custom denotes a mentality that some of today's city dwellers will find hard to understand: it proves that in these neighbourhoods rural activities have not been forgotten.

TABLE IX: FACILITIES AND SCHOOL RESULTS

	Kisutu PS	Olympio PS	Changombe PS	Mikocheni PS	Yombo PS
Number of pupils admitted to Secondary school	8/119 6.7%	12/412 3%	65/129 50.3%	18/160 11.25%	16/424 3.7%
Canteen	Under Construction	No	No	No	Authorization being sought
Library	Yes, very small	No	No storage space for books	No	No
Sanatorium	No	Yes	Yes	No	No

(Source: personal surveys, Dar es Salaam, 1998 – 1999).

Paradoxically, despite good teaching conditions, Kisutu PS and Olympio PS do not get very good results, seeing as only 3% of the pupils at Olympio PS and 6.7% of Kisutu PS go on to secondary school. This does not mean that these two schools are particularly bad. As they attract more well-to-do pupils, the poor success rates underline the fact that the children are reluctant to sit for the national exams and prefer to sit for the entrance exams to private secondary establishments, thus turning their back on public secondary schools. With its 11% success rate, Mikocheni PS is not too badly placed; neither does Yombo PS have the poorest results either.

Parents' compulsory contribution to school operations is another source of discrimination. Indeed, depending on their standard of living, it weighs more or less heavily on the household budget. Thus a virtuous circle is formed, transforming the richest schools into well-maintained and equipped establishments, while the schools in the working-class neighbourhoods, where parental contributions are lower, cannot modernize their infrastructure in the same way. Thus inequalities pertaining to education and social standing are maintained, or even increased. However, whether parents are rich or poor,

more and more demands are being made on them: at Olympio PS, the School Committee proposed extending a building thanks to parental contributions. This is an interesting example, because many parents refused, thereby forcing the headmistress to use radical means to force them to do so: she threatened not to distribute examination certificates to pupils whose parents had not contributed.

The Dar es Salaam City Council (DCC) was aware of these differences and devised a system which could eventually allow for a slight easing of socio-spatial discriminations. Every month, each of the city's primary schools sends back a questionnaire. The DCC then compiles the information on the number of teachers, pupils, classes, materials needed and various other projects. The file facilitates a comparison between the poorest establishments, which consequently receive practical assistance from the council. The workings of the machine are well-defined and extremely centralized. The DCC makes all the decisions, even in the case of a modest purchase such as a typewriter. In 1998, important changes were made to Yombo PS. The new headmaster, who arrived in 1997, decided to start with large-scale restoration work to improve the mediocre school and pedagogical conditions. After consulting the School Committee, construction of new buildings was approved with DCC support. Work started in February 1998 on the following basis: firstly, parents paid 3,000 Tsh for the construction work. Those of them who were construction workers participated in laying foundations and received their salary from the amount of school fees paid at the beginning of the year. Once the foundations had been completed, the DCC provided materials to finish the building: bricks, cement, sheet metal etc. This practice, a reminder of the way schools were built under Nyerere, may explain the almost identical aspect of almost all the schools in the city. Moreover, the headmaster of Yombo declared: "*This school is owned by parents, they can decide if they want to improve its standards*" (interview with the headmaster of Yombo PS, January 1999). If parents do not agree, the headmaster must act like a businessman and try to motivate them. The last recourse is an appeal to the Ward Executive Officer, a municipal authority; a public, political and administrative notability if ever there was one! In his capacity as manager, the headmaster tried to reduce the charges paid by the parents. As for the construction work, when the banks refused to lend the school money, the headmaster knocked on the door of the neighbourhood church, which presented him with 300,000 Tsh. in 1998.

On the other hand, headmasters also try to erase social disparities that exist within their schools. At Changombe PS, the most destitute parents, selected according to the criteria of each neighbourhood Ward Office, are exempted from payment. On a schools level, there are systems of mutual aid, compensation and assistance for the most destitute parents and, on an institutional level, for the poorest schools.

However, the aid is not sufficient; today, many people are saying that the government is paying nothing except salaries. The schools must thus find new partnerships: embassies, NGO', neighbourhood institutions such as hospitals or churches.

Different neighbourhoods, different conditions: the persistence of this logic regarding public schools creates an opposition between the centre with all its facilities and the often under-equipped outskirts (regarding public establishments). Segregation thus operates on two levels: firstly, on a social level, by being able to choose one's school, having access to private classes, being able to purchase workbooks or school handbooks etc., and secondly, on a spatial level, because certain urban areas are under-equipped. Pupils from the outlying schools must face this double division, unlike children whose parents belong to a more well-to-do socio-economic class.

The schools that were investigated structured space in very different ways from one neighbourhood to the next. Principally, the modes of this structuring process have as a corollary the parents' sense of belonging, which partially determines children's level of education. Despite a few rare exceptions, very few pupils from schools on the periphery will go on to the secondary level. Socio-spatial discrimination thus reaches a high intensity level. All things considered, Dar es Salaam's public schools proved not to be a homogenizing element. Moreover, the phenomenon probably gets worse in an urban space where private establishments develop very rapidly.

III – ROLE PLAYERS IN SCHOOL: URBAN PRACTICE AND CITY REPRESENTATIONS

Interviews conducted with teachers and pupils serve as a basis for the analysis of spatial practices and representations of the role players in education. Firstly, attention must be focused on a section of the city dwellers (the pupils) whose customs have not been entrenched and who do not have in-depth knowledge of urban space. It also means analyzing the established relations between adults (teachers, pupils' parents) and their space and in so doing having a different vision of the city. Lastly, it is knowing which elements give structure to Dar es Salaam according to the pupils. Is the school one of these?

A. Teachers' living space: an example to illustrate life in the city

Studying a living space makes it possible to discern the landmarks of urbanity. The landmarks of teachers' lives are interesting because they belong to a middle class, which represents part of Dar es Salaam's inhabitants. We can take the example of a teacher from Yombo PS. Teacher Modest comes from Kilimanjaro region where her family lives. However, she herself lives and works in Kiwalani. She is married, about thirty years old, and has two children attending a private school. Everyday, she goes to school on foot (about 15

minutes). It is a clean and peaceful neighbourhood and the modest houses are well-maintained. You know that you are in the urban outskirts by the state of the (dirt) roads, the lush vegetation growing wild and the small number of motorized vehicles. Of the 45 teachers at this school, only three do not live in a nearby neighbourhood. They live in Ukonga, Kipawa and Buzu, which are nevertheless adjoining neighbourhoods. Broadly speaking, teachers live in the neighbourhood where they teach. The same set-up is repeated at Mikocheni PS: 29 teachers out of 36 live in that neighbourhood. For transport reasons, teachers try to live close to schools located in the outskirts.

Teacher Modest's Swahili-type house is enclosed by walls, a sign of a certain social standing. Although enclosure walls may be a security measure, it is also the privilege of the more well-to-do population, especially in this outlying Swahili neighbourhood. She and her husband own a small shop (*duka*). The revenue from this small business ensures a higher standard of living and will be a source of income when they retire. The existence of this parallel business shows that complementary financial strategies are put in place. Teacher Modest circulates within a relatively limited space, that of the neighbourhood. That is where she owns a house, where she is employed, has an extra means of income, her friends and attends the church situated close to the school. It is a space she masters well, because it is signposted with meaningful social and professional landmarks. She completes this territory punctuated by living space by visiting another more useful space. Once a week she usually goes to the big Kariakoo market. It's the city's biggest market, located about 30 minutes by *daladala* from Kiwalani. To many teachers (especially women), this Dar es Salaam landmark is regarded as a key space, a meeting place, a place of conviviality. In contrast to life in Kiwalani, it represents a reason to leave the neighbourhood, and is a perfect illustration of urban and commercial hustle and bustle; it is the image of an area of activity where the city's inhabitants converge.

When comparing Teacher Modest's living space with that of teachers living in the city centre, we can see that the experience of living in the outlying spaces may be more intense for their inhabitants. Here, the notion of territory takes on its full meaning. Moreover, and in a contradictory way, it may be because Dar es Salaam appears as a place where one only passes through. Because Teacher Modest has no desire to get to know the city from all angles, the living space she masters is anchored in her neighbourhood.

B. The city's pupils, the pupils' city: mental maps and representations

By means of questionnaires we wanted to show which zones were more or less attractive to primary and secondary pupils. Our objective was to detect the city's inner polarities so as to bring out the meaning given to certain urban spaces. To do this, we first asked secondary school pupils: "According to you, which neighbourhoods are the wealthiest, the liveliest, the most dangerous?"

As for the primary school pupils, we wanted to know which places they visited most, liked best and liked least. The answers obtained brought to light the image of a city of contrasts.

I. THE CITY SEEN BY SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS

To secondary school pupils, danger is clearly associated with Manzese: 42% of Kisutu PS's pupils do not like this neighbourhood, while 68% of Kibasila Secondary School's⁴ pupils consider it to be the most dangerous place in Dar es Salaam (Fig. 20 and 21). It is a vast, working-class residential area characterized by its very high density, Swahili houses and poor facilities in terms of basic infrastructure (water, electricity, schools, refuse collection etc.). Manzese used to be a village; it has since been swallowed up by uncontrolled urbanization. Manzese may be the city's biggest squatter area, which means that most inhabitants are not in possession of a title deed in due form. It is also the location of a big market for second-hand clothing, an activity which attracts a lot of people, a lot of hustle and bustle and sometimes a few problems. Hearsay plays a significant role here, because few pupils have actually gone there. It seems that crowds, hustle and bustle, precarious buildings and poverty are synonyms for danger. All the other zones considered as dangerous (Temeke, Mwanyamala, Yombo-Vituka and Magomeni) display the same "landscape of poverty" (Gervais-Lambony, 1994, p. 312).

The image of danger is also associated with the hustle and bustle of certain neighbourhoods such as Vingunguti (where one finds a working-class urban market), Mangomeni (an area of high residential and commercial density) and Kariakoo. Here the hustle and bustle reaches its peak: from morning to evening, small retailers, street vendors, fruit and vegetable sellers call out to potential clients. In these fast-paced neighbourhoods, theft, incidents and accidents are everyday occurrences, leading students to consider them as dangerous. Moreover, when secondary school pupils were questioned about what they considered to be typical about the city centre, many evoked the people and crowds in general, as well as the presence of thieves, beggars and street children. This area appears on the map as a dangerous and busy place. When the Posta *daladala* stop, the city's public transport platform is viewed on its own, it is simply seen as a busy area. Pupils have come to frequent the stop without mishap, while the city centre is still burdened with the reputation of being dangerous because of the drifting and shady crowds plaguing it. Thus, danger and bustle do not always intersect.


Neighbourhoods that are seen as busy are scattered to a large extent; there is not one that really stands out: the bustle factors are thus quite varied. The collective image is less distinct here. Firstly, there are those neighbourhoods that offer various leisure activities. Endowed with facilities and recreational

⁴ The names of the secondary schools will be followed by the abbreviation SS (secondary school) to distinguish them from the primary schools (PS).

installations, they attract people who want to relax: Coco Beach at Oyster Bay, the commercial centre, the Slipway at Msasani, the sport facilities of Upanga and the city centre, the luxury hotels or the bars of Masaki. Certain key activities guide student choices, such as Mwenge, the important *daladala* stop. The area could have had the same negative connotation as neighbourhoods such as Vinguguti or Magomeni, but despite its bustle (noise, street vendors, traders) it is not the case at all: its craft market attracts numerous tourists and has made this expanding neighbourhood famous (companies were set up in close proximity).

Knowledge of the well-to-do neighbourhoods is certainly that which corresponds best to objective reality. Four zones stand out clearly, grouping together the city's wealthiest inhabitants, without covering them all: Msasani, Oyster Bay, Mikocheni and Upanga. The urban shape of these spaces remains similar: a low density residential area where houses are easily customized, roads are tarred and not congested.

Figures 20 and 21: Dar es Salaam’s “dangerous” & “lively” areas



Densities here are the lowest in the city with 33 inhabitants per hectare at Oyster Bay, 36 at Mikocheni and 81 at Upanga.⁵ One can thus understand the perceptions of Kariakoo's city dwellers when considering that the density there easily exceeds 311 inhabitants per hectare. All things considered, the so-called well-to-do neighbourhoods are located more towards the northern parts of the city, along the Indian Ocean, while the more working-class zones are in the south, more towards the interior. Based on the questionnaires, a few other neighbourhoods also came up, although they did not rank very high. These included Kimara, Keko and Buguruni, to mention but a few. It may be that the answers came from students who found these neighbourhoods pleasant compared to other neighbourhoods, which they visited for different reasons.

By means of an analysis of secondary school pupils' urban practices and representations, it is possible to produce an image of the city that is peculiar to this population group. Admittedly, it is merely a partial image of Dar es Salaam, but it says something about the feeling and the values inspired by certain neighbourhoods. What about the primary school pupils?

2. Primary school pupils: a more contrasted view of the city

From the responses given, one sees quite a strong opposition between North and South. "Contrast is the everyday reality of underdeveloped countries, with the result that, in most cases, categories are extremely clear-cut" (Santos, 1971).


Thus, pupils from Yombo PS make a clear distinction between North and South when indicating the well-to-do neighbourhoods. On the one hand there is Msasani, the neighbourhood most often mentioned, but also Oyster Bay, Mikocheni and Mbezi. On the other hand, there is the southern part of the city where the more destitute and poorest people supposedly live: neighbourhoods such as Tandika, Kipawa and Kiwalani (Fig. No. 22 and 23). Children living on the distant outskirts often experience a sense of isolation in relation to the centre, the smart neighbourhoods and even the ocean. Here the concentration of unpopular neighbourhoods around the place of residence expresses the neighbourhood's obsidional position as well as, perhaps, the frustration of certain pupils who cannot move around as they would like to. They thus reject the surrounding spaces and run them down because they feel hemmed in by these confined spaces. To the pupils of this outlying institution, images of Dar es Salaam are characterized by this marked contrast. The same lay-out is found at Changombe PS: the unpopular neighbourhoods are concentrated in the Temeke district, intersecting with other areas such as Manzese and Kariakoo which are often associated with danger or bustle. The valued areas are also the so-called wealthy areas: 26% of Changombe's pupils cited Oyster Bay, 13% Mikocheni or Kunduchi.

Pupils from Kisutu and Olympio PS, well-to-do schools located in the city centre, gave answers that differed from those of the outlying school

5 Urban Planning Area, Dar es Salaam City Commission, 1998.

pupils. While the lesser-valued neighbourhoods remain quite concentrated and replicate those from other schools, the valued spaces are more dispersed. Thus, at Kisutu PS, Oyster Bay is cited by 4% of the pupils, Kijitonyama is next with the same proportion; Upanga is cited by 15% of the pupils and Mbagala by 8%.

Figures 22 and 23: The city's neighbourhoods of "preference" & "unpopular", Yombo Primary School



This wider range of valued areas is also found at Olympio PS. A conclusion has to be drawn: the contrasted nature of Dar es Salaam's image increases as children move out to outlying neighbourhoods. Although pupils from Kisutu and Olympio PS can list more places in the city, it is because they travel through the city more often (as we saw, the children from these two schools in the city centre live in extremely varied areas).

All of this corroborates the study of school integration into the fabric of construction and into the city. Outlying schools participate in the landscape and in the life of their neighbourhood and distinctly structure the spatial practices of their inhabitants. Their pupils have a contrasted vision of Dar es Salaam, because the urban areas known to them are often limited to the adjoining neighbourhoods and to the places they tend to visit.

3. From the street to the neighbourhood and to the city: the mental structuring of urban space


Using mind-maps as a point of departure seemed interesting to us to the extent that pupils necessarily have a very personal vision of Dar es Salaam. This category of city-dwellers apprehends the city in a much more differentiated way than adults. The mind-map does not correspond to the topographical map, but they both have the same function, to locate oneself in space. As this vision is subjective and not subjected to the strict rules of classic cartography, it illustrates the influence of places frequented on a daily basis. It also highlights the emotional value associated with certain places, the importance of personal experience, especially when influenced by pupils' customs, dreams and fantasies. By analyzing mind-maps, geographers can distinguish a first version of reality by studying the main orientations, the territorial limits and the boundaries; they can apprehend the spatial vision (reticular, global or areal) and recognize elements of spatial organization by means of roads, places and trajectories.

Generally speaking, spatial practices within a city become conspicuous around objects and processes such as locations, differentiations, limits, spatial continuums, distances, connections and interactions. They are as many indicators providing information about the urban experience, concretely as well as symbolically. Consequently, pupils are firstly able to name a large number of urban toponyms scattered all over the city, indicating a relative knowledge of the city as a whole. The city centre does not seem to constitute a hegemonic spatial landmark. This feature can probably be explained by the fact that children do not actually frequent the centre.

Kevin Lynch has demonstrated that, beyond their differences, urban representations are all structured by five element types: edges, nodes, paths, districts and landmarks. Pupils' representations of Dar es Salaam are no exception to the rule. The maps they drew up fall mainly into two categories. The drawings carried out by the pupils all evoke the importance of the

neighbourhood as a place of life, its position within the city and within their everyday lives. “The neighbourhood, [...] is a place of spontaneity, of automatic reflexes in practice and in the course of encounters” (Moles and Rohmer, 1978). At Mikocheni PS, one finds this same situation on many of the maps. The neighbourhood, which sometimes extends to the neighbouring areas, takes precedence over the remainder of the city. Pupils do not describe Mikocheni as much as they locate it: it is about an entity in its own right (fig. 24). On the contrary, pupils from Olympio PS, drew more targeted maps, not indicating their neighbourhood in general, but precise points, landmarks which structure urban space and which are found in various drawings: the Mwenge church, the Karibu Hotel at Oyster Bay and the United States embassy.

Figure 24 – Drawings by the Mikocheni pupils




Source: Interviews with pupils, Dar es Salaam, 1998 – 1999.

In numerous cases the schools also appear on the maps, proving that they are an essential landmark in the vision of the city and a major element for social success (Fig. 25). All things considered, the neighbourhood is a very

important entity which is perceived more or less globally, depending on the pupils: a pupil from Mikocheni PS will say that he lives in Mikocheni while a pupil from Olympio PS will say that he lives in such and such a street opposite such and such a place.

Figure 25 ; Drawings by the Olympio pupils




Source: Interviews with pupils, Dar es Salaam, 1998 – 1999.

The city often constitutes a reticulated space marked by places that are frequented and structured by transport infrastructures on a regular basis. Drawings by Changombe PS pupils are interesting because they reflect the importance of communication routes: the various frequented spaces are not just positioned on the maps, but are linked by main roads, such as Mandela road, which serves a large part of the Temeke district. It is thus a reticulated space, structured by crossroads and railway lines (Tazara station sometimes appears, and secondary school pupils often draw the tracks), as well as by junctions and rivers (Fig. 26).

Secondary school pupils evolve in an environment where they master certain places, such as libraries (International Tanganyika Library), churches, sport clubs or places where they receive private lessons. That is why their drawings


By means of the steady influx and the pendular migration thus created, schools take part in giving structure to the networks. By the extent of its integration into the landscape, its functionality and various utilities, the school contributes to the formation of urban territory (others will use the term 'neighbourhood school').

Figure 27 ; Drawing by secondary school pupils



Source: Interviews with pupils, Dar es Salaam, 1998 – 1999.

Figure 28 ; Drawing by secondary school pupils



Source: Interviews with pupils, Dar es Salaam, 1998 – 1999.

Urban Transport: following the course of free enterprise

Pascal Pochet and Lourdes Diaz Oliveira

Dar es Salaam's urban transport sector makes for interesting study on two accounts. It provides a good example of the economic and political difficulties experienced by Africa's major cities in managing public services and infrastructures within a context of rapidly growing needs and a shortage of public financing. However, in Dar es Salaam especially, an analysis of how management of the roads infrastructure and collective transport services is evolving also indicates a strong orientation towards a free-market model. The failure of the "socialism from the bottom up"-period seems to have prepared the way for deregulation "from the bottom up", with increasing requests for assistance to private role-players, companies, users and associations from the failing public authorities, which have produced mixed results for the moment.

I - INFRASTRUCTURES: THE WITHDRAWAL OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Various inventories of Dar es Salaam's roads capacity concur that the entire network covers about 1,100 km, of which approximately 40% is tarred (Transurb Consult, Inrets, 1991; Halla, 1992a; Rwebangira, 1993). Those sections of the roads network that are in good condition and wide enough for motorized travel between neighbourhoods are quite limited; about 150km in total. They consist mainly of four large, radial highways and two links running at right angles (Fig. 29).

This main roads network, which is the responsibility of the central government, has had the advantage of significant repair work and a widening of the carriageway since the beginning of the 1990's. At the time, according to certain assessments, two thirds of the surfaced network were in need of either a whole new surface or of total reconstruction (Rwebangira, 1993). Financed by the Japanese, the aim of the road works was to facilitate exchanges between areas of economic activity and the peripheral residential areas. Although certain main roads tend to become congested during peak hours currently, the good general condition of the main network contrasts with the increasingly obvious degradation of the peripheral neighbourhoods' inner access roads in the course of the past ten years.

Certainly, in a geographical context characterized by numerous rivers creating the impression of a multiple barrier effect (especially during the rainy season), the difficulty of establishing easy access beyond the large, radial

highways is nothing new (Banyikwa, 1988; Halla, 1992a). In this city with its equatorial climate, some of the factors aggravating the damage caused by the heavy rains which fall from April to June leading to road deterioration include a lack of regular network maintenance, no canals to evacuate rainwater or waste or a clogging up of existing canals, sand or even refuse accumulating next to the road and overloaded vehicles driving on untarred roads. During this season, the increase in rut erosion presents an insurmountable obstacle for vehicles in several places. Since the 1980's, these handicaps have been made worse by the effects of the economic crisis on the national budget.

Since then, the human and material resources of the various public institutions responsible for the sector have deteriorated even further. This is especially true in the case of the City Council. Whatever the vicissitudes of its administrative existence, it is clear that the financial means at its disposal have always been markedly insufficient. In an ideological context where, for a long time, cities were penalized to the detriment of the countryside, Dar es Salaam was penalized to the detriment of the country's other cities and the transport sector to the detriment of the other sectors, central government subsidies were unable to compensate for the huge inadequacy of other financial sources, especially in local tax collection (Raison, 1994). During the 1980's, central government funds allocated for the maintenance of the roads network dropped significantly, covering only about 5 to 10 % of the city's actual needs, while the sectional allocation of these resources was not optimal (Halla, 1992b). Even if, at present, tax collection seems to be more profitable, the amounts thus obtained are still inadequate compared to the needs.


Therefore, there is always the temptation to try and raise other types of financing, as a supplement to (or instead of) loans or donations granted by international backers. There are two possible strategies: the first depends directly on the residents; the second is subject to the privatization of certain activity segments.

A. The roads network: capitalism from the bottom up?

The end result of the advanced deterioration of access roads to the residential areas and the slow progress of the repair programs has been an increasing number of residents from certain neighbourhoods contributing financially to road repairs or even doing it themselves. Similar initiatives have become a reality and are in progress in the areas of Kijitonyama, Tabata and Kimanga. In Mbezi and Mikocheni B, inhabitants have come together to buy truckloads of gravel to fill up the numerous potholes in the road. In Sinza, inhabitants are joining hands to name streets or pay for the painting of road signs.

To compensate for the incompetence of the authorities, local associations or Community Based Organizations (CBO) are emerging in certain zones to promote the economic or environmental development of their area.

Figure 29: Dar es Salaam : main urban facilities



The increasing importance of NGO's and especially basic organizations providing various services such as education, health, refuse collection or even justice in urban areas is a widespread phenomenon at least in East Africa (Therkildsen, Semboja, 1995).

Sometimes, before projects are carried out, the substitution reaches a point where the CBO's become the interlocutors of the international backers and introduce local toll-gates to finance maintenance of the access roads to certain neighbourhoods once repairs have been completed. These practices, which are

becoming widespread, have the advantage of a common understanding with local authorities, as has been the case in Hanna Nassif in Mabibo.

The development of this practice is also the result of a doctrinal transformation. The different role-players (local authorities and international backers) are now part of a logical process that involves a participatory approach. The state no longer has the means to be a purveyor of capital and has to become a "facilitator" of non-governmental organization actions. Since the beginning of the 1990's (Munishi, 1995), the role played by the NGO's and especially the local associations, considered to be better equipped to deal with "real" needs (Habitat, 1995b), has been reasserted. Indeed, the role played by communities is becoming a central one, not only because of emerging priorities, but also because of their financing! Thus, as part of the *Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project* (SDP) set up in 1993 under the aegis of Habitat to validate their interest in particular projects, local communities have to supply the land (if needs be) and above all contribute at least 20% to the investment and agree to take total financial charge of operations and maintenance. The increasing importance of NGO's and especially basic organizations providing various services such as education, health, refuse collection or even justice in urban areas is a widespread phenomenon in East-Africa at least (Therkildsen, Semboja, 1995).

Did Tanzania actually move from bottom-up-socialism to bottom-up-capitalism in just a few years? The status and role of the CBO's, which are currently put forward as a cure-all, are not without ambiguity: their members are often civil servants, and when the projects of these associations turn out to be ambitious, they are very much dependant on foreign donors, which puts quite a different slant on their apparent self-organization. In addition, in certain sectors at least they seem to experience the same difficulties as the State they are supposed to replace. Therefore, for many years, getting the State to maintain the roads network was more difficult than obtaining the financing for its construction. It would seem that, as far as the education sector is concerned, basic organizations release the funds for building schools more readily than the cost of running them (Ishumi, 1995). As regards the roads infrastructure, there is a great risk that the transfer of responsibilities and expenses from the public to the private sector will not really solve the problems of coherence within the time-frame of the actions that have been undertaken.

More profoundly, however, this type of financing seems unable to ensure the necessary cross-subsidization on an urban level between the disadvantaged enclaves and the "rich" neighbourhoods. Beyond considerations of principle (for example, justifying the fact that 41% of Mabibo's residents refuse to pay for services they consider to be part of the authorities' responsibilities, Habitat, 1995a), residents from certain disadvantaged areas such as Vingunguti do not have the budgets to pay for projects requiring minimum amounts. In an effort to improve the roads network, the local association of Tanki Bovu set the share at 15,000 Tsh, the equivalent of a minimum monthly wage, (payable in

instalments) to be paid by each household. During the mid-1998's, in Mabibo, toll was fixed at 200 Tsh for a car and 500 Tsh for trucks, while a public transport ticket cost 150 Tsh (100 Tsh is the equivalent of 0.9 French francs). Thus, it seems difficult to implement a project when its interest is measured by its future beneficiaries' agreement to pay, when those same people find themselves on the threshold of absolute poverty. The inevitable result is a widening of the gap between sectors with the type of quality infrastructures that are able to support fast-moving, motorized traffic, and the slums, where the roads network is only suitable for walking or, in the best-case scenario, for bicycles.

To compensate for the insignificance of territorial community budgets, another strategy implemented by the authorities depends on the privatization of certain activities, such as parking space management.

B. Parking: choosing to privatize

At the beginning of the 1990's, parking in the city centre started posing a problem. Although it is difficult to give an exact estimation of the number of vehicles on Dar's roads (probably 70,000, or fewer than 10% of the equipped households), registration and vehicle import indicators show that it is in a growth phase. Demand for parking is on the increase, while previous regulations have become obsolete. It is the users who bear the brunt, for although there are approximately 2,500 parking spaces along the public highway, a large proportion has been diverted from its initial use: some have become coach stations and parking spaces for intercity public transport while others are occupied by street hawkers. There is hardly anything in it for the municipality either, because there are no financial returns to be collected from parking on the public highway. In the mid-1990's, a lack of financial and human resources to take charge of this function and the impossibility of entrusting it to the initiative of local associations led authorities to accept a solution of privatization, particularly since it is a potentially profitable activity.

Within the scope of the SDP, paid parking was introduced in 1997 during the overhaul of the city centre's traffic programme. Phase one of the operation focuses on the city centre and makes provision for 3,200 parking spaces; an extension to Kariakoo is also in the pipeline. The City Commission has entrusted the management of the system to a private company called the Tanzania Parking System (TPS). The TPS has undertaken to put in place the necessary technical tools (ticket booths, parking ticket machines, signs, road markings plus computerized monitoring of its utilization) and to transfer an additional 500 million Tsh per year (a quarter of the takings) to the authorities, an amount earmarked for improving the roads network. The hourly tariffs, which apply between 7h and 18h, vary according to the location of the parking: from 300 Tsh in the hypercentre's worst conflict areas, to 150 Tsh in the remainder of the hypercentre and 100 Tsh on other city centre streets; offenders are liable to pay a fine and have their vehicle immobilized or even towed away.

From a user's perspective, privatization has produced mixed reactions. To begin with, residents complain about the absence of reduced tariffs or subscription options for resident while motorists also criticize the inflated tariffs. What is more, from one day to the next, many motorists who were either civil servants or parastatal business employees working in the hypercentre, witnessed their usual parking space change hands, from that of their employer to that of the TPS: they consider this "gift" to a private enterprise which has invested precious little to be an unjustified one. Lastly, pedestrians are also expressing their discontent, which is widely covered by the local press. Indeed, the increase in parking spaces is also because certain pedestrian walkways (which have now been reserved for parking) were called into question, in total contradiction with efforts made in favour of non-motorized modes of transport. Generally, the operation does not appear to have acted as a deterrent to using vehicles, in fact quite the opposite: strategies to get around it were gradually being put in place. To quote Touré's (1985) remark about Abidjan, seeing as imagination always comes to the rescue of "particular circumstances", a new job was invented which spared "rich" motorists the expense of paying for parking without having to pay a fine: indeed, lookouts are now paid by users to alert them about the arrival of TPS inspectors!

From the authorities' point of view, a balance sheet must still be drawn up. As far as motorized traffic and congestion reduction are concerned, results seem to have been tenuous; however to the credit of privatization, the city is guaranteed certain monetary returns. Nevertheless, city dwellers' intense dissatisfaction must be noted. At the moment, there may be no serious political consequences, since the City Commission does not have to answer to the voters, but what will happen once the city returns to a common regime and an elected municipal council is put in place? In any case, it seems difficult to extend the privatization strategy to network construction. However, scanty public budgets and the vagary of international funding as much as the impossibility of mobilizing the necessary funding from the all too poor population, translate into a highly differentiated spatial coverage of the roads network, consolidated by those characteristics that are peculiar to the present public transport offer.

II - PUBLIC TRANSPORT: THE INDOMITABLE RISE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Like many developing countries, various local and central administrations play a part in the urban public transport sectors, sometimes without the necessary coordination. In theory, the Dar es Salaam City Council is responsible for working out an urban transport strategy, but its role is extremely limited. In addition, while it has held 51% of the UDA public transport company shares since 1984, it has never acted like a majority shareholder. The Ministry of Communications and Transport is supported by two organizations:

the National Transport Corporation (NTC), a parastatal society under its supervision which is also UDA's second shareholder with the authority to advise and consult not only the UDA but also the regional transport companies (planning, financing and auditing). The other is Central Transport Licensing Authority (CTLA), which delivers transport licences to private operators and assumes responsibility for defining and laying out the routes served by the registered companies. Other public institutions are also involved, but their field of action is more limited. All these organizations are faced with the same handicap as those in charge of roads infrastructures: insufficiency of human and material resources. Therefore, in 1990, the Ministry of Home Affairs appointed a hundred traffic officers in Dar es Salaam (Rwebangira, 1993). Likewise, CTLA civil servants admit inability to control the activities of the transport carriers, due to a lack of staff. The gap between flaunted ambitions and practice is even more striking when one looks in detail at the way the sector functions.

A. UDA, chronicle of a slow death

The terms that come to mind to describe Dar es Salaam's transport situation today translate residents' discontent and dissatisfaction in the face of qualitative and quantitative shortcomings in the supply, however this was not always the case. In the mid-1980's, Dar's oldest residents still recalled the quality of public transport twenty years previously with some nostalgia (Sporrek, 1985). In 1967, in a city of about 300,000 inhabitants, 200 to 300 buses ran daily, respectful of the timetables and offering a service to almost the entire urban area. Certainly, the city's growth (the population has multiplied by ten) is not without bearing on this deterioration of the service. But other factors have also greatly contributed to the widening gap between city dwellers' needs and the services offered by the carriers. There are two important dates when relating the main stages of this evolution.

The first date that stands out is 1970 when the Dar es Salaam Motors Transport Company (DMT), a private British company that had provided Tanganyika's urban and intercity public transport up to that point was nationalized. This was soon after the Arusha declaration, at the height of the huge wave of nationalisations intended to enable the country to embrace socialism by relying on its own strengths. Transport could not be left to foreigners therefore the government created the National Transport Corporation, a state company responsible for public transport on a national scale.

The second chosen date is a more recent one. The intercity transport (entrusted to KAMATA) was separated from the urban service, delegated as the responsibility of UDA (Shirika La Usafiri Dar es Salaam) in 1974. Moving from one state company to two had little effect on the service provided; the real decline of the government-owned company started later, in 1975 according

to Stren (1993), in 1983 according to Maunder and Fouracre (1987). In 1983, authorisation was also granted for a private public transport company, which had been operational for ten years, but had started to compete openly with UDA. However 1985 should be marked as a pivotal time. Indeed, when UDA had to face the challenge of private transport services and the marked disinterest of its supervisors, it sunk into a slow decline. In addition, although trade liberalization had reached a decisive point much earlier, in 1977, Julius Nyerere's departure in November 1985 marked the "end of an era" (Martin, 1988). Liberalization would only increase during the second half of the decade after the implementation of the First Structural Adjustment Plan (1983-1986), before gaining momentum during Ali Hassan Mwinyi's second presidential term of office, which translated into an uncontrolled mushrooming of private transport.

1. 1970-1985, From a rightful monopoly to de facto competition

At the beginning of the 1970's, UDA buses were nicknamed the "lions of the road". Their supremacy had not yet been contested by the timid appearance in 1972 of private buses, the *thumni-thumni*, named after the passenger fare of 0.5Tsh. They were prohibited in 1975, before the advent of economic liberalization.

And yet, judging by various indicators, public supply was unable to satisfy the demand. First, there was the notable gap between public and private tariffs, a ratio of 1 to 2.5, indicating that a huge part of the population was prepared to pay more for better transport; also the swift reappearance of the previously banned private operators under the name of *Sanya Sanya*, a nickname implied a process of rapid enrichment by all available means (Banyikwa, 1988); and finally, the acknowledgement of UDA's inability to get a sufficient number of vehicles out of the depots on a daily basis. In 1976, on average, only 175 buses out of an entire fleet of 325 serviced the city's streets; in the absence of private carriers, it was the truck drivers who sporadically offered to transport passengers (Sporrek, 1985). In less than ten years, from 1967 to 1976, the city's population more than doubled, the surface area increased considerably, travelling distances got longer, but the number of buses decreased. Yet, this did not seem to have a significant effect on UDA's monopoly.

The beginning of the 1980's was a crisis-era. In 1983, after two devaluations (in 1982 and 1983), the country accepted FMI recommendations and the buying power of the city dwellers, more so than that of the country people, collapsed in the face of the combined effects of salary freezes¹, an increase in the price of local produce and a rise in the price of imported goods. At the same time, a parallel economy was developing, supplementing household

¹ According to Elson (1992), city dwellers on a payroll probably lost 50% of their net income between 1980 and 1984. The GNP per inhabitant fell from 1,328 Tsh in 1976 to 1975 to 1,175 Tsh in 1985 (Maunder, Fouracre, 1987).

revenues and offering goods and services that were indispensable to daily life. This intervention acted as an intermediary for the controlled sector that was incapable of satisfying the city dwellers' needs. Urban transport would follow the same route.

At first glance, towards the mid-1980's, UDA seemed to withstand the crisis well. Indeed, after a decrease in the second half of the 1970's, their fleet seemed to stabilize around 200 vehicles. However, management problems and in particular their incapability to obtain funds from the authorities to buy the necessary spare parts for proper vehicle maintenance resulted in the daily mobilization of only one out of every two vehicles. Other indicators were even less satisfactory. Thus the kilometres covered by the buses on an annual basis decreased slightly from one year to the next with number of users clearly dropping. There should be no illusion about the UDA's apparent service maintenance during the first half of the 1980's; in fact, in relative terms, it tallies with a perceptible erosion of the state-owned company's market shares, whether it is attributed to population growth or measured according to the strong growth of its competitors.

Private transport was always available on the streets of Dar es Salaam; it was still illegal, but harder than ever. Inexpensive Korean pick-up vans were especially imported and the bodies cheaply re-fitted locally for passenger transport. Tariffs gradually increased, reaching 5 Tsh. in 1981. The vans were nicknamed *daladalas*, from the Swahili word for the 5 Tsh. coin. They were authorized in 1983 and 102 *daladalas* obtained a concession to operate according to a fixed service itinerary. Factors which reduced operation costs and insured profitability included frequently faulty vehicle maintenance, little respect for the highway code and an absence of time-table constraints which enabled them to "disappear" during off-peak hours (of little economic interest to operators).

D.C. Martin observes that liberalization at the beginning of the 1980's consequently translated into a second economic activity for certain members of the working population, especially those on a payroll, and into the acquisition of a *daladala*, of which the "return will be very high" (Martin, 1988:178). It enabled the most comfortably off, to curb the drop in buying power resulting from the economic crisis.

The high profitability of this line of business explains why, only a few months after their legalization, the number of *daladalas* had practically doubled so that in 1985 there were probably close to 300. Still, demand was such that, compared to the service provided by UDA, a private taxi industry also developed alongside the *daladalas*. Also companies organized transport for their own staff from their residences to the office and a school bus service to certain institutions. These practices are difficult to quantify since, according to Banyikwa (1988), there were approximately 120 buses providing company transport service in 1985, whereas Stren (1993) estimates that the fleet

consisted of more than 450 vehicles (of various sizes), representing 91% of UDA's capacity. What is more noteworthy than the illusory nature of exact figures, is the capacity offered by the competition equalled that of UDA.

One should, however, guard against hastily opposing a battered official sector and a flourishing parallel economy. Indeed, the latter does compensate for the shortcomings of the former, but 'interweaving' would be a more appropriate term. Firstly, because the company transport service represented an intermediary form that challenged UDA's monopoly from within public structures, ministries or parastatal companies. Also, in many cases, *daladala* owners were recruited from the salaried staff of these same ministries or parastatal companies. From UDA's point of view the balance sheet was, however, less complex. Over a period of ten years, with little or no support or supervision, the company went from a rightful if not de facto monopoly to fierce competition. As far as UDA was concerned, the following years would even be worse.

2. Rapid growth in the self-employment sector since 1985

A study by Maunder and Fouracre (1987) makes it is possible to characterize Dar's public transport at the beginning of this second period. Almost 400 buses (100 of them public) were running on a daily basis, along with 2 100 taxis. When considering demand or use, *daladalas* appeared to be the principal mode of public transport. UDA attracted less than 30% of the users, a figure that could have been even lower if it were possible to measure the use of illegal *daladalas*. However, UDA buses were used extensively whereby the average number of passengers transported per day and per bus, as well as the number of kilometres covered were particularly high for a third world city. But the company, which had a network of 55 routes at its disposal for only about a hundred buses that were operational on a daily basis, was being challenged on 23 of these routes by the *daladalas* which ran a much more regular service for a slightly higher price (6 Tsh. against UDA's 4 Tsh). The constraints on the *daladalas* were not uncommon: almost a quarter of the fleet was still not registered although a license was granted for a given itinerary, tariffs were set by public authorities and schoolchildren paid a reduced tariff of 1 Tsh. In 1987, the service remained marked by a notable deficit translating into vehicle overload, long waiting times on the least busy routes (where there were no *daladalas*, or hardly any) and the possibility for the operators to "choose" their customers. Thus schoolchildren in uniform were very often turned away by drivers looking for more profitable clients.

The configuration of the service evolved rapidly. Despite a lack of precise information, the end of the 1980's was marked by the sharp decline of UDA, which attracted little more than 10% of the demand, and especially by the recognition of illegal *daladalas*, which became the principal mode of public transport, accounting for 48% of all trips against 42% by the registered

daladalas (Transurb Consult, Inrets, 1991). Added to this were about 3,000 taxis. In 1991, there were about a thousand *daladalas*, half of them illegal. All types and sizes of vehicles were used (including lorries or rebuilt pick-up trucks), and they were quickly adapted to the spatial evolution of the demand. On the contrary, UDA's bus service, always keeping rigidly to fixed itineraries, involved no more than 25 routes.

In 1995, this number dropped to 12 routes serviced by 72 vehicles, while the city was innervated on a daily basis by an average of 2,000 *daladalas* on an 87 route-network plus 1,500 taxis registered with the authorities. Since then, the number of *daladalas* has continued to increase, stabilizing in 1997 at around 3,000 to 3,500 vehicles operating on a daily basis, of which about a third is illegal. In any case, the UDA fleet, made up of fewer than 40 buses in 1998, seems laughable, especially as the private sector has consolidated quite a number of taxis, whether authorized or pirate (a quarter, according to sources that preferred anonymity). However, according to the few available statistics, their number seems to be on the decrease since the beginning of the 1990's. This double movement of a sharp increase in the number of *daladala* routes and the comparative disappearance of the taxis was made possible to a great extent by highway maintenance's 1994-96 rehabilitation effort to make it physically practicable for buses and mini-buses to use roads which, due to their advanced state of deterioration, had only been accessible to taxis until then.

The service offered by the *daladalas* is characterized by an extremely radial configuration, basically concentrating on the main roads. The ten main terminals are situated either in the centre or at the junctions of the main roads network (fig. 2). There are very few routes that do not depart from or arrive at one of these terminals. Furthermore, more than two out of three buses stop in the inner suburbs. There are few mini-buses venturing into the outlying areas and the service seems to become increasingly limited as one moves away from the large urban motorways and the two bypasses. Secondary itineraries in outlying zones, where demand is not as high or where access is difficult, have a less extensive and inferior quality service. These routes are often serviced by the oldest mini-buses which have become less competitive on the main roads or by illegal sedans serving as public taxis, or even 4x4 vehicles, when the condition of the road has greatly deteriorated.

Consequently, Dar's public transport evolved within ten years, from a lack of service capacity to a relative overcapacity. Relative only because service levels on the main roads no longer seem to pose a problem but the shortcomings remain obvious as soon as one leaves the tarred road and ventures into the neighbourhoods or when one has the ill fortune to be wearing a school uniform. The social will displayed by the authorities to fix a specific tariff for schoolchildren is actually not without uncertainty: because this reduction is not compensated, its application depends on little more than the goodwill of

the operators. One only has to skim through Dar's press to realize that this goodwill does not carry much weight compared to profit demands and that the problem is a recurring one. There is no lack of incidents, ranging from news items (schoolchildren beaten up by drivers' assistants or drivers attacked by students) to society columns (dinners in support of financing the purchase of school buses) and even the sex pages (female students sexually harassed by drivers or their assistants). However, the conclusion of this state of affairs is suggested on the financial pages (for example, the failure of the School Bus Project in 1995) and will remain so providing the authorities refuse to accept that public service obligations involve monetary compensation.

There is now discussion of privatizing UDA. But by the summer of 1998, the sale of 75% of the company's shares planned for July 1997 had not yet taken place. This is not surprising, given that the viability of operating a structured company in a context marked by a large number of small, widely deregulated operators seems poor.

B. The *daladalas*, a speculative, small-scale line of business

The restriction of activities pertaining to the urban transport of passengers is in fact quite limited. Since the fixing of tariffs was abolished by public authorities in the course of 1997, it refers almost exclusively to the issuing of licences for this activity. The CTLA supplies the licences to contractor candidates who apply for them on presentation of the car registration book and insurance documents, the owner's tax certificate and a certificate of the vehicle's technical compliance (issued by the police) on first request. The cost of the licence depends on the vehicle's capacity (10,000 Tsh up to a fifteen-seater, 20,000 Tsh for 15 to 25 seats, 35,000 Tsh. for 25 to 65 seats, to which 1,000 Tsh for the application and 2,000 Tsh. for the technical control certificate must be added), but remains modest in comparison with vehicle prices (5 to 6 million Tsh in 1998). At first the licence is valid for six months and can be renewed thereafter for periods of two years. The candidate must indicate the route he wishes to service, but afterwards he may change routes without any additional formalities, as there is no control over the conditions of service provision. Besides, the new itineraries being applied for have often been tested earlier, "pirate fashion", by operators who are already active on those routes.

In the mid-1980's, soon after the legalization of *daladala* activities, the CTLA apparently tried to limit this development because of the weight carried by UDA (Maunder, Fouracre, 1987), but today admission to this sector is absolutely free. Also, because new vehicles that are authorized to operate are registered manually, the CTLA does not know which vehicles are in circulation at a given date. Besides unauthorized vehicles, with or without false papers, there is no indication of the frequent exits from the system. As in the case of

other African cities, the public transport service found itself totally unrestricted in the 1990's.

1. A fragmented and less than professionalized sector

Due to a lack of statistics it is not possible to deal with the structure of the *daladala* sector, i.e. company characteristics and the number of vehicles. Moreover, there is little information, even of a qualitative nature, filtering through from within the sector regarding inter-company relations, connections between professional trade unions and companies and the internal running of the latter. However, it is possible to mention a few of the major running features concerning the *daladala* owners, the transport crews and the vehicles themselves.

Historically, private service depends on micro-enterprise policies. Therefore, in 1987, 80% of the owners had only one vehicle, 10% had two vehicles, 7% had three and only 3% had four vehicles or more (Maunder, Fouracre, 1987). In 1990, the leading owner had only 7 vehicles. The sector's configuration does not seem to have evolved towards a greater concentration, quite the reverse. By far, the majority of owners currently have only one or two vehicles at their disposal and those with three are rare. Hence the profession of *daladala* owner like that of taxi owner is quite disorganized, especially because the owners' organization, MUWADA, never seemed to be a powerful pressure group. Ever since the tariff deregulation, an initiative supported by MUWADA moreover, their activities amount to denouncing to no great avail the authorities' attitude towards the *daladalas*, harassment during checks, issuing tickets or even confiscating vehicles for a few hours or days in the case of an offence.

The sector's fragmentation is closely linked to the origins of invested capital. Indeed, although statutory constraints are practically non-existent, access to the sector is limited on the other hand by the required monetary contribution. The high price of the vehicles and the very weak credit offer forces the potential buyer to have almost the entire investment at his disposal to pay in cash. For the owners, it is somewhat a secondary activity, which enables them to get rapid returns on money accumulated within the context of another principle activity, by entrusting the vehicle to a driver, and without necessarily reinvesting the profits in urban transport. It is difficult to provide a more precise socio-economic owner profile: however, according to sources, those mentioned include people in high government positions, parastatal companies or the private sector, if not rich traders or members of certain ethnic groups considered as economically powerful (Indians, Asians and the Chagga, to mention but a few), as well as retired civil servants using their severance pay to buy a vehicle. Although the profile of the *daladala* owner remains blurred, there is no doubt however that he comes from the well-to-do level of society but may not belong to a specific ethnic group, unlike what is happening in Kenya for example, where the sector remains monopolized to a large extent by the *Kikuyu* elite (Grignon, 1997). However, the current overcapacity on the most

profitable routes is likely to challenge the reputation of a highly profitable sector and lead to greater professionalization of this activity.

2. *Working conditions: between exploitation and system D*

The vehicle owner is rarely the person operating it. In 1987, less than 3% of the drivers were also owners (Maunder, Fouracre, 1987), and this rate has probably not changed much since then. There is little variation in cost and task distribution between owner and driver. The former must pay the taxes, insurance (between 5 and 10% of the purchase price), tyres, maintenance, and vehicle repairs. In return, the *daladala* drivers, like the taxi drivers, are “quota drivers”, i.e. they have to pay rental to the owner every night (Nguma, 1993), the amount of which depends on the vehicle type: 10,000 Tsh. for a taxi, between 20,000 and 25,000 Tsh. for a mini-bus, from 30,000 to 35,000 Tsh for a bigger vehicle such as a 40-seater DCM. Fuel costs are borne by the driver, as well as paying the indispensable fare collector. The latter ensures that transport fares are collected from the commuters and touts for customers at the intermediary stops.² Because the total of the day’s takings depends partly on his efficiency, the driver, who pays him directly (100-150 Tsh. per trip), tries to maintain close relations with him with regard to confidence, collaboration and even complicity, and generally chooses him from amongst his own family or acquaintances ... There is one last contributor who must be mentioned, the route tout whose role at every terminus is to fill the vehicles as quickly as possible in the absence of any strict turn-taking system.

Daladala drivers work at least 10 hours a day, breaks included (Sawaka, 1996), which means between 10 and 15 round-trips per day, 6 or 7 days a week. It is in their interest to keep driving for as long as possible in order to maximize their turnover, because their own income depends directly on the daily takings, amounting to the difference between the fares collected and the various expenses they have to pay (vehicle “rental”, payment of the fare collector and the tout, and fuel³). A similar system can be found in many other African cities: in Dakar, with its cars *rapides* (Teurnier, Mandon, 1994), in Nairobi, with its *matatus* (Grignon, 1997), in Bamako, with its *durunis* (PRADEILLES *et al.*, 1991) and even in Abidjan, with its *gbakas* (Godard, Teurnier, 1992). This has immediate implications in terms of service quality: aggressive driving, exceeding the authorized 50 km/h speed limit, completing only a part of the itinerary by dropping off passengers to make a rapid return to the terminus or, on the contrary, leaving the terminus with an empty vehicle so

2 These two functions are sometimes separated, in which case the tout is paid around 1,000 Tsh per day, an amount which he can increase by carrying passengers’ luggage or even collecting the fare for the trip from passengers missed by the collector inside the vehicle.

3 It is hardly surprising that 1998 saw the arrival of dealers selling fuel at prices lower than the official tariffs. Thus the supply chains emerged, starting at service stations where the calibration of the pumps was tampered with and stretching all the way to the small-scale retailers of Kilwa Road, some of whom have no hesitation in setting up shop a stone’s throw from the police station.

as to collect customers from the intermediary stops; operating on unauthorized routes, cramming in a maximum amount of passengers, limiting the number of schoolchildren transported in the vehicle and reducing the travel fare during slack periods or on certain parts of the itinerary. The bad quality of service is mainly due to the transport crews' lack of professionalism. Many of the drivers have little or no training or do not even have a driver's license (a forged license costs only 5,000 Tsh.). Furthermore, MUWADA regularly warns its members about this situation and advises them to check their drivers' papers with the police. This being the case, one can only note that there is a lack of professionalism on all sides.

The poor service quality also extends to the condition of the fleet. Although the *daladala* fleet was initially made up of large vehicles, most probably old UDA buses (KIRONDE, 1992), mini-buses (20-36 seats) soon took over, although their comfort left much to be desired: the nick-name *panya* (rats) was soon attached to certain vehicles, because they offered little space for passengers' legs and were poorly ventilated. Many second-hand mini-buses are imported from Japan and, because of the laxness of any technical control, are only more or less fixed up before flooding the market. The fleet is run-down, (about 80% of the *daladalas* are between 5 and 10 years old, and most of the taxis are more than 8 years old) not just because of the conditions of use (the state of the roads network, vehicle overloading, the way they drive), but also faulty maintenance. This can be explained in part by the heterogeneousness of the fleet and the lack of availability of certain spare parts (as well as their high prices!). But the causes must first be sought in businessmen's behavioural logic: It is not difficult to understand that in the short term, owners juggle with expenses by postponing or minimizing maintenance to reach that goal, in order to secure a return on their investment and maximize their revenue. In case of a police check, a compromise is reached at any rate cheaper than preventative maintenance, which however does not provide absolute certainty of avoiding police harassment. It is equally true that it will be a mistake in the long run, but speculative logic often leads to ignorance of this fact by focusing on the short term.

CONCLUSION

As far as urban transport and the economy as a whole are concerned, what prevails in Dar es Salaam today is liberalization logic. Institutions dating from the "socialism from the bottom up"-period have gradually been dismantled, regulatory or tariff interventions called into question or abandoned; and the only spheres of activity retained by public authorities are certain infrastructures and safety regulations. There are many reasons for this public withdrawal: a world-context conducive to liberalization, a pre-existing disinterest in the transport sector and the existence of a private sector which "more or less" functions.

The liberalization/privatization movement, which is in the process of imposing itself, is certainly not distinctively Tanzanian. The current international context and specifically the doctrine of the main sponsors, States or international bodies, is especially favourable to State withdrawal and putting forward the policy of a private sector freed of all constraints imposed by public authorities. . Beyond these doctrinal aspects, such a position can be supported and justified within the Tanzanian context by the contradiction between a previously expressed demand for a development strategy from the bottom up which for a long time was ubiquitous in the public discourse, and in fact the existence of planning processes largely dominated by the State to the detriment of local initiatives and people's participation (Eriksen, 1997). This discrepancy is all the more critical since public authorities do not have the essential financial resources to implement these plans. The current orientation tends to promote the development of a public-private partnership to supply and maintain infrastructures, improve the management capacities of the bodies concerned and favour cost recovery strategies by setting adequate tariffs (Halla, 1992a). However, the pending question remains whether this recovery must be total or perhaps only partial, as the answer may vary from one type of service to the next (schools, health, transport) within this type of logic, UDA's revitalization by the public authorities will imply a massive investment in order to build up a competitive fleet again and thus at the risk of a deficit and of subsidy demands from the operators, can be totally excluded, leaving a clear field for the *daladalas*, increasingly subjected to the law of supply and demand.

The lack of interest in the transport sector, which goes far beyond that of urban transport, became particularly clear during crisis periods. Thus the 1980's, marked by structural adjustment plans, were characterized by a decrease in public spending in favour of the transport sector in the Tanzanian state budget. However, this lack of interest dates back much further, since none of the three successive master development plans emphasized the organization of urban transport (Banyikwa, 1988). The 1970 nationalization of public transport companies proved to be nothing but an epiphenomenon which, far from being the result of reflections on the functions of urban transport or even bearing its premises, in fact formed part of a larger movement to establish state control over the economy, of which the sector necessarily formed a part. Conversely, the more recent *Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project* aims to promote more efficient urban management and is turned towards solving the sector's problems: it is looking for technical answers (developing highway maintenance and non-motorized transport, promoting innovative means of public transport) and also moving towards a more extensive liberalization of the sector, for example, by means of privatizing parking spaces. Once again, choices seem to rest on ideological considerations rather than in-depth analysis of the sector; the lack of interest as opposed to expert knowledge of transport demands is justified mainly by confidence in the market's regulatory mechanisms.

Lastly, public transport does function, somehow. The informal urban transport sector has succeeded in taking over from the shaky state-owned company, largely deprived of its means by its guardianship. This has made it possible to ensure a vital minimum for the city, i.e. to service the main roads linking (with some difficulty, at times) the residential areas and the business park without the help of any public subsidy. On the main radial itineraries carrying almost the entire flow, the service's flexibility to adapt made it possible to respond to growth demand. In many cases, the waiting time at the stops is shorter than during the UDA era. Of course, not everything in the current situation is positive, far from it. But at present there are probably not enough problems to generate strong demands, either from the operators or the users.

Dar's private transport system therefore shows strong similarities with that of other African cities (Godard, Teurnier, 1992), but on a more embryonic, organizational level. This is the case both on a daily basis, when observing the conditions of route exploitation, and when keeping track of the professional organization's shortcomings, whether on a trade union or an association level. While MUWADA may have multiple functions, including managing internal professional relations, particularly in the case of conflicting interests and, especially, intermediating between operators and authorities within a pressure group logic, it does not actually take on any of the above as a result of its lack of representation. This can be explained by the activity's history which is a recent one, at least on a grand scale; the fragmentation of a profession which brings together a multitude of small-scale owners who have entered into a logic which is more speculative than entrepreneurial, and also very probably by the fact that, for the moment, the cohabitation between legal and pirate carriers poses no major problems. However, the recent explosion of the fleet, creating conditions for an overcapacity in supply, could eventually challenge or terminate such cohabitation and translate into internal tensions in the sector, which will have a strong impact on service performance.

Towards a two-tiered city?

Lourdes Diaz Oliveira And Pascal Pochet

Inhabitants of Dar es Salaam rarely seem to travel and when they do, it is with some difficulty. Statistical sources are rare and incomplete but the available information advances a theory of ineffectual and constrained mobility on a daily basis. There is probably fewer than one return trip per person per day on average; mobility is also constrained as 70% of the trips are motivated by work or study. For many city dwellers, walking is the only means of transport and the use of mechanized modes remains at a low level, especially at off-peak hours.

In today's Dar es Salaam, there is a huge disparity between the need to move around and the means to do so. Situated in one of Africa's poorest countries, the main city is experiencing particularly strong demographic growth, as the population has doubled in the course of the past ten years. This growth is accompanied by a rapid and disorderly extension of the urbanized area, which increases the distance between places of residence and of employment, businesses, medical care centres and schools. In view of the unfavourable economic conditions marked by a process of rapid liberalization, the transport service has difficulty responding to this double demographic and area growth. It is unable to satisfy inhabitants' basic needs, and notably, the needs of the poorest of the poor.

The numerous shortcomings in the transport system tend to aggravate the situation. First, the infrastructure is insufficient and often too run-down to offer service of even minimal quality at city and suburban level. Additionally, the characteristics of the current public transport service, the slow demise of the state-owned company and the increase of speculative strategies in the private sector (Pochet and Diaz Oliveira, 2005) only contribute to worsening or emphasizing the disparities in accessibility from one suburb to the next. This leads to great difficulties in access to various urban services and facilities for most households, who have few alternatives due to their limited budgets.

I - RESIDENTIAL EXPANSE AND JOB CONCENTRATION

According to census results, Dar es Salaam had 348,000 inhabitants in 1968, 852,000 in 1978 (or an annual rate of + 9.4 %) and 1,345,000 in the last census in 1988 (+ 4.7 % annually since 1978). Dar es Salaam of the mid-1980s was a city of immigrants. Only one out of every five inhabitants was a native of the city (Kulaba, 1993). Over the past few years, demographic development has not slowed down although it is difficult to have an exact idea of the population of Tanzania's principal city. Estimates settle on an annual

growth rate of 7 to 8%. Currently, the number of inhabitants would therefore be 2.5 to 3 million. This strong growth, barely controlled by the authorities, translated into the city's functional and area explosion.

Area wise, demographic growth translated into the exceptional expansion of urbanized areas, following the classical model of the fingers of a glove, with an initial diffusion along the roads infrastructure followed by a filling up of the open spaces in-between. The city's surface area thus multiplied by five from 1968 to 1982 (Maunder and Fouracre, 1987). The city's maximum expanse, which was only between 6 and 10 km in 1969 and 15 km in 1978, attained spectacular dimensions in the 1990s (Kombe, 1994):

- 27 km in 1993, and currently almost 30 km to the north, along Bagamoyo Road and along the shore, where there is marked growth;
- between 15 and 25 km in 1993 to the west, along Morogoro Road ;
- between 15 and 25 km in 1993, to the southwest, along the highway of Nyerere Road, after the airport;
- 13 km in 1993, currently between 15 and 20 km to the south, after Mbagala, mainly along Kilwa Road, on the other side of the bay (Kigamboni).

However, this panorama must be qualified by observing that the majority of the population lives in a 10 km radius around the centre. This nevertheless constitutes a considerable surface area, if the structure of the existing roads network is taken into account. This distribution is even more problematic — an examination of both the urbanized areas and the location of the main activities (fig. colour) is proof enough of the high concentration of places of employment rather than that of residences. Particularly, administrative jobs are located in the Central Business District (CBD). The densely populated Kariakoo area amalgamates many formal and informal commercial activities. Likewise, the city's best stocked and most attractive market is situated in Ilala, a suburb located very close to this central area. Industrial jobs are not much further out of town; these are found mostly in the industrial area, situated 4 km from the centre, or around the harbour. Lastly, Dar es Salaam's largest hospital is situated less than 2 km from the centre. This concentration of economic activity and employment zones in a restricted area is obviously not comprehensive. The main university campus (10 km from the centre) is situated on the outskirts of the town. Industries have been set up in the peripheral areas of Ubungu or are spread out along the radial highways (especially Bagamoyo and Nyerere roads). There are markets and large concentrations of artisans (Manzese, Mbagala, Temeke Makumbusho...), many small shops, community-based schools and health facilities scattered throughout the peripheral areas. Dar es Salaam is characterized by a high degree of area specialisation and by a dissociation between residential and employment functions.

Considering the city's morphology and the distribution of jobs and residences, the distance one has to cover daily to get to work (or school or to the university) and to return home again can easily run into 20 km for a return

trip. During the mid-1980s, a (one-way) trip on public transport already averaged about 8 km (Maunder and Fouracre, 1987) and it follows that this average distance has kept on growing, parallel to the urban spread. Even if the strong flow of pedestrians on the sidewalks of the main roads leading to the non-urbanized areas shows that travelling on foot for several kilometres is far from being an exception in Dar es Salaam, the distances involved make it increasingly difficult to use non-motorized modes of travel (walking or using a bicycle) when one has to leave the suburb. However, it is within these suburbs themselves that major problems are experienced.

Local roads are rarely tarmacked and are thus almost impassable for four-wheel vehicles. The zig-zag movements at greatly reduced speed which mini-buses are forced to execute between the ruts bear witness to this. Conditions for non-motorized trips are also made difficult and even more dangerous by the absence of side-walks and reserved bicycle paths, by roadsides congested with stalls and booths set up in public spaces and by rubbish dumps. During the rainy season, the increased number of potholes and their gullying create an impassable obstacle for vehicles. The few motorists are obliged to leave their cars at the entrance to the suburb, while taxis double their fees or else simply refuse to enter. Merchandise is transported by carts. Pedestrians' daily trips are also complicated by the rains; when road and rail bridges are destroyed as happened as in Tabata in 1998, the residents are left stranded in their suburbs. They are forced to ford swelling rivers, at their peril, as the streets are completely flooded and crossing points have to be guessed at.

The road infrastructure is defective in the formalized residential areas as well. Sinza and Kijitonyama are areas divided into plots to accommodate middle-class residents. However, these could qualify as modern slums because of the deplorable state of the roads. Nevertheless, it is the inhabitants of the non-formalized areas who experience the worst difficulties when getting around. In the latter case, accessibility problems result from a larger urban planning flaw. In most of these cases, service roads were simply not provided to begin with. It was not possible to construct these once people had settled due to technical (the soil is not always favourable) and social (widening them would require evicting residents and traders) reasons. Access roads to the squatter areas are particularly deteriorated, be it Tandale, the outskirts of Kijitonyama and Mwananyamala suburbs, or the area including the greater part of Manzese, Mabibo, Mbuharati and Kigogo. Others are the connections between Tabata and Segerea, the links between areas such as Yombo, Mtoni and Tandika.

Over the last few years, the roads network's dual emphasis, with a clearly radial main network structure in good condition and a rapidly deteriorating secondary network, has increasingly generated interconnection problems between the residential areas and tends to accentuate the access differences between them, depending not only on their distance from the centre, but even more so on the distance on "tarmac" and from the public transport stops.

II - PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND ACCESS TO THE CITY

A 1993¹ survey provides a measure of these inequalities between residential areas and distinguishes between non-formalized, formalized and well-to-do areas. This three-group typology gives an account of the differences between households according to housing type, resource level and socio-professional position. (Table X).

TABLE X : A TYPOLOGY OF THE LIVING AREAS, APPLIED TO THE HRDS SURVEY

In our secondary analyses of the HRDS survey (assessment of the roads infrastructure, access to services and urban facilities, transport expenses) we suggested the possibility that the characteristics of the residential area constituted a determining factor in distinguishing three types of suburbs : established residential areas, areas divided into plots and lastly informal settlements where no plot division had taken place.

The distinction was made in two phases. Firstly, according to the characteristics of the accommodation in question (building material used for the walls and connections to water and electricity networks), households were classified into 3 groups : 1/ permanent structure housing, but without water or electricity, or housing where the walls were made of another type of building material, 2/ permanent structure housing, with water or electricity (but not both), 3/ permanent structure housing with both water and electricity. Subsequently, according to the relative proportions of these three types of housing, each area of investigation was allocated to one of the following categories: areas without division into plots (47% of the households), areas divided into plots (31%) and well-to-do areas (22%).

Of course, the differences in living conditions between these three residential types are not absolute. Although the most residential suburbs appear to be the most homogeneous as far as living conditions are concerned, informal settlements can be found in areas which have been divided into plots, and vice versa. Social differentiation is far from being absolute between areas where planning has occurred and areas where no planning has taken place. Although the latter is constituted largely by households who are active in the informal or private sectors (or in some cases, who are not in active employment), the formalized areas, on the other hand, accommodate most of the public or semi-public employees whose regular income has made it possible to attain higher housing standards. The non-formalized areas are the poorest, with an annual, average expenditure per household of around 800,000 Tsh. compared to 1,060,000 Tsh. in the formalized areas, and 1,550,000 Tsh. in the well-to-do areas (in 1993, 100 Tsh. = 1.60 FF).

¹ The HRDS (Human Resources Development Survey) survey resulted from the joint initiative of the Economics Department of the University of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzanian Government and the World Bank, and was financed by the World Bank, the Japanese Government and the British Agency for Overseas Development. It included a subset of 1128 representative Dar es Salaam households. Except when otherwise indicated, the data referred to in this article is based on our own reading of these files.

On average, the closest road is situated 300 m from the living quarters, and is served by public transport in only two-thirds of the cases (Table XI). But even here, there are huge disparities, since the distance to the closest passable road may double between informal and well-to-do areas. Although the average values are apparently not very high, they do reflect important differences, conveying contrasting situations within each suburb type; some living quarters are very close to the roads, while others may be more than a kilometre away. Taking into account the longer distances between stops on the *daladala* lines, we can surmise that the closest stop is situated around one or two kilometres from the place of residence. The corresponding terminal trips on foot can take between 15 and 30 minutes, to and fro. This considerably increases the time spent on daily transport.

TABLE XI : DISTANCE FROM THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE TO THE CLOSEST ROAD
ACCORDING TO SUBURB TYPE

	Non- formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	Average for all suburbs
Time taken to reach the closest road serviced by vehicles	5 min 50	5 min 20	3 min 30	5 min 10
Distance to the closest road serviced by vehicles (metres)	380	260	180	300
Time taken to reach the closest road serviced by public transport	7 min	6 min	4 min 30	6 min
Distance to the closest route serviced by public transport (metres)	450	290	180	340

The quality of the roads is equally variable. In the informal settlements, only 46% of the access routes proportioned for vehicles are asphalted, compared to 55% in the formalized areas and 60% in the wealthy areas (Table XII). Public transport services are satisfactory in the formalized areas (77%), and are paradoxically similar in the non-formalized areas (62%) and in mostly residential areas (64%). The situation of the latter two can be explained by the low demand for public transport, as an appreciable percentage of the population own a personal car, rather than by the state of the roads in these mostly low-density suburbs. Some streets in these areas may even be rather deteriorated. The situation of the poorest residents in these suburbs and of those who go there to work, is just as worrying as that of the residents of the non-formalized areas on the outskirts which can only be accessed with

difficulty. These inequalities of access to the transport networks are all the more critical since they go hand in hand with the insufficient facilities which characterize these living areas.

TABLE XII: STATE OF THE ROADS AND PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICE
ACCORDING TO SUBURB TYPE

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	Average % for all suburbs
State of the closest road for vehicle use (%)	46	55	60	52
Tarmacked road				
Gravel road	14	15	16	15
Dirt road	40	30	24	33
Service type (%)				
Road for vehicle use	62	77	64	67
Other roads	38	23	36	33

The relatively recent construction of non-formalized suburbs and their inferior connection to the roads network are probably at the root of the longer distances on average between places of residence and the main school and health facilities. The most well-to-do suburbs seem to be best equipped as far as these two public service types are concerned, contrary to the non-formalized suburbs. Only primary schools (Table XIII), clinics (Table XIV) and community-based basic facilities appear to be as numerous in the non-formalized suburbs as in the remainder of the city. Lastly, the shorter distance covered by schoolchildren living in the non-formalized suburbs supports these results, probably due to a discontinuation in school-going by children from the poorest households at an earlier stage. In the non-formalized suburbs, schoolchildren are thus more likely to attend a primary school close to home, than schoolchildren in the formalized areas. Moreover, over the past few years, disparities between rich and poor increased because of the sharp decline in the percentage of children from poor households in full-time primary education (Lugalla, 1997).

TABLE XIII: DISTANCE BETWEEN PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND SCHOOL FACILITIES, ACCORDING TO SUBURB TYPE (KM)

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	Average distance all suburbs
Public primary school	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.9
Private primary school	6.7	5.6	3.8	5.1
Public secondary school	5.7	4.5	3.4	4.8
Private secondary school	3.7	3.0	3.1	3.9
Average distance covered by schoolchildren	1.7	1.8	2.4	2.0

TABLE XIV: DISTANCE BETWEEN PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND HEALTH FACILITIES, ACCORDING TO SUBURB TYPE (KM)

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	Average distance all suburbs
Public clinics	2.3	2.6	1.7	2.3
Private clinics	1.0	1.3	0.9	1.1
Public hospitals	4.7	3.2	2.9	3.9
Private hospitals	6.3	4.9	4.4	5.4

An analysis of visits to three care centres situated at different levels within the health establishment hierarchy - the Mwananyamala Hospital, the Sinza Care Centre and the Tandale community-based clinic - confirms the difficulties experienced by city-dwellers in accessing facilities (Zambrano Gil, 1994). Of these three establishments, only Sinza is well serviced by public transport. Tandale clinic is situated 400m from any public transport and the Mwananyamala Hospital is 800m away. Most of the patients go there on foot (95% to the clinic, 78% to the hospital and 62% to the care centre). It thus seems logical that, considering the scarcity of motorized transport or the difficulties in accessing it, when choosing a public establishment, proximity should be the main criterion, next to the type of care required.

This proximity is most often relative, since 45% of the trips extend further than a kilometre, of which 45% to the hospital, 70% to the care centre (40% extend even further than 2 kilometres), and only 15% to the clinic. More than half of those visiting private establishments use motorized means of

transport, mainly *daladala*. This figure contrasts quite sharply with the 12% which characterizes the clientele of the three types of public institutions under scrutiny. The use of a more effective means of transport than walking goes hand in hand with a much wider choice of hospital facilities, and seems beyond the reach of poor households. In addition to the often already prohibitive cost of medical care, there is the cost and difficulty in access to an establishment, which limits visits to the hospital. These constraints also become apparent in different ways, depending on the residential suburb and a standard of living that enables households to stock foodstuffs.

Food buying practices (Table XV) indicate a slightly higher number of residents buying their goods from community-based businesses in non-formalized areas. But in this case, it is probably not by choice, but rather due to the scarcity of nearby markets and financial constraints. Thus, walking becomes compulsory when making purchases. Practically all the principal shopping areas are situated near the main roads (Fig. 3). As for the suburban markets, like other facilities, they are most often found in the established areas. The fact that the markets are far away constitutes another daily handicap—product prices are higher in the small stalls close to their homes than in the big markets (De Langen, 1994).

TABLE XV: FOOD BUYING PRACTICES ACCORDING TO SUBURB TYPES (%)

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	City average
Place of purchase (%)				
Market	65	68	77	69
Suburban shop	33	30	23	30
Shop outside the suburb	1	1	0	1
Purchase from neighbours	1	0	0	0
Distance to place of purchase (m)	450	630	660	550
Duration of trip (one way, min)	8 min 20	11 min	9 min 40	9 min 30
Part of trip taken up by walking (%)	100	95	89	95

The daily constraints inflicted upon the most disadvantaged households because of a lack of facilities or due to more difficult access to basic facilities come to light sharply in the supply of water (Table XVI). The limited access to water poses a problem in many households, since, irrespective of the type of suburb, nearly one out of every three people goes out to fetch water during the course of an ordinary day (38% in the non-formalized areas, 32% in

the formalized areas, 23% in the wealthy areas). In about three out of four households, this chore is carried out by women. Living in accommodation where there is no running water as is common in the non-formalized areas; daily living is rendered difficult especially since public drinking fountains and other watering places are fewer in these areas. For more than one out of two women (or young girls) and one out of every five men in the non-formalized areas, fetching water takes an average of almost an hour per day. Not only is the number of people involved much higher, but accessibility is also much tougher. Lastly, in addition to the discomfort and the problems in access, in many cases there is a high cost and hence limited consumption of basic essentials. When one is obliged to resort to water sellers, which is the case for almost one out of five households in the non-formalized areas, little else can be spent on other products.

TABLE XVI: WATER SUPPLY ACCORDING TO AREA TYPE

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	City average
Average distance to a watering place (m)	230	80	10	140
Distance to a watering place when the place of residence is not connected to the network (m)	280	120	20	190
Time spent daily on fetching water per person (trip included, min)	50	21	19	34
Time spent on fetching water per household (min)	59	34	20	55
Number of households with a watering place as part of the concession (%)	12	36	76	34
Purchased from sellers (%)	18	12	3	13
Number of individuals who fetch water (%)	38	32	23	33

Analyzing the different dimensions of access to urban services shows that accessibility problems are generally cumulative. Hemmed-in suburbs and a lack of equipment go hand in hand. This not only translates into longer and more difficult daily trips, but also, in certain cases, into higher costs to carry

out activities which are essential to daily living. Residents have no choice but to use two *daladala* to get to work and have to buy small (and thus costly) quantities of supplies. The price of such trips proves to be prohibitive for households that have an extremely low standard of living, as shown by the analysis and cost of daily mobility.

III - TRANSPORT DEMANDS UNDER A LOT OF PRESSURE

Despite the lack of precise and recent data, the various types of information available give a glimpse into restrained daily mobility. Thus, in the mid-1980s, according to a survey involving 126 households in six of the city's suburbs, Maunder and Fouracre (1987) estimated the average mobility to be at a level of 1.5 journeys, irrespective of age.² More recently, the light 1993-survey undertaken in the suburb of Temeke comes up with figures which are quite close to the above, even if the survey cannot be taken to represent the entire city. Mobility is at a slightly higher level of 1.9 trips per day (De Langen, 1997a, 1997b), but this figure was obtained by conducting a survey only amongst persons of 14 years and older, who are more mobile than young children.

Except for uncertainties resulting from the survey, the number of mechanized trips provided by these two studies is not very different, whether on a global level (in the order of one mechanized trip per person during the week) or, more specifically, trips by means of public transport (buses or *daladala*). Public transport is at a level of 0.8 daily trips in both surveys. An estimate according to public transport expenses recorded in the 1993 HRDS survey shows that this rate of 0.8 journeys on public transport per day per person is a very likely one. On the other hand, walking is practised to a greater extent in the 1993 survey: 0.9 trips as opposed to 0.4, but the latter figure is probably under-estimated.

One must be careful not to systematically assimilate trips on foot and short distances. Thus, their average distance is estimated at 1.7 km in the 1987 survey whereas, according to the 1993 survey, half of these trips extended over 2 km. Nevertheless, the figure of one mechanized trip per person and per day translates into a small number of trips enabling residents to leave the suburb. Considering that the same mode of transport is generally used to and fro, and that the minority of individuals who have access to a car have a much higher mobility which raises the average, one may reasonably hypothesise that the large majority of Dar es Salaam population does not use any kind of motorized transport on an ordinary weekday. Although comparisons in this domain must be handled with a lot of caution because of the different methods used to compile the survey, the available information shows that this low level of motorized exchanges is not unique in Africa. For example, in 1993 the number of motorised trips per person and per day was 1.2 in Bamako and 1.4

² According to a generally accepted definition, a trip is made between a starting point and a given destination in order to carry out an activity (job, purchases, visits...) and may thus involve several journeys. Therefore, a person who goes to work by walking to the bus-stop, then takes his first *daladala* and connects to a second one and lastly walks the last part of the way to his place of work, has made one trip.

in Niamey in 1996 (Diaz Oliveira *et al.*, 1998). But what makes this low level so revealing in the case of Dar es Salaam, is the size of the city. It is distinctly larger when compared to the capitals of West Africa; trips on foot from one suburb to the next are particularly long and trying.

We must also remember that these average mobility levels probably cover a wide range of values and levels, according to people's place of residence, household income, job type and activity status, as noted in other African contexts. Thus, there is every indication that in a context of scarce resources and in view of cultural models excluding women from employment in Tanzania (Omari, 1994 ; Rwebangira, 1996,³ arbitration regarding trips will neither be in their favour, nor in that of others who are not 'in active employment'. Transport difficulties crystallize and consolidate differences in social status between households, as well as within the households themselves, following the example of what one observes in other African cities (Diaz Oliveira *et al.*, 1997). However, this reduced mobility weighs heavily on household budgets.

Expenditure allocated to household members' daily trips can be apprehended from the HRDS survey as well as by lighter, but more specific surveys on the travel conditions of these trips. According to the HRDS survey (Table XVII), transport expenditure in 1993 represented just below 10% of the total on average, that is, the third largest item on the household budget, although it was far below food expenditure (more than 50%) and housing (more than 20%).

This item can be compared to the 7% recently measured in Dakar within the framework of a general survey on household consumption (République du Sénégal *et al.*, 1997), but it is much lower than estimations from other large African cities: 20% in Ouagadougou in 1992 (Diaz Oliveira *et al.*, 1999) or 17% in Yaounde in 1993 (Ngabmen, 1997). This one to two year gap in evaluations is probably due to differences in data collecting methods, but is probably also a reflection, in the case of Dar es Salaam, of fewer private cars and motorcycles. These are the high-cost modes of transport. It must however be noted that an earlier estimate, devoted specifically to transport expenditure revealed that 16% of income was spent on public transport in 1985 (Maunder and Fouracre, 1987). This item of expenditure does not seem to have decreased noticeably over time. On account of the combined effects of tariff liberalization and a drop in household buying power, the price of a daily *daladala* return ticket went from 9% of the average daily salary in 1978 to 22% in 1998 (Tembele *et al.*, 1998).

3 Even if the crisis is likely to have favoured women's access to employment (Messkoub, 1996), it is stillessentially a question of low-paid tasks (O'Riordan, 1996) making access to mechanized modes of transport less justifiable.

TABLE XVII : ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD BUDGET DISTRIBUTION
ACCORDING TO SUBURB TYPES

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	City average
Annual expenditure (Tsh 1993)	798,760	1,060,260	1,553,780	1,046,880
Structure according to item (%) :				
Food	53.1	51.1	47.3	50.6
Housing	23.7	22.2	20.7	22.2
Transport	6.3	8.0	13.3	9.1
Clothes	4.5	5.0	4.5	4.6
Health	2.7	2.7	1.9	2.4
School (excluding school transport)	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.0
Leisure, other expenses	6.7	7.3	7.8	7.3
Transfers	2.4	2.7	3.2	2.8
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Be that as it may, it is the structure more than the level of expenses, as well as the disparities revealed in the process that enable us to grasp situation differences with regard to daily trips within the city. The expense structure partially reflects the dominating influence of public modes of transport in Dar es Salaam's transport system, accounting for two-thirds of transport expenditure. On the other hand, individual motorized modes of transport are much more expensive than using public transport. More than eight out of ten households declare spending money on public transport during the year, while only one in thirty spends money on fuel. This confirms that ownership and use of a car or a motorcycle remain marginal phenomena.

These disparities appear even more clearly when transport expenses are broken down according to suburb type (Table XVIII) or according to income quintile (Table XIX). These expenses, which are much lower in the non-formalized areas, appear to be average in the formalized areas and to show a strong increase when one moves into the residential areas. In these well-to-do suburbs, expenditure on transport is four times higher than in the non-formalized areas. The expenditure gradient is even more marked from the first to the fifth income quintile, with public transport also predominating in four-fifths of the households. Access to individual modes of transport is the

privilege of the wealthiest residents who spend nearly 15 times the average amount allocated for transport by a fifth of the poorest households. In order to understand the selective character of household motorization, one must remember that the average income of the fifth quintile is twice as high as that of the fourth quintile and nearly six times higher than that of the first quintile.

TABLE XVIII:A BREAKDOWN OF TRANSPORT EXPENDITURE
ACCORDING TO SUBURBS

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	City average
Total expenditure (Tsh 1993)	799,000	1,060,000	1,554,000	1,047,000
Total transport expenditure (Tsh 1993)	50,200	84,900	206,100	95,500
Transport expenditure items (%)	6.3	8.0	13.3	9.1
According to (%):				
Car purchases	0	7	17	10
Motorcycle purchases	4	1	0	1
Repairs	1	2	6	4
Fuel	4	4	28	16
Public transport	89	84	47	67
School transport	2	2	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100

TABLE XIX: DISTRIBUTION OF TRANSPORT EXPENSES ACCORDING TO THE HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUINTILES

	1st quintile	2nd quintile	3rd quintile	4th quintile	5th quintile	City average
Total expenditure (Tsh 1993)	393,500	609,700	811,000	1,148,700	2,269,300	1,046,900
Total transport expenditure (Tsh 1993)	20,460	33,720	51,900	79,520	291,840	95,480
Transport expenditure items (%)	5.2	5.5	6.4	6.9	12.9	9.1
According to (%):						
Public transport	100	96	93	87	54	69
Individual transport*	0	4	7	13	46	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

(* purchase of vehicles, repairs, insurance and fuel)

The relatively low level of public transport expenditure amongst the poorest of the poor is doubtlessly related to their fiercely constrained daily expenditure. For the first three quintiles, up to 80% of the already very low income is spent on food and housing. Thus, a quick estimation based on expenditure figures from the HRDS survey shows that, for 40% of the poorest households, once food and housing costs have been deducted, there is only about 450 Tsh. per day to cover all the four household members' other needs (health, education, transport, other purchases ...). For the poorest 20%, not even 250 Tsh. is available. When one takes into account the modest price of a *daladala* return ticket (140 Tsh. when the survey was conducted), it is understandable that the use of public transport is reserved for essential trips so as to cut down as far as possible on this expenditure item.

But if income is particularly important as far as transport patterns are concerned, it also seems that households belonging to the first three income quintiles spend more on public transport in the formalized zones than in the non-formalized zones (Table XX). As these areas are closest to the tarred roads and enjoy the best public transport service, it could be the result of a better public transport supply. Nevertheless, the social composition of the various suburbs also plays a major part, as shown by Banyikwa (1988) who distinguished between strong and *a contrario*, weak areas for generating public

transport trips according to their socio-professional composition. Indeed, public and semi-public employees are relatively numerous in the formalized and residential suburbs, while there is a marked increase in people working in the informal sector. The latter holds true with non-working people within the non-formalized areas. However, this group makes less use of public transport and devotes a smaller portion of their income to it than the civil servants (Table XXI). In the light of their expenses, the civil servants appear to use public transport on a daily basis, with the rare exception of those who have access to a private vehicle.⁴ Public employment, which is fairly concentrated in the city and is therefore often far from people's place of residence, necessitates the use of a motorized mode of transport when one does not live in proximity to the administrative centre. Conversely, people working in the informal sector are more inclined to work within the suburbs or at locations that can be reached on foot from their place of residence. Furthermore, the uncertain nature of their income forces them to walk to their places of work more often, even when the latter is situated far from their residence (street hawkers, peddlers and other small traders).

TABLE XX: PUBLIC TRANSPORT EXPENDITURE ACCORDING TO INCOME AND TO HOUSEHOLDS' PLACE OF RESIDENCE TYPES (TSH.)

	Non-formalized areas	Formalized areas	Residential areas	City average
First quintile	17,100	25,600	19,000	20,500
Second quintile	29,000	42,200	28,800	32,400
Third quintile	45,100	65,300	40,500	51,400
Fourth quintile	66,300	72,400	70,600	69,400
Fifth quintile	132,100	133,700	190,000	156,600
Suburb average	45,400	73,400	99,600	66,000

Transport costs are thus not negligible—with the single-price ticket having increased from 100 to 150 Tsh. since the beginning of 1996 (except for schoolchildren who pay 50 Tsh. when in uniform), the price of the trip has largely compensated for the drifting prices. However, since the increase, transport operators still have difficulties in getting the new rate accepted. During slack periods or over weekends when it is more difficult to fill the buses, or even for short trips, the price can drop to 100 Tsh. again. This *de facto* resistance to the new tariffs is the best indicator of the daily financial hardships

⁴ Civil servants and salaried employees in the structured private sector receive a transport allowance, although it does not even nearly cover their actual transport costs.

which households are experiencing and of the majority's limited choices when faced with daily transport costs. Considering the heavy constraints on income, one may deduce that the price increase at the end of 1996 led to a marked decrease in solvent travel demands.

TABLE XXI: PUBLIC TRANSPORT EXPENDITURE ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION

	Expenditure (Tsh)	% of expenditure for public transport
Non-working households	41,000	5.2
Households with one working member:		
-Independent or employed within the private sector	44,500	5.7
-Employed within the public or semi-public sector	68,500	6.5
Households with two working members:		
-both independent or in the private sector	61,000	5.8
-one in the informal sector and the other in the public sector	72,000	5.9
-both in the public or semi-public sector	133,000	8.1
Average household expenditure	66,000	6.3

IV - URBAN DEVELOPMENT AT THE RISK OF WITHDRAWING TO THE SUBURBS

The bad state of the roads or the lack thereof, an unequally distributed transport service, the high cost of public transport in exchange for diminishing service quality (insecurity, lack of comfort, vehicles in bad condition, limited reliability as far as respecting itineraries is concerned, frequent rejection of schoolchildren...). Currently, the obstacles faced by Dar es Salaam inhabitants in the course of their daily travels are numerous. These obstacles put a strain on timetables, further complicate access to service, limit the use of urban space and place severe pressure on household budgets. However, Dar es Salaam inhabitants consider transport as just one of their daily concerns and not the principal consideration. They have priority problems such as housing, employment, access to water as well as paying for health care or education. The fact that no demands are made by the transport users can probably be explained by a measure of fatalism as well as by the habit of having to manage on a daily basis in difficult conditions. An example of this is their resignation

during police roundups which temporarily immobilize a considerable number of *daladala* and impose an increased recourse to travelling on foot. However, the implications of such a problematic system go far beyond ordinary transport problems: they weigh down on the running of Dar es Salaam society as a whole, and even if it not always clearly perceived and expressed, it illustrates many negative effects as far as development opportunities are concerned.

In the job market, transport problems further reduce available employment possibilities. Moreover, the amount of time spent on public transport during trips between places of residence and places of work as well as the difficulty of covering long distances on foot may influence the productivity of the working population, especially the poor majority.

In terms of living conditions, availability and cost of public transport are a burden on expected results in basic domains such as health or education and tend to reduce the regularity of visits to these facilities. In particular, as far as secondary schooling is concerned, the limited number of schools often necessitates the use of public transport, considering the present scarcity or inadequacy of alternative means such as bicycles. Over and above the difficult conditions of the trips, more so in the case of schoolchildren who are often turned away by *daladala* assistants, the mere price of a trip, despite the reduction in tariffs, increases the cost of schooling which must already be paid for, and may be one of the reasons for the lower age of school-leaving children from underprivileged households.

Finally, in terms of citizenship and city access, the problems in the transport system have contributed to the trend of withdrawing into the suburbs, especially in the non-formalized peri-urban areas, as a survival strategy. The population, often rural in origin, tries to recreate village living conditions, limiting trips to 'the city' to a bare minimum, as analysed by Gibbal (1988) in the case of one of Bamako's peripheral villages. This model certainly encourages lively neighbourhood sociability, but it also implies a traditional way of life (keeping the women at home or in the immediate surroundings, a low percentage of children in full-time education, self-sufficient production) which does not favour social exchange on a city-scale and resolving economic problems. As an increasing amount of space is being taken up by poor, non-formalized areas which can only be accessed with difficulty, with the heavy influx of migrants, there is, on the whole, a great risk of this way of life gaining ground in the outskirts of Tanzania's main city.

Certainly, each city has its specificities. In Dar es Salaam, a harbour city open to exchange, the Swahili integration mould has to play a dominating role, especially by turning the suburbs into a melting pot of urbanisation by favouring a strong territoriality (Calas and Bart, 1997). But is an integration model of this kind not likely to have its limits, as soon as powerful differentiation factors appear? Such factors are found throughout Tanzanian

society as well as within the transport system. For some, there are roads infrastructures in good condition and access to cars, the only risk being traffic jams and metred zone parking. For this group, the Swahili cultural heritage can indeed serve as a support base to encourage use of the entire city, its facilities, its sociability networks and its many services, using the suburbs as a starting point. For others, there are deteriorated roads, *daladala* which are too expensive for meager budgets and walking as the only resort in most cases. For the large majority, having strong roots in a residential space runs the risk of acting as a trap and limiting their access to the city. In a context where transport infrastructure and services make it impossible to lift the numerous physical barriers, is there no other outcome for the economy's dualisation and for the deepening social gap than a major confrontation between the territoriality/openness of some and the territoriality/confinement of others, within a two-tiered city?

Water Management

Institutional weaknesses and urban answers: towards a new urbanity?

Valérie Messer

After the Second World War, African cities experienced an unprecedented urban explosion. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania's biggest city, did not escape this evolution. Indeed, the city recorded important annual growth rates: rates increased from 6.5% between 1957 and 1967 to more than 10 % between 1970 and 1975, before dropping to around 6 or 7%. This sharp, rapid urbanization of people explains many of the current management problems. At present, Dar es Salaam's municipality is facing various difficulties which will have to be handled: population density is increasing in certain quarters; informal, irregular and illegal constructions are appearing on the outskirts; the city is expanding disproportionately. There is growing demand for infrastructure and urban services.

This delay in the provision of amenities is due in part to Julius Nyerere's policies during the 1970's. During the 1972-1978 decentralisation period the government was in fact centred around rural development. During this period, urban amenities greatly deteriorated and few projects were implemented in response to the needs of the population who had packed into the capital. This combination of disinterest and substantial urban growth explains the current shortage of services and infrastructure. Our study will focus specifically on water distribution. The existing water conveyance network does not meet the population's needs, and the network is unable to serve the whole city. For geographical, social or technical reasons, a large number of inhabitants have no access to the city's water distribution system and are excluded from this urban service. City-dwellers are therefore compelled to find other water sources; solutions can be either of an individual or a collective nature. Thus one sees associations and neighbourhood committees being created, often supported or put in place by international organizations. Studying water management is therefore a way of monitoring the evolution of urban society. Indeed, it is a pretext for the emergence of new role-players as well as for changes in management style, revealing social and political transformations.

As is the case elsewhere in Africa or in the rest of the third world, new methods for supervising water management are now emerging in Dar

es Salaam in response to the failure of the distribution company. As far as water management is concerned, the issues at stake are no longer restricted to supplying water to the population, but also involve the legitimacy of the new intermediaries and new management styles as well as the creation of new water territories.

I. URBAN GROWTH AND POLITICAL CHOICES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS IN URBAN SERVICES

Authorities play a fundamental role in providing services and collective amenities. It is up to them to define which services should take priority and in which location. Providing water conveyance amenities thus relates back to the nature of past and present power structures. In part, Dar es Salaam's lack of amenities was brought about by political choices made by various administrations who successively managed the city.

A. Urban segregation: a colonial heritage

Dar es Salaam's colonial past still surfaces even today, although the original divisions have been erased or sometimes rendered more complex.¹

Under British mandate (1918-1961), Dar was the country's capital. At the same time, it established itself as the country's industrial centre and its main port in 1949. With its 69,200 inhabitants, it achieved municipal status. Initially, it was thus a classic example of a colonial city, with European residential neighbourhoods situated along the Indian Ocean, an administrative district and African quarters, which included Kariakoo. In 1948, Sir Alexander Gibbs drew up the city's first urban development plan. Following racial and social criteria, the town was divided into different sectors: European, Asian and African neighbourhoods that were differentiated notably by the density of the developed sites and the size of the plots. A distinction was made between densely, moderately or sparsely populated neighbourhoods. Today, the distinction is still visible in the city's symmetrical central sectors and corresponds to a differentiation in amenities and services levels. The densely constructed African neighbourhoods had very little infrastructure and only basic services. By contrast, the sparsely populated European neighbourhoods were serviced by all the urban networks: water, electricity and purification.

Water distribution by means of a pipe-system started in the 1920's. Water was drilled and pumped in Gerezani. Due to the salinity of the water, the system was abandoned in 1948. Consequently, the Mtoni treatment plant was constructed south of the city. On the eve of independence, the following neighbourhoods were equipped with a pipe-system: the town centre, the European neighbourhoods north of the town (Oyster Bay and Msasani),

1 Sutton J.E., "Dar-es-Salaam: A sketch of a hundred years." In Sutton J.E., "Dar-es-Salaam City, Port and Region", *Tanzania Notes and Records*, no. 17, 1970, p. 9.

Upanga and, to a lesser extent, formalized African districts like Kariakoo and Illala.

Colonial segregation remains noticeable even today. Amenities are available to the well-to-do, sparsely populated residential neighbourhoods along the Indian Ocean, the administrative and commercial districts in the city centre and the densely populated, formalized African quarters. After independence, racial segregation was replaced by social segregation.

B. Policies favouring the countryside and the drop in urban investments

With the proclamation of Tanganyika's independence in 1961, Dar became its capital, thus consolidating its attraction on a national level. In 1967, however, President Nyerere laid the foundation for his new socialist policies in Arusha. He denounced social inequalities and in particular the ascendancy of the cities (where wealth and infrastructures are concentrated) over the countryside. He also launched the policy of *Ujamaa*, which favoured collectivist villages. This policy found concrete expression in the 1972 decentralisation process, which was at odds with the centralized approach inherited from colonization. Local urban authorities were abandoned in favour of Districts and Regions. Nine centres of growth were selected across the entire national territory. Dar es Salaam lost its capital status to Dodoma, situated in the centre of the country. These choices were all motivated by an ideological will to reduce the inequalities within Tanzania's national territory. Policies favouring the countryside were supposed to make it possible for those areas to equip themselves with infrastructures such as schools and hospitals and to obtain services like education, health and water distribution free of charge.

As regards decentralisation, the central Tanzanian government strengthened its position. Thus, it was rather a case of decentralisation resulting in tighter control. This was "accompanied by the abolition of all local administrative councils in rural and urban Tanzania, which were replaced by regional bodies and districts governed by central government officials."² City councils were abolished from January 1974. In Dar es Salaam, the town council was dissolved and its functions divided among three District Councils for the Development of Ilala, Temeke, Kinondoni and the Dar es Salaam Region. Decentralisation consolidated government officials' positions in the central government appointed councils. In addition, the various ministries assigned engineers at district and regional level to manage technical problems on a local scale. With city councils a thing of the past, the fragmented urban management was in the hands of various ministries and consequently of the central government's

2 "[...] s'accompagnait de l'abolition de tous les conseils d'administration locaux dans la Tanzanie urbaine et rurale, et de leur remplacement par des corps régionaux et de districts dominés par les fonctionnaires du gouvernement central." Stren (R.), "Les collectivités locales urbaines en Afrique". In Stren R. White R. (dirs.) *Villes africaines en crise. Gérer la croissance urbaine au sud du Sahara*. L'Harmattan, coll. *Villes et Entreprises*, 1993, p. 35.

technical authorities. Urban management suffered because of this state of affairs; according to R. Stren, “decentralisation created serious coordination problems in Dar es Salaam’s administration and (indirectly) led to extremely low subsidy levels as well as staff shortages in amenities and service domains.”³

On this occasion, government seized the resources of the former municipalities. Local taxes were abolished and replaced by a direct government tax. The various taxes were collected by the central government and the Regions redistributed the subsidies according to government priorities. Within the context of the countryside development policy, this resulted in the reduction of urban investments during this period. Between 1972 and 1978, minimum resources were allocated to the cities; the government considered that, compared to the countryside, the cities were sufficiently developed and equipped with infrastructures. S. Kulaba confirms that “it is true that, by and large, development strategies had a bias in favour of rural development.”⁴ During the decentralisation period between 1974 and 1978, the Dar es Salaam region recorded a budget of 80,587,000 Tsh (Tanzanian Shillings): only 20% of this regional budget was allocated to the three districts of Dar es Salaam city (16,037,000 Tsh.) for all its development projects, including the annual maintenance of infrastructure and services. This amount was lower than the sum distributed to the region’s rural districts. For some Tanzanian authors, the ideology of the *Ujamaa* era was truly “anti-capitalist, anti-urban development and anti-Dar es Salaam.”⁵

In the field, decentralisation translated into a drop in urban investment; infrastructure fell into disrepair and there was a decline in available benefits. “Four years after the abolition of urban authorities, there was already strong protest from all quarters in the light of deteriorating urban living conditions and more specifically basic services such as water supply.”⁶ The situation is exemplified by the public taps and stalls set up in the 1970’s by the government in those areas that were not served by the network. Initially, the population could get their water supply from these taps for free. However, because of a lack of maintenance and repair, most of them no longer work and have been abandoned by the population.

3 [...] la décentralisation a causé à Dar es Salaam de sévères problèmes de coordination administrative et (indirectement) des niveaux de subvention extrêmement bas ainsi qu’une pénurie de personnel en ce qui concerne la plus grande partie des domaines des équipements et des services.” Stren (R.), *op. cit.*, p. 36.

4 “[...] la stratégie de développement avait, dans l’ensemble, il est vrai, un préjugé en faveur du développement rural”. Kulaba (S.), “Les collectivités locales et la gestion des services urbains en Tanzanie”. In Stren (R.) White (R.) (dirs), 1993, p. 231.

5 “[...] anti-capitaliste, anti-développement urbain et anti-Dar es Salaam.” Haala (F.) *Institutional arrangements for Urban Management, The Sustainable Dar-es-Salaam Project*, Ph. D Thesis in Urban Planning and Policy, Development, The State University of New Jersey, United State of America, 1997, p. 23.

6 “[...] Après seulement quatre années d’abolition des autorités urbaines, il y a eu une forte protestation de l’ensemble des quartiers au vue de la détérioration des conditions de vie urbaine et plus spécifiquement des services de base comme le service d’alimentation en eau.” Kulaba (S.), *Urban growth and the management of urban reform in Tanzania*, second report, 1985, p. 20.

Yet, urban growth reached almost 8% per year during the same period. Dar's population went from 272,800 inhabitants in 1967 to 757,400 in 1978. This unexpected population increase was mainly due to rural migrants. The pro-countryside policy pursued during the 1970's failed: farmers' income remained low, production was insufficient and people were still awaiting the promised infrastructure. As a result, the low standard of living in the countryside was unable to prevent a flood of rural emigration. Rural areas did not experience the kind of development authorities were hoping for; on the contrary, they went through a period of decline and under-development. During this period, informal settlements proliferated. This type of housing was the only response to the need for rapid relief for the massive number of poor, new arrivals. The houses in question were usually built with durable materials, but amenities and urban infrastructures were lacking in these new areas. Government policies to oppose this type of migration and the proliferation of informal settlements on the outskirts of town were unable to curb the phenomenon.

Low levels of urban investment and high growth rates in cities increased the pressure on urban services that no longer matched the demand. Pro-countryside policies only highlighted the services' lack of capacity.

C. The return of urban authorities in a time of crisis (1978)


In view of the "decentralisation" failure, urban authorities were reinstated in 1978. Municipalities took responsibility for town planning but without funds or the necessary staff. The 1982 decree on local authorities became the legal framework for the way local urban authorities were organized. Since then, all local authorities are governed by a council made up of elected members, members of parliament and 5 or 6 members appointed by the Minister of local communities.

Since 1978, Dar es Salaam city is administered by a mayor heading the *Dar es Salaam City Council*. The municipality consists of various committees, each with its own experts. The municipality has not shown greater ability to manage town matters and to deliver satisfactory services. Councils' dependence on government subsidies makes them less autonomous. The reinstatement of *City Councils* was not followed by a redistribution of funds, which would have given the new local authorities the means and the necessary autonomy to manage their city. Central government continued to claim part of the taxes, which resulted in municipalities having only a very small income. Development tax, which is paid by adults between 18 and 65, constitutes the municipalities' main source of income. Municipalities often don't reach their expected revenue target. Other sources of income include central government subsidies. However, these amounts remain quite insufficient in the face of problems that have to be solved. Since the beginning of the eighties, the government itself has experienced a depletion of their resources, within the context of an economic crisis and following the Ugandan war, the increase in the oil price and the drop in the sales price of agricultural export products.

The example of the 1985/86 financial year illustrates the gap between needs and resources: the city received 21.1 million shillings for development projects, a paltry sum (less than 10%) in the light of the municipality's demands, which amounted to about 372.8 million shillings. Moreover, almost half the amount was allocated to the region's rural area.⁷ As a result, deprived of financial means, the new municipality is unable to meet the expectations of the ever-increasing and mostly poor population.

Despite the 1976 investments in the construction of a treatment plant on the Lower Ruvu and the university's two new reservoirs, Dar es Salaam's water distribution network experiences the same constraint. The network and its installations, which were put in place as far back as the fifties, have not been maintained; the network's inadequate extensions have not met the challenge of spatial expansion and population growth. The old town has to rely on a deteriorated network through a lack of maintenance, while recent neighbourhoods are under-equipped.

Figure 30 ; Dar es Salaam : water distribution system



7 Hayuma (A.M.), *The Reform and Operation of Urban local Government Authorities in Tanzania, 1899-1986*, 1986; p.73.

Because of urban authorities' financial dependence on central government, they are also less autonomous regarding the capacity to take action. Urban authorities' main functions are to maintain public order, provide the population with urban services and to monitor activities of public interest, such as trade. Central government has however reserved the right to monitor, supervise and coordinate these different services.⁸

Parallel to the drop in municipal revenues and investments, the 1968 and 1979 urban plans were not fitting guides for the town's growth and for the economic reality of the times. The plans issued by foreign consulting firms reflected Western perceptions of the city and of town planning which were often incompatible with Tanzania's urban reality.⁹ By denouncing informal settlements as "tumours within the town", the 1968-plan attempted to limit urban expansion while at the same time greatly underestimating urban growth. Predefined limits were put in place to curb urban extension. In comparison to its ambitious predecessor, the 1979-plan was meant to be pragmatic and more flexible, taking into consideration the crisis the country was going through and the deteriorating situation in Dar es Salaam. But the plan was not implemented, due in part to the relentless population increase against the background of a worsening economic crisis. So, the plans failed, and the resulting urban crisis was partly due to the fact that they were ill-suited to the city's reality.

Dar es Salaam's infrastructures were badly affected by political choices restricting urban investments and underestimating demographic growth. The Ministries exercised no control over the city, leaving it to develop in an informal manner, illustrated by 70% of informal settlements. In this city-in-crisis, infrastructures in general and water distribution in particular (because the latter requires extensive planning and investment) are unable to meet the population's needs. Not only does the urban crisis have an effect on infrastructure, but also on its managerial structures. It is within this context of an urban governance crisis that the water distribution system was put in place. Today, the system's limitations and its inability to respond to the demands of a city housing several million people have been laid bare.

II - WATER SUPPLY: AN ILL-ADAPTED SERVICE

Dar es Salaam's water distribution service does not meet the expectations of its citizens. The problem lies as much with the distribution and treatment system as with the water resources level. The system suffers from numerous leaks due to inadequate maintenance. The city's distribution network is under-sized, the water pressure is insufficient and parts of the city are not serviced at all. In view of these difficulties, water management has undergone various transformations.

⁸ Ibid, p.19.

⁹ Armstrong (A.), "Masters Plans for Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The shaping of an African City", *Habitat International*, Vol 11, no. 2, p.133.

A. DAWASA¹⁰: a state-owned company in crisis and in the process of being privatized

Before the creation of a sole Water Board in 1977, the city's water conveyance system was managed by the region and by the Department of Water Affairs. In 1974, the latter devolved part of its functions by creating structures on a regional and district level. Regional offices responsible for water conveyance were thus placed under the authority of the Ministry of Water Affairs. The installation of water networks in the different regions is managed by the *Regional Water Engineers*; on an administrative level, they answer to the *Regional Development Director*, who in turn represents the central government at regional level¹¹. The Director gets technical support from the Ministry of Water Affairs. These departments, which fall under the authority of the Ministry of Water Affairs, are now operating in the Dar es Salaam rural district.

This administrative structure changed in 1981 with the promulgation of the decree on water distribution in an urban environment and the establishment of NUWA (the *National Urban Water Authority*) as a parastatal organization, under the supervision of the Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. This parastatal company was supposed to manage the distribution of water in urban centres, maintain the network, plan new projects and extensions to the network, and educate and inform the population as far as public health is concerned.¹² In the face of NUWA's disappointing results, its responsibilities were reduced to managing water distribution in Dar es Salaam city. In collaboration with urban authorities, NUWA had to prepare and implement plans to expand the water supply system. A member of the Dar es Salaam *City Council* was appointed to NUWA to coordinate the actions of the different role-players. NUWA is responsible for water distribution in the urban area. Other role-players intervene on the outskirts of the agglomeration and upstream from the water supply system. The *Rural Water Supply Section*, which depends on the Region, is responsible for underground resources in the outlying areas. Dar's former technical departments, which arose out of the dissolution of the urban authorities, were joined together in one technical department known as *Maji Vijini*.¹³ This office is responsible for water in the rural areas of the Dar es Salaam Region and in particular in its 52 villages.

This department of water, which falls under the municipality's administrative supervision as well as that of the Ministry of Water Affairs, builds wells and reservoirs. The Ministry of Water Affairs retains the responsibility to develop water resources and large water resource facilities and is generally involved in NUWA's policy-making.

10 Dar-es-Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority.

11 Ministry Of Water, Energy and Minerals, Workshop on roles, responsibilities and coordination of water and sanitation sector agencies, 1994, p. 2.

12 Humphrey (H.), Rehabilitation study of Dar-es-Salaam Water Supply System, feasibility report, NUWA, The United Republic of Tanzania, 1995, p. 214.

13 Village water.

In 1997, NUWA was changed to DAWASA. The principle difference between the two concerns the purification process, which is no longer within the province of the Dar es Salaam municipality but that of the water distribution company, hence the name change. The remaining functions have been left unchanged, but sections 10 to 15 relating to the distribution company's intervention in other urban centres were cancelled, as DAWASA's scope of activities is being restricted to water distribution in Dar es Salaam. In truth, the distribution company is incapable of managing Dar es Salaam's water distribution on its own; its disappointing results are proof of this. Water leakages, water cuts and drops in the water pressure are a daily occurrence. Only a few, restricted sectors of the city are connected to the network. The informal settlements, home to poor as well as wealthy city-dwellers, have been forgotten.

Although DAWASA is financially autonomous in theory, profit-making has not been authorized. The company's prime responsibility is to supply city dwellers with drinking water and thus it cannot, in theory at least, deny its services to anyone in its distribution area. Theoretically speaking, the main source of revenue is the recovery of users' invoices. A United Nations report¹⁴ has estimated unpaid invoices to represent about 15% of the total and DAWASA's current revenue to be about 70% of the expected income. The company's financial managers are less optimistic and put the percentage of unpaid bills at more than 45%¹⁵. Recovering the totality of the invoices seems to be difficult for various reasons: firstly, a large part of the population comes from a rural environment where water is a free commodity; the new urban population is therefore not in the habit of paying for it. Secondly, the threat of water cuts does not traumatise population as they can either get water from their neighbours or connect themselves to the network illegally. The payment rate also varies according to the population's satisfaction with the service. In the best-served areas, the payment rate is more than 75%, whereas it drops to 60% in the formalized areas¹⁶, and barely reaches 30% in the informal settlements.¹⁷ In the latter, the population refuses to pay their bills, considering that they need not pay for a defective service which only serves the neighbourhood once or twice a week.

DAWASA is unsure of the exact number of users. There is indeed a wide gap between the number of users known to the company and users who are actually connected to the service. In 1990, NUWA officially recorded 59,020 users of whom 54,513 were domestic consumers. NUWA approached the *Ardhi Institute* (the University of Dar es Salaam's Town Planning Institute) for assistance in

14 United Nations, *Managing the sustainable growth and development of Dar-es-Salaam*, 1992, p.16.

15 Interview with Mrs Mmeso, Head of client services - July 1998.

16 It is easier for Dawasa's inspectors to locate non-paying clients and proceed with disconnecting them from the network in the formalized quarters.

17 The Ilala area manager's estimate - interview, July 1998.

evaluating the number of illegal connections to the system as well as their location. The agglomeration totalled 115,308 legal and illegal connections.¹⁸ In 1998, the number of domestic consumers was 84,473; the number of users is on the increase, but remains well below the amount of households.

The financially weakened water distribution company is no longer in a position to finance new facilities or extensions to the city's network. Although the World Bank has taken charge of rehabilitating the primary water distribution network, maintenance and expansion of the remaining network are financed locally to a limited extent by different role-players: residents' organizations, NGO's or sponsors. The Dar es Salaam water distribution company is financially dependant on sponsors for construction work or for expanding the network; politically, it depends on the Ministry for intervention when strategic decisions are taken. Ministerial interference occurs primarily at tariff level (increasing tariffs or discontinuing free street-fountains). At the time of my investigations, DAWASA wanted to charge for water from public taps or bore holes, but because of the risk of a cholera epidemic, the idea was opposed by the Ministry of Water Affairs and by the Prime Minister's office¹⁹. The government found itself in a crisis situation and did not want to risk being unpopular. The semi-public company is thus far from having the autonomy that was intended when it was created. Water management conditions have led to the privatisation of state-owned companies, which is in line with the state's overall withdrawal, as requested by international organizations. Plans to privatize Dar es Salaam's water distribution company are indeed in the pipeline. Technical reports and legal texts defining the framework of the new water distribution company are nearing completion. The process started in July 1997 when the *Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Committee* (PPSRC), a state organization responsible for the privatisation of the state-owned companies, published a prequalification notice in the local press. The official 1999-bill²⁰ outlines the basic structure of the new private distribution company. This bill attempts to amend two organs relating to water distribution and use, with the intention of providing a legal framework for DAWASA's privatisation.

With these amendments, the *DAWASA Assets Holding Authority*, which owns the basic infrastructures for water distribution and purification, becomes *The Public Granting Authority*. The private operator will distribute water to users and collect payments directly. In the exercise of their respective duties, the operator and DAWASA will be subject to regulation by the *Water regulator*²¹

18 JICA, The Study of rehabilitation of Dar-es-Salaam Water Supply in the United Republic of Tanzania, Final Report, p. 199, table 3.9.

19 Interview with DAWASA's Financial Director - August 1998.

20 The United Republic of Tanzania, Bill Supplement, The Water Laws (miscellaneous amendments), Act 1999, Arrangement of sections, in Gazette of The United Republic of Tanzania, n°3, vol 80, 1999, p. 9

21 Section 5B Act 1999, p9.

(a regulating organization). This external body is supposed to prevent potential abuse by a company with a monopoly, and will also arbitrate the relationship between the state and the private operator. The smooth functioning of this tripartite entity will depend on the independence of the regulator, which may be seized by either of the parties.

As yet, no information has been forthcoming about the type of contract established between the new private company and the Tanzanian state, or about their "social commitments" to meet the needs of the poorest members of the population. But it seems obvious that a private company with commercial objectives and an interest in performance will initially favour creditworthy members of the population, important clients, who will be able to pay their water bills. On a spatial level, one can expect privatisation to underscore current differences by favouring profitable areas, hence increasing inequalities. Setting up a technical network in some city quarters will render social segregation visible, reinforcing it within the agglomeration.

B. Network inability to adjust to the population's needs

At present, Dar es Salaam has a population of more than three million inhabitants, 70% of whom live in under-equipped squatter camps. The amount of water distributed by the network is lower than the demand. Extending the pipes to the town's new residential areas does not suffice. As a result, a significant part of the population simply has no access to water on a day-to-day basis. Elsewhere, water pressure, cut offs and inferior water quality pose problems. Some neighbourhoods are equipped, others are not; daily water distribution varies according to the location of the areas.

1. THE GAP BETWEEN NETWORK CAPACITY AND DEMAND

Water generated in and conveyed to the city does not meet the demand. Many factors account for this: the rundown equipment is more than 20 years old; there is insufficient maintenance and a significant number of leaks and broken pipes; water is consumed illegally and city-dwellers waste a considerable amount of water.

In theory, water from the many rivers flowing through the city cannot be used because of human waste and pollution from the many industries. Dar es Salaam city gets its water mainly from the Ruvu River, some sixty kilometres north of the city. The water supply point of the upper Ruvu River is located 65 km west of Dar es Salaam, on the Morogoro road. This site was developed in 1959. Water is conveyed from here to the Kimara reservoir. Currently, the old pipes have many leaks, which lead to significant water loss in the system. With its 34.2 ml capacity, the reservoir supplies water to the northern part of the city. Because the demand is too high, the reservoir is often empty. The Lower Ruvu system, which has a capacity of 182 ml, was built in 1976. This water supply point is located 22 km downstream from the Upper Ruvu's water

supply point and 18 km from the sea. Water is conveyed from there to the University's reservoirs on the outskirts of the city. Today, the city has three reservoirs: at Kimara and at the University north of the city, and there is a reservoir with a smaller capacity at Mtoni, in the south. Distribution thus exemplifies the imbalance between the city's northern and southern areas. The northern part is better served and experiences fewer water distribution problems, cut offs and shortages. However, the reservoirs are rarely full and experience two peaks in demand per day, one in the morning and one in the evening. Water is sent directly through the distribution network so that when demand is high, the reservoirs can't fill up. This causes water pressure problems in the network.

With its almost 3 million inhabitants, the city experiences constant water shortages. The demand for water is estimated at 355,000 m³/day²² while the total production capacity of the three systems barely reaches 270,000 m³/ day, resulting in a daily deficit of 80,000 m³/day. This shortage is accentuated by network losses estimated at between 35 % and 50 % (established by various studies on Dar es Salaam's water distribution system).

The distribution network does not serve the whole city. It covers 321 km² (25 kilometres from north to south and 15 kilometres from east to west). The city is covered by 821 kilometres of pipes, of which 237 belong to the primary network and 584 to the secondary and tertiary network. The age of the pipes is related to the city's growth: the oldest pipes, located in the town centre, date back to the 1950's, while in Kinondoni and Oyster Bay, they date back to the 1960's. Very few new pipes have been installed since the 1970's.

22 The United Republic of Tanzania, *Water and sanitation sector Review*, Final Report, Ministry of Water Energy and Minerals, 1995, p. 63.

TABLE XXII: A HISTORY OF DAR ES SALAAM'S WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Year	System	Description
1919 1931 1939 1942		A water distribution system is initiated (4 wells) 11 bore holes at Gerezani Creek Seepages in the culverts Water treatment plant at Gerezani
1949 1952	System Mtoni	Construction work begins Operations begin
1959 1964 1966 1971 1975 1976 1982	Upper Ruvu	Start of operations 1st Phase British aid 2 nd Phase idem 3rd Phase idem 4th Phase idem 5th Phase German aid Operations begin Canadian aid Renovation Canadian aid
1984	Distribution network	Renovation Japanese financing
1987	Upper Ruvu	Renovation Italian financing
1997	Different System	Drilling of bore holes British aid, UNICEF
1998	Upper Ruvu Lower Ruvu	Renovation (in progress) Financed by the World Bank

(Source: according to the Japan International Cooperation Agency, 1991, p. 2.18)

TABLE XXIII: TOTAL WATER TREATMENT PLANT CAPACITY


Source	Theoretical capacity (ml)
MTONI	9
UPPER RUVU	82
LOWER RUVU	182
Total	273

(Source: Humphrey, 1995, p. 13)

New extensions to the network are carried out with poor quality PVC pipes. The well-developed part of the network is thus mostly located in the city's old neighbourhoods and in the wealthy residential areas. The outlying and informal areas are not served (or else, are badly served) by the network. There seems to be a shortage of secondary and tertiary pipes in the recently developed neighbourhoods. Residents must connect on an individual basis to the main pipe that runs along the outskirts of the neighbourhood. Kilometres of badly laid pipes run through the neighbourhoods in this way. In addition, certain areas on the city's edge, such as Kigamboni, are not served by DAWASA, but

by boreholes that are either managed by the Region or by the City Council. In Dar es Salaam, individual connection is not the most common supply mode.

Figure 31 ; Dar es Salaam : an unequal water service



Sources : Sustainable Dar es Salaam Programme, 1998 ; field surveys, 1998

Based on surveys conducted in Dar es Salaam in 1985 amongst 660 people, Kulaba S. concludes that “as far as individual households are concerned, water connections in Dar es Salaam are insufficient. Among the households studied, 47 % don’t have running water, not at home nor directly outside, and 32 % have indicated that they have to share running water. Of all the households, only 20.9% had running water.”²³ City dwellers connected to the network were therefore in the minority at the time of the survey. In 1996, a survey on domestic water demand among 990 households spread over 13 neighbourhoods in Dar es Salaam estimated that a third of the households were connected to the network²⁴. On 1 January 1998, the distribution company’s official domestic connections amounted to 84,473, which represents barely 15% of the households.²⁵ 20%, 30% or 15 %: the percentage of the population connected to the network changes from one survey to another, from one source to another. This shows just how difficult it is to obtain a profile of the water consumers in a developing city where the population rapidly outgrows the estimates and where the distribution company doesn’t know the sum total of its consumers.

Despite urban growth, the number of consumers is barely increasing. The network has been unable to expand and accommodate new, potential consumers. The cost and the red tape involved in getting connected also explain the low subscription rate. An individual wanting to connect to the network has to apply for a permit from the water distribution company. Consequently, the company’s technicians install a water supply point on the main pipeline closest to the plot of land. The individual pays for this service; the rate charged by DAWASA depends on the location and on the amount of work involved. The installation of the pipe, from the water supply point to the plot of land, is the owner’s responsibility. However, the owner can ask for technical assistance from the company’s staff. These pipes are buried approximately 20 to 30 centimetres deep; they are usually more than a hundred metres long and can even reach a kilometre in length. Because of their length, residents call them “spaghetti pipes”. They are rather fragile: during the rainy season they are rapidly exposed and rendered vulnerable; a car or a stone can break them. The number of connections is also limited by the settling of accounts. How can residents without a fixed income, working in the informal sector on an irregular basis, put aside a sufficient sum of money? As the following table shows, water tariffs have shown a constant increase in the course of the last decade. This can be explained by the water distribution company’s change in policy. During the 1970’s, the government considered water to be one of the population’s basic assets, which resulted in minimal service charges; however, from the 1990’s onwards water was considered a marketable asset.

23 Kulaba (S.), op. cit., 1993, p.253.

24 CEEST, *Dar es Salaam Water Demand: an end use perspective*, CEEST Research Report Series, 1996, p. 25.

25 Calculated according to an average of 5 people per household.

The lowest tariff is for domestic use. Due to the absence of water meters, tariff setting is based on classification according to pressure zones. The area served by the distribution company is divided into 294 zones, with each zone representing a group of no more than 999 consumers. Meters are installed at each zone entrance for a few months to measure total consumption. The amount of water consumed in each zone is then relayed to the number of consumers to calculate the average consumption per consumer and to draw up individual bills. Invoice amounts range from 3,253 Tsh. for a consumption of 15.9 m³ in those neighbourhoods that are served once or twice a week, to more than 12,000 Tsh. for a consumption of 43 m³ in neighbourhoods like Upanga. All the consumers in one area thus pay the same amount, whether the household is made up of 2 or 10 people and whether they use little or a lot of water. Setting tariffs according to zones relieves households of any sense of responsibility and does not encourage the saving of water. The tariffs disregard the population's social and economic grouping, thus ignoring the income differences of residents within the same area.

Different tariffs according to consumer status have also been developed. There is a distinction between domestic, commercial, institutional and industrial tariffs.

TABLE XXIV: WATER TARIFF INCREASES FROM 1985 TO 1998
(IN TANZANIAN SHILLINGS PER 1000 GALLON)

Consumer group	July 1985	July 1988	Sept. 1992	Sept. 1993	Mar 1994	Jan 1995	Jan 1996	Jan. 1997	Jan. 1998
Domestic	13.50	57.20	100.00	120.00	140.00	161.00	700.00	700.00	1065
Institution	13.50	90.00	160.00	200.00	230.00	265.00	926.00	1,066	1,620
Commercial	13.50	192.00	330.00	400.00	460.00	530.00	1,127	1,296	1,971
Industrial	13.50	248.00	420.00	500.00	575.00	661.00	1,329	1,528	2,324
Agriculture					575.00	661.00	1,329	4,025*	4,628*
Expatriates	USD 2.25	USD 5.7	USD 5.7	USD 6.5	USD 7.6	USD 7.6	USD 5.7	USD 5.7	USD 8.6
Brick manufacturers				25,000	29,000	33,350		15,280	
Water in tanks				8,000	10,000	11,500		26,456 (9,000l)	39,675 (9,000l)
Exchange rate \$ in Tsh.	16.44	97.28	325	474	494.4	590		460	580

Source: CEEST, p.5, and internal NUWA document as regards the last three columns

2. The reticulated town and the serviced town

Residents' social standing and the status of the land are determining factors when it comes to having a distribution system in the cities of developing countries. Distinctions are made between formalized, wealthy and fully equipped neighbourhoods; formalized neighbourhoods resulting from town planning or renovation programmes, where there is a water supply network in place, and lastly the unequipped neighbourhoods. But in Dar es Salaam the situation is more complex, and a number of factors must be taken into account when it comes to equipping and supplying a neighbourhood with water or not.

The city's location between the small northwestern hills and the coast has an influence on the type of equipment and water distribution required. The rivers from the Pugu hills to the east of the city divide the coastal plains into a series of U-shaped valleys before flowing into the Indian Ocean. This explains why Kigamboni, situated on the other side of Dar es Salaam's port and separated from the city by this stretch of sea, is not equipped, while part of the area was planned in 1979.

Because of insufficient network pressure, there is no service in some equipped neighbourhoods; DAWASA technicians' term for this is "dry pipes". This phenomenon particularly affects neighbourhoods located on high ground or far from the main pipes. The most noteworthy example is probably that of Msasani Peninsular, a conglomeration of expatriates living in large, beautiful villas; there is a network in place, but there is no longer any water in the taps. The neighbourhood is situated slightly higher than the main pipe running through the southern part of the Peninsula. Insufficient pressure makes it impossible to service all the connected houses. Houses to the north of the Peninsula are worst affected since they are furthest from the main pipeline.

The neighbourhood's land or urbanistic status is not necessarily a limiting factor; some non-formalized areas occupied by wealthy residents with the financial means to pay for the connection between the main pipeline and the house (as in the case of Mbezi, to the far north of Dar es Salaam, for example) are eventually connected to and serviced by the network.

City-dwellers settling down do not seem to take into account whether a neighbourhood is equipped or not. It would seem that water distribution in the whole Dar es Salaam area is in such a critical state that it is no longer taken into consideration by new property owners. Once the house has been completed, people connect to the network or build a well. Mbezi Beach's rich homeowners connected their homes on an individual basis to the pipeline from the Ruvu River running along Bagamoyo Road.


However, it is possible to establish a typology distinguishing equipped and serviced neighbourhoods from equipped, non-serviced neighbourhoods and non-equipped neighbourhoods.

- *Equipped areas* include formalized and old neighbourhoods. Old neighbourhoods are connected to the distribution network. These include the central areas (administrative and commercial areas) equipped during the British presence, the residential areas along the Indian Ocean such as Oyster Bay, and the old African areas. These neighbourhoods were the first ones to be equipped, and the network in these areas is dense. However, the old pipes are quite worn, resulting in many leaks. In addition, the population in these areas has increased considerably. As Kariakoo's African neighbourhood has experienced significant densification, demand for water has increased considerably. The current transformation of Kariakoo sets new standards as far as equipment requirement is concerned. Since the mid-1990's, many traditional Swahili houses have been replaced by apartment blocks. The original network was adapted to horizontal housing, whereas vertical constructions need much more network pressure. These relatively well-serviced areas are therefore experiencing pressure problems and water cut offs, particularly during the day. The consumer distribution map shows a concentration of consumers around the town centre. The areas concerned are the old, densely populated areas like Kinondoni, Magomeni or Ilala.
- *Formalized areas* are connected to the distribution network by and large, and equipment standards depend on the inhabitants' income. In the wealthy residential areas, the residents have several taps inside and outside the house. In addition, these neighbourhoods are often equipped with pumps and tanks with a capacity of about 2,000 litres for storing water and circumventing the fairly lengthy water cuts. In other planned residential areas, equipment standards depend on inhabitants' resourcefulness. Some have only one tap in the courtyard, others rely on their neighbours for water. In Sinza, an area northwest of the city which was planned in the 1970's as part of the "*Sites and Services*" programme (an equivalent of the Rehabilitated Plots programme), roads and pipelines were laid out before construction work on the houses started. At first, running water was provided by public taps: 4 taps for 50 plots.²⁶
- *Some poorly connected areas* only get water from the network at night when demand from the other neighbourhoods decreases and the network's pressure increases. Water pressure is reasonably good close to the new Bagamoyo road north of the city, along the Indian Ocean to the east and south of Pugu Road. Pressure is poor in the recently constructed outlying areas where, at present, the primary network is either not developed enough or undersized when it exists at all.
- *The informal settlements*, where no planning has taken place, have been

²⁶ Kironde (L.), The evolution of the land use structure of Dar es Salaam. 1880 -1990 : A study in the effects of land policy , Ph. D. Thesis, Department of land development, Faculty of Architecture, Design and development, Nairobi, 1994, p. 385.

forgotten by the distribution system because of their illegal nature, geographical position and morphology. These areas are far from the main highways and therefore far from the distribution system; the absence of roads makes it difficult to develop a network. Some of these areas are equipped with “*standpipes*” where water is free; but because there are so few of these, residents are obliged to carry water-filled containers over long distances. These water supply points can take on various forms. Most of them consist of an ordinary tap, sometimes cast in cement. In some instances, a cement slab and a gutter to catch the water are added to the tap. These water supply points are often an important source of water loss. Most of them are currently out of order. Their state of neglect can be explained by the company’s lack of financial means and an absence of political will. The water company wants people to pay for water from these taps. For this to happen, a management system is needed according to which the company assigns water-selling functions to an individual or an employee. All residents living in these areas rely on resellers or collect water for free from rivers or wells.

Figure 32: Dar es Salaam: water distribution network users in 1998




Sources: network, Dar-es-Salaam Water Distribution System, data, Dawasa Branch (investigations carried out by Valérie MESSER in July 1998)

Three service levels can be distinguished according to residents' socio-economic status: several taps inside the house, only one tap on the plot, or no connection at all. The situation in town is a complex one. Several scenarios are possible within the same sector: connected or unconnected households, resellers or wells.

Because of the town's undersized distribution network, pressure problems and water cuts of varying lengths occur frequently. To circumvent this difficulty, residents are obliged to resort to water storage. Here too, there are obvious disparities between different groups within urban society. Building a pump and a reservoir for a house's water supply is very expensive; only the well-to-do minority is equipped with such facilities. Dar es Salaam thus has real inequalities when it comes to access to water. This is also reflected in differences in daily water consumption, the amount of which varies from 22 to 400 litres.

Figure 33 ; Diversity of water supply types: the example of Mchikichini



Sources: field surveys carried out in August, 1998

“Water consumption is very low in Dar es Salaam, and 39.8% of households use a maximum of 120 litres per day, 30.7% use between 102 and 200 litres per day and 31.5 % use more than 200 litres per day (...). The average consumption is actually 23.6 litres per person per day”²⁷.

27 Kulaba S. op. cit. (1993), p. 253.

The population in the well-off sectors virtually uses as much water as those from industrial countries, i.e. about 400 litres per inhabitant per day; however, this privileged group is a very small one. The poorest members of the population use barely 20 litres (the equivalent of a bucketful) for their daily needs (drinking, washing, doing the dishes and personal hygiene) while the minimum recommended by the WHO is 40 litres per inhabitant.

In view of the distribution company's inability to supply and convey water satisfactorily to the whole population, city-dwellers are turning to other supply means.


III - FROM A PROLIFERATION OF SUBSTITUTION MODES TO A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM

At present, Dar es Salaam's water management system does not respond to the notion of public service in the sense that service is not provided to all members of the population and that there is no equality regarding access to water. Water management is also dissatisfactory from a social point of view (different service levels), an economic point of view (the company is in debt, there are costs which the population cannot afford) as well as a political point of view (regarding competency distribution amongst the various administrative levels). Various role-players are intervening to compensate for this state society deficiency.

Members of the population who have been excluded from the city's distribution system may have individual or collective recourse to alternative water points from various sources. Depending on the type of neighbourhood and its inhabitants' social profile, the sophistication level of the water supply modes and water point management at local level may vary (water points for private use, shared points managed by a neighbourhood committee, etc.). International role-players and numerous NGO's (Non-Governmental Organizations) active in the city also intervene in the management mode at a local level. A. Household individualisation and empowerment

To get access to water, people in the un-serviced neighbourhoods often have recourse to individual alternatives alongside the public network (wells, water from the rivers) or at a lower level (resellers). Illegal connections, using resellers, digging for individual wells on plots, recovering rain and river water are typical examples of individual supply modes implemented by city-dwellers. The population takes these individual water supply initiatives either because they are not connected to the network or to compensate for deficiencies in the water distribution system (water cut offs, insufficient pressure, breakdowns, etc.

Figure 34: The water sellers: the final water distribution link, the example of the Mnyamani subdistrict in Buguruni



Sources: field surveys carried out in August 1998

In the connected neighbourhoods, people compensate for the distribution company's deficiencies with solutions to the various defects in the water distribution system. With regard to DAWASA's charges³¹ to get connected to the network and procedural red tape involved in obtaining this connection, it is estimated that 63,000 illegal branch-pipes (JICA report, 1991) provide water to those households living near the mains.

Wells for domestic use dug by individuals on their plots are a relatively common supply mode. More often than not, the water provided is of inferior quality. This concurs with the situation in Kinshasa (Zaire), where the most common water supply system is the individual well.²⁸ But in Dar es Salaam, contrary to Kinshasa, wealthy members of the population are also obliged to use this supply mode in the badly serviced neighbourhoods. In this respect, the example of Kigamboni is an absolutely remarkable one. This former fishing village was planned in 1979. On the one hand, there are large houses occupied by wealthy residents and on the other, illegal dwellings all along the coast. The area is badly serviced by the distribution network. Only one pipeline services the neighbourhood; its pressure is often insufficient. As a result, the

28 Pain M., *Kinshasa : la ville et la cité*, Paris, ORSTOM, 1984, p.179.

population uses other supply modes for water. Water pumped from the subsoil by means of shallow wells is preserved in tanks. This system is a relatively expensive one and only wealthy families can pay for it. These families don't experience any shortages, as the neighbourhood is not yet densely populated. According to the residents, the water quality is relatively good, although it is a bit salty. Less wealthy residents either use the services of a reseller or dig more basic, shallow wells without a pump system. The well is just a simple hole, without any extras.

Private operators are lower down on the institutional distribution network, and function as the last distribution link within the city. The water distribution company is unable to provide a water distribution service in the city's informal settlements on its own. Private operators intervene mainly at a water distribution level (water carriers, resellers, etc.) in the squatter areas. They replace the missing tertiary distribution system in the area. There are different types of resellers.

Some owners connected to the network build tanks with a capacity of thousands of litres of water. These are often located at neighbourhood entrances and sell to the carriers who transport jerry cans to the houses for an amount of 100 Tsh.²⁹ Prices vary according to the distance between water point and household plot, and according to the availability of the resource. In times of major shortages, water can be sold at between 400 and 500 Tsh. per 20 litre bucket.³⁰ More often than not, the resellers are young people between the ages of 18 and 25 working independently or within a family network. The basic investment does not entail much: a cart and some jerry cans are all that is needed to embark on a career as a reseller. The youngest resellers rent their equipment for the day, while the older ones own their carts. The clients are often resellers' acquaintances: "*...my clients are my neighbours; I sell between 2 and 5 carts to 4 clients. I take the jerry cans back home and my wife sells them to the neighbours; in the meantime I go back to fetch more water*".³¹ Many young people took up this activity during the 1996 water crisis. During this period, some were asked by their neighbours to take up this activity and have continued to do it ever since.

The resellers also operate in connected (but badly supplied) neighbourhoods like Msasani Peninsular. Of the peninsula's 1,035 homes, 554 (whether connected or not) make use of the tankers that deliver 9 m³ water for the sum of approximately 40,000 shillings.³²

29 Personal interviews with sellers from Buguruni-Mnyamani in July 1998.

30 The Express, Hygiene goes for a toss as water crisis continues, 14-20 May 1998.

31 "[...] mes clients sont mes voisins, je vends entre 2 et 5 charrettes à 4 clients. Je ramène les jerricanes à la maison, ma femme les vend aux voisins; pendant ce temps je reviens chercher l'eau". Personal interviews with sellers from Buguruni-Mnyamani, July 1998.

32 Sogea - DAWASA, Survey report on Msasani Peninsula connections, Dar es Salaam, Internal document, 1998, 14p.

More than half of Dar es Salaam's population also recovers rainwater,³³ and places containers under the roof to collect water.

In short, the one piece of equipment which can be found on all the city's plots is the reservoir, whether it is a simple 200-litre drum for those residents who are un-connected, who are trying to find water or who have it delivered to their homes, or a tank with a few hundred litre capacity for houses that are actually connected. The presence or absence of this piece of equipment also says a lot about the town's social inequalities. The tank makes it possible to stock up on water and thus to compensate for possible water cut offs.

For residents who are socially and spatially excluded from Dar es Salaam's water distribution network, free water supply is the only solution. Poor members of the population get their water supply on the surface or from the city's rivers and lakes. Due to urban density (almost 500 inhabitants/ha) and gradual, significant water-table pollution (caused by surface waste, wastewater that doesn't drain off, faecal pollution of the sub-soil), the quality of most of this water is mostly inferior. The many cases of waterborne illnesses, especially cholera, which takes its share of victims every year, bear witness to this environmental problem.

Residential areas thus provide residents with a variety of circumstances organizing their own water supply according to their capabilities. Substitution modes used by households are linked to two factors: firstly, the household itself, whose income makes it possible to invest in (usually expensive) quality equipment (a well with an electric pump or a tank with pump); and secondly, the plot's location within the city, its distance from the network and its location in relation to the water table.

B. Collective responses: new role players emerge

Collective responses to institutional breakdowns can be identified either on the level of management (creating development committees inside the neighbourhoods) or on a distribution level (creating sales points run by the people themselves). It could emanate from competent authorities, city-dwellers or international organizations.

New water access collectives are being created within the neighbourhoods. City-dwellers are rallying around a particular equipment project, in this case providing the neighbourhood with water. For example, the residents of Kimanga (a recent quarter on the western side of the city, developed at the beginning of the 1990's) put together a committee to finance a 2 kilometre-long canalization. During a one-year period, individual members of 45³⁴ households paid contributions of about 132,500 Tsh. When interviewed, neighbourhood committee officials (board members when the project started) denied having favoured a certain sector of the population. Members' sociology reveals a number

33 CEEST, 1996, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

34 45 is the maximum number recommended by DAWASA's technicians for a satisfactory water supply.

of common points: the collective consists of salaried employees³⁵ (people with a regular income) and the majority have a certain level of education (high school level at least, in most cases). The committee was responsible for financing the canalization; it was up to the households to finance the connection between the plots and the canalization. At present, only 9 of the 45 members have not yet been connected to the canalization. These households take priority when getting water from those members who are equipped with a tap. Households connected to the network resell water to other neighbourhood households who did not have the means to join the committee. Being connected to the system is thus beneficial to the households concerned and also represents improved living conditions for the population as a whole.

Other neighbourhoods have organized themselves into CBO's or *Community Based Organizations* of which the best known is probably the TDF (or *Tabata Development Front*), created in 1992 to oppose a public dump in the neighbourhood. Tabata is a recent neighbourhood of which parts were planned in an area with a lot of pressure to obtain urban services. Situated on the city's western outskirts, along Nelson Mandela Road, it houses a population of would-be landowners. The committee demonstrated against the municipality's decision and won the case. This incident led to the realization amongst Dar's residents that they could oppose the authorities' official decisions. In the case of Tabata, it strengthened the inhabitants' mobilization capacities. The objective of these committees is to improve living conditions in the neighbourhood. At present, international organizations are either working in direct partnership with these committees (similar to the United Nations operating within the framework of the SDP or Sustainable Dar es Salaam Project) or trying to imitate them in other neighbourhoods. Within the framework of the CIP³⁶ or Community Infrastructure Programme, Irish Aid³⁷ financed the equipment of a parallel system to the distribution network in Tabata and Kijitonyama: a system including boreholes, reservoirs and public taps managed by a salaried employee who resells the water. This water supply system gives autonomy from the water distribution network managed by DAWASA to these two neighbourhoods. The latter are, however, partially connected to the network; there are worse situations in other parts of the city.

The United Nations aim to involve the population by creating a contribution and participation structure in the course of the project's various planning and execution stages in these two neighbourhoods. On the one hand, the population participated by digging trenches for the water network; on the other, they contributed financially to the construction of roads and a purification system. 5% of the project is financed by the population. The

35 Of the 45 members, only one is a shopkeeper. (Neighbourhood surveys and visits, March 1999).

36 The Community Infrastructure Programme was started in 1995 as part of the United Nations' SDP programme and was financed by Irish Aid.

37 Irish development organisation.

water points are managed by committees who sell the water and who are responsible for maintenance. The various NGO's (or Non Governmental Organizations) wanting to get involved in water distribution in one of Dar es Salaam's neighbourhoods now see Tabata as the example to be followed. The report is indeed a positive one, as two boreholes are providing more than 4000 people with water, jobs are being created (that of tap managers and a supervisor) and profits will be reused to build a community centre. United Nations employees who have been in the neighbourhood for the past 3 years will soon be leaving: the project will be transferred to the local CBO management.

These committees are managed by a board and are elected by the people, at least in theory. In theory, because the number of residents who are present during elections is relatively low. Neighbourhoods are divided into sub-sections, each with its own representative acting as an intermediary between the board and the people. But even there, people's participation and involvement depend largely on the personality of the neighbourhood representative. The extent of popular involvement is often limited to those people living in close proximity to the representative. At the time of the survey, Mr Limbo, who is the representative for sub-section 2 in Kijitonyama, had only collected contributions from those people living in his own street.

These representatives are either volunteers or were solicited by members of the board. In Kijitonyama, most of the representatives were elected by the existing committee. For the most part, these representatives are public figures with many obligations, on school boards of directors or as local government secretaries, for example. These committees are on the increase in the city, not only to equip neighbourhoods, but also to solicit assistance from international organizations who are ever more present, and who are encouraged by government to intervene in equipment management and financing.

The current policy consists of requesting the intervention of international role players in managing water within the neighbourhoods because of the network's current incapacity to meet the needs of the population as a whole across the territory of Dar es Salaam. The NGO's are integrated into urban policies either pertaining to the water distribution company, the ministry or even the municipality.

The practices of DAWASA and of some of the city's official role players faced with residents' requests for amenities is a good illustration of the change which has taken place. Indeed, from DAWASA's side, requests for amenities emanating from certain groups are considered merely as material for feasibility studies and estimates; it is up to the people to procure the financing. More often than not, people are unable to come up with the required amount and thus have to approach backers from outside the neighbourhood. Thus, the distribution company delegates part of its competences to foreign role players or to the civilian community.

In 1998, as part of the SDP³⁸ (Sustainable Dar es Salaam Program), the United Nations created a water coordination department on a municipal level. Its objective is to establish contact between NGO's wanting to intervene in Dar es Salaam and those neighbourhoods requesting amenities.

After the 1996-drought and the ensuing water shortage due to the 1977 fracture of one of the main transmissions, the government constructed more than 200 wells and boreholes. The construction of the boreholes was undertaken by the *Task Force*, an organization that brings together government and DAWASA officials and the regional water distribution board. Most of the wells were built in the southern part of the city, which has the lowest number of network connections. For the government, the wells intended for collective use remain a medium-term solution to the city's water distribution problem. Within the framework of this project, the government solicited international role players to finance these wells and boreholes, and to put them in place, as well as, in certain cases, to manage them. Some twenty wells have been earmarked to become communal boreholes managed by the inhabitants themselves.

In modern-day Dar es Salaam, amenities as well as the management thereof depend on foreign organizations. On the one hand, it reveals the extent to which the government has disengaged itself, and on the other it reveals the change in management methods in the urban spaces of developing cities. Backers' local intervention is part of a more global policy of change in scale of intervention following the failure of previous interventions. Today, Western role players favour "action planning". In concrete terms, it manifests itself in the provision of small-scale assistance focusing on bringing specific, short-term projects to completion. Equipment intervention is no longer done on an urban scale, but on a local or even micro-local scale.

38 Sustainable Dar es Salaam Program, which was started in Dar es Salaam in 1992.

TABLE XXV: DIFFERENT PROJECTS INITIATED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR LOCATION IN DAR ES SALAAM IN 1998

Name of the organization	Intervention area	Structure	Achievements
United Nations SDP	Tabata Kijitonyama	Community Based Organization	Boreholes, reservoirs and distribution
Red Cross	City Periphery	Local committees	Construction of wells and boreholes
Plan International	Buguruni Vingunguti	TDC (Contribution)	Wells and canalization carried out in 1994 <i>In the process of being renovated</i>
Poverty Africa	Ubongo Tandika Mtoni	Mpangokata (membership contribution)	Preparation
MSF	Kipawa	Health project following the 1977-cholera epidemic	Construction of a borehole
Water Aid	Kigamboni Yumbo Kurasini	Work with existing organizations around the boreholes constructed in 1996	Neighbourhood choices Project developed financing awaited
UNICEF	Yombo Vituka	Women's Committee	Consultation stage with population <i>Pending</i>

(Source: Personal surveys 1997/1999)

These various projects are indicative of the changes taking place within urban society. We are witnessing the establishment of the delegated management of collective water points supervised by the people, as well as the emergence of new role players. Conscious of the fact that the government cannot provide adequate answers, the NGO's are looking for new contacts. We've moved from the 1980's policy of maximum connections on an urban scale to more modest, realistic achievements on a neighbourhood scale. However, these local actions only provide temporary, limited answers. What is lacking is global thinking on an urban scale.

C. Inequality and fragmentation

The delegation of sales point management, the increasingly strong presence of international organizations in the different neighbourhoods and the desire for

popular participation seem to be considered as the solutions to Dar es Salaam's present water needs. How do these changes affect the city and its development?

The city's geographical inequality is emphasized by the intervention of international backers and especially by the choice or even the selection of neighbourhoods that qualify for financing. NGO's investing in urban management never leave the chosen areas of intervention to chance; these have to meet specific criteria: i.e., the population's ability to mobilize and participate on a human as well as on a financial level. This change of approach on the part of the international role players has its origins in past failures of Non Governmental Organization projects in African villages.

The United Nations' programme for infrastructure establishment selected two neighbourhoods, Tabata and Kijitonyama, where the population had already organized themselves into Development Committees. In Kijitonyama, two of the CBO's present in the neighbourhood were merged by the United Nations. The first one, *Kijico*, located in the neighbourhood itself, financed the construction of a road and a canalization. The second one, *Kijitonyama Mpakani Community Development Trust Fund* (KMCDTF), created in 1992, collected money (400,000 Tsh.) for road construction and a purification system.

A new arrival in Dar, the British NGO *Water Aid*, already present in two Tanzanian cities (Dodoma and Tabora) selected 7 boreholes as part of the program for communal borehole management. At first, the selection criteria for these boreholes were the residential collective population's participation and mobilisation and secondarily the need for water in these areas. Relatively formal organizations have been created around these boreholes: water sales, the creation of water committees, collective equipment requests to the appropriate authorities (DAWASA or Region).

Another NGO selection criterion is urgency. In crisis situations, *Médecins Sans Frontières*³⁹ (MSF) responds to water needs by selective intervention. The project implemented in Kipawa (a sector which is seriously affected by cholera) ran for less than a year, during which time the organization constructed a borehole. MSF was interested in the technical aspect and left it to others to manage the equipment.

This selective attitude adopted by the NGO's obscures an important part of the population: its "silent" members, usually the poorest of the poor, who lack the ability to organize themselves and who are preoccupied by the difficulties of daily survival.

These international organizations have been working together with the people since the beginning of the 90's. Currently, they are all still present in the field, but questions are already being asked regarding the monitoring of these actions. Once the NGO's leave, will these initiatives aimed at including the population be pursued? How will equipment maintenance, the financing of reparations etc be run? The management question has already been raised

39 Doctors without borders.

about MSF's borehole; Water Aid is currently trying to mobilize the population around this borehole and to create a collective. The United Nations office is trying to be confident about the future of the committees created in the Kijitonyama and Tabata neighbourhoods. However, certain reflections made in the field do lead to questions. Mr Mshanga, the KMCDTF representative of Kijitonyama's sub-section 1, told us that "*...once the United Nations' project ends, we will pull out of Kijico*"⁴⁰. How will the boreholes, the reservoir and the taps in place be managed if the neighbourhood's inhabitants are divided?

The city as a whole is becoming a real patchwork where neighbourhoods frequent, adjoin and demarcate one another: those that are connected or not, organized into committees or not, supplied by boreholes (...). Today, Dar es Salaam is a collection of "wholes and holes" testifying to the water distribution company's priorities and the intervention of international organizations. Spaces are being created in which people can retrench themselves: firstly, those people whom the network forgot. This population is not part of the government's priorities: they are poor people living in informal neighbourhoods who have technical handicaps when it comes to establishing a network. The entrenchment of certain neighbourhoods may also be voluntary, as in the case of the Tabata and Kijitonyama neighbourhoods where a water supply system giving them independence from the water distribution system and making them invulnerable to poor water distribution was deliberately constructed. Parallel to this entrenchment process, other inhabitants want to connect to the network so as to be part of the city and be recognized as residents of Dar es Salaam. Kimanga residents did not want a borehole in their neighbourhood, but taps on their plots providing water whenever they needed it. Even though they currently get water only three days per week, they are satisfied with their facilities; they no longer need to go and fetch water.

In Dar es Salaam, water management is extremely complex, as shown by the population's diverse supply methods and the variety of neighbourhood situations. The many international organizations emphasize this complexity and heterogeneity. They follow their own strategies and ideological choices when intervening in a neighbourhood. The neighbourhood's supply method (private connections, wells or street-fountains), the population's mode of organization (committee, association) and their integration into the project (financial participation or not) all depend on each organization. For the moment, there is no communal (dare one say public?) policy on an urban scale. Each and every NGO seems busy experimenting with supply and management modes on a neighbourhood scale.

As in Lusaka (Zambia), one thus witnesses the "emergence of lone individuals with their own service system and rules."⁴¹ Silvy Jaglin talks about

40 "Une fois le projet des Nations Unis terminé on se détachera de Kijico".

41 Jaglin S., Piermay J.L., "Lusaka, de la ségrégation à l'archipellisation" in Daloz J. P., Chileshe (J.), *La Zambie contemporaine*, Karthala - IFRA, 1996, p. 247.

the creation of archipelagos in the face of the city's increasing number of role players and projects. Indeed, each international role player demarcates his intervention areas without taking the neighbouring actions into consideration. Urban inequalities are thus not only corrected, but also increased by similar dynamics. However, the idea of creating archipelagos is implemented on a neighbourhood level, but in Dar es Salaam the situations differ greatly, even within the same neighbourhood. Houses close to the canalization can connect to the network while the situation gradually worsens as one moves away from the network. There is a superimposition of sub-systems within the same neighbourhood: connections, wells providing for 4 or 5 households, surface water collected directly. In the city, differentiation takes place on a larger scale as small, homogeneous units appear in the same neighbourhood. Therefore, the process is rather one of fragmentation than of creating archipelagos. Territories are appropriated on a scale which is even smaller than that of the neighbourhood, i.e. the neighbourhood unit. Today, Dar es Salaam is a city in crisis, plagued by housing shortages, social and supervision crises. Previous management choices weighed heavily on the city and will continue to do so. The huge discrepancy between the city's water distribution capacities and actual demand can be explained by the burden of history and particularly by the decrease in urban investments for many years.

CONCLUSIONS

The principal dynamics in the field of Dar es Salaam's water supply are: redefining DAWASA's competencies and intervention areas, increasing sales points managed by the population, and involving the population in various projects run from the outside. The distribution company's privatisation is bringing about changes in water distribution supervision, but also runs the risk of reinforcing spatial disparities.

Water distribution is increasingly provided by intermediaries, committees or individuals. These intermediaries, who are water point and fountain managers, ensure that water gets distributed in those neighbourhoods that are not served by DAWASA. How will their relationships with the authorities on the one hand and with the residents on the other be defined? How will these different role players in the management of water be connected? Today, this seems to be one of Dar es Salaam's main challenges.

These transformations are in response to the need to provide the entire population with water. The choices reveal the changes in society: the transformation of State Society, the delegation of water distribution on a local level to new intermediaries, and the emergence of a civil society exemplified by the CBO's. We are thus seeing the emergence of urban management from the bottom up, as the population is increasingly prompted to manage these difficulties and to provide their own answers for every situation.

As a Dar es Salaam resource, water is thus managed by different role players. The distribution company is trying unsuccessfully to distribute water to the whole population. At the same time, the NGO's and the neighbourhood committees are providing alternative answers to the problem of accessing water. These role players intervene on different levels. DAWASA intervenes on a reticulated city level; the NGO's and CBO's intervene on an areolated neighbourhood level. The solutions proposed by the NGO's consist mostly in the installation of a parallel supply system overlapping with the existing network managed by DAWASA. What we are seeing, therefore, is a differentiated equipping of neighbourhoods according to the residential collectives' various mobilization abilities, which, in turn, depend on the supervision abilities of the local notables. Water management thus suffers from the lack of an overall vision on the part of the different role players. There have been some attempts at coordination; some of the water management role players come together for work sessions, but it's more about sharing communal management experiences on a local level than about actual reflections on an urban scale. These initiatives from the bottom up are on the increase and may be considered as the people's response to institutional failure. But do these interventions as a whole give meaning to the city in its entirety and in a permanent sense? Multiplying the number of wells and boreholes in the city's various neighbourhoods could weigh heavily on its future. What will the true impact on the environment be? Bearing in mind the absence of a precise diagnosis of Dar es Salaam's underground resources, some time or another, all initiatives on a local level are likely to be faced by a decisive deadlock situation, such as over-exploitation of the groundwater. The increase in consummation due to higher density in the informal settlements could have a harmful effect on the water reserves. Future increase in density could also have a negative impact on the groundwater because of insufficient purification. The absence of reflection on an urban level also poses the problem of maintaining and extending the existing network. The amount of risks exemplifies the limited nature of actions taken on a local level. Merely financing or offering assistance to district initiatives or local associations runs the risk of not considering the long-term effects and of "...only dealing with daily management problems, which would amount to the voluntary sacrifice of the future for the present."⁴²

42 "[...] ne s'occuper que des problèmes de gestion quotidienne reviendrait à accepter volontairement de sacrifier l'avenir au présent". Venard J.L. "Bailleurs de fonds et développement local" In *Pouvoirs et cités d'Afrique Noire : décentralisations en questions*, Paris, Karthala, 1993, p. 31.



Poster campaign on hygiene and health: the need to boil water before consumption.
-Photo by Cecile Roy.

Harbour Landscapes

Bernard Calas

Tanzania is exemplary for two reasons: on the one hand, it is exemplary of that African paradox of a continent structured according to extroversion and integration into world trade circulation, although virtually absent from world commerce (2% of trade); and on the other hand, it is exemplary of the erosion of competencies acquired by state machinery after independence, especially those pertaining to harbour management. Furthermore, the weight and volume of imported and exported merchandise and the distance separating the country from its principal commercial partners result in most of the trade being done by sea: in 2002, 80% of Tanzania's foreign trade was conveyed in ocean transit. That is enough to illustrate the importance of maritime traffic to the economy. Thus it also seems important to study the maritime traffic of Dar es Salaam. From the wharfs, boats as well as trains and trucks thus outline a functional view of the city.

Dar es Salaam was born of its harbour functions. In 1905, the Germans built a jetty and wharfs. However, until 1956, the harbour was nothing more than a lighterage harbour. From this time onwards, within the framework of the colonial policy of equipping the colonized territories with extensive infrastructures, 3 deep-water wharfs were constructed south of the Kurasini cove. Today, the harbour apparatus consists of 11 wharfs along the ria's west bank (Fig. 35). The last wharf runs alongside the Kurasini petroleum jetty (pumping capacity: 600 tons per hour) for boats of less than 20,000 dwt.¹ In addition to these 11 wharfs there is the Mjimwena sea buoy (which opened in 1973, with a pumping capacity of 5,000 tons of crude oil per hour) for unloading the biggest oil tankers (100,000 dwt, transporting crude oil, a part of which is then refined at the TIPER refinery); the remainder is conveyed directly to the Ndola refinery in Zambia. The harbour has 10 transit warehouses covering a total of 20,000m². The freight handling area covers a total of 130,000 m². Today, Dar es Salaam has 5 specialized terminals: for passengers, oil, cereal (a 30,000 ton capacity silo towers above the terminal), containers and ore tankers. In theory, the harbour's annual capacity is estimated at 6.4 million tons and 150,000 containers. Harbour authorities are hoping for a growth in container traffic of up to 200,000 TEU² within

1 Deadweight tonnage.

2 Mombasa, which handles 9 million tons and 150,000 TEU [twenty-foot equivalent units, EVP in French], has 16 wharfs, including three for container ships, 3kms of wharfs, a depth of 11m which is convenient for ships of close to 300m and 2,200 TEU. Moreover, the harbour has two petroleum jetties: one for crude oil and one for refined oil. Container terminal capacity is 220,000 TEU.

the next ten years. The harbour apparatus is bordered by a warehouse zone, serviced by a road and 2 railway lines: one with a metric gauge, managed by the Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) and one with a southern gauge (1.6 m), managed by Tazara (Tanzania Zambia Railways). Wharfs 6 to 11 are directly serviced by Tazara. The TRC manages the railway lines built by the Germans between 1905 and 1914 and which serve lakes Tanganyika and Victoria, while Tazara was built by the Chinese between 1966 and 1975 with the aim of serving the Zambian Copper Belt.

I- HARBOUR TRAFFIC AND THE HINTERLAND


On a global scale, Dar es Salaam's sea traffic is derisory, since its maximum is about 4 million tons (imports amounting to 3.4 million tons and exports amounting to 0.7 million tons), which is the equivalent of that of La Rochelle³! However, it serves a vast territory, 3 times the size of France, inhabited by nearly 60 million people, which shows its geographical importance, which is out of proportion to the tonnage handled. Until 1966, traffic stagnated around a million tons, when it started to grow and to reach a first peak of 4.5 million tons in 1977. Until 1985, a first decline of 30% preceded a small increase that peaked around 5 million tons between 1994 and 1998. Today traffic has stabilised at around 4 million tons. The pivotal periods of 1966, 1977, 1985, 1990 and 1994 correspond to:

- Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1966, which closed the path via the South African harbours for Zambian copper and prompted a reorientation of Zambian exports towards Dar es Salaam;
- a drop in the price of coffee and copper after the 1977 peak and due to the chaotic management of the railway, causing traffic withdrawal;
- the 1985 setting up of liberalization measures, the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Plans (SAP) in the Copper Belt and the release of Nelson Mandela in the early 1990's, which retracted activities in the hinterland even further (the freight volumes transported by Tazara dropped by 50% between 1985 and 1995!) and initiated a reorientation of traffic towards South Africa;
- the Rwandan genocide in the spring of 1994, the exodus of Hutu refugees, the start of the Congolese war, the humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region, Tanzania's economic recovery (an average of 6% annual growth) since 2000. The slight resumption of activities in the Copper Belt, linked to higher copper prices and to peace in the Congo, the glut in rival South African harbours and the overvaluation of the Rand prompted the timid current increase. That enabled certain people to declare that Dar es Salaam was hot on the heels of Mombasa. However, this slight improvement is likely to be nothing but a flash in

3 Container traffic in Rotterdam and Le Havre is 5 and 1 million containers respectively (or the equivalent of Africa's total container traffic). Tanzanian authorities are proud to announce that that of Dar es Salaam exceeds 140,000 containers!

the pan due to passing difficulties in the other big harbours on Africa's east coast, rather than to Dar es Salaam's technical and economic achievements and geographical qualities.

Figure 35 ; Dar es Salaam: the port and its environment



Trade containerization still marks the evolution of traffic. While in 1998 only 98,000 containers were handled, in 2002, 140,000 containers were loaded or unloaded, resulting in a tonnage of 1.6 million tons (2/3 of imports and 1/3 of exports), constituting a third of the total harbour traffic. Since containerization made its appearance in the 1960's (the first container was off-

loaded in East Africa in June 1975) it has become the most important aspect of maritime transport. What started out as just a technical modification has profoundly transformed the entire organization of the sector.

The importance of hydrocarbons on the harbour's balance sheet comes as no surprise. Half of the traffic is made up of hydrocarbon imports of which 45% is refined at Dar es Salaam and the rest is exported as crude to the Ndola refinery in the Zambian Copper Belt via Tazama (an oil pipeline put into service in 1968). The exports (a third of the traffic, on average) are made up chiefly by Zambian copper, coffee and wood.

The origins and destinations of the ships that put in at Dar es Salaam outline the functional landscapes of the big city. Its outer harbour is composed of 3 main landscapes: Western Europe, the Persian Gulf and the East (India, Indonesia, Japan and China in particular). Oil represents an important part of imports and comes directly from the Persian Gulf, resulting in a total shortfall in the commercial balance sheets. Since colonization, trade was oriented towards Europe; around 60% of trade was conducted with "the Old World" which, faithful to unequal trade, imported raw material and exported manufactured goods. However, for the last fifteen years or so, we have been witnessing a reorientation of traffic towards Asia. Devaluations, the commercial aggressiveness of Asian capitalism and growth-boosted demand contributed to this development. Japan consumes most of Tanzania's coffee. Furthermore, according to an attentive observer of harbour activities, trade with China probably represents half of Dar es Salaam's activities! Indeed, Chinese growth requires increasing amounts of raw material, especially Zambian copper; ever increasing amounts of manufactured products, especially textile products and tools, are being dumped in Tanzania.

The lifting of apartheid and South African growth – container traffic between Asia and South Africa has increased 7% per annum since 1996 – have strengthened links between Southern Africa and Asia. This development tends to short-circuit the African continent's intertropical façades. That is why all the experts agree that what the future holds, is increased traffic between, on the one hand, intertropical Africa and Southern Africa, with its industries, which could easily substitute those of Europe and a proximity that would reduce transport, costs, and, on the other hand, between the hub ports of India and the Persian Gulf's East-West fleets. The East-African coast is increasingly mentioned in relation to the dependency of its southern and northern neighbours. Clear proof of the increasingly important role of the South African harbours, of which Durban is ranked first, is provided by the Bank Line/Andrew Weir line, which is involved with Safmarine/SCL in the SafBank group which participates in a larger group with MSC and Lykes Lines and provides a weekly container service between the USA and South Africa, with new feeder services to East-Africa.

The map of Dar es Salaam's inner harbour is drawn by the destinations and origins of the trucks loading and off-loading merchandise along the wharf-side, by the layout of the railway lines which are still in use, and by the pipeline (Fig. 1). Even if re-linking with the Mombasa hinterland takes place to the north, in the Moshi, Arusha and Musoma regions, especially as far as mining products are concerned (too heavy for Tanzanian roads and thus rerouted to Mombasa), most of continental Tanzania cannot escape Dar es Salaam's influence. However, beyond this national function, its international transit function seems fundamental, affecting about a third of harbour traffic.

Although Zambia remains the Tanzanian harbour's main external partner, its role is diminishing. In 1985, half of Zambia's external trade made use of the Dar es Salaam corridor. Between 1998 and 2002, the share of Zambian products exported from Dar es Salaam harbour dropped by half. The downward production trend in the Copper Belt mines, linked to that of global rates,⁴ the implementation of the SAP and the mines' ageing exploitation facilities, reached 30% between 1990 and 1997, dropping from 442 to 328 million tons of refined copper. This decline affected Dar es Salaam's activities all the more so since the end of apartheid, Mandela's election and the end of the civil war in Mozambique reopened the port of Beira and the South African harbours to Zambian traffic. The reorientation of Zambian traffic is happening at Tanzania's expense. However, since 2002, the rise in the copper price, boosted by Chinese demand, and the overvaluation of the Rand rate have limited the decline of Dar es Salaam's transit function for Zambian products. The fact remains that, on the whole, Zambian companies are making less use of the Tanzanian harbour than before apartheid was lifted.

At one point, the drop seemed to be compensated by stronger relations with Malawi. However, there too, improved links between the small state's southern region and the Mozambican coast, as well as the rehabilitation of the Mozambican harbours of Nacala and Beira, pose a serious threat to Tanzania. Today, freight traffic between Lilongwe and Dar es Salaam has virtually come to a standstill.

The decline of the transit function in the direction of Malawi and Zambia is partially compensated by market shares gleaned by Dar es Salaam from Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and from Uganda. Around 25% of the merchandise transiting via Dar es Salaam affects the landlocked states of Africa's Great Lakes or the southeastern regions of the DRC.⁵

4 This is caused by Soviet overproduction, the collapse of Asian demand, Japanese scandals and growth in Chilean and American production.

5 In 1998, the cost of transporting cargo weighing a minimum of 30 tons between Dar es Salaam and Lubumbashi by rail cost 140 US \$ *for (free on train/truck)* whereas it would cost 200 US \$ *for* by road. At the time, transporting one ton of coffee from Kampala to Mombasa cost 70 US \$ by road, as opposed to 40 US \$ by rail; bringing one ton of sugar from Mombasa cost 120 US \$ by road as opposed to 70 US \$ by rail.

Dar es Salaam remains Burundi's classic outlet for exporting coffee and tea (Decoudras, 1984). Despite slowness and theft, 1/3 of the exports is transported by rail from Kigoma to Dar es Salaam. Until 1996, Burundi's 3 supply routes were the Mombassa-Bujumbura road (25% of the imports), the central Dar es Salaam-Bujumbura corridor by rail or road (50% of the imports) and the southern Mpulungu-Bujumbura road (25% of the imports). All of the country's meagre exports passed through Dar es Salaam. During the embargo (1996-1998), a southern alternative was gradually established via Lake Tanganyika and Zambia, and seemed to threaten the position of Dar es Salaam harbour, but it did not withstand the lifting of the embargo.

More to the north, the northern corridor, serviced by Mombasa, runs through Rwanda and Uganda; companies in these countries use the competition between the two East African harbours to try to negotiate advantageous tariffs. Dar es Salaam is winning some market shares of the traffic to or from these two states. However, because of shortcomings in the continental links between Mwanza and Dodoma, these gains have been unable to decisively cut into Mombasa's dominant position. Only 1/8 of Uganda's traffic and 1/3 of Rwanda's traffic transits through Dar es Salaam.

With the result that, for the moment, it must be concluded that Dar es Salaam's transit function is being eroded; in terms of tonnage, this is compensated by the effects of Tanzania's economic growth. Harbour and logistic activities are supported by the construction sector, particularly mining. This geography of the hinterland and the outer harbour is not set in stone. It is the result of commercial relationships built up around the harbour apparatus by a certain number of role players whose requirements and strategies determine the outline. Geographical constructions thus outlined waver between being territories, customer catchment areas and networks. Indeed, if for a time, somewhere between 1964 and 1990, the national Tanzanian transit, customs clearance, loading and handling companies' legal monopoly transformed the harbour customer catchment area into a territory, liberalization and policies of economic openness imposed by backers cut into this exclusive position and transformed this territory, this exclusive domain, into a heterogeneous customer catchment area subjected to the onslaughts and blackmail of the different role players in the transport business.

II – FIRST AND FOREMOST AMONG THE ROLE PLAYERS:

THE SHIP-OWNERS

Developments in maritime traffic bound for Africa largely determined Dar es Salaam harbour's recent evolution. On a worldwide scale, proportional to the ever-increasing proportions of the boats⁶, the huge sums of immobilized capital

⁶ The biggest container ships can transport up to 6,000 containers. Henceforth, a 14-man crew is enough to manage such giants, while ships of only 1,200 to 3,500 containers previously needed 18 to 24 men. Running and recuperation costs on big ships (> 4,000 TEU) run into 40,000 € per day. Currently, the biggest container ship is a 8,500 container "Maersk". It can no longer pass through the Panama Canal. For this reason, trips around the world are stagnating in favour of pendulars and links between continents.

led to an equipping “financialization” in a context of intense competition stirred up by the freight overcapacity crisis. Because of the world fleet’s overcapacity, shippers had a head start because of a balance of power with the ship-owners who, by passing along upstream the pressures they were subjected to, were henceforth both forced and in a position to blackmail the harbour authorities with productivity. However, until recently, Africa was exempt from this situation as it had dealings with fewer companies. The leading ship-owners controlled the handling and 90% of the shippers depended on it. The ship-owners fixed the freight rates, which thus remained high. Rates from Europe remain twice as high as rates to Asia.⁷ However, this situation changed drastically between 1996 and 2000. During this time, African destinations suffered a 35% drop in freight rates within 5 years. This drop seemed to indicate an erosion of the specificity of the African maritime market because of new equipping strategies.

These strategies can be split up into 3 categories: global operators (Maersk, P&O Nedlloyd, Mitsui-OSK), semi-global operators (Evergreen, COSCO, Mediterranean Shipping Co, Hanjin/DSR-Senator) and sectional operators. Today, the first-mentioned cover the entire planet although, being primarily involved in East-West relations, they neglected North-South relations for a long time. They link the world’s three megalopolises, thanks to multiple East-West fleets using ships of more than 2,500 TEU.

On a world scale, only one company reaches the ideal: Maersk (150 ships worldwide, 7 million tons of traffic, 250 offices in 70 countries). It links Africa to the world thanks to an ensemble of well-run transshipments, put in place during the 1990s, connected to the hubs of Algeiras (Spain) and Jebel Ali (Persian Gulf); Maersk has 14 boats per week at its disposal in Jebel Ali and in Colombo, including boats of more than 6,000 TEU! Maersk serves East Africa by a revolving service with India, Sri Lanka and Jebel Ali, put in place in 1997 and using 6 ships of 600 to 900 TEU. The company first tested the market by only positioning one boat of 400 TEU on the route, and by only serving

7 These high freight rates are putting a serious strain on African exports and are increasing imports of intermediary products, thus constituting a check on the entire economy. Besides the dominant position occupied by equipping, there are also technical reasons for these rates: the biggest container ships do not travel along the African coastline, where traffic is less containerized. What is more, in Africa, the time needed to complete a logistic ‘loop’ (i.e. the time needed for a container to do a return trip) is 150 days, whereas it takes 130 days in Central America and 102 days in Asia. Likewise, a comparison of the ratio between loop time and transit time in the harbour is not in Africa’s favour: 1.62 in Asia, 3.25 in Latin America and 3.6 in Africa. African harbours are thus very slow. The time spent on off-loading and on loading into containers is what is at stake. Furthermore, a lot of African merchandise does not yet transit on regular lines, but circulates by means of tramp steamers, which is more expensive. The cost of a cell (the space occupied by a container on a boat) is 15% more expensive in Africa than in Asia and 22% more expensive than in Latin America. Ship size determines whether the transport cost of a container can be reduced: however, transport activity and harbour organization in Africa make it impossible to establish shipping lines with huge container ships ($\geq 2,500$ TEU). Africa’s harbour costs are also higher. In fact, geometrical distance becomes a minor criterion. In terms of costs, Asia is closer to centres of consumption and wealth than Africa. Until recently, the latter was disadvantaged by comparisons with Latin American and Asian harbours’ superior time-distance and especially by a lesser degree of containerization, preventing Africa from profiting fully from the drop in maritime tariffs.

the harbours of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. Some time after that, in view of the positive results and to anticipate competition, the company extended its service to Mozambique and South Africa with heavier boats (600 TEU).

Two other companies also come close to covering the globe: the Anglo-Dutch P&O Nedlloyd and the Japanese Mitsui-OSK. The Dutch company uses both direct and transfer services. Three services operate from East-Africa: a direct service to Europe; to Asia, a service in partnership with Mitsui-OSK with a port of call in Singapore; lastly, a connection between America and East-Africa with a call in Durban. In the major league, the Mediterranean Shipping Co (MSC) offers two frequencies between Europe and East Africa and a service to Asia with a call in Jebel Ali. At the moment, these are the only groups which are able to efficiently take on the relay of North-South connections by means of the East-West fleets, whether by bipolar shuttles, pendular services or services around the world.

Other ship-owners still have some serious shortcomings. However, North-South connections constitute niches where small companies can subsist by specializing in ports of call that are not yet coveted to the same extent. Some of the important role players include SCL (Safmarine/CMBT Lines) and especially Delmas (which was taken over by the Balloré group in 1991), specialists and, as far as the latter is concerned, long-time world leader in Africa with around 40% of the market share (50% in Kenya). In 1997, Safmarine started establishing connections between the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and East-Africa. The service was expanded to Southern Africa. Another middleweight, Messina, based in Genoa, links the Mediterranean with East- and South Africa, thanks to its 4 big ro-ro ferries. Danish group Dannebrog's Nordana opened 2 regular lines, berthing in East Africa every 2 weeks (Antwerp-Dar es Salaam in 19 days and Tilbury-Mombasa in 21 days), thanks to 3 cargo ships of the "Astrakham Mark III" type, specializing in ro-ro and in freight which does not conform to the gauge. In association with Panalpina (customs clearance) and Tibbet and Britten (coordination of the logistics chain) within the East African Express Service, Nordana's strategy is to implement a door-to-door service.

After 1995, competition was stirred up by the arrival on the North-South route of the big shipping companies attracted by the updraught of the end of apartheid, the lifting of the embargo against South Africa and the global overcapacity crisis. In May 2000, Global Container Lines (GCL) started a new service to Mombassa, Dar es Salaam and some Southern African harbours (Maputo, Beira, Nacala and Durban). GCL thus rivals A.P. Moller's Safmarine which until recently was the principal ship-owner in the Indian Ocean. GCL representatives want to use Mombassa as a hub for all cargo destined for Karachi and Durban. Four boats (Global Progress, Global Pride, Global Pioneer and Global Prosperity) have been allocated to this service; every 10 days, a boat passes through each harbour. In 2002,

Delmas in turn put three new container ships⁸ on a new route between Asia and East Africa.

Between 1995 and 2002, this increased rivalry caused freight rates to Africa to plummet. Ship-owners therefore applied three distinct tactics to respond to these developments: mergers, conference partnerships or space sharing agreements. Apart from the rapidity of these developments, their analysis complexity stems from the fact that, parallel to these association or merger tactics, shipping companies continue developing their usual aggressive tactics of capturing market shares at their partners' expense! In 1999, Delmas acquired the British Otal followed in 2001 by the Italian Linea Setramar with its 38 million turnover, well established on the Mediterranean-Western-African links. The Midas line connecting the Middle East and West Africa via Durban was supplemented in 2002 with a service between Singapore, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. More particularly, competitive pressure reached such proportions on the Europe/East-Africa links that it resulted in a merger between lines operated by the Delmas/SCL/SEAL group and those operated by CMA-CGM in 1998. Since then, certain direct services are offered by pools trying to avoid overbidding and tariff wars. In 1999, in order to reduce costs, 3 international lines (CMBT, Laurel Navigation, P&O Nedlloyd) combined to open a new service for their total freight destined for Dar es Salaam. This weekly service is made possible by sharing the available space on the boats. The line links the southern and east African harbours to the East-West "lane" for the Middle East. The ports of call are Durban, Beira, Nacala, Dar es Salaam, Dubai, Karachi and Mumbai.⁹ Those in charge of this service put forward two arguments to explain why Dar es Salaam was favoured at Mombasa's cost: the widening of the access route to the harbour and the night lighting which allows boats to dock without having to wait at sea for sunrise or for another boat to depart. At the beginning of 1997, 3 companies (Laurel, P&O Nedlloyd and Unicorn-CMBT) had already set up an agreement to share space on 8 of their vessels (450 to 550 TEU) between Africa and India.

However, freight rates for Africa have increased since 2002. In 2002, Bolloré (world nr. 1 on the North-South lines) increased its tariffs with 150 € per TEU between Africa and Europe. This increase became necessary to back the group's maritime subsidiary (Delmas) and get back to the middle 1990s level.

During the second half of the 1990s, Delmas had to face strong competition with the arrival of Maersk amongst others (nr. 1 for maritime transport). This sound company staked a great deal on this destination. Its interference resulted in a merciless price war and a drop of 25% in freight rates, which was beneficial to shippers whose exports to Africa were thus greatly facilitated.

8 These 1800 TEU vessels (the biggest vessels allowed to enter Dar es Salaam or Mombassa carry 2,200 TEU) sail under the Bahamian flag – while most of the group's 60 or so ships are registered in the Kerguelen Islands – with Polish or Ukrainian officers. In 2001, *Delmas'* turnover was 840 million €; only 160 French sea-going personnel were used.

9 This new service led to the introduction of a new surcharge of 60 US \$ per container.

However, as early as 1999, the creation of a conference devoted to the West-African lane (with which Delmas, armed with its 40% market share, did not join forces) pacified the market and led to a reversal of the tendency and a general increase in freight rates.

In total, the crisis in world maritime transport resulted in the biggest ship-owners – notably Maersk – exploring for new markets on the North-South lines and competing with these destinations' traditional role-players, Delmas in particular. The recompositions that took place make it impossible to confront global and specialized transporters, as North-South connections increasingly adopted multi-mode techniques. Recent reorganization of East-African services can be explained by this development. Ship-owners' blackmail of harbour authorities and the fierce negotiations amongst these role-players were responsible for recent events in the harbours of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. For example, in Mombasa, as early as 1997, shipping companies imposed a compensatory supplement on shippers because of the harbour's inflated fuel price. The following year, shipping companies imposed a new compensatory supplement (Vessel Delay Surcharge) of 120 US \$ per TEU on the pretext of overlong waiting time.

The same year, shipping companies already benefited from the deterioration of the Mombasa situation by imposing a new tax (of around 20 US \$ per TEU) on off-loaded or collected merchandise. The shipping companies based their argument on the terms of an agreement signed with the Kenya Port Authority (KPA), according to which they had to put their own handling equipment on the wharfs. In terms of this agreement, what European companies obtained in exchange was the exclusive right to dock at wharf nr 18 of the container terminal! Maersk, the leader in Europe-East-African trade, even had the monopoly of wharf 12; wharf 5 was reserved for GCL, which dominated Far-East-East-African trade; Ignazio Messina and Conférences Méditerranéennes, which serve southern Africa, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean reserved wharf 3 and 4 for the ro-ro boats. Once the system was up and running, the equipment installed and the wharfs allocated, the big companies decided to impose a surcharge to pay off the installation costs of the handling equipment. However, there was nothing in the signed agreement, which authorized the companies to operate in this fashion and to surcharge the freight agents and shippers. To pull the rug from under the ship-owners' feet and recover an obvious loss of earnings, the harbour authorities chose to fit out the wharfs with new equipment: this not only shows the weight of the big shipping companies in harbour matters, but the importance of the stakes and the twisted and fierce nature of the negotiations.

III – HARBOUR AUTHORITIES

How much leeway do harbour authorities have in this game?

In the face of groups operating on a global scale such as these, demanding new handling practices from the ports, authorities are not in a position to impose their interests. Therefore they have to compromise with these oligopolies with their credo of liberalizing the sector. The port hinterland's range and nautical qualities are no longer enough to secure the loyalty of ship-owners and shippers and thus the activity level and stability of their geographical and economical horizons. This development emphasizes inter-harbour competition and the growing pressure on harbour authorities from the side of the ship-owners, who are very sensitive to reductions in docking duration and tariffs. The increasing competition requires the modernization of the harbour apparatus to improve productivity and accelerate the work tempo; mechanizing the handling process and determining unit costs are the main responsibilities. Accelerating transshipment speed has to reduce port of call time. Within a few years, African harbours have thus moved from market protectionism to free-market competition, led by a few aggressive oligopolies. Adjusting the harbour apparatus is therefore a necessity.

Dar es Salaam harbour's mid-1990s diagnosis – a lack of equipment, ill-adapted to traffic containerization, deficiencies in the harbour's administration, an overabundance of inefficient manpower, bad storage conditions, etc. - made it the prototype of African harbours, held responsible for ship-owners additional expenditure. For a long time, harbour congestion constituted one of the major constraints of the Tanzanian and indeed East-African transport systems. During the 1970s, the vessels' port of call time never fell below 24 hours. The glut reached unbelievable levels between 1976 and 1979 during Zimbabwe's war of independence. Dar es Salaam took on most of Zambia and Shaba in the DRC's imports and exports. In 1984, a two to three-week wait in the harbour was normal. Harbour congestion was explained by multiple bottlenecks: unavailable equipment, a congested container park and warehouses, authorities corrupted by exporters leaving their merchandise in the harbour for too long, etc.

Improving harbour performance started with the modernization of its apparatus, the objective of a 25 million US \$ project, of which 40% was financed by the Tanzania Harbours Authority or THA and 60% by the Dutch government. The result of this modernization is clear to see. As far as growth is concerned, the wharf occupation level is at 80% and crane use is close on 70%.

One of the stages in modernizing the harbour was to widen the ria's gully. Although ship-owners had long considered the site's nautical qualities as favourable, large vessels had been unable to enter the harbour by way of the gully, necessitating one-way traffic and limiting manoeuvres to diurnal hours. The increase in vessel size, their growing specialization and the reduction

in time spent in the port of call (for a vessel, being immobilized for one day can cost up to 70,000 €) thus necessitated widening the channel to the ria, improving accessibility to the harbour for 4th generation large vessels (40,000 dwt), during the day or night and during high as well as low tide. New navigation aids were installed which accelerated manoeuvres and enabled navigation according to international standards and with reduced docking costs to take place at night. The Central Bank of Tanzania totalled 5,724 dockings in Tanzanian harbours (Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara) in 1998, against 4,618 in 1997, an annual growth of 24%. During the same period, high sea vessels increased by 9% from 724 to 788 (676 cargo vessels and 112 tankers). Since the harbour has been opened to nighttime traffic, the number of dockings has increased by 160%. However, the number of dockings has decreased since 2000; nevertheless, this development, combined with the stability in the amount of tonnage handled, in fact shows that the average size of boats coming in to dock is increasing.

Harbour modernization and performance improvement are reflected in the reduced docking time. Between 1995 and 2002, the average decrease was from 4 to 1.2 days. In April 2000, the unloading of 10,000 tons of rice and maize from the *Liberty Sun* in less than 24 hours instead of the usual 3 days was celebrated as being an achievement. Apart from the stability in the amount of tonnage handled, this improvement in harbour performance has increased the harbour's economic profitability by 40% since 1996.

Modernizing facilities and restoring harbour profitability were a precondition for privatization, an essential precondition for attracting investors who were keen to take over the management of the harbour apparatus. Privatization is a long and complex process for which experts came from Hamburg and Felixstowe at the request of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Privatization depends on the concept of the "landlord port", i.e. Tanzanian authorities do not sell the fixed capital and remain the harbour owners, but concede operations to private law companies, to whom they rent out the amenities and the harbour apparatus. For the World Bank, the aim of the operation is to do away with bureaucracy (inevitably unproductive and corrupt), improve efficiency and harbour productivity so as to reduce delays and transit costs. The aim is to make the harbour attractive to ship-owners, thanks to a service which meets their requirements.

The first step was to dismantle the Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA). This meant granting autonomy to the services and operational units, followed by drastic cuts to do away with non-profitable units according to financial calculations (housing for sailors, the training college, sheds and Tanga

and Mtwara¹⁰ harbours). This was followed by the modernization – with public and international capital – of profitable units essential to harbour functions that were either ceded under state control to private role players, or managed commercially by the THA. In early May 2000, container terminal management was conceded for a period of 10 years to a consortium (TICTS), which combined 2 Philippine companies (International Container Terminal Services Inc and ICTSI International Holdings Corporation) and a Tanzanian company (Vertex Financial Services Ltd.).

A Malaysian company (the Zizi11 company) was awarded the handling of the conventional sector. Some people are even talking about privatizing customs clearance operations. But the international and mainly Western sponsors are worried that the harbour will become a hub for drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean.¹² Be that as it may, modernizing the harbour apparatus and privatizing operations improved performance in Dar es Salaam harbour considerably. When a question pertaining to the performance of the container terminal was put to one of the harbour's principal freight agents, the Bolloré group's SDV, his satisfaction came as a surprise: he mentioned the speed with which loading and off-loading operations took place, the absence of theft and the availability of interlocutors. Privatization therefore reached its objective: to improve harbour performance.

However, the future of Dar es Salaam's harbour will no longer only be dictated by its own nautical, technical or financial performance, but by decisions taken before that stage is reached. Indeed, on a scale of continental appearances, increased competition between neighbouring harbours results in ship-owners and shippers choosing certain harbours as a platform of

10 Closing the Tanga and Mtwara harbours, a step that was considered for a while because they put a strain of more than 5 million Tsh on the THA's accounts, was postponed. Privatizing Tanga was considered. To counter the emergence of Nacal and to capture part of Malawi's traffic, Mtwara was turned into a duty-free harbour. Modernizing Mtwara is on the agenda, as well as extending the southern Tanzania railway all the way to Lake Malawi. It is true that Mozambique's far northwestern region contains significant coal reserves, which form the object of an extensive project of agricultural colonization by South African colonists. Is it a castle in the sky aimed at delaying the inevitable realization, or long-term economic realism?

11 For the last few years, Malaysian capital has gradually been penetrating into Africa. They are investing in South Africa, in Tanzania's electricity production, in Ugandan banks, in Ghana's telecommunication sector and media. The brain behind this onslaught is apparently the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir himself: more than ten years ago he set up a think tank on South-South cooperation, led by Nyerere. Third World ideology puts up with the advance of capitalism. The role played by the Chinese diaspora in seeking to secure certain Hong Kong capital must also be emphasized. One must be mindful of the amount of money at the disposal of these companies prepared to sink to any level of corruption to obtain joint ventures, manipulate invitations to tender in the course of the privatization process. The condition stated by these companies for investing is that governments pay the debts of companies within the liberalization process. For these companies, the aim is to pay off the investments within 2 years in order to reduce the risks resulting from political instability.

12 Their concern is somewhat belated, since it is already common knowledge that Dar es Salaam is one of the hubs for the trafficking of heroin and synthetic drug between the Indian peninsula and South Africa. A few years ago a refining laboratory was discovered in a container from Pakistan. The porosity of Dar es Salaam's border is well-known, especially as significant quantities of arms and ammunition transit from there to the Congo-Nile ridge and the Great Lakes, under the watchful eye of the Mafia networks from notably Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Congo.

specialisation and of convergence for cargo (hubs), thus marginalizing the least competitive harbours by subordinating them to the former.

“The strategy which seems to be put in place in Africa is to establish regional harbours and services by feeders as in Asia ... [This strategy] has two consequences: a drop in global transport costs from the continent and increased cost differentiation according to the harbour of origin. Becoming a harbour of specialisation with regional influence thus becomes a major issue for national economies. However, decisions are not taken by the harbours, but by the ship-owners whose only objective is to limit their costs. Harbour competitiveness thus indirectly becomes a strategic issue” (Patriat, 1998).

Logically, all harbour authorities dream of seeing their domain becoming a harbour of specialisation. They collect rights from every vessel entering the harbour and departing from it. These rights, which are proportional to the size of the vessel, the quantity and the value of unloaded merchandise, directly determine harbour profitability.

Dar es Salaam could benefit from the increasing congestion and the poor productivity of Durban harbour where a 90 hour waiting period is a common occurrence and where dock workers handle only 10 to 13 containers per hour for an average of 25 movements per day. Durban's congestion is estimated at 10,000 containers. South-African authorities are therefore asking their customers to reroute their boats to Port Elizabeth. The situation is, however, similar in all South African harbours. Shipping companies are threatening South-Africa's harbour authorities with the imposition of a surcharge on containers loaded and unloaded in Durban, all the more so since the South African façade is suffering due to the overevaluation of the rand. Nowadays, ship-owners categorize Dar es Salaam as the number two harbour in the West Indian Ocean. Certain logistical consultant agencies from Western Europe, such as SAFDAL, a London-based company, advise their clients against docking in Durban and prefer Dar es Salaam for freight destined for Zambia, Malawi or the DRC. However, this relatively good situation appears to be fragile. The upturn could prove to be a mere flash in the pan. Despite the harbour's modernization, despite the opening of the Dar es Salaam channel, despite the lowering of tariffs ranging from 30 to 50%, despite economic growth in Tanzania, despite the increase in tonnage exchanged by Africa, Dar es Salaam's traffic recently declined. According to harbour authorities, the cause of this decline is due essentially to the high cost of maritime freight practised by ship-owners. It costs 600 US \$ to dispatch a container from Western Europe to South Africa, against 1,200 US \$ to Tanzania. The THA therefore asked the principal companies serving the Indian Ocean coast to reduce their tariffs. But, as far as fitting-out is concerned, it is the cost of continental transport offered for transporting merchandise to landlocked countries, which is too high, and this is where efforts must be concentrated. Indeed, as other harbours have also started similar modernization processes,

the appeal race now depends on lowering approach costs, i.e. on modernizing transport by land.

IV – INTEGRATING THE HARBOUR INTO THE CONTINENTAL LOGISTICS CHAIN

The harbour's increasing integration into the continental logistics chain emphasizes the intermodal rivalry and the competition for transit corridors. Previously, the harbour was organized around transshipment development. That era is in the past inasmuch as, being synonymous with the immobilisation of traffic, congestion and extended call periods and handling, it led to cost increases. Today, the harbour is merely one of the links in the logistical chain, although it is certainly an essential one: it is a door, and the merchandise merely passes through. Because of containerization, the maritime part of the journey has become an extension of the transport route over land. A continuous, smooth journey from the place of production to the place of consumption became imperative. Progress in containerization made this development possible. Merchandise transport as a whole gradually adapted to containers and to the type of continuity it allows between different transport types. The success of door to door services, bridges spanning continents and piggyback infrastructures are a reminder of this. Problems posed include continental approach costs and continental transport infrastructure performance, which harbours depend on. Furthermore, the ambition of big groups such as Bolloré, but also Maersk, has become to be in possession of the harbour apparatus and even at times the railways which the State is privatizing left, right and centre in order to control the whole logistical chain and to be in a position to ensure a door-to-door service. As far as fitting-out is concerned, a strategy of vertical integration, with the ambition of achieving economies of scale, scope and networks has been opted for.

That is why the role players in the development of the harbour (mainly the government, decision-makers from the THA and international sponsors), fully aware of the fact that the harbour's future also depends on improving performance of facilities on land under its control (railways, roads, pipelines, transport across lakes) and on the involvement of private investors in the logistics sector, insist on the necessary complementarity between the modernization of the wharfs and the modernization of continental transport. Efforts under way are on the same scale as the challenges: huge and diverse. These role players take into account the complaints of those who are active in economic life: businessmen and carriers, a number of whom play off the intermodal competition and the rivalry between the harbours of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam against each other in an effort to goad on the decision-makers. During the 1990s, the southern African harbours' commercial offensive on central East Africa relied on the rehabilitation of the continental corridors. In June 1998, the Maputo corridor linking Maputo to Johannesburg by road

was inaugurated with great pomp by Presidents Mandela and Chissano. The improvement of the Mozambican corridors of Beira and Nacala poses a serious threat to Dar es Salaam. The performance of the South African road and railway networks, much better than those of Tazara and Tanzam, contributes to reorientating Malawian, Zambian and Katangese traffic to the south. Caught between the offensives of the continent's southern harbours and relative resistance from Mombassa, Dar es Salaam's secure income could run out of steam. The future appears uncertain. Improvement of continental transport performances serving Dar es Salaam constitutes a *sine qua non* condition of the harbour's health. The basic points of Tanzania's logistical policy are based on this analysis. When taking into consideration Dar es Salaam harbour's transit function, it falls increasingly within the scope of a sub-regional perspective. Consequently, its analysis cannot dispense with being compared to logistical strategies of other sub-regional States, especially Kenya and Uganda.

The southern corridor was put in place between 1964 and 1975. The facilities were a political matter, the Zambian and Tanzanian authorities' riposte to Zambia's hemmed-in position, prompted by Rhodesia's unilateral Declaration of Independence, the wars of national liberation in Mozambique and Angola and South Africa's foreign policy of destabilisation of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) states. In 1965, almost half of Zambia's oil was refined in Southern Rhodesia (at Umtali, now Mutare) and more than 90% of imports was conveyed in transit crossed this country. Setting up the corridor started in 1966 with the surface preparation of the route that crosses northern Zambia and going through Mbeya. This was followed in 1967 by the construction of a pipeline by an Italian company; it was completed in 1968. The pipeline is 1,680 km long and 8 inches in diameter. Taking up an old colonial idea, Chinese construction of the Tazara lasted from 1969 to 1976. This 1,860 km corridor links Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Moshi on the Lusaka line and to the Copper Belt. Apart from the Beira link, this corridor constitutes the shortest route between central Zambia and the sea. However, there are serious deficiencies as far as its efficiency is concerned. Tazara's capacity is 2.6 million tons per year in each direction. Between 1976 and 1985, total traffic never exceeded 1.2 million tons (752,000 tons at the lowest). It is thus clearly under-utilized. Likewise, Tazara is used by fewer than a million passengers. The number of weekly trains has thus been reduced by half since 1975.

The link between Dar es Salaam and Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria constitutes Tanzania's main logistical bottleneck. This corridor remains virtual to the extent that, in 2005, it is supported by one single railway line. The Dodoma-Mwanza road via Tabora and Ishaka, financed through Japanese cooperation, will not be tarred before 2007, and the Dar es Salaam-Mwanza pipeline is still in the early stages. As for the Tabora-Kigoma link, there is only railroad at present.

"The railroad from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma dates from 1910. It is a one-way track, which necessitated setting up sidings in order to allow for convoy crossings. The length of the convoy track is dependent on the maximum length of the crossing tracks. The track's maximum operating conditions are 150,000 tons on average (in 1984) ... The rolling stock has the same characteristics: old, out-dated and puffing ... Even if the rolling material should be in good condition, convoy speed would remain much reduced because of the bad condition of the railroad". "The rolling material's rotation speed is very low; there is already a long wait before loading ... 8 days in 1982. ... The TRC itself hardly knows where their 3,900 wagons are located ... Wagons are frequently immobilized underway, which multiplies the risk of theft and extends the waiting period for deliveries: 4 days should suffice to link Dar es Salaam to Kigoma, but nowadays the best average is 10 days" (Decoudras, 1984).

Things did not really change before the end of the 1990s.

The weaknesses of Tanzania's railway companies are not original when compared to a well-known continental picture: ruptured rails, derailments, low productivity-level equipment (a large proportion of wagons out of order, very low rotation speed: 11 days on the Tazara in 1978, 26 days in 1982), manpower problems, congestion of storage facilities ... tell the story. In Uganda, only 40 out of 54 locomotives were in working condition in the 1990s! On the opposite side of the region, ship-owners are worried about the number of containers which never came back from Zambia: this number seems to have increased from 312 in the 3rd quarter of 1995 to 1,400 in the last quarter of 1996.

In 1997, Tanzania's logistical frailty, Dar es Salaam harbour's weakness factor, was in the spotlight because of exceptionally heavy rains; floods swept away roads and railways, notably between Dodoma and Morogoro. The frailty of the infrastructure and its sensitivity to climactic uncertainties severed the two main roads Dar es Salaam-Mbeya and Dar es Salaam-Mwanza. In November 1997, the railroad was swept away for 32 km between Kidete and Kilosa by the raging Mkondoa. Because of this breach, the Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) lost 150,000 US \$ per day. Foodstuff for the Burundian and Rwandan refugee camps to the West had to be sent by truck to Dodoma. The rains also swept away 7 bridges in the Dodoma district. It was still possible to reach Mwanza, provided one travelled via Kenya! For a few months, coffee from the Bukoba region was exported via Mombasa instead of Dar es Salaam. In January 2000, the Lilongwe road was cut off in the vicinity of the Kiwiri charcoal mines, 26 km from the Malawi border, because of landslides. Occasionally, climatic uncertainties may cut off Tanzania's harbour from its hinterland, the significance of which is illustrated above by its volume of activity. More than ever, transport thus constitutes one of the Tanzanian economy's bottlenecks. The frailty of Tanzania's economic revival thus becomes even more obvious, to

the delight of its Kenyan rival. Efforts undertaken to improve Dar es Salaam's competitiveness are thus undermined, because of this logistical break with the hinterland. At a time when international maritime lines are being reorganized, interrupted supply lines may deal Dar es Salaam harbour a fatal blow. This is why a series of measures is attempting to remedy this situation.

When more than 70% of the regional freight – 90% of Ugandan freight – circulates by truck, improving connections between the shoreline and the hinterland is subject to improvements in the roads networks. The Tanzanian roads network consists of 88,000 km of road (10,000 main roads, 25,000 regional roads and 53,000 district and rural roads) of which only 3,300 kms are tarred. Programs regarding road surfacing and extending the asphalted network thus constitute the cornerstone of development plans for the Tanzanian territory. This is an absolute priority, as this main road is of strategic importance; tarring of the Dodoma-Mwanza road is underway. Within the framework of the East African Community (EAC), there is talk of opening a North-South main road (Mwanza-Tabora-Mbeya) and of building a road alongside the Dodoma-Kigoma track.

Furthermore, sponsors obtained the introduction of a new means of financing the maintenance and construction of roads, which is supposed to be more efficient, from the Tanzanian government. Until now, the Ministry for Public Works was responsible for this sector and contributed 90% of the maintenance budget and only 10% to network extensions. Henceforth, funds are no longer allocated to the government, but to an autonomous accountant firm; the Roads Fund will distribute specific subsidies to the local authorities. The Fund's board of directors includes representatives from the private sector to ensure that the economic role players' interests will be taken into consideration. This Roads Fund administers funds that sponsors granted to the transport sector and the road tax on the price of fuel (9 US cents per litre). Moreover, another institution, Tanroads, was created and carries out maintenance, repair and network extension work. Thus it is hoped that road maintenance will improve and that traffic movement will be accelerated, as this is assumed to be an imperative prerequisite for the development of this vast Tanzanian state.

Under the pressure of international sponsors, exasperated by the Danaides' jar represented by road maintenance in the region, Tanzania and Kenya had to adopt a measure that limits the weight of the load transported by trucks to 25 tons.¹³ This measure is essential to explain recent developments concerning the East-African corridors. Indeed, it increased road transport costs, transit waiting periods were extended and rail transport became competitive. Current developments emphasize competition between the central corridor and the northern corridor serving Uganda and the Great Lakes, as well as modal

13 Before this new limit was introduced, Tanzanian trucks were allowed to transport up to 40 tons of merchandise, while Kenyan trucks were allowed up to 50 tons. At the same time, Zambia had already introduced a 25 ton limit.

competition between the railroad, which has long since been disqualified, and the hegemonic road. This is why harbour employees insist on the need for rehabilitating the railways in order for privatization and the improvement of Dar es Salaam's competitive position with respect to other harbours in the sub-region to succeed; this to the extent that, according to them, the railways are less subjected to congestion and traffic jams than the roads. Moreover, the introduction of axle load limits to Kenya and Uganda¹⁴ and increased fuel prices force businessmen to look for solutions to reduce transport costs and delivery time. The railway solution, although marginal, seems to hold some promise for the future.

More generally, putting three occurrences into perspective will reflect the revival of East-Africa's railway potential. In June 2003, the Nairobi-Nanyuki line was reopened after having been closed for 17 years. Another symbol of railway traffic's future perspectives was the reopening of the links between Mombasa and Moshi in the autumn of 2002, at the instigation of the Caltex company, a subsidiary of the major Chevron Texaco company: the Taveta-Moshi segment was restored and equipped with two locomotives and five tank wagons to supply a new Caltex depot in Moshi. This reopening, which was carried out at the behest of private capital, raises hopes of a resumption of activities and a diversification of the outward traffic and return freight.

Similarly, considering a partnership with Tazara, Caltex renovated the Kitwe depot in the Zambian Copper Belt from where it hopes to penetrate the Congolese market. Lastly, the Ugandan government proclaimed its desire to reopen the Toror-Pakwach line in northern Uganda. Lastly, in 2003, an American NGO undertook to clear lines the Congolese Kivu lines in order to reopen them for traffic.

Moreover, this revitalization of the railways is dependant on improvements in railway companies' performance efficiency and especially that of the TRC (freight in 2002: 1.4 million tons transported at an average speed of 16 km/h; 685,000 passengers transported at an average speed of 30 km/h). The same medicine administered to the THA is recommended for the TRC, whose sponsors want performance to improve before it is dismantled and privatized. Improving the availability of rolling stock (the average availability of TRC locomotives and wagons increased from 49 and 68% in 1998 to 73 and 76% in 2002, respectively), introducing unit trains, reducing the number of passenger trains and concentrating equipment in the most profitable sections explain the decrease in journey time to Kigoma and Mwanza and to Zambia. Taking into account the large-scale diseconomies, which make it less profitable, to circulate goods trains and passenger trains on the same lines rather than to retain either

14 However, enforcing the law on axle load limits is much stricter in Tanzania than in Kenya. Also, exceptional loads, notably equipment destined for the mines in northern Tanzania, do not transit via Dar es Salaam, but via Mombasa. The corruption of the Kenyan police and *a contrario* the comparative power of the Tanzanian police apparatus constitute a differential factor in this case.

passenger or goods traffic, Tanzanian railway authorities gradually reduced the number of passenger trains in circulation. The Dar es Salaam-Moshi-Arusha, Tanga-Arusha (Pedersen, 2001) and Tabora-Mwanza links are already reserved for freight. These developments lead to traffic concentration as well as a decrease in transit time. In 2002, the average transit time from Kampala to Mombasa was 12 days as opposed to 10 days to Dar es Salaam.

Moreover, the dismantling of the TRC, which will lead to the privatization heralded for the past 7 years has already started: a new company, the Tanzanian Marine Services Company Ltd, took charge of the TRC's lakeside operations and was privatized in 2001. The company is based in Mwanza. It manages harbours in Mwanza, Bukoba, Kemondo Bay at Lake Victoria, Mbamba and Itungi and 12 other villages on Lake Nyassa and Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika. It owns 4 boats on Lake Victoria and 4 on Lake Tanganyika. In 1998, it transported 150,000 tons of freight and 500,000 passengers. Spoornet, the South African company that is a member of the Comazar group, which includes Transnet, the Commonwealth Development Corporation, Bolloré, the South African Infrastructure Funds and Makosi Holding and Management, is already participating in the operations of the TRC. Spoornet owns 20% of the TRC and is awaiting its privatization. It is also contemplating to revolutionize East Africa's railway transport sector by extending the lines, multiplying continental depots such as Kitadu and by renting hundreds of wagons and locomotives.

Improving performances of the Dar es Salaam-Kampala connection and, conversely, Mombasa's increasing congestion, would encourage certain Ugandans to take the Tanzanian route. In August 1999, after a good coffee harvest, four of the main Ugandan carriers – including AMI, a subsidiary of Bolloré – chose to export the coffee – the country's principal export product – via Dar es Salaam. Because of delays in delivery between Mombassa and Kampala, the Tanzanian route won 25% of the Ugandan market. Between January and June 2000, monthly imports from Uganda to Tanzania increased from 16,000 to 26,000 tons. This increase was partially ascribed to the decongestion of Dar es Salaam harbour, to the fact that it remained open during the night for handling operations and to TRC efforts to speed up the running of the trains.

Ugandan and Rwandan businessmen also tried to play the two corridors off against one another to obtain the best transport conditions. Henceforth, the THA offers the same advantages to Uganda that the harbour made available to other landlocked states. The railway war between the TRC and Kenya Railways (KR), between the central and northern corridor extends to tariff levels. For example, in October 1996, the TRC and the Uganda Railway Corporation (URC) jointly reduced their tariffs. At the same time, the KR announced a drop in its tariffs: for one container the transport price between Mombassa and Kampala thus decreased from 948 US \$ to 840 and for a 40 feet container, from 1,900 US \$ to 1,610. This step was immediately copied by the TRC.

However, beyond the advertisement hype from the side of business in an effort to put pressure on Kenyan authorities, Dar es Salaam's competitiveness on the Ugandan market in relation to Mombasa remains largely peripheral. Indeed, transport costs for one TEU between Kampala and Dar es Salaam exceeds that of Kampala and Mombasa with more than 200 US \$. Nevertheless, maintaining pressure on their Kenyan interlocutors, Ugandan carriers and freight agents confirm that the KR's tariff reductions are not enough to attract customers who opted for Dar es Salaam.

Since the middle 1990s, this desperate search for logistical alternatives to the deteriorated roads and congested railway lines emphasizes the extent to which notably Ugandan and Rwandan businessmen pit Kenyan and Tanzanian corridors against each other and contribute towards revitalizing transport across Lake Victoria. The TRC and URC's 4 cargo boats navigating between Port Bell (Kampala) or Jinja and Mwanza, are now operating at top speed. A boat takes 33 hours to make a return trip between the two harbours. Railway companies are obliged to put an ever-increasing number of wagons into service. This year 460 wagons (345 from the URC and 115 from the TRC) are circulating between Dar es Salaam and Kampala. The duration of the journey between the two cities has been reduced to 6 days! It has never been this short. Exporters find this a more attractive solution, to the extent that there is an increasing need in the ordinary run of things for strict logistical connections between a cargo and a particular boat. If this docking appointment is not respected, the culprit – whether carrier or ship-owner – must pay a fine. This growing formalization by contract is explained by the need to establish relations and by the need to make vessels profitable by mobilizing them to a destination where they are certain of being loaded rapidly.

After having improved apparatus performance and proceeded to dismantle national monopolies, the sponsors' aim is to reduce custom clearance delays and administrative procedures. Infrastructure weight is reduced while the superstructure weight is increasing. Once the apparatus has been restored and the institution adjusted, once dismantling and privatization have taken place, it is time to deregulate and simplify procedures. A tight flow, one single customs office and traffic transparency become the dominant objectives of the logistics program imposed by the sponsors, experts, ship-owners and shippers.

Logistical development projects certain harbour functions towards the interior. Continental container depots and oil terminals, dry docks and continental transshipment platforms are flourishing. The cities of Kitadu, Ishaka, Eldoret, Kisumu, Kampala, Embakasi and Thika are taking advantage of this. In Dar es Salaam, Ubungu's transshipment platforms flourish as well. Storage and transshipment are continentalized and not connected to harbour activities. The harbour thus loses some of its pre-eminence, its hegemony in the logistical chain; its attractiveness for spinoff activities is diminished, its influence enhanced. That is why, within the framework of establishing a

comprehensive corridor between Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, gaining a firm foothold in Rwanda and competing with the Kigali-Mombasa road, Tanzanian authorities decided to modernize the bimodal platform at Ishaka¹⁵ where the daily capacity management should increase from 120 to 360 containers. This decision cannot but satisfy the Rwandans and the Burundians who want the track to be extended to the Rusumo Falls (Chrétien, 1991). In Uganda and Kenya, various private and state initiatives are accelerating the creation of continental container depots and dry docks, linked by an express transire system. By reducing time and transport costs, these initiatives improve regional integration and thus strengthen links as well as competition between railway companies and the main stations.

What emerges at the behest of the logistical role players and political elite is a city network integrated into the same system. TRC and KR offices have been opened in Kampala, Kigali and Bujumbura. The THA and the KPA both sent a permanent representative to Kampala to be closer to the clientele. The THA even made it possible for imports to be settled directly in Kampala. This is an important change with respect to the recent past, when invoices had to be honoured in Dar es Salaam and nowhere else. The THA carried out the same operation in Kigali in February 2000 and hopes to extend its offensive to the DRC, a counter-attack aimed at repaying each of the KPA's blows; the KPA is multiplying its visits to Rwanda and its delegation exchanges with that country, and has opened a bank account in Kampala for the direct payment of rights and costs by its Ugandan clientele.

This development is strengthened by the creation of a Ugandan-Tanzanian technical committee for consultation and logistical standardization (the Central Corridor Transport Coordinating Committee). The Tanzanian members of this committee are the TRC, the THA, the Tanzania Central Freight Bureau, the Tanzania Freight Forwarders Association, the Marine Services Division Ltd (Mwanza) and the Tanzania Shipping Agencies Association. The Ugandan side is represented by the URC, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the Uganda Clearing and Forwarding Association, the Ugandan Manufacturers Association, the Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Importers, Exporters and Trade Association. The emphasis on harbour competition thus also participates in the emergence of strategic cities in the hierarchical organization and the consolidation of the East-African urban network.

In May 2000, officials from the 3 East-African railway companies and the Tanzania Marine Services Company Ltd met in Kampala and set up a common secretariat: The East African Railway Secretariat. Its essential function

15 Ishaka's dry dock was opened in 1999 after an agreement between the Tanzanian, Rwandan and Burundian authorities. The Ishaka harbour is also an autonomous customs clearance centre for merchandise in transit. The opening of this depot resulted in merchandise destined for Rwanda taking 48 hours instead of a week, which was the required time previously. Situated 500 km from Dar es Salaam, it is served by one daily train, which runs between Dar es Salaam and Mwanza and by 2 container trains per week.

is to lobby East-African governments to adopt a common and coordinated privatization strategy.

This unsystematic, but effective cooperation is extended by the beginnings of a dialogue between the Mombassa, Dar es Salaam and Kampala harbour authorities. At the beginning of 2000, after 8 months of consultation, they jointly relinquished customs seals on the entire transit route to Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. They also took the first steps towards abolishing handling taxes and working towards establishing a simplified payment system for custom rights and transport fees for the region's importers.

As for the ship-owners, they consider East Africa as one and the same unit and apply the same tariffs in both harbours. Since August 2000, they have been in conflict with Tanzanian authorities about a tax on the total freight, including freight conveyed in transit, which Dar es Salaam wants to impose. The ship-owners reject this tax, which, according to them, violates maritime traffic rules. They are backed by an agreement signed with the Inter-Governmental Standing Committee on Shipping (IGSCS) which specifies that Tanzania is situated in the same commercial zone as Uganda, Kenya and Zambia. All the maritime transport companies thus consider East-Africa as being one and the same tariff area. This logic is prompting ship-owners to pursue the Tanzanian government and to refuse them the right to impose a different tariff to that of Mombasa. The meaning of this fiscal quarrel is that the big shipping companies are seeking to erase national borders and advance regional integration. The argument in question hides behind a co-called defence of the interests of Tanzanian tradesmen; the carriers ask themselves why these tradesmen should be penalized by subsidizing a State institution (the Tanzania Central Freight Bureau is the institution which created this new tax which is expected to bring in 5 million US \$). But beyond that, their aim is well and truly to liberalize maritime traffic, and establish a vast, fiscally homogenous area, which will lead to a vast free trade area of which Dar es Salaam would be one of the two gateways.


All things considered, development role players are taking into account the requirements of the harbour users, ship-owners, carriers, shippers and hinterland tradesmen, who play off road and rail and the competition between Mombassa and Dar es Salaam against one another to spur the decision-makers on and to try and impose reforms – in the direction of a cost reduction, a reduction in docking and transit time and an improvement in performance. The tendency is thus towards sub-regional logistical integration. This feeds the competition between Dar es Salaam and Mombasa and between the Tanzanian and Kenyan corridors. But at the same time, it brings their destinies closer by making them show solidarity.

Observations from the wharfs of Dar es Salaam emphasize the extent to which the lot of the harbour function, using urban identity as a point of departure, is linked to the strategies of the large Western and Asian ship-

owners, the big South-African investors, the Bolloré group (half of Kenya's unloading), international sponsors and regional initiatives pertaining to political integration. "These [transport] areas which the companies have set up are now a reality which has been strengthened by spatial operations on a world-wide scale" (Debrié, 2001). Taking the example of the Bolloré group, Derié claims that: "The establishment of a private Bolloré transport area becomes effective. By selecting a growing number of main roads linking various African cities to the world, a new network reveals the strong impact of these new, private forms of power". However, observing the creation of a network of cities, acknowledging the driving force of the transport sector in East-Africa's institutional construction (Calas, 2002), qualify the worrying idea that "these areas do not participate at all in establishing an African economic area". Without denying the existence of renewed extroversion dynamics and the creation of veritable business areas, the fact remains that these are articulated with real economic growth which is localized and sustained by the strategies of the national elite – notably businessmen with political or military interests. Moreover, Debrié continues by saying: "if, on the one hand, a certain logic reveals the possibly perverse excess of a private enclave, on the other hand, the modernization of the global transport apparatus seems increasingly effective".

The reduction of Tanzania's country-risk, the increase in the exchange of non-heavy or non-perishable goods (precious stones, flowers, out of season vegetables, drugs, weapons, etc.), tourism development in the southern parks and on the coast and the economic perspectives offered by liberalization is prompting an increase in the air links with Europe, South Africa and the Gulf countries (Fig. 36). However, these dynamics are common to the region's metropolises. The same type of reconstitution I observed in the harbours and maritime traffic, competition-oriented and tending towards the hierarchical organization into hubs and spokes, is emerging as far as air traffic and airports are concerned. Accompanied by the deregulation of exchange and traffic, a decrease in tariffs, an improvement of user-benefits, this reconstitution is to the advantage of Nairobi, Johannesburg and Addis Ababa. It therefore outlines a recontinentalization of the sub-region dynamic areas. Nevertheless, in relation to these competitors, Dar es Salaam's urban area is accumulating harbour and airport facilities. Does the proximity of these two facilities constitute enough of an advantage for the dominant role players in the continent's metropolitan game to invest in the Tanzanian metropolis until its eventual dynamism counter-balances the heavy tendency to strengthen the interior areas?

Figure 36: Airport horizons



Is it possible to synergize harbour and airport landscapes? When all is said and done, to what extent is it in the interest of South African capital, which will eventually occupy a dominant position in Tanzania, to favour

Dar es Salaam in relation to Mombasa, or at the very least to treat the two harbours equally? Will the impetus of economic growth dynamics from the South compensate for the effects of the looming, inevitable dependency?

Cultural Landscapes: Sedimentation, fusion or mutations?

Bernard Calas

Styles, references and borrowings express what is different about a society, as well as its horizons, and therefore shed light on the society's aspirations and its models. The urban, architectural, symbolic, dress and behaviour constitute references, express ideals which are sometimes incarnated by heroes, but which always manifest themselves through constructions, places, monuments and choreographies. The cultural approach is not so much a question of observing an object which could be termed cultural, as observing a social fact: the geographical space seen through 'cultural spectacles', i.e. sensitive to intellectual or spiritual referents guiding the broader reproduction of societies and shaping production processes pertaining to space and landscape. One can also not overlook the city's historical dimension. These models may be old or recent, the culture alive, or related to a cultural heritage. To understand a city's cultural dimension, one must understand the spiritual, intellectual and/or ideological values referred to by these signs. It is thus a matter of rereading Dar es Salaam's urban landscape, starting from that preferred public space—the street—so as to notice the components of the urban 'human comedy'. The stage, the scenery composed of the façades and the constructed volumes; the choreography played out all attempt to see what refers to the society's intellectual and spiritual activities, viz. its values and beliefs.

I – REFERENCE SEDIMENTATION OR CULTURAL RECYCLING?

Superficially speaking, Dar es Salaam's inhabitants successively looked for their inspiration in three main directions—the world economy of the Indian Ocean bordered by Arabia, Persia and North-East India, and certainly by the African continent; Western-Europe; and the American superpower. Apart from listing these external influences, it should be remembered that Mwalimu Nyerere's Ujaama was precisely an attempt to go beyond these influences and to re-discover Tanzania's 'roots'.

History shows a progressive broadening of the reference sphere and of cultural borrowings, seeing as the first globalisation was focussed on the world economy of the West Indian Ocean. From 1880, colonisation oriented the reference area towards Europe. Presently, however, the borrowings are taken especially from North America and the Arab peninsula. The urban signs of these three civilization influences abound, especially in the city centre, where more than a century of investments by the dominant group led to a relatively

prolonged sedimentation of cultural markers which are less obvious in the new peripheral areas. These borrowings are obviously explained by the city's economic, political and migratory history and by the context of its coastline.

Coexisting with Swahili civilization, which is built explicitly around this reference, the Arab-Muslim reference is expressed through certain façade details—the insistent recurrence of Gothic arches, geometrical and polychromatic decoration, moucharabiens, etc.—and through the number of mosques. Submission to God and integration into the Umma—the community of believers—the development of proximity with the Gulf in all its forms and in all its complexity, constitute the principles proclaimed by these referents. The setting thus bears meaning and direction as well as political, spiritual and geopolitical context. The orientation of the mihrabs dictates the orientation of the dominant references. The architects of the Sheraton Hotel which was built in the 1990s made no mistake and created a geometrical façade with gothic façades, an applied reference to Iranian architecture (the Ispahan mosque) or that of India's moguls (Taj Mahal). But also, more modestly and locally, it refers to that of a few buildings inherited from the city's Zanzibari period (1867–1891), some of which are still standing (hospital). Nevertheless, the diversity of the Muslim world is such that this can only have a general meaning. More meticulous enquiry (undertaken by Swahili-oriented architects, anthropologists, political scientists or geographers) would be required to probe this approach. Despite having been eclipsed for a while, this horizon seems to have been revitalized since the economic liberalisation, the Gulf War (1990–1991), the return to Islam and the emergence of Islamic contesting of Western domination. Links are once again being strengthened between Tanzania, more particularly Dar es Salaam, and the Persian Gulf. For better or for worse, the 1998-attack on the American Embassy serves as a reminder of this.

The trademarks of the dominant West compel recognition, whether as remnants of the colonial episode, or whether they were imported by Western multinational companies carried along by triumphant capitalism.

Urban order—the exclusivity of public spaces, the straightness of the avenues, the separation of traffic, the order of reticulated technical systems, the alignment of the façades, the standardised regularity of volumes—expresses the cultural and political domination of the West and the importation of foreign urbanistic norms and models since the end of the 19th century. These dynamics have been extended to the present day by an ethos of experts, sponsors and Western universities. Certain colonial houses, mainly the middle classes' practically generalized adoption of the residential model, are proof of this view. Colonial intrusion led to unprecedented urban development. The Europeans imported their urban conceptions into East-Africa. Thanks to the Department of Roads, networks, various railways networks and strategic management of parks, logistical main roads, industrial areas and recreation grounds are

used as a cordon sanitaire. Also as a result of health and architectural norms, they based the growth of cities like Dar es Salaam on functional separation, racial and social segregation. This city, which was inspired by colonialism, originates from an ideology based on hygiene and racism, on the depreciation of otherness, specifically African in this case, and on the over-evaluation of all that is Western. The city is also a reflection of the primacy of economic values as well as the ethics of domination. It expresses the extension of the cultural interaction sphere. The Tanzanian middle class assumes the colonial heritage by stigmatizing both urban disorder and the poor and by insisting on the urgency of a mopping-up operation. Additionally, they express their frustration towards the dominating factions. Aided by advertising, tradesmen inspired by the West impose their products and fads— cars, beer, cigarettes and mobile telephones. The old metropolis therefore has to compete with North America, whose values are conveyed by icons invading Dar es Salaam's public space.

II – CURRENT CULTURAL INNOVATION: URBAN FORM, PLACE MARKING AND CHOREOGRAPHY

Since Independence, Tanzanians have been shaping the city as it stands today. The process began with an extension of the urban fabric, whose map is now much more complex to read than before. The 'patchwork' image emerges as the metaphor of a mutation rather than as a concept. The absence of a hegemonic urban order seems to be its main characteristic. This urban society, undergoing massive changes can not find a solution to the challenge posed by the need to make demographic growth, poverty and the respect of social demands compatible in proven urban models. *"Architecture ... remains an element of urban marking. However, dingy extensions are developing a different architecture, that of necessity ... An architecture of the indispensable and the precarious, the minimal secretion of misery"* (De Maximy, 1988). The architecture of the largest number thus reveals a totally different dimension of urbanity, a particularly economic dimension bearing the mark of precariousness. This morphological disorder, supported by recycling constituted construction forms marks a cultural effervescence. The fragmented urban form is interesting, although globally involuntary and largely compelled by poverty. It expresses the cohabitation of different intentions and practices as well as the absence of a comprehensive regulation other than market forces. Two rationalities can be distinguished amongst others: that of international experts and the municipality developing technical solutions and urban productivity; and that of small urban developers who, in touch with inhabitants' concern, combine the demands of residential profitability and the respect of domestic privacy. All things considered, none of the old references appear to be pure or intact. They are reworked and recycled. Technical innovations often radically modify certain characteristics which are considered cultural because they are old.

Cross-cultural borrowings occur. For example, coastal residences inspired by North American models are adorned with makuti roofs. Swahili houses are converted into horizontal collectives (Polomack, *infra*). A global process also dominates in this case. On an urban area scale, landscapes tend to become commonplace through acculturation and reciprocal borrowings. Superficially, there is a certain micro-landscape diversification that makes use of heterodoxy.

For the last ten years, the most common colonial or Indian buildings in the city-centre have been replaced by small skyscrapers, moderately-sized on a world scale. These are borrowings from the type of functionalism inspired by North America and an expression of a fascination with the latter. On the other hand, they also function as a distant echo of the Persian Gulf urban sky-lines, in particular Dubai, which most property developers in the neighbourhood visit on a regular basis. Even more striking because of the abruptness of the development, is the rapid substitution of Kariakoo's Swahili houses by some ten storey buildings. The hold over the soil is however, reduced by the resistance to the previous division into plots. Sometimes these new buildings recycle the old house shapes, but it is a cheap typism meant to disguise the triviality of the architecture. The cultural allusion is stuck onto the functionality of this "non-lieu"¹ (Augé, 1997) to relocate the facilities and call attention to the place. The Sheraton Hotel is a good example of this. Having faced extended economic lethargy, the city centre now constitutes a veritable conservatory of ancient architecture, which has been preserved because of a lack of investments. For how long? Timid but genuine attempts at conservation have saved some of the buildings deemed to be bearers of a common memory, such as the Boma (Roy, 1998). Rather paradoxically, these cultural heritage-related buildings mostly reveal the colonial stranglehold and the fascination it holds for the elite. Sometimes, companies or diplomatic missions rehabilitate colonial villas for use as luxury office space. This is why the city centre is gradually resembling an architectural mosaic with numerous style references, stuck onto an ever more specialized functionalism. Post-culturalism and functionalism combine to shape Dar es Salaam's central areas.

By means of its façades and its furniture, the urban stage displays an abundance of brands and encoding processes. The speakers are revealed by the observation thereof. The domination of four speakers is clearly displayed here: the state, religions, companies and the dominant social groups.

There are several markers of state power and of the historical and political memory. These range from toponyms recalling the national liberation struggle, to rusted triumphal arches celebrating the umpteenth anniversary of Independence; from national flags flying at the least visit of a head of State, to monuments glorifying the party or the president. Such monuments have notably been erected in the Mnazi Moja garden. These brands as a whole are

1 This play on words in the original French is based firstly on the judicial meaning of the term 'non-lieu', i.e. the dismissal of a case for lack of evidence, and secondly on the meaning of 'lieu', i.e. 'place'.

a showcase of power (Balandier, 1992) and claim the city as a strategic section of the territory controlled by this power, but not as a fully-fledged territory.

The markers pertaining to religion, which is referred to as the 'first' cultural globalization, are omnipresent within the landscape.² These include minarets, Hindu stupas, steeples, multi-coloured barnums, topped by flamboyant labarums. One loses count of the religious edifices under construction and which mark out the public space with references to another place which often begins to look either like a heavenly or infernal beyond, according to preference, and of new Jerusalems. More discreet, but no less present are the markers of superstitions and animism—trees that escaped the urban tide, for example the immense baobab planted in the middle of Bagamoyo road, ribbons or plastic bags containing something mysterious, attached to particular bushes facing the sea, small shrines hidden at the bottom of gardens, dead leaves suspended above the entrance of Indian houses, supposedly to ward off evil spirits, etc. 'Real life' seems to be absent from this city, so much so that in return, religiosity permeates the landscape and structures people's timetables. The profusion of these new Jerusalems, places of repentance and of an affirmation of a better identity, emphasize the depth of people's immediate frustrations and aspirations for a joyful alternative place which, for the moment, seems very far away. But beyond this relatively standard meaning, what is the significance—provided that it is univocal—of this religiosity? The multitude of churches, sects, chapels, brotherhoods and congregations, proves not only that Dar es Salaam (still) constitutes a space of religious cohabitation and religious freedom, but also that it is a land of missions and crusades. Here, tolerance and rivalry combine to encourage overlapping, conversion and challenges. (Peake, 1998). Populations use the city's coastal location to cultivate the Muslim and Swahili heritage, while urban primacy attracts neo-urban continentals who are more sensitive to the calls of the new crusaders, encouraging an abundance of sects and religious innovations.

In Dar es Salaam, Indian religions also appear to be livelier and flaunted to a greater extent than in the two other East African capitals. Should one interpret it as a sign of greater tolerance, the impact of a communal history which is less traumatic than Uganda's, and less open to innovation than in Kenya? Should one not rather re-examine this judgement by a sojourn in Nairobi which would show that segregation in the Kenyan capital still participates in the isolation of religious spaces?

Entrepreneurial and consumerist markers saturate the city centres, the main roads of the well-to-do suburbs and the city entrances. Billboards are mostly confined to Bagamoyo Road, Kilwa Road and in particular, Mbiti

2 'First' in the sense that Islam was imported in the 10th century, and that religious globalization precedes other forms of globalization. Nevertheless, this religious diffusion continues to endure. East Africa is one of the areas where North American preachers and Muslim converts confront one another.

Mohamed Road and Morogoro Road, which are the main roads giving structure to the city. One could hypothesise that they indicate the city's 'non-lieux', those generic places that are interchangeable from one metropolis to the next (Augé, p. 165). These main roads serve the centre and the privileged sectors of Msasani and Oyster Bay as a priority. Branding is media hype—although moderate on a global scale, this branding displays the fetishes of the global consumption's dominant ideology. Cars, cigarettes, alcohol, fizzy drinks and cellular telephones represent 80% of all advertised products, mostly sold by a smile (showing the rest of the body would still be too daring and thus counter productive) of a young, pretty and pleasant coloured girl. The commercial target is clearly the well-to-do middle class, main vector of the urban acculturation. Its spatial reference is the American city, with its gated communities and its endlessly cloned sprawls. These 'non-lieux' stage this meeting of convenience dictated by marketing strategy, and reveal the trivial globalisation methods in progress and the dynamics of a neo-dependence. This is where, in July 2003, the smiling faces of participants in the first African reality show, *Big Brother*, were put up. It was carried out on the initiative of a South African television station with participants from all-over the sub-continent; the star presenter was ... a white man.

However, one would be mistaken to merely see it as proof that urban markets are being penetrated solely by the formal sector. The informal sector also produces its own 'informal' advertising, an iconography which takes part in marking the urban surroundings. The aesthetic canons of the latter are those that reach the largest number of consumers and come closer to a type of local authenticity. This is an authenticity of convenience only, one of fleeting domestication and of exploitations which is often demagogic. Apart from the products, the main theme of these mural advertisements is the youth and beauty of their consumers; the advertisements depict men and women, all duly muscular and in admirable physical shape. Sometimes a few virtuous stars escape the materialism—Nyerere and Mandela, Bob Marley and Zidane, but also Bruce Lee, Schwarzenegger, Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and Sylvester Stallone.

In other respects, big companies are to a certain extent sensitive to the characteristics of the local market. Their advertisements are often contextualised. For example, the benefits of Coca Cola are advertised in Swahili. They are the expression of a meeting between a businessman, who is often a foreigner, and a local market. These localisms are exploited to reach consumers more easily. In a highly significant move, Coca Cola Tanzania ran an advertisement in 1996 with identifiable places in Dar es Salaam as its guiding line. Three geosymbols were selected by the advertisers—the harbour, the main daladala station on the seafront and the big Sokoni Kariakoo market. This advertisement operated on the basis of a classical mirror effect, forcing consumers into a cycle of self-evaluation.

Lastly, the dominant social groups clearly display themselves as the political elites, Whites and Indians. For this reason, the urban scene first reveals an entrenched architecture, the dominant culture is stilted, crystallized, or sometimes dead or reactivated. But 70% of the urban population have no means to build their own houses. Because the working-class strata of the population seem to invest fairly little in urban spaces, culturally speaking, the peripheral residential areas which cover three-quarters of the urban space are on the whole fairly poorly equipped as far as cultural markers as concerned. It may also be that this absence of markers is an intaglio print of popular culture. As the latter is constrained by the piercing anxiety of daily survival, it hardly indicates its horizons. However, this does not mean that these working-class spaces are neutral and that disadvantaged groups have no horizons. To start with, their frames of reference are widespread: party cells, neighbourhood chiefs, mosques, churches and schools mark out the space and invest it with a normative order and thus an ideal. Next, although the cultural markers take on a less material and less durable form which is not inscribed in the surroundings to the same extent, the culture of the dominated members of society is no less present. It is expressed by means of details which are more fleeting, less durable, but monumental.

III – POPULAR CULTURE'S FLUCTUATING MARKERS

Only the streets of regular districts are named. Apart from the names given to suburbs, the toponymic forefront is taken up by a few toponyms which evoke cities elsewhere: *Olympic grocery, London, New York, Los Angeles, California, Florida*, etc. as many geomarkers of Tanzania's geographical imagination and of mesmerizing polarities. Toponymical evocation is readily global. Amongst the bars and night clubs frequented by the middle class are the *New Florida, Half London, California Dreams*, the Bilicana and the Tivoli. Bars in Manzese have names like *Kingston, Paris and Bronx*. On the bus shelters at the Posta stop in Dar es Salaam's symbolic nerve centre, *London* cigarettes take up all the advertisement space. The publicly displayed referential space thus appears vast, but essentially Western. However, a wide range of Muslim toponyms are also evident: Jeddah, Medina, Karbala, etc. Conversely, the tourist areas or those frequented by expatriates display Swahili or Tanzanian toponyms. Thus, the junction between Bagamoyo Road and Old Bagamoyo Road one of the Meccas of expatriate sociability, is called Namanga, after the border post between Kenya and Tanzania on the Arusha road! Lastly, the public landscape places ethnicity as the dominant marker of a so-called Africanism into perspective. In the image of all the public spaces in the world, the African urban public space would therefore be not so much a space for expressing ethnic singularities as a space of cohabitation and transaction, where the majority of role players neutralize and censor their uniqueness and sense of identity to avoid conflicts. The public spaces seem depoliticized; this results in the geographical public space being set apart from the political public space, and communal areas

from public areas (Augustin and Sorbets, 2000). However, this conclusion would require an immediate relativization to the extent that identity is revealed in details which are much more subtle and which are not as visible in the landscape. Although these details are not as perceptible to outsiders, even foreign researchers, they are extremely meaningful to the city dwellers.

IV – ‘HUMAN COMEDY’ AND URBAN CHOREOGRAPHY

It would therefore be appropriate to analyze role players as well, by means of their practices, posture, dress, discourse, interactions, in street, sidewalk and beach scenes. This would obviously require a mastery of the language lacking to this researcher. Furthermore, it is obviously neither possible nor desirable to attempt to decode everything. However, resulting from an extremely meticulous observation, the following, brief description of three men sitting at a table at the terrace of a popular restaurant in the centre of Dar es Salaam, Lybia Street, allows for a few hypotheses to be put forward.

An elderly man of about sixty, with grey hair combed back in the Obote style, is picking at his plate, alone, while reading a newspaper in Swahili and smoking a cigarette. He is wearing large glasses made of dark tortoiseshell. Moccasins, socks, front-pleated corduroy trousers, a Kaunda suit jacket comprise the rest of his outfit. My impression is that of seeing a former activist, an Independence trade unionist, modelled by the Colony's schools, turning the weapons of instruction (understood, but judged as intrusive) against the Whites. He is busy reading, indifferent to the loud conversations of a group of businessmen.

The businessmen are aged about forty, and their affluence, if not their wealth, are equally ostentatious. Closely-cropped hair, synthetic flannel pants, cotton polo shirt in pastel colours tucked into the pants, slim leather belt with a gilded metal buckles. They are speaking loudly and are slightly arrogant; their display of material success thus appears all the more artificial, indeed temporary and fortuitous in the eyes of the customary reserve. There is a type of greed in their eyes, their way of occupying space is a bit too insistent, their behaviour as consumers is almost compulsive. Beers and fizzy drinks are downed on a regular basis, cigarettes are lighted often, waitresses are frequently approached, never-ending discussions about petty traders of consumer goods are started and abandoned regularly ... and, of course, their cell-phones make them equally unpleasant and interesting to watch. The scenario is parody of the businessman's universal outfit, worn by upstart businessmen who recently emerged from an economy of want. Gradually beginning to fatten up, small potbellies bear witness to their good health and their success. The bulging muscles, the curve of their backs, the restless legs, the volubility of the conversations betray a certain tension around this table. The tension experienced by businessmen who are up to something, of affluent singles in the middle of a big city's 'red-light district', of men striving for the ideal of the accomplished man ...? Are we not in the

presence of an incarnation of the ethos of manducation described in connection with Cameroon (Warnier J.-P., 1994)?

One of their victims, docile, resigned if not consenting, is a young boy who is offering American cigarettes—the packets are neatly aligned on an aluminium tray—which he carries while swaying his hips in a supple way; as a Muslim, he wears a pretty little embroidered bonnet on a freshly-shaven head, a carefully ironed, unbleached, short-sleeved linen shirt, over a pair of jeans ‘made in Asia’, and blue plastic sandals. The deference he displays is more than a commercial attitude or politeness dictated by humility. It is a mixture of nonchalance and seriousness, humble status and self-confidence.

Three styles, three types, three trajectories, three ethos, as well as three spaces ‘elsewhere’ amongst Dar es Salaam’s multitude of places; three instances in life’s trajectory. However, each of these men expresses an ideal type of accomplished man. This one has adopted a coherent costume and follows a homogenous style. Culture shapes bodies, gestures and textiles. Fashion is a cultural marker—this is an obvious, universal fact with no additional information on the places I am observing. Perhaps it will instruct about the superposition, the cohabitation of these three ethos, which is a fairly political, economic and religious ethos. But does that not imply taking a very local scene as a symbol, and characters as types? This is a universal problem put to a foreigner’s glance, a passing glance. How does one interpret the coming together of these three styles in the same place, a café terrace on Libya Street, at the same time, in the iridescent heat of a late Saturday afternoon? A meeting dictated by the functionality of the place, indeed, by the roles played by each of them, a cohabitation between three sets of values—or maybe three systems—coherent, constituted, chance, researcher’s reconstructions. Notions of tolerance and neutrality imposed themselves on the setting. Do they have any relevance or meaning for each one of the above-described characters at all? This is uncertain.

Urban choreography often places adolescents and young adults at centre-stage. On the one hand, they not only constitute the largest proportion of the population (more than 60% of the urban population is between 10 and 30 years old), but also the most active, the most mobile and the most restless. On the other hand, most married people contribute to downgrading their position by their surprised and often disapproving glances. These youngsters are often unsettling because of their incredible ability to mix references, confuse registers, arrange symbols and use styles in a de-contextualised way which is out of line with rest of society.

They disregard convention and do not have the same desire for apparent coherence which one finds amongst the elderly. They wear a T-shirt under their *kanzu*, the Levi jeans go well with the small Swahili lace cap; the long, sober loincloths worn with close-fitting T-shirts. English goes hand in hand with Swahili and vernacular words are welcome; slang (*sheng*)(again, it is my

understanding that sheng is a Kenyan phenomenon) is permanently recreated, according to fashion, groups and places. Portmanteau words are the perfect testimony to this vitality. Upon their return to the country, emigrants admit to needing time to adapt to the rapid evolution of the language. Music shows the same tendency towards flaunting mixtures. Swahili works just as well in a rap song as in reggae or taraab music (Fargion, 1998). One of the cassettes that are all the rage in the *daladala* is called '*Bongo side NY side*'; its *stacatti* alternate with the sonorous zouk of Frankie's '*Alice ça glisse*'. Only a foreigner would appreciate the allusions to the "*petites grosseilles*", out of place in this seemingly chaste universe. The mystery of tamed, tolerated ... or sustained globalization (Ssewakiryanga R., 1999), or the mystery of a civilization hiding its salaciousness from the passing foreigner? This make-shift approach mainly concerns the young men. The women seem to be more conformist. Gender differences remain very strong as well as socially operational.

Interpreting these postures poses a problem. Are these youngsters displaying an actual constituent culture? It bears witness to a rejection of constituted, coherent and suitable cultures and to a process of individualization and construction of the individual, in the process of breaking off 'traditional' ties: with the group, the family, the ethnic group. Are we witnessing the emergence of a constituent culture, elaborated by make-shift approaches, borrowings and recycling, in great haste and confusion? However, the corpus of horizons, from where the most common borrowings and references of this adolescent culture have been drawn, seems extremely limited and poor, largely controlled by the Asian and Western mass industry, from Bombay, Hong Kong, Sao Paolo or Hollywood. How could it not be, when taking into account the means available to most of these young people? How could it not be when the copied culture is the popular counterculture of the ghettos? Are we not overestimating the cultural innovation at work in this play? To what extent are these young role players aware of their role in the game? Does it refer to anything other than itself? What values are hidden behind their impertinence? Is the researcher, overcome by Eurocentric fervour, influenced by a culture which overrates self-conscience, is his postulate of "*I display, therefore am I, therefore I think*" not a little too hasty?

Indeed, these adolescents, awaiting hiring as day-labourers, or packers or loaders, who ape Van Damme, with an American baseball-cap jammed back to front on the head, a T-shirt bearing the image of Madonna, John-Paul II, Monica, Mandela, Saddam or even Milozevic, while conversing in slang (called *sheng* in Kenya), mixing three movements simultaneously—a military salute, a karate position and lascivious dance steps—cheerfully undermine grammar, morals and conventions. Are they aware of it, or is it not an elaboration by default? Indeed, having a conscience is not a necessity for a human being. Are they really in search of an identity or are they simply over-determined and crafty consumers and opportunists? Likewise, do these craftsmen who

reproduce wooden statuettes or pseudo tinga-tinga engravings destined for repetitive and never-endings stalls which, in the long run, are nauseous to the spectator, express a singular culture or the tyranny of a consumer model and a production orientated towards the exotically typical? These questions refer back to the old question of counter-culture.

If one relies on the sincerity of the role players—or on their artfulness—on the transparency and the consciousness of their game, public spaces become spaces of acculturation, caught between often decontextualized, local and global references, and the youth of mutants rather than people of mixed raced (Ndoye, 2004). These abilities to deflect from or deride urban dwellers, this spontaneity at work in discourse and behaviour makes it possible to just narrowly escape! Do they participate in an autonomous assertion of identity in and on public spaces? Is it more than simple opportunism of decomposition/recomposition of numerous deflected, make-shift and manipulated references? Does the social meaning of this game overtake that of the informal sector? When all is said and done, does this game not express the suffocating constraint of scarcity? Above all, is it not the expression of a-culturation rather than of acculturation? I perceive mutant postures which are corrosive as a result of diversion, ostentatious billposting, farcical and caricatured redundancy, manipulations of conventions and aggression, but in a setting which is marked by power and economic relations determined by domination. Is it anything other than a carnivalesque culture, a tolerated saturnalia? In that case, this culture would be nothing but a game of images, following the example of those aggressive and provocative decorations of Nairobi's *matatu*—veil the reality of exploitation and accumulation in which they are instrumental—with the use of gaudy colours and the provocative topicality of their incantations (*God with us*), their slogans (*Love unfaithfully and uncarefully*) and their heroes (*Lady Monica, Africa's Don Giovanni, Saddam, Bin Laden, Bush*). This results in an apparent subversion of an oppressive and sustained operation, if not accepted with fatalism. I view this aggressive mirth, these garish and joyous settings and the provocative gesticulations of these youths pessimistically as the modest veiling of an oppressing reality. To the extent that they unveil the existence of new dress and behavioural rituals, they also bear witness to identity anxiety. In this context, innovation would be secondary to domination and dependency, mutation softened by the continuity of oppressive mechanisms. Innovations and mutations would be exploited by those in a dominating position as instruments of domination or as consumer products, exploited like a drug. Is urban culture the new 'opium of the people'? Doesn't the growing consumption of *changaa*, diverse and various pills and *bhang* confirm this hypothesis?³ Does hero worship and the profusion of sects (more than 300 in Dar es Salaam) mark out public areas in the same way with their blazing and vengeful banners?

3. Changa: traditionally produced gin; bhang: Indian hemp.

Whatever the case, these postures, however aggressive, do not challenge the way the system functions. Thus, it is little more than sabre rattling. In fact, they indicate an integration on the fringe of the dominant system. Therefore, is it not possible to interpret public spaces as areas of re-creation rather than recreation? Words and postures would thus be “liberated” to improve the workings of body and mind. Culture—as a game between role players combining local and global references—would be one of the lubricants, a safety valve, a regulator making it possible to express an irresolute revolt, for the greater benefit of the dominant system? But then, between cultural ossification, bearer of all types of alienation, and the fleeting instability of compulsive role play, where does salvation lie? It appears to me that role play serves well-established interests, in the same way as postmodernism.

This pessimism is qualified by two observations. Firstly, didn't jazz and gospel fulfil the same function on the plantations? Secondly and more significantly, public spaces are placed under close surveillance by the authorities. In Dar es Salaam, like in other big African cities, through a fear of overstatement as much as the fear of things getting out of hand, the government keeps an eye on all kinds of fundamentalism and sects. They keep a close watch on all gatherings through informers and policemen. This surveillance in fact reveals not only the paranoia of uncertain authorities, but probably also the genuine capacity for criticism of public spaces. Indeed, this type of surveillance is anything but effective and full of gaps. But the fact that it actually takes occurs reveals the tension elicited by controlling public spaces.

The essential observation thus emphasizes the relative public neutralization of specific characteristics and individuality. The search for cultural markers particularly uncovers political power, social success and ostentation, a pre-colonial past or one related to a colonial heritage, spirituality and, lastly, dominated and dependent modernity. Would the analysis of a city's culture thus be nothing but the analysis of the large majority's elitist consumption and consumerist alienation? These remarks should be qualified by emphasizing the spatial limits of this observation which neglected the working class suburbs and places of emerging identity (temples, political cells, etc.) One should also qualify these remarks by recalling the extent to which contact with and combination of local allegiances and by-products of globalisation hijacked by individuals builds the urban culture which can be observed in East African public places.

Also noteworthy was the distinction between domesticated behaviour and behaviour in the process of being domesticated. Did this bear witness to *métissage* (a fusion of sorts) or to mutation and especially to the emergence of an identity, or on the contrary, to the strengthening domination. I believe these youth find themselves confronted by hyper-globalization. The latter is put together by crafty characters, caught in the trap of domination, alienation and dependence, which gives all the more reason for them not to be easily

taken in, although they get hooked onto the culture and hero games offered to them. Can one talk of identity confirmation and of culture in such a context? Is a *de facto* culture a culture? Is consciousness of self necessary for a culture? What room to manoeuvre is there between a constituted culture, which often favours indoctrination, and the faltering beginnings of a mutant culture often related to make-shift role play, at the mercy of all types of pseudo-heroic manipulation and a product of the weirdest reorientations?

More generally, this analysis poses the question of individuality and individualization processes underway in Africa. Are individuals nothing but puppets with little room to manoeuvre? In other words, are individuals not just actors in the theatrical sense of the word? These questions pertaining to content also pose questions of the very modalities of identity construction. Indeed, although identity is shaped from a corpus of borrowed references, all individuals are make-shift with veritable Frankenstein identities. Individuality thus rests on the originality of the combination of borrowed particles. According to this scenario, the city and particularly its public spaces would constitute a vast, post-modern supermarket where the components of a re-folklorized, local panoply of postures and décor would be displayed next to the classical kit of Third World modernity. This modernity has become a fully-fledged merchandise and displays the most common attributes of the middle-class man from the panoply of American outskirts. How does one escape this somewhat depressing vision? In fact, was this observation of cultural markers not destined to note the primacy of determination, seeing as it focuses its attention on public spaces and communal places, on places of allegiance and neutrality? Indeed, these are firstly places of movement and interaction, where otherness, differences and self-censorship must be smoothed out, and where the most tolerated, dominant and neutral commonplaces are flaunted ... apparently with a view to ensuring that conflicts are neutralized.

Dar es Salaam – Zanzibar: exchanging glances

Jérémie Robert

Zanzibar is separated from Dar es Salaam by only a few kilometres. And yet, when approaching the archipelago from the capital,¹ one enters a different cultural universe. This insular society constitutes a melting-pot which combines African, Arab and Indian influences, giving birth to the Swahili culture shared by the Muslim populations along the East African coast. Although Dar es Salaam is situated midway along the Swahili coast, it is not strictly speaking a Swahili town.² Various ethnic groups, cultures and religions rub shoulders in the capital. Even though these urban populations speak Kiswahili, they cannot all be considered Waswahili.

Dar es Salaam looks like many other African capitals. The sprawling, unattractive megalopolis with its three million residents is constantly feverishly teeming. During rush hour, the city is paralysed by traffic jams, while the market area of Kariakoo is a-buzz with activity. The town centre is in the process of being renovated: in the course of the past few years, towering glass buildings have sprung up where the old Indian or Arab shops were once located. In comparison, Zanzibar appears to be a sleepy town, almost a town that time forgot. The old town proudly exhibits its palaces bearing witness to a prestigious past. It is difficult to imagine that little more than a century ago, when Dar es Salaam was no more than a small town, Zanzibar played a key role in commerce and politics. Although the archipelago and Tanganyika were united as Tanzania in 1964, Zanzibar seems unable to bear the loss of its sovereign status. The main centre, Zanzibar Town, has largely been superseded by Dar es Salaam. Human, economic, religious and cultural exchanges between the two cities remain significant, although they have fluctuated over time.

This research, based on groundwork done in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam in January–February 2001, presents these relations and analyses perceptions (notably linguistic) of the capital's population about Zanzibaris, and vice-versa.

I - A COLONIAL HERITAGE WITH A DIFFERENCE

In order to understand relations between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, one must refer to the history of the Swahili coast. Exchanges between the Bantu

1 In 1974, Dodoma, the seat of Parliament, was chosen as the official capital. However, most of the various administrations are in Dar es Salaam. Even though President Mkapa recently indicated that he would like to see a concrete transfer of the capital, for the purpose of this article we will refer to Dar es Salaam as Tanzania's capital.

2 Regarding the notion of a Swahili town, see B. Calas, 'Ng'ambo: le double oublié de la ville de pierre', in C. Le Cour Grandmaison and A. Crozon, 1995, *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, Karthala-Ifra.

populations of East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula have a thousand-year old tradition. The Arabs were in control of the small city-states along the coast or on islands such as Kilwa, Lamu, Mombasa and Zanzibar, from where they organized a lucrative trade in slaves or ivory. The cities' riches aroused the greed of many European and Arab powers. Towards the end of the 18th century, the Omanis drove the Portuguese away for good. The Sultan found himself in charge of an immense territory consolidating Oman and a large coastal belt stretching from the Horn of Africa to the north of present-day Mozambique. In 1832, Sultan Seyyid Saïd, captivated by the beauty of Zanzibar Island as well as its commercial potential, decided to transfer his capital there. He introduced the cultivation of clove trees and increased slave trade. Zanzibar was linked to the East-African region by a non-egalitarian system based on the economy of the slave trade. Commercial routes were controlled by Arabs who ventured far into the interior of the African continent, all the way to the Great Lakes region. Before being transported to Zanzibar by boat, goods were passed either through Bagamoyo³ or through a small fishing village further south which the Omanis called Dar es Salaam or "haven of peace", and where the Sultan decided to construct a palace in 1861. While Zanzibar prospered and established itself as the greatest political and commercial power on the western side of the Indian Ocean, Dar es Salaam was still little more than a modest trading post.

Towards the end of the 19th century, at the time of the scramble for Africa, the Swahili populations were placed under the supervision of various European powers. The Sultanate of Zanzibar, which had gained its independence from Oman in 1865, was forced to accept the British protectorate in 1890.⁴ Tanganyika fell under German control. Fearing that the coastal cities of Pangani, Tanga and Bagamoyo would challenge their authority, the Germans chose Dar es Salaam as their new territory's capital. With the construction of port installations⁵ and railways linking it to the rest of the country, this small town of 5,000 inhabitants was about to experience quite a boom. After the First World War, Tanganyika, which had become a trust territory of the League of Nations, was given to the British,⁶ who decided to administer it separately from Zanzibar. The new colonizers were not too enamoured of a territory with limited economic opportunities. Zanzibar was perceived as an Arab State⁷ that could not, under any circumstances, be likened to the continent. The march of the two territories towards independence was accomplished separately. Julius Nyerere took over the reins of an independent Tanganyika in 1961, while Zanzibar became a constitutional monarchy led by a Sultan of Omani

3 Bagamoyo is the continental city closest to Zanzibar Town (about thirty kilometres away).

4 The Sultan remained in his position for the duration of the British protectorate.

5 In contrast to the other towns mentioned, Dar es Salaam had the advantage of having a natural, deep-water harbour at its disposal.

6 In 1946, Tanganyika became a trust territory of the United Nations.

7 See N.R. Bennett, 1978, *A history of the Arab State of Zanzibar*, London, Methuen.

origin two years later. On 12 January 1964, a month after independence, the archipelago was shaken by a revolution that resulted in the collapse of the Sultanate and brought the African leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), Abeid Amani Karume, to power. On 26 April 1964, Karume and Nyerere signed a treaty that united Zanzibar and Tanganyika and led to the United Republic of Tanzania. The Tanzanian political system was neither truly federal, nor truly unified. Zanzibar had its own government and was largely autonomous in managing its own affairs. The Dar es Salaam government was in charge of questions pertaining to the Union as well as to Tanganyika. The reasons that led to the creation of Tanzania are still subject to discussion.⁸ It cannot be denied that there were many ties binding the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the ASP and that Julius Nyerere, a convinced pan-Africanist, considered this union to be the fulfilment of an ideal. The Zanzibari and Tanganyikan leaders emphasized that the creation of Tanzania had to correct the “anomaly” of the split between Zanzibar and the continent during the colonial period. However, the interests of the two partners were more political in nature. Karume feared that the more extreme elements would take power within the revolutionary council, and was looking for support which Tanganyika and its army were able to give him. In addition, for this man who had been born on the continent, the Union implied Zanzibar’s symbolic detachment from the Arab world. On the other hand, Tanganyika was facing mutinies and trying to prevent the creation of a revolutionary hotbed at its doorstep. As far as the United States were concerned, their fear within the context of the cold war was to see a new Cuba coming to the fore in Zanzibar, inciting them to insist on the creation of Tanzania.⁹

II ZANZIBAR’S DECLINE

This union marked the beginning of Zanzibar’s long decline with regard to Dar es Salaam. Relegated to the status of an ordinary provincial town, Zanzibar town was to be unseated by the new capital. Despite considerable autonomy, Zanzibar, once the cultural and economic centre of attraction, would gradually be in a continental orbit. At first, this dependence was political in nature, as entire sections of Zanzibari politics were (and still continue to be) fleshed out in Dar es Salaam. It is here that the seat of the major administrations, the most symbolic areas of power—the Presidency, the Armed Forces Command, etc—as well as most of the diplomatic missions were located.¹⁰ The 1973 decision to choose Dodoma as the capital did little to change this state of affairs, as the transfer of administrations has remained largely theoretical.

8 See A. Crozon, 1992, *Zanzibar en Tanzanie: essai d’histoire politique*, doctoral thesis in political science, University of Pau.

9 See Amrit Wilson, *US Foreign Policy and Revolution: the creation of Tanzania*, London, Pluto Press, 1989.

10 While during the 19th century Zanzibar received many diplomatic missions, there are now only five consulates left in the archipelago (those of India, China, Egypt, Mozambique and the Sultanate of Oman).

Zanzibari institutions¹¹ have a limited scope and their actions are strictly supervised by the union government, which has the essential skills and competence (defence, foreign affairs, finance, etc) at its disposal. Although Zanzibaris have the advantage of being over-represented within Tanzanian institutions, they are nevertheless in the minority. The 1977 fusion of the ASP and the TANU into one party, the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM or party of the revolution) sanctioned continental domination. Before a multiparty system was instituted in 1992, the CCM was Tanzania's highest decision-making authority. Even today, the continental elite still considers it to be a powerful instrument for control of Zanzibari political life. In this regard, the selection of the CCM's candidate for Zanzibar's presidential elections in October 2000 was not without significance. Whereas a large majority of the CCM's Zanzibari committee had chosen Zanzibar's Prime Minister, Mohammed Bilal, the National Executive Commission (NEC), (the party's supreme body), voted massively for another candidate, Amani Karume, the son of Zanzibar's first President. His moderation and 'African' origins were reassuring to people on the continent. The CCM's Zanzibari members were obliged to give in, but not without a certain feeling of bitterness in view of this new continental diktat.

For Zanzibaris who feel that the continent benefited most from the union, their political dependency is a bitter pill to swallow. Most of the islanders consider themselves to be Zanzibari first and Tanzanian second. They emphasize the fact that as a former sovereign State, Zanzibar cannot be reduced to the simple status of a region of Tanzania. The issue of defending the distinctive Zanzibari identity against the Christian and continental elites based in Dar es Salaam has political meaning and is particularly capitalized on by the main Zanzibari opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF). The capital seems distant and hostile, crystallizing insular criticisms. As a whole, the Zanzibari population feels that the leaders in Dar es Salaam (an ideal scapegoat in times of economic crisis) deliberately disregard the archipelago. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, considered to be chiefly responsible for Zanzibar's loss of autonomy, was often bitterly criticised by Zanzibaris, who also gave him the less than respectful nickname *Chonga Meno* or 'broken tooth'.¹² Zanzibaris were much more tolerant towards their "compatriot", Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who succeeded Nyerere and ruled Tanzania from 1985 to 1995. His presence at the head of the country was a source of reassurance to them. Some obtained key positions within the government and the administration and benefited from numerous privileges and commercial advantages. At the time, the capital did not seem as distant as Zanzibaris had taken over the main centres of power, *viz.*, the presidency and the CCM's executive in 1990, after Nyerere's withdrawal. Significantly, in Zanzibar, president Mwinyi was called *Mzee*

11 Zanzibar has a President, a government, a parliament and its own judicial institutions.

12 Nyerere was called Mwalimu or 'teacher' with regard to his former profession. His other nickname was inspired by his broken teeth.

Rukhsa, meaning ‘the old man who allows everything’. This period of relative euphoria ended in 1995 with the election of Nyerere’s protégé, Benjamin Mkapa as president of Tanzania. This latter supported the strict application of plans for structural adjustment and respected the conditions set out by the international financial institutions. During this period of austerity not only for Zanzibar, but for the whole of Tanzania, old perceptions resurfaced concerning the Christian elite, who are not looked upon favourably in Zanzibar. In the archipelago, *ana pesa za Mkapa*, literally ‘in possession of Mkapa’s money’ became an expression meaning that someone is poor.

Zanzibar’s dependency with regard to the capital is also of an intellectual nature. The continent exercises control through the media. Note that the first newspapers in East Africa were published in Zanzibar in the 19th century and that there were about ten titles in circulation before the revolution. Today, there is only one newspaper in existence; *Nuru*, the Zanzibari government newspaper. The newspapers published in Dar es Salaam, which are delivered each morning barely, concern themselves with the archipelago’s current affairs. The same can be said about Tanzanian radio and television stations which, with the exception of the Zanzibari government organs—*TV Zanzibar* and *Radio Zanzibar*—broadcast from Dar es Salaam. Before the revolution, Zanzibar’s schools attracted students from all over East Africa; today, it is badly affected by an education deficit with regard to the continent. Higher education remains one of the union’s prerogatives and Tanzania’s future elites are trained in the country’s only university, University of Dar es Salaam.¹³ Despite the boom in tourism, Zanzibar has no institute for training skilled labour for this sector. Zanzibaris with sufficient financial means send their children to study in the capital (sometimes from as early as primary school), where a strong support system replaces the role of parents.

Health care standards in Zanzibar are mediocre. The few hospitals in existence suffer from a dearth of staff and equipment. Those islanders with the necessary means are obliged to go to Dar es Salaam for treatment in private clinics—for example those of the Aga Khan group—or in public hospitals, like the Muhimbili.

Zanzibar unquestionably suffers from its economic dependency on the continent. Far from being self-sufficient as far as food production is concerned, the archipelago imports an ever-increasing quantity of basic foodstuffs from continental Tanzania. These include wheat, maize, onions, tomatoes, rice, tea and coffee. Since 1980, the Zanzibari government has been purchasing its electricity from continental Tanzania. Electricity is transported through underground cables that link the archipelago to the continent like umbilical cords. Recent attempts by the Zanzibari government to build an electric power station running on fuel oil which would ensure self-sufficiency in energy was

13 Zanzibar has a private Muslim university established in 1998. It currently offers only a few courses aimed at training teachers.

aborted because the Dar es Salaam government would not grant permission, citing ecological considerations.

III SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The intense economic relations between Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam are not only to the capital's advantage. Zanzibari traders drew huge benefits from the economic liberalization that followed more than twenty years of *Ujamaa* or socialism, the African way. The Zanzibari government began a liberalisation of commerce in the mid-1980s. Businessmen of Arab or Indian origin who had remained in Zanzibar after the revolution were able to reactivate family networks in their countries of origin. These helped them to import the consumer goods, which, until then, had been impossible to find in Zanzibar,¹⁴ as well as certain basic foodstuffs. At a time when the continental population was facing shortages, Zanzibar appeared to be a land of plenty. Intense smuggling occurred between the islands and the continent. Goods transported to Dar es Salaam in small dhows were sold there illegally, more often than not to dignitaries within the regime. When economic liberalization was decided in Tanzania,¹⁵ Zanzibari dealers (some of whom had accumulated considerable fortunes)¹⁶ had a clear lead over their continental partners. Anxious to expand the confined Zanzibari market, they were free to extend their activities to the continent and to establish branches in Dar es Salaam. The proximity of the capital and powerful family intermediaries made it possible to establish themselves amongst the urban economy's leading role players. Dar es Salaam's Zanzibari community is indeed an influential one, despite being complex in nature. The inhabitants of Pemba Island live there in such large numbers that the term *Mpemba* has become synonymous with *Mzanzibari*. In an effort to escape the economic difficulties on their island as well as the increasing intransigence of the Zanzibari government's attitude towards them,¹⁷ the Wapemba 'emigrated' to Dar es Salaam in successive waves. Today they still run most of the small stalls that are often little more than a simple goods container. The spatial distribution of the Zanzibari diaspora living in the capital follows no particular logical pattern. Zanzibaris are present in all the neighbourhoods, although they have a special predilection for Kariakoo, where the big, central market is situated. Although they accumulate considerable profits, they invest little in their island of origin and prefer to build luxurious houses in the well-to-do neighbourhoods of Dar-es-Salaam — Msasaki, Oyster Bay and Namanga. In addition, it is the Pemba fishermen who control

14 Such as khanga or loincloths manufactured in India, as well as electric appliances transiting via Dubai. See F. Constantin and F. le Guennec Coppens, June 1988, 'Dubai Street, Zanzibar', *Politique Africaine* (30).

15 By the 1991 Zanzibar declaration.

16 See the example of Bwana Mkubwa, the 'empire-builder', in S. Valcke, 'Entrepreneurs: Business à Zanzibar' in C. Baroin, F. Constantin, 1999, *La Tanzanie contemporaine*, Karthala-Ikfa.

17 Pemba's residents, who had the reputation of being more favourably disposed towards the Sultanate than those of the main island, Unguja, did not actually participate in the 1964 revolution.

the capital's fishing sector. Travelling aboard their canoes, they settle on the Kigamboni beaches in provisional camps and stay there for several weeks before others take their place while they themselves return home.

Taking advantage of Zanzibar's position and its inherited commercial ties, some Zanzibari¹⁸ families were able to rebuild real commercial empires stretching all the way to the Great Lakes region. As a general rule, imported goods — ordinary consumer goods as well as luxury products — transit through Zanzibar before being transported to Dar es Salaam for distribution throughout Tanzania or even re-exportation to Malawi, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi or the Democratic Republic of Congo.¹⁹ The fiscal differential which existed between Zanzibar and continental Tanzania upto 1999 made it possible for the inhabitants to run a 'legal' smuggling business, as the Zanzibari traders cleared the goods destined for the continental market through customs in Zanzibar. At the time, Zanzibar lived up to its role as Tanzania's coastal port and aimed to become the Dubai or the Singapore of East Africa. When a market economy was instituted, it gave many Zanzibari businessmen the chance to enrich themselves. Paradoxically, it also contributed to securing Dar es Salaam's domination. Indeed, in the course of ten years, there was tremendous development in the Tanzanian capital, which established itself as Tanzania's commercial and economic centre. To begin with, the Tanzanian government set out to bring the largely outdated infrastructures up to scratch by building a new international airport and by renovating the docks. After this, they tried to control those imports destined for the continent and which, by transiting through Zanzibar, were causing the loss of considerable amounts of money. Declaring his desire to combat tax evasion, President Mkapa decided (not without resistance from the Zanzibari government) to make the existing tax system between Zanzibar and the continent²⁰ truly consistent and to reject the proposal of a duty-free harbour in the islands. Today, Zanzibar's ambition of establishing itself as an African dragon is in jeopardy while Dar es Salaam has become East Africa's second harbour, hot on the heels of Mombasa.

Through various legal means, Dar es Salaam authorities are trying to anticipate competition from Zanzibar. Thus, those few companies who do decide to set themselves up in Zanzibar have great difficulty in extending their activities to the continent. The case of Zantel, an Indo-Arabic-Zanzibari mobile telephone company is particularly enlightening. The Zanzibari

18 The case of A. Bakhresa is of particular significance. This Zanzibari of Hadrami origin embarked on an import-export business in the 1980s and within a few years became one of the richest men in Tanzania. Amongst other things, his company, Azam, owns a food processing division, a cement works and three speedboats commuting between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. In July 1991, the Kenyan review, *Executive* revealed that he "was doing more for the balance of payments than any government or aid programme".

19 Goods are transported to the Great Lakes region by truck or the railway linking Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika or Mwanza on Lake Victoria, and then by boat; in Zambia, delivery is done by train (Tazara) and in Malawi by road.

20 Fiscal politics fall under the union government. Note that VAT was only introduced in Zanzibar in January 1999.

government which holds 30% of the capital, wanted to use it as an example to attract other foreign investors. However, the union government denied the company the right to operate on the continent, while companies who choose to set themselves up in Dar es Salaam have no difficulty in gaining access to the Zanzibari market. This blow dealt to the island government is exploited to the hilt by the Zanzibari opposition in its crusade against the injustices suffered by Zanzibar. This judicial harassment causes foreign companies to set themselves up in Dar es Salaam rather than in Zanzibar. During the 1990s, when Dar es Salaam experienced a period of growth, Zanzibar entered a period of economic stagnation. The high increase in tourism in the archipelago barely compensates for the drop in clove prices and the suspension of international cooperation that was decided after the 1995 elections.

IV AN INCREASE IN HUMAN EXCHANGE

Economic liberalization also considerably increased the number of people moving between Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam. During the *Ujamaa* period these exchanges were limited by drastic legal measures²¹ and the insufficient means of transport operating between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. Until the beginning of the 1990s, it was very difficult to travel to the archipelago. Only one government boat, the *Mapinduzi*, made the trip between Zanzibar and the capital three times per week. Today, continentals can travel freely to Zanzibar and private transport companies, run mostly by Zanzibari families, connect Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam several times a day. The trip takes little more than an hour. These maritime connections have profoundly changed the nature of Dar es Salaam–Zanzibar relationships and have resulted in the archipelago becoming even more dependant. Hundreds of Zanzibaris travel to Dar es Salaam daily on business, to visit relatives, get medical attention, engage the services of a lawyer, etc. Zanzibaris living in Dar es Salaam frequently travel to Zanzibar, notably during the great Muslim festivals. Indeed, there are strong religious ties between the Muslim communities of Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. The Islamisation of the continent was conducted from the archipelago. Even today, thanks to its contacts with the Arab world, Zanzibar enjoys a certain prestige in the domain of religion. Muslims from Dar es Salaam travel to Zanzibar particularly to engage in private prayer alongside the tombs of famous sheikhs²² or to attend the teachings in the *Madrassa* or in renowned Islamic institutes.

The volume of commerce between Zanzibar and the continent is weak. Anxious to make some extra money during their spare time, Dar es Salaam residents travel to the archipelago to buy consumer goods, fabric or garments,

21 Continentals needed special authorization to go to Zanzibar, while Zanzibaris had to have a passport.

22 See François Constantin, "Présences musulmanes" in C. Baroin, F. Constantin, 1999, *La Tanzanie contemporaine*, Karthala-Ifra.

which they resell at a slightly higher price in the markets of Dar es Salaam.²³ Often considered a mini-utopia offering more job opportunities than the continent, Zanzibar attracts many continentals who decide to settle there. It is noteworthy that communities of continental origin living in Zanzibar first transit through Dar es Salaam. When faced with the capital's difficult living conditions, they decide to go to Zanzibar. Such is the case of the *Wamachinga*,²⁴ small-time travelling salesmen, the Maasaï, who hold jobs as caretakers, the Nyamwezi, who perform various odd jobs, or young people trained in the tourism institutes of Dar es Salaam. These latter travel to Zanzibar after having sought in vain to find a job in their region of origin or in the capital. These continentals constitute 70% of the labour force working in the archipelago's tourism sector. The continentals live in the new town and meet in places where people usually socialize, such as bars and associations. To emphasize the clear separation between the continentals and the islanders, Julius Nyerere coined the word *Wazanzibara*, a mixture of *Wazanzibari*, Zanzibaris and *Wabara*, continentals, to refer to people originating from continental Tanzania and living in Zanzibar. The presence of these *Wazanzibara* is a source of anger to a large proportion of the Zanzibari population who accuse them of taking away their jobs. The construction of Christian churches and schools, notably in the countryside, is raising islanders' fears of a form of invasion and of the archipelago's conversion to Christianity. During the 2000 general election campaign, strongly aggressive words were used against the continentals and some of their houses were set alight, notably in Pemba. However, despite its increase, continental immigration to Zanzibar remains marginal and to a large extent, something that is fantasized about.

Inversely, the influx of tourists to Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar is a new phenomenon and is relatively significant. Dar es Salaam takes advantage of its status as a stopover city that cannot be avoided when travelling to Zanzibar by boat. Although the city boasts no particular tourist attraction, it receives thousands of tourists who, after a safari would like to travel to Zanzibar and have to spend at least one night in Dar es Salaam.²⁵ In addition, the airline companies connecting Tanzania's two main tourist centres, Arusha and Zanzibar, are both based in the capital.²⁶

23 The widespread corruption of Salmin Amour's government led to high levels of tax evasion. Even after the tax system was made consistent, goods remained a bit cheaper in Zanzibar.

24 The term *Machinga* comes from the name of an ethnic group originating from Southeast Tanzania, known for their mobile trading.

25 Zanzibar's tourism commission estimates that 25% of tourists travelling to the archipelago transit via Dar es Salaam. The number of tourists visiting the archipelago amounts to more or less 100,000 a year.

26 It has to be noted that the only airline company based in Zanzibar, "Zanair", is experiencing great difficulties operating on the continent.

In the wake of the October 2000 elections, human traffic between Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam has suffered from the deterioration in the archipelago's political and security situation. In reaction to a drop of more than 50%²⁷ in the number of visitors, shipping companies only offer minimal service.

V ZANZIBARI FEELINGS OF SUPERIORITY

Most Zanzibaris, notably in the villages, have never travelled to Dar es Salaam, but entertain many acquired ideas about its residents. In the island's collective imagination, the capital's residents, like most continentals, suffer from a particularly negative image.

Zanzibaris have not forgotten that until the end of the 19th century, the Sultan exerted his authority on the continental populations. They thus retain strong feelings of superiority about this period in their history. Although one should guard against attributing these ideas to the entire population, popular perceptions that can be linguistically analysed are worth our interest. In Zanzibar, the term "*Mnynamwezi*" is frequently used as an insult and enables the speaker to refer to the continent's inhabitants as a group, beyond the Nyamwezi ethnic group. During the slavery era, the Nyamwezi were used as domestic workers in Zanzibar and they may still be regarded as such in the collective imagination. In Zanzibar, one also hears terms explicitly in reference to slavery. Continentals are still sometimes likened to slaves or *Watumwa*. Classified as infidels — *Kaffir* — they are perceived as backward, and sometimes as savages, *Washenzi*, who do not respect the Islamic way of life. Zanzibaris ridicule their appearance and skin colour. They are called *Wachongo*, "people with big heads." It must be noted, however, that these (often brutal) perceptions are present in various degrees amongst the Zanzibari population. Feelings of superiority are mostly manifest amongst Zanzibaris of Arab origin. Zanzibaris of continental origin do not escape such clichés either. Thus, Omar Ali Juma, Tanzania's vice-president, has been nicknamed *Kidonge cha Lami*, 'a small piece of tarmac', referring to his small size and his skin colour.

Although many Dar es Salaam's residents are of the Muslim faith, the capital is perceived as a Christian city, a place of debauchery where gambling is allowed and where alcohol flows like water. The men are readily described as alcoholics, *walevi*, while the pejorative term used for the women, *changu doa*,²⁸ refers both to continentals and to prostitutes. In popular terminology, Dar es Salaam is nicknamed *Bongo*,²⁹ or the brain. As capital, the city is the country's 'head', but it is also the place where its residents, the *Wabongo*, use their brainpower to carry out fraud. In the same vein, Zanzibaris use play

27 Tourism has dropped by approximately 80%.

28 This term is difficult to translate. Continental women are found everywhere, just like the changu, Zanzibar's most widespread fish. Because of their behaviour, they are like stains — *doa* — on the fabric of society, or like flaws.

29 This name is not only found in Zanzibar but also in other regions of Tanzania.

on words to describe the continent's inhabitants. The term *Watanganyika*, 'inhabitants of Tanganyika', leads to the derogatory *Wadanganyika*, 'tricksters'.

VI ZANZIBAR SEEN FROM THE CAPITAL

Most of Dar es Salaam's residents think of Zanzibar as no more than a part of Tanzania and of its President as some sort of governor with limited powers. Zanzibaris are seen as ordinary Tanzanian citizens, *wananchi*, or just another ethnic group amongst the more than hundred ethnic groups recorded in the country. Dar es Salaam's Zanzibaris are relatively well integrated in the capital's melting pot, even if they rarely marry (even the Muslim) continentals. National unity, elevated to a supreme value by Julius Nyerere, is considered a dogma in Tanzania and cannot be questioned. Vague attempts at an insular, separatist movement and efforts to move closer to the Arab world, such as the archipelago's membership of the Organization of Islamic Conferences³⁰ in 1994, are a source of irritation to the capital's populations who do not understand that, despite their 'privileges', Zanzibaris are still not satisfied. They are often considered as parasites who refuse to be fully integrated into the Union. While for a long time most Tanzanians seemed to favour a total fusion between the two parties of the Union, in the last few years, that forbidden word, 'Tanganyika', has resurfaced in political discourse and in people's conversations. Taking up one of the Zanzibari demands as their own, continentals are now calling for the creation of three governments.³¹ This measure would have the merit of creating a true federation, with the constitution of a Tanganyikan entity (with Dar es Salaam as its capital) alongside Zanzibar and the federal structure. Tanzanian authorities, fearing that a split in the *status quo* would result in a more profound reappraisal of the union, continue to turn a deaf ear to these demands. However, the death of Julius Nyerere in October 1999, the great defender of Tanzanian unity, as well as the general election campaigns in 2000, have rekindled the debate about Union structures.

As we have seen, Zanzibaris living in Dar es Salaam mostly originate from Pemba Island. And yet, in the era of the Sultanate, the latter was quite susceptible to Arab influence. There were more biological and cultural mixed breeds on Pemba than on Unguja Island.³² The way in which the residents of Dar es Salaam picture Zanzibaris today is mostly reflected by the behaviour of these *Wapemba*, who are often likened to Arabs. Significantly, those nicknames most commonly ascribed to Zanzibaris by the capital's

30 As regards their membership in the OIC, see Ariel Crozon, 1993, 'L'adhésion de Zanzibar à l'Organisation de la Conférence Islamique', *Politique Africaine* (52).

31 In 1998, a commission of enquiry specified that two-thirds of the Tanzanian population were in favour of a three government system. In the capital, this percentage reached 80%. Certain eminent members of the CCM openly declared themselves in favour of it.

32 The abundance of fertile land on Pemba enabled native populations to achieve landowner status and to get closer to the Arab way of life.

residents derive from Arab expressions. *Yakhe*, meaning “Oh, my brother”, frequently used by Zanzibaris, or *Mzenji*, which refers to *Zenj el bar*, “land of the Blacks”, the name originally given to the archipelago by the Arabs. The apparent unitary discourse in Tanzania conceals perceptions that were, to a large extent, inherited from the past. F. Constantin³³ reminds us that the memory of “*Mswahili, a Zanzibari and a slave-hunter, is still very much alive in the collective memory.*” The Arab origins of many Zanzibaris sometimes classify them as ‘foreigners’ whose allegiance to the Tanzanian nation is suspect. With the advent of the multiparty system, the opulence of Dar es Salaam’s Zanzibari traders prompted certain opposition leaders to include the islanders in the non-indigenous communities in their campaign for economic indigenisation. The term *Gabacholi*, referring to foreigners — ‘bosses (*Gaba*) with many servants (*Mcholi*)’ — which was invented by the Reverend Christofer Mtikila openly targeted not only the Indian community, but also Zanzibaris. Today the indigenisation campaign has become less pronounced, but the divisions remain topical.³⁴

VII - ZANZIBAR’S POLITICAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON DAR ES SALAAM

For a long time, Dar es Salaam paid little attention to the political crisis Zanzibar has been experiencing since 1995. In protest against the conditions in which the first general elections organized in Zanzibar were held when the multiparty system was instituted, the main Zanzibari opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), called for a boycott of the institutions. The continental population considered these problems to be part of internal Zanzibari politics. While the CUF boasted a large support base in Zanzibar and in particular on Pemba Island, its electorate on the continent³⁵ was limited to a few supporters in Muslim urban zones such as Tabora, Mwanza or certain neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam. In 1995, the CUF won 24 of the 50 deputy seats in Zanzibar but not a single one on the continent. However, Tanzanian authorities took this party seriously, as its influence was threatening to spread to the capital and across the continent. During the October 2000 general elections, the CUF once again denounced Zanzibar’s so-called “irregular” ballot and announced their refusal to recognize the new President, Amin Karume. While other opposition parties obtained mediocre scores, the CUF made headway on the continent, notably in Dar es Salaam where, in Kigamboni, they took the only seat outside Zanzibar and came close to victory in other districts. The CUF electorate is mostly Muslim and comes from all levels of society. Dar es Salaam’s large Zanzibari community, mostly

33 F. Constantin, ‘Condition swahili et identité politique’ in G. Prunier and J.P. Chrétien, 1988 *Les ethnies ont une histoire*.

34 Mtikila, the ‘saviour of the poor’ (Mkombozi wa walalahori), whose party was banned in 1993, has since disappeared from the political stage.

35 Tanzanian political parties have a constitutional obligation to be present in both parts of the union.

made up of people who fled the revolutionary regime, votes massively for the CUF. Their support base in the capital makes it possible for the CUF to relay the campaign orchestrated in Zanzibar for new elections to be organized. On 27 January 2001, demonstrations prohibited by the authorities were to be held simultaneously in Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam and in other Tanzanian towns. In the capital³⁶, violent clashes in which dozens of people were injured pitted the demonstrators — including many Zanzibaris — against the police. In Zanzibar, the demonstrations could have been mistaken for genuine streetfights, in which some thirty people³⁷ were killed. Tanzania, a remarkable example of stability and social calm in a troubled regional environment, was going through the worst crisis in its existence. Today, Zanzibar's political situation is a subject of concern, as it is a threat to law and order not only in Zanzibar but also in the capital. From interviews conducted and letters to the Editor in the main daily newspapers, it was clear that the capital's residents were divided in opinion on these events. For some, the right to demonstrate is guaranteed by the Constitution. The Tanzanian government exceeded its rights by prohibiting the demonstrations and by making excessive use of the police. For others, the CUF has become an extremist (even considered terrorist) party that should be banned.³⁸ Whether the responsibility for the violence lies with those in power or with the opposition, Tanzanians reacted to this crisis with horror and experienced a deep malaise. Subsequently, the CUF and the CCM leaders viciously questioned one another using meetings held in Dar es Salaam or in Zanzibar, rallying tens of thousands of sympathizers on either side. These meetings were a clear indication that the Zanzibari political stakes go well beyond the island's parameters and that the turbulent political debates between the CUF and the CCM, which have divided Zanzibar since the onset of a multiparty system, have now reached the capital.

36 More particularly in the neighbourhood where the CUF has its headquarters.

37 These clashes took place in Zanzibar Town and on Pemba Island. It is difficult to give an exact figure. The government reported 23 killed and the opposition about 60.

38 In the wake of the elections, about ten bombs exploded in Zanzibar, three hotels were set alight and the CCM official in Chake Chake (Pemba) was murdered without the government being able to prove the CUF's guilt.

Zanzibari Investments in Kariakoo

Mohamed Ahmed Saleh

On the initiative of the Sultan of Zanzibar, Seyyid Majid bin Said bin Sultan,¹ Dar es Salaam was built on Shomvi and Pazi² clan territory in Zaramo³ country at a time when Zanzibar was the focus of activities involving economic, political and cultural exchanges on an international level. At the time, Zanzibar was the region's most important warehouse, a commercial depot for manufactured products from industrialized countries and for raw materials from the islands or from the interior of the continent.⁴ The decision to build the town and the harbour of Dar es Salaam was taken when this commercial empire was at its zenith and in search of new horizons.⁵ The main objective in building Dar was (a) to provide Zanzibari businessmen with a port of call for their trade activities on the continent⁶ and (b) for the Sultan to distance himself not only from Zanzibar⁷'s diplomatic representations and its political debates, but also from the old Bagamoyo port. It is exactly for this reason that the name Dar es Salaam ("peaceful abode", in Arabic⁸) was chosen as a substitute for Mzizima, the initial place-name. In other words, it was a place of serenity where the Sultan could rest. The palace, fort and residence for members of the Sultan's escort were built between 1866 and 18679.

1 Sultan of Zanzibar from 1856 to 1870; Al-Maamiry (Hamoud, A.), *Omani Sultans in Zanzibar*. 1832 - 1964 (1988), p.14.

2 Hartnoll M. "A Story of the Origin of the Name of Bandar-Es-Salaam, which in the old days was called Mzizima", (1937).

3 The distinctive feature of the Kutu and the Luguru, who probably come from the same socio-cultural matrix as their immediate neighbours, is their coastal habitat dating back to the 18th century. They live mainly on agriculture, fishing and small commerce. They are made up of several clans, sub-divided into many sub-groups; they have a segmentary type of social organization. Their society seems to be in a transition phase from the matrilinear to the patrilinear system. Most Zaramos converted to Islam, but they remain attached to their own belief system, organized around the ancestor cult (*matambiko*). The caravan trade moving from the coast up to the Great Lakes region contributed to a tradition of bartering between the Zaramos and the Nyamwezi. See "Zaramo" in Tamsier J. CH., *Dictionnaires des Peuples*, (1998), p.356.

4 Sheriff A., *Slaves, Spices & Ivory in Zanzibar*, (1987); Babu, A. M., "Zanzibar and the Future", (1994), and Saleh M., "Introduction: les différents secteurs de l'économie", in Le Cour Grandmaison C. and Crozon A. eds., *Zanzibar aujourd'hui* (1998), p.151.

5 New caravan routes towards Kilwa in the south and Lamu in the north were envisaged. Emissaries were sent out to inform businessmen from these localities of the existence of the new Dar es Salaam harbour; Farant L., *Tippu Tip and the East African Slave Trade*, (1975), p.48/49; Gray (Sir John), "Dar es Salaam under the Sultans of Zanzibar", (1950), p.7.

6 Tippu Tip's caravan was the first to arrive in Dar es Salaam with goods from the interior, destined for Zanzibar; *ibid*.

7 Lynne R.N., *Zanzibar in Contemporary Times*, (1905), p.70; Farrant (Leda), *Tippu Tip and the East African Slave Trade*, (1975).

8 Gray Sir John, "Dar es Salaam under the Sultans of Zanzibar", (1950).

9 Lynne R.N., *Zanzibar in Contemporary Times*, (1905), p.70; Farant (Leda), *Tippu Tip and the East African Slave Trade*, (1975), p.48.

However, Dar es Salaam could also be a distortion of Bandar Es Salaam,¹⁰ i.e. “harbour of peace”, as Seyyid Majid supposedly conquered it without any resistance from the Zaramos, in other words without any blood being spilt.

Beyond these toponymical considerations, it may be that Seyyed Majid’s initiative was in fact just an attempt to replicate what his father, Seyyid Said bin Sultan had accomplished in 1832, when moving his kingdom’s capital from Mascate (Oman) to Zanzibar to be closer to the clove plantations and the caravan terminals, the source of his wealth. During Seyyid Majid bin Said bin Sultan’s reign, Dar es Salaam was on the verge of becoming the capital of Zanzibar’s commercial empire. It would have come to pass if the urban plan had not been abandoned by his successor, Seyyid Barghash¹¹ after Said’s death on 7 October 1870. Barghash preferred to keep his empire’s political centre in Zanzibar and to concentrate his efforts on the development of Stonetown.¹² Dar es Salaam therefore remained in its initial peripheral¹³ state. This situation came to an end with the establishment of German colonisation in 1891 and the choice of Dar es Salaam as Tanganyika’s capital.

But apart from these political twists and turns, the history of the Zanzibari presence in Dar es Salaam runs parallel to that of the town itself. On various levels, Zanzibaris participated in writing pages of the town’s history. They started out as metropolitan migrants who settled on the periphery.

Towards 1870, some Zanzibaris close to the Sultan’s entourage were living next to the harbour; others lived around the town centre, in the sector, which would become the so-called “Asian” neighbourhood. This state of affairs would continue up to the Second World War. The patrimony of the former Comoran settlement is the mosque (Masjid Ngazija, built by the Zanzibari community of Comoran¹⁴ origin in 1934) at the junction of Sewa and Indian Streets and the community cemeteries in Kisutu, not far from the Mnazi Mmoja garden. After the Second World War, the quickening pace of urbanisation gradually forced the Zanzibaris and other Tanzanians of modest birth to move to Kariakoo, which eventually became Dar es Salaam’s Zanzibari neighbourhood. However, in the course of the last four decades, Zanzibaris have settled in many Dar es Salaam quarters, notably Tandika, Sharifu Shamba (Ilala), Mwananyamala and Msasani.

10 Hartnoll M., “Story of the Origin of the Name Bandar-Es-Salaam, which in the old days was called Mzizima”, *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, No. 3 (1937).

11 The Sultan of Zanzibar from 1870 to 1888; Al-Maamiry (Ahmed Hamoud), *Omani Sultans in Zanzibar: 1832 - 1964*, (1988), p.18.

12 Ibid; also see The Aga Khan Trust for Culture, *Zanzibar: A Plan for the Historic Stone Town*, (1996), p.18.

13 Gray Sir John, “Dar es Salaam under the Sultans of Zanzibar”, (1950), p10.

14 Saleh M. A., “La communauté zanzibari d’origine comorienne. Premiers jalons d’une recherche en cours”, (1995).

1- KARIAKOO IN DAR ES SALAAM

Nonetheless, Kariakoo still displays the most visible signs of Zanzibari urban integration. Since the start of the 1980's, their economic investments have been really considerable. This quarter offers an established setting to assess the afore-mentioned economic investment within a demarcated space.

During the colonial period, the town of Dar es Salaam's spatial organisation was developed according to a triangular shape largely reflecting the division of the different populations into ethnic zones: the European quarter (*uzunguni*), the Asian quarter (*uhindini*) and the working-class or African quarter (*uswahilini*). The latter is represented by the Kariakoo quarter. The name 'Kariakoo' comes from the English term *Carrier corps*. Today that regiment (which was stationed here) has been forgotten¹⁵. The town's tri-partition has been partially preserved to the present day: the European quarter became the bureaucratic and commercial middle-class neighbourhood, while the Asian and African quarters remained more or less intact. In 1988, Kariakoo was home to 12,569 people (or 1% of the town's total population), divided amongst 2,499 households averaging 5 members¹⁶.

A public garden - Mnazi Mmoja garden - separates the Asian neighbourhood from Kariakoo, one of Dar es Salaam's most emblematic working-class neighbourhoods. It differs from the other working-class neighbourhoods in that it is close to the town centre and the harbour and houses Dar's central market. In addition, the country's best-known football clubs all have their headquarters there: Young African Sports Club, Pan African Sports Club, Simba Sports Club, Red Star Sports Club and Cosmopolitan Sports Club. The last three clubs (and particularly Cosmopolitan) have developed special Dar es Salaam-Zanzibar relations. Indeed, Zanzibari football players living in Dar es Salaam play in one or the other of these teams. The same applies to the Zanzibari football supporters; they support one of these teams when the match is not against a team from Zanzibar. For the past few decades, these Kariakoo clubs and their Zanzibari counterparts have been organizing annual visits during the Easter weekend, alternating between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar; for example, Dar es Salaam's Simba Sports Club and Zanzibar's Kikwajuni Sports Club, and Dar es Salaam's Cosmopolitan Sports Club and Zanzibar's Vikokotoni Sports Club. For a long time, the latter two clubs were managed by brothers, Mansour Magram (Cosmopolitan, Dar es Salaam) and Said Magram (Vikokotoni, Zanzibar). Abdall Khalifa Salim, who was nicknamed *Kinara* (i.e. leader / president) by the Cosmopolitan Sports Club supporters, is another Zanzibari who managed this Dar es Salaam club during the 70's.

Zanzibari influence on the development of *taarab* music on the continent also emanated from Kariakoo. Today, this type of music, which was introduced to Zanzibar at the beginning of the 19th century and which was initially

15 Hodges G., *The Carrier Corps: Military Labour in the East African Campaign, 1914-1918*, (1986).

16 Tanzania Sensa (1988).

reserved exclusively for the royal court, has become a popular form of music in the country. It was popularised on the continent by two orchestras from Kariakoo: the 'Egyptian Musical Club' and the 'Al-Watwan Musical Club'. Dar es Salaam's Zanzibari artists played and sang in either one or the other of these orchestras. Following the example of the football clubs, these orchestras from Kariakoo also had close ties with orchestras in Zanzibar, particularly with Ikhwaan Safaa. This orchestra, which was founded in 1905, was the forerunner of all the other *taarab* groups in East Africa. Lastly, it is also in Kariakoo that Dar es Salaam's most famous *chakacha*¹⁷ groups can be found, and it's from the same locality that modern *taarab* forms such as "*Rusha roho*"¹⁸ spread to the rest of the continent.

Another distinctive feature of Dar es Salaam's Zanzibari presence is the duplication of their *baraza*, particularly in Kariakoo. Initially, the *baraza* was the protruding part of a traditional house on which men could sit down to talk and get some fresh air. Unlike the sociable *ua* (backyard) used by women, the *baraza* is a meeting-place for men where they discuss daily life, football or even politics. It is one of Zanzibar's fundamental social institutions. Its development was significant during the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's when many Zanzibaris residing in Kariakoo were organizing their trip abroad. For the most part, the elders organized their *baraza* around the mosques; young people went elsewhere. The Manyema Mosque *baraza* is one of the most famous socialization venues for Kariakoo's elders. It brings together a number of Zanzibari intellectuals from Dar es Salaam and the circles of Sheik Aboud Maalim Mahmoud¹⁹, Sheik Ahmed Rashad²⁰ and Sheik Ashraf Himidi²¹. Another of the elders' *baraza* was situated on Tandamti Street, close to the market; every evening, a number of Zanzibaris met there in front of Sheik Kassim Issa's house. This *baraza* has ceased to exist since Sheik Kassim Issa returned to the island of his birth, Unguja. There were several *baraza* for young Zanzibaris in Kariakoo, including (amongst the most famous ones) the Jobless corner (Lumumba Street), Cool Brothers (Livingstone Street), Chez Papa Jo (Narung'ombe Street), Chez Adam & Ibrahim (Swahili Street), Cooley High (Mkunguni Street) and Chez Boss Othman (Mahiwa Street). These *baraza* were meeting-places where young Zanzibaris scattered across Dar es Salaam spent part of their day talking and enquiring about job opportunities. Indeed, it was around these *baraza* that different strategies were developed for finding

17 Taarab and chakacha music is a mixture of African, Arab and Indian melodies. It is known as (and locally referred to) as muziki wa mwambao, music from the coast.

18 Literally speaking, *Rusha Roho* means "to reach the soul of others". It means to sing mocking songs within a sentimental, social (or by extension, political) context.

19 A former Union government minister. He later occupied several posts within the former East African Community and within para-statal organizations such as the National Insurance Company (NIC).

20 A militant pan-Africanist, who, by means of Radio African Liberation based in Cairo during the 1950's and 1960's, played an important role in mobilising African opinion in favour of decolonisation and continental unity.

21 Until his retirement he was manager of the Cigarette Company when it was controlled by British American Tobacco (BAT) as well as after its nationalisation, when it became the Tanzania Tobacco Company.

jobs in Dar es Salaam and for obtaining official documents. Useful contacts for the future trip also made there.

Indeed, for a significant number of Zanzibaris, pioneers in the construction of this type of *métissage* centre where nationals from all the country's regions had been gathering for more than a century, Dar seemed to be a window on the world. Initially, Dar was considered a port of call for businessmen involved in trade activities on the continent; later, it became a point of passage abroad for Zanzibaris fleeing the terror of President Abeid Amani Karume's dictatorship.²² He ruled Zanzibar with an iron fist from 1964 to 1972 and prohibited Zanzibaris from travelling beyond the islands. This blockade prompted a significant number of fishermen to neglect their fishing activities²³ and to engage in transporting stowaways attempting to escape from the islands to the continent. During this period, Zanzibar experienced an unprecedented brain drain. Most members of the Zanzibari diaspora²⁴ organized their trip from Dar es Salaam. Those Zanzibaris who were unable to leave Tanzania did, however, succeed in escaping numerous *nguvukazi* operations, i.e. police searches in the capital to arrest the unemployed and send them back to their villages of origin or simply to the countryside to work the land. Sending unemployed Zanzibaris back to Zanzibar was quite a sensitive issue for the continent's police authorities. Such an action could easily have been regarded as a deportation. Zanzibaris were thus integrated into the city and made a career in various sectors. Others went into business, especially in Kariakoo. Kariakoo has always played an important part in the capital's commercial activities. It was true in the past, when Tanzania followed the principles of *Ujamaa*, Julius Nyerere's African socialism that imposed a State monopoly on all economic activities. And it is even truer of present-day Tanzania, following liberal economic tendencies depending on the market's "invisible hand". Since the policy of economic liberalisation was launched in the 1980's, Kariakoo's influence has increased consistently. Today, Kariakoo is in the process of radical social and economic transformation. Traditional²⁵, Swahili-type houses which made up the landscape until recently are gradually being replaced by modern, high-rise buildings. Former owners and residents are slowly being driven towards the capital's outlying neighbourhoods. Economic and property speculation is booming. The large numbers of Tanzanian businessmen of various extractions, who have invested in this neighbourhood, include an impressive number of nationals from the Zanzibar islands (Unguja and Pemba).

22 He was assassinated on 7 April 1972 by Captain Hamoud Mohamed, a young Zanzibari army officer, who was avenging his father's murder by President Karume a few years previously.

23 Saleh M. A., "Impact of Changing Conditions in the Fishing Industry", (1992).

24 Saleh M. A., "Zanzibari Diaspora: Identity and Nationalism", (1997).

25 Traditional houses consist of six main rooms, three on either side, separated in the middle by a passage, and a backyard which separates the main part of the house from the adjoining rooms such as the kitchen, toilet, etc.

II - ZANZIBARI INVESTMENTS IN KARIAKOO

After 1964 and until the beginning of the 1980's, the islanders' migration to the continent (and especially to the cities of Dar and Tanga) intensified. Indeed, the bulk of these departures was motivated by political and economic considerations. Not only did the island's new government nationalize all means of production and exchange, but it had also imposed its control on all aspects of society life. In an effort to escape the new rules imposed by the autocratic regime of Abeid Amani Karume and his successors, the Indo-Pakistani members of the trading class fled the island with capital that could be re-invested immediately in Dar's commercial sector. For the most part, they settled in the central part of town, especially in the so-called "Asian" quarter of Kisute. Some businessmen also set themselves up along the major roads of the Kariakoo quarter, notably along Uhuru Street (formerly Kichwele Street) and Msimbazi Street. On the other hand, most of the other Zanzibari migrants, especially those from Pemba, reached the continent in a state of complete destitution. For them, the motivation for leaving was to escape persecution or to improve their living conditions. Thanks to the solidarity networks created during the migration process and the ability to seize economic opportunities, a certain number of individuals slowly accumulated a modest capital, which enabled them to succeed economically. Following the example of one of Tanzania's most famous businessmen, Bakhresa,²⁶ who started with a small sandal-making workshop in Kariakoo, most Zanzibari businessmen in modern-day Kariakoo came to this quarter with nothing but the ability to work hard. Originally, they knew nothing about business, but they acquired it gradually, by empirical means. They entered the business world after a long apprenticeship process and a slow accumulation of capital. Some of them started out as factory workers or as tally-clerks in the harbour; others worked in Kariakoo's various stores and grocer's shops (*maduka*) which, at the time, were run by Mahara traders (Tanzanians of Yemeni extraction); others had small jobs as mechanics or itinerant of coffee, fruit juice, kebabs and many other light meals. It is also worth mentioning that Kariakoo was home to the *Seamen's Club*, i.e. the meeting place of sailors looking for work or carrying out boarding procedures. Because of this, the neighbourhood was the privileged place for dealing in stolen goods from the harbour²⁷ and in black market currency. This is how some Zanzibaris earned a living for a while, by acting as intermediaries in these lucrative, illegal activities.

It is within this context that the first embryonic group of Zanzibari businessmen was developed in Kariakoo. After the Kagera war (1978-1979), the serious shortage of vital consumer goods had the effect of strengthening this emerging group even more. In these difficult conditions, the principal

26 The owner of a fleet of ships that provides a daily connection between the islands and Dar es Salaam. He owns a number of stores and bakeries on the islands as well as on the continent.

27 Usually clothes and shoes.

means of accumulating capital or even of social advancement through business, resided essentially in smuggling, the black market and in corruption. Towards the end of the 1970's, Zanzibari businessmen developed an informal economy, which was well-established on the spice-islands as well as on the continent, by reactivating their trans-national networks within the Diaspora. In this way they made huge profits by reselling goods for everyday use (soap, toothpaste, material, clothes) as well as luxury products (household appliances, televisions, video-recorders and cosmetic products).²⁸

In 1984, the Zanzibari Government or "*Awamu ya Tatu*" (Third Phase), led by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and Prime Minister Seif Shariff Hamad,²⁹ was the first to take measures to encourage private initiative. President Mwinyi's famous statement, "*Zanzibar ni njema atakae aje*",³⁰ was aimed at encouraging private investors to participate in the islands' regeneration. A year later, the Union government followed suit, thus putting the country on the road to capitalism. The opening up of the economy was a source of hope to the islanders and revived the memory of the spice-islands' glorious past. For a long time, Zanzibaris had considered the continent to be a vast hinterland for stocking up on supplies and especially for marketing imports that had not been absorbed by Zanzibar's narrow market. Since the introduction of a policy of economic liberalisation, Dar es Salaam and by implication the continent were seen as potential markets for products from Zanzibar: local products, or imported products from the Persian Gulf and the Far East. In an effort to broaden their activities and ensure the economic development of the twin islands, Zanzibaris endeavoured to emphasize Zanzibar's situation as an intermediary between Africa and Asia.

Dictated by the IMF in the mid-80's, this change of course translated into the adoption of a structural adjustment programme which totally changed Tanzania's economic profile in general and that of Zanzibar in particular. At the beginning of the 80's, Zanzibar's private sector was organized on an

28 The country's widespread, unprecedented drop in living standards did not prevent Tanzanians from keeping their sense of humour. It was during this time that Tanzanians first nicknamed the then president Julius Nyerere Moussa (Moses), because he had promised (in vain) to save the country and to put an end to the crisis, and then *Haambiliki* (The Stubborn One), because he wouldn't listen to anyone's advice and was particularly deaf to any talk of reforms which would stabilize the country's economy. During the same period, Tanzanians renamed Tanzania (and especially its capital) "*Bongoland*", meaning a country where one is supposed to use his imagination to the utmost in order to survive. Zanzibaris living on the continent did not wait for an invitation to activate their brainpower!

29 The First Phase government was that of Abeid Amani Karume, who took power after the bloody events of 12 January 1964. He ruled with an iron fist for eight years until his assassination on 7 April 1972. The Second Phase government was that of Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi, who succeeded Karume in 1972. In 1984, after a 12-year rule, Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi was forced to resign by the "supreme" authorities of the only party in power and by the Union government, which was then headed by Julius Nyerere. He was replaced by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1984.

30 Taken from a popular song by the famous female singer from Zanzibar, Siti binti Saadi; it means "Zanzibar is a generous country, welcome".

informal basis and composed of micro-units concentrated in agricultural and tertiary activities; today, it is structured by multiple micro-enterprises and more or less one thousand registered companies. It represents Zanzibar's prime economic sector.³¹ Economic restructuring was made possible by the dynamism of the island's entrepreneurs. The latter constitute a mixed group of Zanzibaris of different extractions, made up of small, medium and prominent entrepreneurs working in various sectors.³²

Karakoo's Zanzibari entrepreneurs provide an important depot for marketing of goods from the islands. A substantial number of them purchased stores from previous owners forced by the crisis to file for bankruptcy. They rapidly became what is called *dukawallah* (shop-owners) in the local jargon. Of the 973 shops recorded in 1999, 398 (or 41%) belonged to Zanzibaris, of whom 79% were originally from Pemba, thus representing 30% of the total. The other shops were mostly run by nationals from Kilimanjaro, Chagga (Wachagga), Pare (Wapare) or Tanzanians of Indo-Pakistani origin. The variable capital housed within these (usually medium-size) shops was between 1.5 and 12 million Tanzanian Shillings (the equivalent of \$2,000 and \$19,000 respectively). The data provided an estimate of Zanzibari investments in this quarter, representing a capital of about 26 million Tanzanian Shillings or 4 million € in 1999. These numbers are much lower than those submitted by Sheikh Suleiman Adam Mdahoma, one of Kariakoo's prominent Zanzibari businessmen. According to him, Zanzibari investments in Kariakoo in 1999 represented a capital of between 40 and 60 million Tanzanian shillings, or between 6 and 9 million €.

Business tends to mobilize networks of family and friends. Indeed, most Zanzibari shops in Kariakoo and in other quarters of Dar es Salaam function according to this family model. They very rarely employ people from outside the network of family or friends. On the one hand, it's a means of protecting oneself against the misappropriation of funds; on the other, it's a way of providing jobs and social advancement to members of the extended family. These networks operate on trust and on the given word that occasionally (when recruiting or when a potential conflict situation arises) may be reinforced by recourse to religious arguments and the use of Coranic procedures. This system is also a means of reducing salary costs. Shopkeepers starting out in business can afford to pay a trivial salary without being challenged by their staff members. It's as if the two parties had come to a tacit agreement: solidarity comes into play, enabling everyone to make the necessary effort to ensure the company's success. It's an important trump card that guarantees competitiveness.

It's true that Kariakoo's Zanzibari shopkeepers rarely invest in interior decoration, maintenance and the renovation of their stores, but it's also because

31 Valcke S. (1999), p. 335.

32 *ibid.*

very few of them actually own the building. On the other hand, those who own traditional houses in Kariakoo, whether they live in them or not, make special efforts to maintain them. However, they devote a very small portion of their wealth to the purchase or reconstruction of buildings. Until now, very few Zanzibari owners have taken the initiative to demolish their traditional houses and to rebuild in a modern style, as the present general tendency manifestly seems to be in Kariakoo. For the Zanzibari shopkeepers, their residences in the archipelago take priority. Houses bought or built in Dar es Salaam constitute a secondary property investment with the distinct objective of providing a roof and eventually some rent; in other words, financial yield.

Like most African traders, Zanzibaris favour investments, which secure high, immediate returns. In that context, transporting goods and passengers remains a very profitable sector. As Dar es Salaam is quite vast, the transport sector provides an economic niche that has been quickly and massively taken over by Zanzibaris. They own an impressive number of (*special hire*) taxis operating in Dar and especially in Kariakoo. In 1999, the number of taxis owned by Zanzibaris represented 28% of all taxis in the Kariakoo sector, and particularly at the two biggest taxi ranks, Mnazi Mmoja and Msimbazi Street. However, most of their taxis are second-hand and it's clear that no effort is being made to invest in new vehicles. Zanzibaris have also invested hugely in the *daladala* or minibuses responsible for passenger transport between the different sectors of Dar es Salaam city.³³ These are direct investments or reinvestments of profits from other commercial sectors. Members of the Zanzibari Diaspora have invested hugely in this sector. Many Zanzibaris, notably those living in the United Arab Emirates and other regions of the Arab-Persian Gulf, have sent repaired minibuses to members of their extended family. This type of investment, which also provides a working tool,³⁴ is one of the ways in which members of the Diaspora can reduce the dependency of those who stayed behind.

Butcheries and restaurants are part of the framework of shops traditionally owned by Dar es Salaam's Zanzibaris. For a long time, even before the economic liberalization, certain Zanzibari families had become rather famous in these two sectors. For example, the Magram family was quite renowned in the butchery sector and the Bakhresa family was well-known in the restaurant business. These two activities constitute a third focus of Zanzibari investments in the capital. Until the mid-1980's, Zanzibaris owned only two

33 Named after the US dollar, *daladala* refers to the 5 Tanzanian Shilling note which was then the price of a one-way ticket on one of these minibuses. It corresponded to the dollar / Tanzanian Shilling exchange rate before the country's economic liberalization, which was accompanied by numerous devaluations of the national currency. Compared to the United States dollar, the parity of the Tanzanian Shilling has gone from 17.5 Tsh. for 1 US\$ (1985), to 32.7 Tsh. (1986), to 64.3 Tsh. (1987), to 99.3 Tsh. (1988), to 139.5 Tsh. (1989) and to 600 Tsh. (1993). The present exchange rate is around 800 Tsh. for 1 US\$.

34 Many Zanzibari families live on the money sent by members of the Zanzibari Diaspora. As a result, a "remittance economy" has developed in the course of the past two decades parallel to a charity mentality, notably within the urban population.

large butcheries and four big restaurants in Kariakoo. Since the economy has opened up, the number of butcheries and restaurants belonging to Zanzibaris has increased remarkably. In 1999, during the course of our field surveys, we established that Zanzibaris not only owned the five biggest butcheries in Kariakoo, but that ten or more of the most popular restaurants in the neighbourhood also belonged to them. These restaurants attracted clients from Kariakoo as well as the capital's other neighbourhoods, in particular because of the variety of Zanzibari / Swahili dishes on the menu.

In a small-scale extension of the catering sector, Zanzibaris have invested in *kiosks* or stalls selling light meals and refreshments. These are direct investments or reinvestments of the dividends from other economic sectors. As in the case of newspaper stands or stalls selling various products, these *kiosks*, which sell refreshments, can be found at all the city junctions and form an integral part of the Tanzanian capital's landscape. Their number has been increasing steadily, especially in the course of the past two decades, even more so as these *kiosks* require only minimal investment (which is soon paid off) in return for significant yield. There are, however, certain sectors from which Zanzibaris are totally absent, such as selling alcohol, for example. The latter is one of the Kariakoo quarter's most lucrative activities: the neighbourhood boasts a relatively high number of bars and alcohol outlets in comparison with the capital's other working-class neighbourhoods. For denominational reasons, Zanzibaris have never invested in this activity, which is largely in the hands of Christians from the Kilimanjaro region.³⁵

On the other hand, Zanzibaris always had a monopoly on the making and sale of *haluwa*, an expensive sweet that is much appreciated in Zanzibar and in the Swahili³⁶ and Arab world. It's a dainty delicacy, which is savoured during Muslim religious ceremonies, such as the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (*Maoulid*),³⁷ weddings and burials. Made and sold locally, the sweet is becoming increasingly popular during Dar es Salaam's various Muslim ceremonies, not only amongst Zanzibaris but also the coastal residents. This has resulted in the number of manufacturers and outlets increasing fourfold during the past fifteen years. If *Haluwa* may be said to encourage fellowship between Tanzanians from the two Indian Ocean shores during religious events, it is not only cultural, but also expressed in terms of economic and political exchanges.

This situation was a favourable factor when Zanzibar once again sought to play its role as East-Africa's warehouse. A move that makes economic sense and which stems from past elements that gave the islands a predominant position in the region, and which should now secure a comeback.

³⁵ It is mostly Chagga and Pare who have invested in this sector.

³⁶ The Swahili world stretches over 3,000 kilometres of the East-African coastal region, from Brava (Somalia) to Sofala (Mozambique), including the neighbouring islands, notably Lamu, Mombasa, Pemba and Unguja (Zanzibar), Mafia, Kilwa and the Comores.

³⁷ Maulidi: an elegy of the Prophet, who gives his name to the ceremony celebrating his birth; religious texts celebrating the life of the Prophet Muhammad.

III - ZANZIBAR: WAREHOUSE OR CORRIDOR?

Promoting Zanzibar's warehouse function is part of state strategy to diversify the economy and to reduce the islands' dependency on the clove³⁸ monoculture by supporting the tertiary sector.³⁹ This should enable the islands to draw the necessary revenue to make up the loss of earnings from cloves, but also and above all to launch into a far-reaching economic process in the region that would turn Zanzibar into the Hong Kong of the Swahili coast. For the first time since the revolutionary government came to power in Zanzibar in 1964, businessmen and island authorities' viewpoints and interests started moving into a state of convergence in 1984. Island authorities offered tax reductions, encouraging businessmen from the continent and bordering countries to get their supplies from the islands. The idea of Zanzibar as a warehouse has established itself amongst businessmen from the continent as well as amongst Zanzibaris. It has enabled big entrepreneurs as well as those starting out in business to get access to imported products a few kilometres from the continent and thus to save on the cost of long overseas trips. This convenience has made it possible for the *Machingas*, itinerant sellers from southern Tanzania, to develop their business skills by frequently travelling to Zanzibar to stock up on goods which bring in significant profits.⁴⁰ In so doing some of them have succeeded in accumulating the necessary capital to become *dukawallahs*, i.e. independant shop-owners⁴¹ in Kariakoo.

Before 1995, Zanzibari businessmen re-exported up to 80% of the products imported into Zanzibar⁴² towards the continent. Through their networks on the continent, goods were sold at unbeatable prices, because they were imported via the islands, where customs duties were lower than on the continent. Business was brisk for the entrepreneurs from the continent and from Zanzibar in Dar es Salaam and in the rest of Tanzania during the whole pre-Mkapa period. Commercial exchanges between the two parts of the united Republic of Tanzania peaked during the era of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi,⁴³ affectionately called Mzee Ruksa, "Mister Laissez-Faire". Tanzanians remember the ten-year period of his presidency with some nostalgia. For them it was a prosperous period during which a lot of money circulated in the country.

38 Until the beginning of the 1980's, Zanzibar's economy was characterised by its dependency on the clove monoculture. Until then, Zanzibar had been the world's biggest producer and exporter of this farm product, contributing as much as 80% to the island state's currency earnings. Since the beginning of the 1980's, the price of cloves has plummeted due to international competition. This aspect was developed in an article by the author of the present article, published in 1998: cf Saleh (Mohammed Ahmed), "La situation économique au lendemain de la révolution (1964)" in Le Cour Grandmaison (Colette) and Crozon (Ariel), *Zanzibar aujourd'hui*, (1998).

39 Amongst other things, developing tourism, island offshore banking services and a duty-free zone and port.

40 They start by working on behalf of a third party; they are paid according to the surplus they've made.

41 Dan Njowoka, "Street Smarts or Poorman's Burden", (1993), p. 28-29.

42 Valcke S. (1995).

43 Ali Hassan Mwinyi was president of Zanzibar for no more than a year and a half (from January 1984 until November 1985); he later became president of the united Republic of Tanzania from 1985 to 1995.

Fiscal pressure was even weaker than it is today; all the more so as there was a certain laxity in deducting taxes.

Since the advent of Benjamin Mkapa, called *Bwanakiboko* or “the bogeyman”, the supply of money in circulation has been greatly reduced and small businesses are being “stifled” by increased taxes and rigorous deductions. Admittedly, Tanzania has started to honour its creditors, which gives a positive impression of the country to the silent partners who see Mkapa as a good pupil; but these measures are carried out to the detriment of the social well-being of the majority of the Tanzanian population. These draconian measures do not result in improved public services. Power cuts and interruptions in the water supply, which penalize a significant number of shops in the capital, are the daily lot of Dar’s residents. To that may be added the increase in bureaucratic and customs hassles. Kariakoo’s Zanzibari entrepreneurs were unanimous in recognizing the spectacular deterioration in business since Benjamin Mkapa made his entry as head of the Tanzanian State. According to their estimation, the daily turnover before he came to power was between 2 and 3 million Tanzanian Shillings (the equivalent of 3,000 to 4,000 €), while in 1999 their daily turnover was only 500,000 Tanzanian Shillings (the equivalent of 800 €). This significant slump in business is further emphasized by the measures taken by the continent’s political authorities, aimed at curbing or even putting a stop to the development of the Zanzibar warehouse. To them, Zanzibar is nothing but a corridor that allows tax evasion. This vision reflects that of (continental) Tanzania’s Confederation of Industrialists, who have constantly pressurized the Union government for customs duties that are consistent with those of Zanzibar and for the imposition of container inspection companies according to the continental model. According to the 1997 estimations, the taxation difference between Zanzibar and the continent is supposed to have cost the latter almost 6 thousand million Tanzanian Shillings⁴⁴ (the equivalent of 9 million €). Still according to the same estimations, the continental government supposedly loses 60 thousand million Tanzanian shillings (the equivalent of 90 million €) per year due to false customs declarations when importing sugar and textiles via the Zanzibar corridor⁴⁵.

The different viewpoints between the island and continental authorities reached a critical level towards the end of Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s presidency, with the so-called “container war” of 1994. At the time, the prime minister of the Union held up all containers from Zanzibar in Dar harbour. It was a case of pressurizing Zanzibari authorities into increasing customs duties so as to make them consistent with those applied on the continent.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Maliyamkono, *Tanzania on the move*, (1997), p. 103.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁴⁶ For a long time, the Zanzibari government refused to comply; a compromise was only reached after several months of stormy debates.

This has indeed happened since the advent of the Mkapa government. Henceforth, all goods from Zanzibar have to pass through the continent's customs and their owners have to honour the difference in customs tax. These measures have dissuaded many entrepreneurs from using Zanzibar's harbour.

Previously, almost 75% of Zanzibari businessmen working on the continent cleared their goods through Zanzibar harbour. Their numbers have decreased to a large extent, to avoid "double handling". Those who continue to clear their goods through Zanzibar harbour do so for specific reasons. One example among many is the speed with which goods are cleared through customs in Zanzibar, due to the simplification of bureaucratic procedures: in Zanzibar, only half a day is needed to recover a container, whereas in Dar es Salaam it could take anything from two weeks to a month. Another reason for passing through Zanzibar harbour is the guarantee of security thanks to good relations with the customs clearance officers, according to Zanzibari businessmen. To avoid redirecting their goods to the continent by means of merchant ships, some businessmen have it transported to Dar by dhow, providing work for Zanzibar's dhows and thus avoiding paying premium on arrival when negotiating with customs officers.

The conflict of interest between the two parts of the Union is a good illustration of the growing opposition between the continental and island elite that could call Zanzibar's integration into the continent into question.⁴⁷ Through these problems, the question posed is that of the islands' political and economic independence. The latter is seen as a threat to continental hegemony, a threat that is not new, which has been in existence since the islands' unification with Tanganyika in 1964. Until now, the different stages in the Union's history have shown that continental, centralised pressure on the islands has always met with Zanzibari resistance, especially during Zanzibar's most prosperous period (from 1964 to 1979). In 1975, Zanzibar had no foreign debt and 25,833,000 £ at its disposal abroad.

Various attempts to reduce the island's autonomy within the Union were partially successful only when the island authorities' room for economic manoeuvring was limited. This was the case in 1995, for example, when the president of Zanzibar was stripped of his prerogative as vice-president of the United Republic of Tanzania, a prerogative explicitly established in the acts of the Union.⁴⁸ It happened again when the continent forced Zanzibaris to accept the current president, Amani Karume, who did not have the consent of the Zanzibari majority and who had obtained only 9% of the recorded votes during the ruling party's Zanzibari elections.⁴⁹ It must be pointed out that since the announcement of the contested 1995 election results, Zanzibar has

⁴⁷ Valcke S. (1995), p. 128.

⁴⁸ This measure was taken when a possible victory by the opposition's (Civic United Front – CUF) in the 1995 Zanzibari elections became evident. It was a case of avoiding the eventuality of a union vice-president coming out of the opposition's ranks.

⁴⁹ Mohamed Gharib Bilal, Zanzibar's former prime minister, obtained more than 60% and Abdulsalam Hassan obtained more than 20%.

been subjected to international economic sanctions. Since then and up to the present day, the regime depends largely on international aid passing through the continent for its survival.

CONCLUSION

Following the example of most cities, Dar is the product of exchanges, intermingling and cultural *métissages*. Zanzibaris and members of other Tanzanian communities participated in the process that forged the city's personality. However, despite the age-old relations between the residents of the Indian Ocean's two shores, most Zanzibaris have long considered Dar es Salaam to be a far-off and mysterious place. Population movements between the two parties were rather limited. Air and sea links were not as frequent as they are today. For a very long time, and until the beginning of the 1960's, the social, economic and political ties that made it possible to bring the two parties closer were maintained by a very small sector of the island's population. Dar's image in the 60's was promoted by the popular music of artists like Salim Abdallah and his Cuban Marimba orchestra. Ordinary Zanzibaris imagined Dar to be a city like something out of a novel, the city of double-decker buses on their way to the Ilala quarter and of trailer trucks leaving for Zambia.⁵⁰ Dar es Salaam only lost its mystery towards the middle of the 1960's, when many Zanzibaris fleeing Abeid Amani Marume's dictatorship or looking for a better life started settling in the city. Zanzibaris came to know, to adapt and then to adjust themselves to living conditions in Dar es Salaam, which was very difficult on a material level. It was a case of sharing the house, toilet and kitchen with several other families. Because most of the Kariakoo houses did not have running water, it had to be drawn from the neighbourhood tap or bought and stocked in a container in the bedroom.⁵¹ You also had to prepare yourself to confront the violent louts (*watemi*) roaming almost every city neighbourhood and especially Kariakoo. Life became a daily struggle. One can talk about Zanzibari integration into Dar, but this integration was not accompanied by a loss of identity. Zanzibaris remain conscious and proud of their identity, and do everything in their power to preserve it. If there is an identity change as far as the Zanzibaris are concerned, it may be said to come from the way they are viewed by others, i.e. the continentals. The latter first called Zanzibaris *Waalabu* (Arabs), then *Mashombe* (referring to Moses Tchombe from the Kongo's Katanga province, because of Zanzibaris' cosmopolitan nature) and finally *Mayakhe* (ordinary, straightforward people), a common image of the way continentals perceived Zanzibaris with regard to football. These collective and individual stereotypes contributed to the idea that Zanzibari players do not like tiring themselves out and that they find the art of dribbling more important than winning by striking goals. The following

50 These are the images projected by the famous 1960's love-song according to which "...it's better to die crushed by a double-decker bus going to Ilala or by a trailer truck going to Zambia than to die of love".

51 It must be noted that water has always been free in Zanzibar.

comments by continentals regarding Zanzibari football-players speak for themselves: “*Kutufunga watufunga magoli yahke lakini chenga twawala*”, i.e. “It’s true that they beat us on points, but we beat them on dribble”.

It is only recently that the Zanzibari identity in Kariakoo was enhanced by the Wapemba: Zanzibaris from Pemba Island, because of their significant numbers amongst the neighbourhood’s Zanzibari businessmen. In Dar es Salaam, as elsewhere on the continent, Zanzibari identity has thus evolved during the past few years and has come to be associated with democratic demands related to political pluralism and to the respect of Human Rights.

Some people consider the presence of Dar es Salaam’s many Zanzibari families to be a sign of increased integration between the islands and the continent. Their presence serves as a bridge between the two, while their economic, political and social successes cement the links between the two territories of the united Republic. However, although they guarantee the safeguard of the Union, they also balance the two parts of the Tanzanian Republic. It would be unrealistic to think that they would support centralizing arguments aimed at substituting the present two-government structure with a single government. If they want to remain linked to the continent, they would have to refuse its hegemony. For subjective as well as objective reasons, they would support requests (which most Zanzibaris find legitimately tenable) for greater island autonomy.

Confusing views: from a wealth of representations to a “polyphonic city”

Bernard Calas

“Cities are not only made up of that which takes place on its territory, but also the way in which migrants and tourists pass through it... Hence the importance of studying textual descriptions and visualizations of the city¹” (Garcia Canclini, 1997, p. 23). As we shall see, this analysis remains incomplete to the extent that it is based on a rather meagre corpus; more particularly, it does not lead to a definite conclusion, but opens up to methodological doubt. What is offered here, are different avenues of analysis. The large metropolis constitutes the common horizon of a certain number of local and non-native role players with intersecting points of view that hardly coincide, although they are directed towards the same space. In this sense, space is considered a pretext for different discourses, the perspective of which provides more information on geographical groups than on the urban space itself. The discourses analyzed here pertain to *tinga-tinga* paintings, the map at 1: 50 000, a Tanzanian novel entitled *Dar es Salaam by night*, and tourist guides.

I – THE MAP AT 1:50 000

The central role of maps in formatting Western representations and researchers’ geographical ideas of researchers means that escaping it is *a priori* an impossibility.

The vision expressed by topographical maps is a technocratic and vertical one and conveys the urban discourse of the State: one with hegemonic pretensions, inherited from colonization and Europe’s history of taking (cartographical) possession of the world. It is this sense that one must be especially distrustful. This discourse is only interested in buildings and in space, not in people. The key to the map absolutely reveals this point of view. Firstly, its main point of interest is the geometric and geodesic expanse. Furthermore, this expanse is characterized by its material aspects: “empty or occupied”, wooded areas, buildings. Lastly, the expanse is marked out with things and not with human beings; it is punctuated with buildings and facilities, infrastructures cut across it, and topographical features provide it with names. This hegemonic and utilitarian vision is the necessary scenery for the actors to play their roles. As it were, residents are invited to be moulded by a pre-existing, discursive and

¹ La ville n’est pas constituée uniquement par ce qui se déroule sur son territoire, mais également par la manière dont la traversent les migrants et les touristes ... D’où l’intérêt de travailler sur les textes qui décrivent et imaginent la ville.

material fabric. From this vertical point of view, horizontal ascendancy prevails over verticality. This urban reading is thus not an innocent one, all the more so since it sketches the authorities' normative discourse *vis-à-vis* working-class urbanization. Indeed, the key very clearly opposes regulated spaces and slums, classified as the greyish vagueness of an *other area*. Urban dualisation is very clear here, without any kind of fragmentation being revealed, however.

This representation is poles apart from that developed by the *tinga-tinga* painters.

II – TINGA-TINGA PAINTINGS²

Tanzania's *tinga-tinga* school of painting is one of the most famous in Africa. Although "its outlines owe a lot to the success of Eduardo Saidi Tingatinga, its motifs, reminiscent of a poetic comic strip and greatly inspired by paintings from the East of Congo, quickly became popular with Western clients" (Maupeux, 2003). The aim here is not to present this school, but to determine which urban representation emerges from the proposed canvasses.

The *tinga-tinga* city has few buildings. The residential function has been completely evacuated here. There is a limited number of represented buildings which only pertain to public services (school, police station, hospitals accommodated in permanent structures), stalls (*duka*), shops and small restaurants, bars, hotels, *kiosks* and guest houses. One of the places favoured by the *tinga-tinga* painters is the market: the Kariakoo market, of course, but also the fish market close to the ferry or the Mwenge market. The only buildings emerging from the human influx are most often official buildings (schools, police stations, hospitals, markets, etc.) Most of the buildings are covered by corrugated iron. There are very few representations of buildings with more than one storey; street level buildings dominate by far.

However, the animation in the city is very dense: strong density and an absence of organizing polarity constitute its second most important characteristics. The city is very densely populated, with activities and even intense agitation cutting across it; it is a place of great social interaction.

The aesthetic bias constructs a space, which is fragmented by the cohabitation of juxtaposed groups: thus, it is an off-centre, splintered and fragmented cohabitation that emanates from these works. A collection of meeting places rather than structured spaces: Dar es Salaam seems to operate like a cluster of different groups incorporated by common ownership.

2 I have analyzed five illustrations. A postcard and two extracts can be found in the 1999 Michel Lanfrey exhibition catalogue. The first is entitled "*City Council dismantling road stalls*" by Malikita Maurus Michael, p. 32. The second, painted by Sey Rahidi Hussein, is entitled "*In Tegeta*". The last two illustrations belong to private collections and were photographed in the course of fieldwork in Dar es Salaam. The reader, equipped with a magnifying glass, can add the cover of the extremely instructive publication by Baroin & Constantin (1999) to this meagre corpus.

This city, which brings together very different social types, is characterized by social diversity. The prostitute, the barfly, the female shopkeeper, the couple of young parents, well-behaved schoolchildren, thieves, policemen, the *Big Man*, preachers and their flock rub shoulders there. The urban economy seems to be dominated by negotiated transactions in the vicinity of shops (food, clothing, newspapers), services (catering, bar, the hotel business, private health institutions, transport) and public services (school, hospital, police, City Council, state-owned water). Circulation appears to be mostly pedestrian. Apart from commercial vehicles (trucks, excavators), public transport (taxis, buses) or company cars (that of the state-owned water company), the only car that stands out in this human influx is the *Big Man's* Mercedes Benz. The only activity that is productive in a material way is illustrated by means of the humorous *mise en abyme* of the *tinga-tinga* painting studio.

These paintings clearly denounce police and political violence and corruption; policemen demand a ransom from a truck-driver, pursue a thief in a threatening way, strike demonstrators trying to oppose the way the thief has been driven off. Indeed, painters are mindful to show that the city is gripped by issues of power: the power of the *Big Man*, of the civil servants of the Dar es Salaam City Commission who drive off the owners of illegal stalls; the power of the police protecting the DCC's excavator and taking their cut on the vehicles in transit; the power of the agents of the state-owned water company; the power of civil servants, etc.

In the centre of this fabric created by power relations, domination and exploitation, inhabitants have to show intelligence to survive. The banana salesman with the Bongo T-shirt proclaims the same thing ("bongo" means "brain" in Swahili); he carries on with his activities while the policemen each try harder than the other to rain blows on the tradesmen in their booths. Lastly, the city is filmed. Thus, it is a stage on which the dominant players of this world flaunt themselves. Indeed, the city is banded by advertisements, panels showing a mixture of global references (Coca-Cola, Fila, Pepsi) as well as the Swahili language. The paroxysm of this linguistic fusion can be found in a preservative advertisement: "*New Salama Condom: Chaguo la Kisasa*". Painters thus denounce the brutality and venality of urban relations and praise education as much as resourcefulness. Here, the city is truly a place of confrontation and friction. Its network is made up of civilities and conflicts as much as by its buildings. Can one not view it as the very essence of what some call urbanity?

For these painters, Dar es Salaam is first and foremost the people who live there. Which brings us back to one of the hypotheses of Africanist analyses, according to which the contemporary period seems to confront two representations centered on distinct power issues: a model centered on controlling people, and a territorial model centered on controlling space. The latter seems to have been imported from the West in the wake of the State and colonization, while the former seems to be endogenous.

III - DAR ES SALAAM BY NIGHT BY B. MTOBWA³

The novel's intrigue is a confrontation of desires, fantasies and the material, sexual and financial appetites of four characters: three provincials (Rukia the prostitute, Hasira the gang leader and Hasara the collarless stray dog, driven from the countryside or smaller cities by misery, violence and boredom) and a rich city dweller who has inherited a considerable fortune. His Mikocheni house – one of Dar es Salaam's well-to-do neighbourhoods – three cars and company symbolize urban and social success. But this success has no meaning because this privileged man has lost his roots: indeed, he doesn't know who his mother is. Because of this agonizing loss he knows no happiness, abandons his wife and children, compulsively drowns his anxiety in drink and in short-lived love affairs. He will meet the three Rastignacs who will seek to fleece in their quest for material success. At the end of the story, the characters will discover that they are brothers and sisters; their identities will be revealed by an old cook, reminding us of Scapino and Molière's Miser!

The tale and the twinkling city lights cannot hide the deployment of a whole anti-urban ideology, which implies novelistic economy and ideology. The city operates like a collection of dens of iniquity: a network of rubbish dumps, bars, hotels, brothels and nightclubs. Conversely, working the land in the countryside constitutes the crucible of the old prostitute's redemption; she is the hero's mother, who deserted the capital to restore her social and cultural image by cultivating her maize *shamba*. Dar es Salaam attracts depraved persons from Tanzania's hinterland. Only agricultural labour will make it possible to rediscover real values. This borders on strict, reactionary ideology, backed by ruralism. In this context, the city is presented as being as ugly as sin, or hell. The author of this instructive third-rate novel confronts two worlds: the life-saving and productive countryside, and the city fragmented into a multitude of spaces that are interlinked by itineraries of excess and debauchery. Anti-urban ideology imbues the vision of many Tanzanians educated by missionaries and bathed in *Ujamaa* ideology. It does not prevent people from having sufficiently precise knowledge of the city and its places of debauchery. This representation qualifies that of the *tinga-tinga* painters with a more pejorative view.

3 On literature's contribution to geographical studies, see Gervais Lambony, 1994. More specifically, the analysis developed by Escallier (2000) applies perfectly to the East African stages of the famous spy's adventures (*Mourir à Zanzibar* and *Enquête sur un génocide*, in particular). "The description of urban space, limited to a few catch-all clichés and the toponymy of the roads (and big hotels) gives credibility to all the descriptions", and so "the urban image has no other function than to anticipate or to give credibility, to approve the explicitly racist discourse".

IV – WESTERNERS AND THEIR TOURIST GUIDEBOOKS⁴*What urban representations are developed in these guides?*

It comes as no surprise that the vision of Dar es Salaam conjured up in tourist guides is over-determined by tourist ideology: it is utilitarian, sectional, pointillist and incomplete. These representations are neither systemic nor ecological, even though one of the major objectives of a trip to Kenya and Tanzania is naturalistic. On a guidebook scale, the spaces favoured by tourist representation are the safari parks and the coast. In this context, the big city seems like a necessary stopover point, although devoid of interest, a stopover one has to put up with, but which one has to leave as soon as possible. Most tourist guides do not allocate a lot of editorial space to Tanzania's most important city. The demeaning judgement which heads the pages consecrated to the city explains this lack of interest. A negative judgement ("*You won't spend your holidays*", "*traffic anarchy*") is dealt out from the first lines of the presentation. It also justifies the little time the authors spend on its description. Dar es Salaam does not interest tourists but constitutes a necessary crossing point. The *Guide du Routard* drives the point home: "It doesn't offer much as far as attractions go", its "...architecture is ... ordinary", its "...streets are congested..." and it lacks "...cheap hotels...". However, "...it is a necessary stop to take the boat to Zanzibar". Therefore the discourse is limited to a strict minimum: the five places worth visiting while "killing time" are listed and the usual logistic information provided in the form of a catalogue. Sometimes, a succinct presentation distinguishes itself from the others by relative attention to certain architectural details and by mentioning the Indian quarter of Kisutu (Hachette).

The urban presentation is composed of a certain number of almost systematic columns: history, topography, airport, useful addresses, urban transport, a map of the centre accompanied by a key that reveals tourist activities. Identical for all the cities of the world, these columns thus erase local singularity. The same columns, the same formulas, the same tricks of the trade, the same centres of interest creating a standardized matrix for presenting the world's great cities. This matrix would tend to turn the tourist's city into one of those "*non-lieux*" (Augé, 1997, p. 1.65) mentioned above. Is it surprising inasmuch as the Western tourist is precisely one of the essential vectors of civilizational globalization?

4 One cannot understand why, in the name of some authenticity or other, Westerners living in African cities should not be subjected to studies in the same way as Montreuil's African immigrants. These cities are also frequented by diplomats, experts, tourists, researchers, priests, descendants of colonists (the famous *Kenyan Cowboys* or Dar es Salaam's Greeks). Their representations and real-life experience contribute to urban structuring in the same way as that of the majority. This participation is especially notable, since the groups in question occupy a dominating, minority position, which diffuses behavioural models which are attractive to many Africans.

Urban spaces developed along these lines include hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, markets, etc., public spaces for public use. The utilitarian pointillism of this geography is clear. The partiality of the glance as well: the city thus represented is not that of the majority. A foreign city has been inserted into that of the residents. The guide's role is not to help discover a certain space, but to encourage the reproduction of practices and itineraries and thus contribute to isolating a tourist space, since he selects accessible, secure and clean facilities from amongst those described. This entails actually putting a seal of approval on the urban space that makes up the minority city, constituted by places where an incessant replacement of tourists by ephemeral and relatively standardized territorialities takes place⁵. However, this tourist city seems to be essential to the function of the city as a whole, in as much as the tourist sector constitutes one of contemporary Tanzania's most dynamic economic sectors, one of the vectors of the liberalized country's global integration, the spirit of growing geographic differentiation. It's not about an epiphenomenon but conversely about a phenomenon that is central to Tanzanian urbanity.

Without exception, geographies constructed by tourist guides all attract the reader's attention to monumental, coastal and ... colonial sights, thus shaping the contours of tourist sensitivities. In this sense, the development of colonial actions by the historical introduction of the Könemann guide is quite eloquent: "*Under German rule, Dar es Salaam was an attractive and orderly place*". The rigour of architectural order and colonial town planning constitutes a structural paradigm of tourist urban representation. Indeed, tourists are explicitly invited to look for European influence. Not a word on the rest of the city, nor on post-colonial history. The key to this backward-looking vision of the city may lie in the longing for that famous "impossible journey", impossible because it is a longing to go back in time (Augé, 1997). Although post-colonial urban history is included in the *Guide du Routard*, this tourist guide goes even further. Indeed, it lists the German buildings, which are still standing, only to conclude with surprised naivety: "Curiously, the city as a whole is not really Germanic in character, and even less British"!

The general exhibition principle is to suggest an urban stroll (the *Guide du Routard's* "urban trek" calls upon the tourist to take a flask ... but not his machete). The route followed by the Arthaud guide-book is more or less the same as that of the other guide-books, seeing as it leads from the *Askari Monument* to the *New Africa Hotel*, and from there to the Lutheran church. The stroll then continues along Sokoine and Samora Machel Avenues, stopping briefly at the Museum and the Botanical Gardens, before continuing along Ocean Road and then the Kivukoni Front. The noteworthy originality is

5 It is the same mechanism described above by Adrienne Polomack regarding Manzese's tenants. The geographical constructions produced by tenants and tourists have certain similarities.

that it is extended by a loop through working-class Dar es Salaam, i.e. the fish market, *Nyumba ya Saana*, the railway and harbour stations, the commercial and Indian neighbourhoods of Dar es Salaam and its architectural gems and lastly a more African Dar es Salaam: Kariakoo.

The Könemann guide's city visit proceeds by neighbourhood. The division and the selection thus carried out are significant as far as tourists' centres of interest and urban practices are concerned: the city centre, *Askari Monument*, Samora Machel Avenue, the museum, the *German Hospital*, *State House*, the sea. This walk continues towards the fish market ("a fascinating place"), along the Kivukoni Front road bordered with Indian almond trees, past the *Kilimanjaro Hotel*, followed by the *Dar Club*, the Anglican church and the old post-office (*Posta*), the Saint Joseph Catholic cathedral, the *Boma* and lastly the old station. It thus outlines an itinerary made up of a string of points within the central space.

This guide quite exceptionally mentions the Asian neighbourhoods and Kariakoo. However, perceptions and representations are not free of clichés, seeing as in Kariakoo "[Africans] are still under the influence of their ethnic group and have kept their good spirits, their sense of community and their love of music, dancing and making conversation". The importance of churches in the urban landscape underlines the monumentality that European tourism practice of the city requires. The tourist gets his bearings from the cultural Meccas.

One can see how this representation differs from that proposed by the artists of the *Tinga-Tinga* school of painting. The photographs which throw light on this invitation to go for a walk are eloquent in this regard: the city centre and its flame trees, the *Askari Monument*, the *German Hospital* on Ocean Road, the imposing Saint Joseph's cathedral, *Nyumba ya Sanaa* near the Sheraton, and lastly, Oyster Bay and the *Oyster Bay Hotel*. In the *Hachette* guide, the reader sees the city through a photograph of the harbour and rusty old boats. To a greater or a lesser degree, all these guides disguise the poor tourist attractions of Dar es Salaam by describing the same places in the city centre and the way in which Dar es Salaam is tropicalizing and expanding along the coast.

The maps presented in these guides are remarkably similar. In most cases, the mapped spaces are reduced to the hyper-centre, which is sometimes enlarged to the oldest peri-central neighbourhoods like Upanga, and in rare cases Kariakoo. That is where the three colonial centres of Dar es Salaam meet, in this space set up by the Germans as early as 1914. Symptomatically, one of the guides claims, that the "Sheraton [is] situated on the outskirts of the city", while in fact it constitutes one of the mainstays of urban centrality. 90% of urban space is thus totally ignored; tourist merely pass through it on their way to the beaches and the pier for departures to Zanzibar. Indeed, for tourists but also for Westerners, Dar es Salaam is first and foremost a coastal city. In most cases places of value are to be found along the coast.

Comparing these tourist representations with those of African artists or those implemented by topographical maps underlines the distance between different representations and practices by different role players. African cities form an areola, they are fragmented because they are convivial (which does not mean at all that they are free of violence) to live in and are lively places; cities as viewed by the State are systematically flat and material; tourist cities are punctual and monumental, axial and linear, and often coastal. Artistic and literary representations taken as clichés show clear cultural influences. These express perceived and anticipated spaces and shape the practices of how the city is visited, practices which bear cultural meaning.

V – THE RESEARCHERS' VIEWPOINT

Lastly, let's not forget the researchers. In an article which is noteworthy for its literary qualities and concision, J.-Cl. Penrad takes an epistemologist's view and states the different representations, which were successively produced with regard to the cities on the Swahili coast. He shows the extent to which these literary representations are informed by writers' preoccupations. But what is most interesting, in the end, is his view of researchers' output. "Far from presenting a demythologized vision of Swahili cities, the flow of descriptions and new data will only feed and develop imaginations describing the 'city of spices'. As if every element added to the knowledge corpus of these places immediately fits into a matrix of ideas which must not be broken for fear of losing part of its meaning. Today, researchers have inherited this tradition". He shows that although "exoticism has a lingering aroma, the magic of a sophisticated memory does not suffice, however, to permanently counter the reality" of a situation of great poverty and underdevelopment. "Thus, by history's faltering beginnings, religion is once again presented as a healing balm. The Swahili city is re-forging its identity around places of prayer ... But imagination, too, is still present, hidden away, lying in wait; in confrontations with Islam it finds fertile ground for its constructions. At present, [following the 1998 attacks in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi], the Swahili city is once again a territory exposed to all kinds of dangers, one where fundamentalism must be driven out of every little alleyway ... The diversity of religious practices and groups is only discussed from one angle, that which is outlined by political imagination, that of a confrontation with Islam".

These intersecting discourses already enable us to ask the question, whether they do not show the city to be a place and a pretext for a dialogue of the deaf? Urban choreography followed by urban cacophony. Does this accumulation of noise and convergent representations have any meaning? Maybe one should implement an analysis of the type that K. Lynch extracted from the profusion of discourses, elementary structures of geographical representation: landmarks, edges, paths, districts and nodes. Are we to be reduced to a structuralist approach?

The combination of material (physical, morphological), geopolitical, cultural, social and phenomenological approaches, sensitive to discourse, to their organization, their encounters and the ideology on which they are based, appear all the more necessary. Indeed, these texts “constitute a choir of different, divergent voices ... Thus, space is caught up in a polyphony belonging to the doubly articulated politics of representation: the enunciation of representations, images and plural versions of space, and the intervention of heterogeneous spokespersons whose discourses are endowed with more or less effectiveness, persuasion and performative power” (Mondada, 2000). When confronted with this polyphony, what attitude should the scientist adopt?

“Two solutions present themselves to scholarly description. The first consists of proposing a version of the facts that explicitly rejects all others ... by categorizing them as non-scientific, naïve, subjective, false, self-seeking ... This solution pertains to classic scientific discourse ... but is hard to reconcile with the crisis in representation. Taking the latter seriously may entail ... diverse alternatives such as renouncing all descriptions of the world, adopting a way of writing that is centered on the researcher himself ... or searching for an experimental type of writing which deflects the world’s objectivizing usages. The solution we would like to outline is, however, a different one. It consists of accepting a multiplicity of descriptive versions ... abandoning the idea of providing an ultimate version ... and in so doing shifting the object of the learned discourse: the latter no longer pertains to the city as an objectivized space, but to the procedures of discourse and interaction which constitute it ... and also the materiality which, through organization and the planning of actions, influence and transform it. Thus, the scholarly text presents itself as a *description of descriptions* ... This option pertains to an empirical organization which takes into account not only the points of view of the role players involved in the action ... but above all the way in which they support and organize this action. It is one of the possible answers to the question, how to continue writing geography ... while taking note of the crisis in representation and of the implacably plural character of social spaces ...” (Mondada, 2000, p. 174).

From this perspective, local singularities – as they appear by means of the described urban object, by means of the cultures of enunciation and as they constrain and accommodate the system of speakers all at once - seem to be fundamental.

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The name *Dar es Salaam* comes from the Arabic phrase meaning *house of peace*. A popular but erroneous translation is 'haven of peace' resulting from a mix-up of the Arabic words "*dar*" (house) and "*bandar*" (harbour). Named in 1867 by the Sultan of Zanzibar, the town has for a long time benefitted from a reputation of being a place of tranquility. The tropical drowsiness is a comfort to the socialist poverty and under-equipment that causes an unending anxiety to reign over the town. Today, for the Tanzanian, the town has become *Bongoland*, that is, a place where survival is a matter of cunning and intelligence (*bongo* means 'brain' in Kiswahili). Far from being an anecdote, this slide into toponymy records the mutations that affect the links that Tanzanians maintain with their principal city and the manner in which it represents them.

This book takes into account the changes by departing from the hypothesis that they reveal a process of territorialisation. What are the processes—envisaged as spatial investments—which, by producing exclusivity, demarcations and exclusions, fragment the urban space and its social fabric? Do the practices and discussions of the urban dwellers construct limited spaces, appropriated, identified and managed by communities (in other words, territories)? *Dar es Salaam* is often described as a diversified, relatively homogenous and integrating place. However, is it not more appropriate to describe it as fragmented?

As territorialisation can only occur through frequenting, management and localised investment, it is therefore through certain places—first shelter and residential area, then the school, *daladala* station, the fire hydrant and the quays—that the town is observed. This led to broach the question in the geographical sense of urban policy carried out since German colonisation to date. At the same time, the analysis of these developments allows for an evaluation of the role of the urban crisis and the responses it brings.

In sum, the aim of this approach is to measure the impact of the uniqueness of the place on the current changes. On one hand, this is linked to its long-term insertion in the Swahili civilisation, and on the other, to its colonisation by Germany and later Britain and finally, to the singularity of the post-colonial path. This latter is marked by an alternation of *Ujamaa* with Structural Adjustment Plans applied since 1987. How does this remarkable political culture take part in the emerging city today?

This book is a translation of *De Dar es Salaam à Bongoland: Mutations urbaines en Tanzanie*, published by Karthala, Paris in 2006.

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